SOCIAL PROBLEMS
A SOCIOLOGY

ELLWOOD

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BY

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD, PH.D., LL.D.

Professor of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, N. C.
Author of "The Psychology of Human Society," "The Social Problem," "The Reconstruction of Religion" "Man's Social Destiny in the Light of Science"

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PREFACE FOR TEACHERS

THIS book was originally written as an elementary text in sociology for use in high schools and colleges, and was published under the title, "Sociology and Modern Social Problems." It was written with the conviction that the best method of understanding sociological principles for elementary students is through the study of the concrete problems of contemporary social life; through the study of the familiar rather than the unfamiliar. Therefore, this book emphasizes the observation, description, and statistical study of contemporary society, although the anthropological, historical, and psychological approaches to these problems have also been utilized. The problems have been selected mainly from contemporary American society, not merely because these are of practical value in training for citizenship, but also because the United States affords, for American students at least, the greatest sociological laboratory that can possibly be found.

The book also emphasizes the fact that the study of society must begin with the study of "primary" or face-to-face groups. This is in line with the soundest trend of scientific sociology. It is generally recognized that the study of human society should begin with the study of these primary groups. This means that we must begin with either the family group or the neighborhood group. For reasons pointed out in the text, the family group seems to be the more natural and more suitable group with which

to begin the study of human society. The book aims, first of all, therefore, to illustrate the working of the chief factors in social organization and evolution, and so the elementary principles of sociology, by the study of the origin, development, structure, and functions of the family considered as a typical human institution. The family is the simplest and in many ways the most typical form of human association. One might almost say that the study of the family is to sociology what the study of the cell, or cytology, is to biology. While there are many things in human association which the student cannot perceive through the study of the family, yet it does reveal in a most unmistakable way the fundamental biological and psychological factors in human social life.

The teacher is therefore recommended to encourage students to study their individual families and their neighborhoods. The history of families through several generations is a form of sociological investigation, or of " case study," well suited to elementary students because such study will bring out clearly the biological, psychological, and cultural factors affecting human social life. Attention should be paid especially to the interests, ideals, and traditions of families. To the same end, monographs or surveys of communities and neighborhoods may be prepared. Thus the making of one or more family monographs, together with the making of one or more community or neighborhood surveys, may well be made the necessary laboratory or field work in an elementary course of sociology in connection with the study of this text. References for the making of such surveys and monographs will be found at the end of Chapter IV.

I would call special attention also to Messrs. Schettler and Simpson's *Workbook in Sociology*, published in 1931 by the American Book Company, which seems to me an admirable handbook adapted for use in connection with this text.

Parallel readings will be found at the end of each chapter suitable for use if it is desired to do wider reading on the problems treated in the text. The references placed under the heading, "For brief reading," are especially commended. For those who use the book in college classes and who desire an elementary presentation of sociological theory, parallel readings in the author's *Psychology of Human Society: An Introduction to Sociological Theory*, published by D. Appleton and Company, have also been added.

While the general plan of organization in *Sociology and Modern Social Problems* has not been changed, this book has been revised to incorporate the results of the Federal Census of 1930, so far as these have been published, and to bring all statistics down to date as far as possible. The lists of Select References at the end of each chapter have also been revised. Through these changes it is believed that the value of the book as an introduction to the scientific study of social problems has been considerably enhanced.

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 9

CHAPTER II

THE BEARING OF THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS 29

CHAPTER III

THE BEARING OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS .. 57

CHAPTER IV

PRIMARY GROUPS: THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY IN HUMAN SOCIETY 76

CHAPTER V

THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY 93

CHAPTER VI

THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY 110

CHAPTER VII

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY 131

CHAPTER VIII

THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY 145

CHAPTER IX

PAGE

THE GROWTH OF POPULATION 181

CHAPTER X

THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM 211

CHAPTER XI

THE NEGRO PROBLEM 244

CHAPTER XII

THE PROBLEM OF THE CITY 273

CHAPTER XIII

POVERTY AND PAUPERISM 297

CHAPTER XIV

CRIME 332

CHAPTER XV

SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY 369

CHAPTER XVI

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 386

CHAPTER XVII

THEORETICAL SUMMARY 403

INDEX 424

SOCIOLOGY AND MODERN SOCIAL PROBLEMS

CHAPTER I

THE STUDY OF SOCIETY

What is Society? — Perhaps the great question which sociology seeks to answer may be this question which we have put at the beginning. Just as biology seeks to answer the question "What is life?"; zoölogy, "What is an animal?"; botany, "What is a plant?"; so sociology seeks to answer the question "What is society?" But just as biology, zoölogy, and botany cannot answer their questions until those sciences have reached their complete development, so also sociology cannot fully answer the question "What is society?" until it reaches its final development. Nevertheless, some conception or definition of society is necessary for the beginner; for in the scientific discussion of any problem we must know first of all what we are talking about. Before we can study the social problems of to-day from a sociological point of view, then, we must understand in a general way what society is, what sociology is, and what the relations are between sociology and other sciences.

The word "society" is used popularly to designate a variety of more or less permanent human groups. A word used scientifically, however, must be given a definite mean-

ing corresponding to observed facts. Now we observe in the first place that collective or group life is not peculiar to man, but characterizes many animals and plants as well. Mere collective or group life, however, is not in itself social life. A clump of grasses, a forest of trees, a colony of bacteria, or a group of protozoa may show interdependence in the life activities of their separate units, but we do not usually call them "societies," because, so far as we know, their individuals do not have conscious relations. Such groups of lowly organisms do, however, show the first mark of social life in that they carry on certain life activities in common. But interdependence in life activities constitutes what we call "comradeship" or "society" only when it reaches the conscious or mental plane.

The second mark of social life, accordingly, is the existence of conscious relations among the members of a group. The group life is carried on by means of mental interactions; that is, the interdependence in life activities is more or less guided and controlled by conscious processes. Using the term in a concrete sense, then, we may say that *a society is any group of individuals who carry on a common life by means of conscious relations.* We say "conscious relations," because it is not necessary that these relations be specialized into imitative or sympathetic, economic or political relations to make society or social life. Society is constituted by the mental interaction of individuals and exists wherever two or more individuals have reciprocal conscious relations to each other. Dependence upon a common economic environment, or mere contiguity in space, on the other hand, is not sufficient to constitute society. It is mental interdependence, the contact and

overlapping of our inner selves, which makes possible that form of collective life which we call "society." Groups of plants do not constitute true societies unless it can be shown that they have some degree of mental life. On the other hand, there is no reason for withholding the term society from many animal groups. These animal societies, however, are very different in many respects from human society, and are of interest to us only as certain of their forms throw light upon human society.

Certain faulty conceptions of society are prevalent, against which the beginner must be warned. In the writings of European sociologists the word society is often used as nearly synonymous with the state or nation. Now the state or nation is a group of people politically organized into an independent government, and it is only one of many forms of human society. To identify society with the state leads to many errors, both in theory and in practice. Another conception of society would make it synonymous with the cultural group or civilization. A society, according to this conception, is any group of people that have a common civilization, or that are bearers of a certain type of culture. Christendom, for example, would constitute a society. But cultural groups again are only one form of human society. Nations and civilizations are very imposing forms of human society, and hence they have attracted the attention of social thinkers in the past to the neglect of the more humble forms.

Any form of association, or social group, if studied from the point of view of organization and development, whether it be a family, a neighborhood group, a city, a nation, a party, or a trade union, will serve to reveal many of the

problems of sociology. All forms of association are of interest to the sociologist, though not all are of equal importance. The natural, genetic social groups, which we may call "communities," serve best to exhibit sociological problems. Through the study of such simple and primary groups as the family and the neighborhood group, for example, the problems of sociology can be much better attacked than through the study of society at large or association in general. In this text we shall take the family as the simplest and in many ways the most typical form of human association, to illustrate concretely the laws and principles of social organization and development in general.

From what has been said it may be inferred that *society* as a scientific term is nearly synonymous with the abstract term *association*, and this is correct. Association, indeed, may be regarded as the more scientific term of the two; at any rate it indicates more exactly what the sociologist deals with. A word may be said also as to the meaning of the word *social*. The sense in which this word will generally be used in this text is that of a collective adjective, referring to all that pertains to or relates to society in any way. The word social is much broader than the words industrial, political, moral, religious, and embraces them all; that is, *social phenomena are all phenomena which involve the interaction of two or more individuals*.

Culture or Civilization. — Social life in its broadest sense, as we have seen, includes the group life of the animals below man. Social evolution begins with animal association. But the social life of man has developed many complex phases not shown by animal social life, such as industry, art, government, science, education, morality, and religion.

Collectively these are known as " culture " (which is the scientific term for civilization in the broadest sense); and *the development of culture is what distinguishes the social life of man from the social life of brutes.* On account of the importance of these various phases of culture in human social life many thinkers have made the mistake of attempting to explain social organization and evolution through these. It has been especially popular of late to attempt to interpret the social life of man through his industrial life. But industry, art, government, morality, religion, and all other phases of civilization are *products* of the social life of man. Beneath them lies the biological and psychological fact of association. This is equivalent to saying that industry, government, morality, religion, and the like, in order to be understood, must be viewed from the social standpoint and interpreted as products of man's social life rather than *vice versa.*

It should be added that the individual and society are correlatives. We have no knowledge of individuals apart from society or society apart from individuals. What we do know is that human life everywhere is a collective or associated life, the individual being on the one hand largely an expression of the social life surrounding him and on the other hand society being largely an expression of individual character. The reasons for all these assertions will appear as we develop our subject.

What is Sociology? — The science which deals with human association, its origin, development, forms, and functions, is sociology. Briefly, sociology is a science which deals with society as a whole and not with its separate aspects or phases. It attempts to formulate the laws or

principles which govern social organization and social evolution. This means that the main problems of sociology are those of the organization of society on the one hand and the evolution of society on the other. These words, *organization* and *evolution*, however, are used in a broader sense in sociology than they are generally used. By organization we mean any relation of the parts of society to each other. By evolution we mean, not necessarily change for the better, but orderly change of any sort. Sociology is, therefore, a science which deals with the laws or principles of social organization and of social change. Put in more exact terms, this makes sociology *the science of the origin, development, structure, and functioning of social groups.*

Certain faulty conceptions of sociology have greatly impeded its progress as a science. We must not conceive of sociology, for example, as an encyclopedic science of all social phenomena; for there are manifestly other sciences of social phenomena, such as economics and politics. Again, it is wrong to conceive of sociology as the science of human institutions; for there are other sciences dealing with human institutions and, besides, the non-institutional activities of our social life are scarcely less important sociologically than the institutional. Finally, it is extremely inadequate to conceive of sociology as a study of social evils and their remedies. The development of sociology is indispensable for the correction of social evils, for the elimination of social maladjustments; but it must study primarily the laws of normal social organization and evolution rather than the abnormal elements in our social life; for the abnormal is an incident, a faulty development, within the normal. By understanding the laws of social

normality, however, we may be able to correct the abnormal.

The distinction between the sciences, however, is one of problems. Thus by understanding what the problems of sociology are, we shall be able to understand its relations to other sciences.

The Problems of Sociology. — The problems of sociology fall into two great classes: first, problems of the organization of society; second, problems of the evolution of society. The problems of the organization of society are problems of the relations of individuals to one another and to institutions. They include not only problems of group structure, but also problems of group functioning. Such are, for example, problems of group unity, and so of national unity; or again, of the influence of various factors in physical nature or in the human mind upon social organization. These problems may be considered as problems of society in a hypothetically stationary condition, or at rest. For this reason Auguste Comte, the founder of modern sociology, called the division of sociology which deals with such problems *Social Statics*.

But the problems which are of the most interest and importance in sociology are those of social evolution. Under this head come all problems of social origins and of social change. Especially important practically among these are the problems of social progress and of social retrogression; that is, the causes of the advance of communities, nations, and civilizations to higher types of social life, and the causes of social decline. The former problem, social progress, is in a peculiar sense the central problem of sociology. The effort of theoretical sociology is to develop a

scientific theory of social progress. The study of social evolution, then, that is, of social changes of all sorts, as we have emphasized above, is the vital part of sociology; and it is manifest that only a general science of society like sociology is competent to deal with such a problem. Inasmuch as the problems of social evolution are problems of change, development, or movement in society, Comte proposed that this division of sociology be called *Social Dynamics*.

The Relations of Sociology to Other Sciences.[1] — (A) *Relations to Biology and Psychology*. In attempting to give a scientific view of social organization and social evolution, sociology has to depend upon the other natural sciences, particularly upon biology and psychology. It is manifest that sociology must depend upon biology, since biology is the general science of life, and human society is but part of the world of life in general. It is manifest also that sociology must depend upon psychology to explain the interactions between individuals, because these interactions are for the most part interactions between their minds. Thus on the one hand all social phenomena are vital phenomena and on the other hand nearly all social phenomena are on the mental plane. Every social problem has, in other words, its psychological and its biological sides, and sociology is distinguished from biology and psychology only as a matter of convenience. The scientific division of labor necessitates that certain scientific workers concern themselves with certain problems. Now, the problems with

[1] For a fuller discussion of the relations of sociology to other sciences, see my advanced texts, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects* and *The Psychology of Human Society* (published by D. Appleton & Co.).

which the biologist and the psychologist deal are not the problems of the organization and evolution of society. Hence, while the sociologist borrows his principles of interpretation from biology and psychology, he has his own distinctive problems, and it is this fact which makes sociology a distinct science.

Sociology is not so easily distinguished from the special social sciences, such as politics and economics, as it is from the other general sciences. These sciences occupy the same field as sociology, that is, they have to do with social phenomena. But in general, as has already been pointed out, they are concerned chiefly with certain very special aspects or phases of the social life and not with its most general problems. If sociology, then, is dependent upon the other general sciences, particularly upon biology and psychology, it is obvious that its relation to the special sciences is the reverse; namely, these sciences are dependent upon sociology. This is only saying practically the same thing as was said above when we pointed out that industry, government, and religion are but expressions of human social life. In other words, sociology deals with the more general biological and psychological aspects of human association, while the special sciences of economics, politics, and the like, generally deal with certain products or highly specialized phases of society.

(B) *Relations to History.*[1] A word may be said about the relation of sociology to another science which also deals with human society in a general way, and that is history.

[1] For a discussion of the practical relations between the teaching of history and of sociology, see my paper on "How History can be taught from a Sociological Point of View," in *Education*, January, 1910.

History is a concrete, descriptive science of society which attempts to construct a picture of the social past. Sociology, however, is an abstract, theoretical science of society concerned with the laws and principles which govern social organization and social change. In one sense, sociology is narrower than history inasmuch as it is an abstract science, and in another sense it is wider than history because it concerns itself not only with the social past but also with the social present. The facts of contemporary social life are indeed even more important to the sociologist than the facts of history, although it is impossible to construct a theory of social evolution without taking into full account all the facts available in human history, and for this reason we must consider history one of the very important methods of sociology. Upon its evolutionary or dynamic side sociology may be considered a sort of philosophy of history; at least it attempts to give a scientific theory which will explain the social changes which history describes concretely.

(C) *Relations to Economics.* Economics is that special social science which deals with the wealth-getting and wealth-using activities of man. In other words, it is concerned with the commercial and industrial activities of men. As has already been implied, economics must be considered one of the most important of the special social sciences, if not the most important. Yet it is evident that the wealth-getting and wealth-using activities of man are strictly an outgrowth of his social life, and that economics as a science of human industry must rest upon sociology. Sometimes in the past the mistake has been made of supposing that economics dealt with the most fundamental

social phenomena, and even at times economists have spoken of their science as alone sufficient to explain all social phenomena. It cannot be admitted, however, that we can explain social organization in general or social progress in terms of economic development. A theory of progress, for example, in which the sole causes of human progress were found in economic conditions would neglect political, religious, educational, and many other conditions. Only a very one-sided theory of society can be built upon such a basis. Economics should keep to its own sphere of explaining the commercial and industrial activities of man and not attempt to become a general science dealing with social evolution. This is now recognized by practically all economists of standing, and the only question which remains is whether economics is independent of sociology or whether it rests upon sociology.

The view of the most advanced economic thinkers of the present day is that economics should rest upon sociology. That economics does rest upon sociology is shown by many considerations. The chief problem of theoretical economics is the problem of economic value. But economic value is but one sort of value which is recognized in society, moral and æsthetic values being other examples of the valuing process, and socially prevalent values express the collective judgment of some human group. The problem of economic value, in other words, reduces itself to a problem in social psychology, and when this is said it is equivalent to making economics dependent upon sociology, for social psychology is simply the psychological aspect of sociology. Again, industrial organization and industrial evolution are but parts or phases of social

evolution in general, and it is safe to say that industry, both in its organization and in its evolution, cannot be understood apart from the general conditions, psychological and biological, which surround society. Again, many non-economic forces continually obtrude themselves upon the student of industrial conditions, such as custom, invention, imitation, standards, ideals, and the like. These are general social forces which play throughout all phases of human social life and so show the dependence of industry upon society in general, and, therefore, the dependence of economics upon sociology. Much more might be said in the way of concretely illustrating these statements, but the purpose of this text precludes anything but the briefest and most elementary statement of these theoretical facts.

(D) *Relations to Politics.* We have already said that the state is one of the chief forms of human association. The science which treats of the state or of government is known as political science or politics. It is one of the oldest of the social sciences, having been more or less systematized by Aristotle. The problems of politics are those of the origin, nature, function, and development of government. It is manifest that politics, on both its practical and its theoretical side, has many close relations to sociology. While the state or nation must not be confused with society in general, yet because the state is the most imposing, if not the most important, form of human association, the relations of politics and sociology must be very intimate. On the one hand, political scientists can scarcely understand the origin, nature, and proper functions of government without understanding more or less about the social

life generally; and, on the other hand, the sociologist finds that one of the most important facts of human society is that of social control, or of authority. While political science deals only with the organized authority manifested in the state, which we call government, yet inasmuch as this is the most important form of social control, and inasmuch as political organization is one of the chief manifestations of social organization, the sociologist can scarcely deal adequately with the great problems of social organization and evolution without constant reference to political science.

An important branch of political science is jurisprudence, or the science of law. This, again, is closely related with sociology, on both its theoretical and its practical side. Law is, perhaps, the most important means of social control made use of by society, and the sociologist needs to understand something of the principles of law in order to understand the nature of the existing social order. On the other hand, the jurist needs to know the principles of social organization and evolution in general before he can understand the nature and purpose of law.

(E) *Relations to Ethics.*[1] Ethics is the science which deals with the right or wrong of human conduct. Its problems are the nature of morality and of moral obligation, the validity of moral ideals, the norms by which conduct is to be judged, and the like. While ethics was once considered to be a science of individual conduct it is now generally

[1] For a full statement of my views regarding the relations of sociology and ethics, see my article on "The Sociological Basis of Ethics," in the *International Journal of Ethics*, April, 1910.

conceived as being essentially a social science. The moral and the social are indeed not clearly separable, but we may consider the moral to be the ideal aspect of the social.

This view of morality, which, for the most part, is indorsed by modern thought, makes ethics dependent upon sociology for its criteria of rightness or wrongness. Indeed, we cannot argue any moral question nowadays unless we argue it in social terms. If we discuss the rightness or wrongness of the drink habit, we try to show its social consequences. So, too, if we discuss the rightness or wrongness of such an institution as polygamy, we find ourselves forced to do so mainly in social terms. This is not denying, of course, that there are religious and metaphysical aspects to morality, — these are not necessarily in conflict with the social aspects, — but it is saying that modern ethical theory is coming more and more to base itself upon the study of the remote social consequences of conduct, and that we cannot judge what is right or wrong in our complex society unless we know something of the social consequences.

Ethics must be regarded, therefore, as a normative science to which sociology and the other social sciences lead up. It is, indeed, very difficult to separate ethics from sociology. It is the business of sociology to furnish norms and standards to ethics, and it is the business of ethics as a science to take the norms and standards furnished by the social sciences, to develop them, and to criticize them. This text, therefore, will not attempt to exclude ethical implications and judgments from sociological discussions, because that would be futile and childish.

(F) *Relations to Education.* Among the applied sciences, sociology is especially closely related to education, for education is not simply the art of developing the powers and capacities of the individual; it is rather the fitting of individuals for efficient membership, for proper functioning, in social life. On its individual side, education should initiate the individual into the social life and fit him for social service. It should create the good citizen. On the social or public side, education should be the chief means of social progress. It should regenerate society, by fitting the individual for a higher type of social life than at present achieved. We must have a socialized education if our present complex civilization is to endure. Social problems touch education on every side, and, on the other hand, education must bear upon every social problem. It is evident, therefore, that sociology has a very great bearing upon the problems of education; and the teacher who comes to his task equipped with a knowledge of social conditions and of the laws and principles of social organization and evolution will find a significance and meaning in his work which he could hardly otherwise find.

(G) *Relations to "Home Economics."* "Home economics," or domestic science, is another good example of an applied social science which rests upon sociology. So far as it deals merely with the physical problems of the household group, such as nutrition and sanitation, it rests upon chemistry, physiology, bacteriology, and other physical sciences. But so far as it deals with the higher life of the family, with the "home" in the true sense, it must rest upon sociology. Sociology comes in, then, to give a point of view and of approach; for the practical problems of the

family life cannot be properly viewed unless the function of the family in human society is understood, and even something is known of the origin and evolution of the family as a form of association.

(H) *Relations to Social and Philanthropic Work.*[1] If social and philanthropic work is to be scientific, it must rest chiefly upon sociology. The elimination of hereditary defectiveness, the overcoming of the social maladjustments of individuals, and the correction of faulty social and industrial conditions — the three great tasks of scientific social work — all require great knowledge of human society. While economics and political science furnish indispensable facts for the social worker, the general laws of normal social life, or human living together, must be sought in sociology. Sociology stands in much the same relation, therefore, to scientific social work as biology does to medicine, and hence the social worker requires thorough equipment in sociology that he may approach his tasks aright.

Whether social work aims to be remedial, that is, to restore to normal social life dependents, defectives, and delinquents; or preventive, that is, to remove the causes of social misery; or constructive, that is, to develop a higher degree of social welfare for all, it must take into account at every step the laws which govern human relations, the principles of social normality, the causes of social maladjustment, and the agencies of social progress; and these must be sought fundamentally in sociology.

[1] Additional reading on this topic may be found in the author's articles on "Philanthropy and Sociology" in *The Survey*, June 4, 1910, and on "Social Facts and Scientific Social Work" in *The Survey*, June 8, 1918.

The Relations of Sociology to Social Reconstruction.[1]— The last sentence indicates briefly the bearing of sociology upon problems of social reconstruction. The World War has left our civilization torn and divided. At the same time it has revealed fatal weaknesses in our institutions. Social readjustments along many lines have become necessary. Hence many programs of reconstruction have been presented. To judge between these the citizen needs to know the fundamental principles of social organization and of social progress — the laws of social survival, of social efficiency, and social harmony. We no longer build bridges without consulting bridge engineers; neither should we attempt to build institutions without the fullest use of expert knowledge. To judge the many social programs of the present, then, the citizen needs a knowledge of sociology.

Among the many party programs put forward as a basis for social reconstruction at the present time, for example, is socialism; and of socialism there are many varieties, from the extreme revolutionary class socialism, which is now popularly known as Bolshevism from the party name of its Russian advocates, to the relatively conservative type of socialism exemplified in the platform of the British Labor Party. Now, while sociology has no logical connection with socialism or any other party program, it is evident that the various forms of socialism cannot be properly understood or intelligently criticized without knowledge of sociology. This is true of all party programs, but it is especially true

[1] Additional reading on this topic (which may be best taken up, however, after Chapter VIII) may be found in the author's book on *The Social Problem* (published by The Macmillan Company).

of socialism, for in many of its forms it rests upon a particular social philosophy or theory of social evolution, namely, the theory that all social evolution is determined by economic conditions. Just how we shall regard the philosophy of revolutionary socialism in the light of scientific sociology, we shall see in a later chapter; in this introductory chapter we are concerned only to notice that the socialist program and all other social reconstruction programs of the present need to be tested by sociological knowledge.

It is not simply proposals and programs which need to be tested by the citizen; many new social experiments which are now being tried throughout our civilization manifestly depend for their success upon a general diffusion of social intelligence. Democracy itself, indeed, is such an experiment. Democracy means a social life in which the opinion and will of every normal adult counts in the determination of social policies. Obviously the success of democracy depends upon the possibility of vast masses of men forming rational opinions and executing rational decisions as a group. That is possible only through social and political education. We must educate for democracy if we wish it to succeed; and that means that we must diffuse knowledge not merely of the machinery of democratic government, but of social conditions which must be dealt with by such government and of the duties of citizens in regard to such conditions.

It is obvious that sociology, if it is to be impartial, must not be developed in the interest of any class, party, or particular reform. Rather it must aim at the discovery of the full truth regarding human relations. But this truth

when discovered will be the means of deciding the wisdom or unwisdom of any proposed reform or program of social reconstruction. Thus scientific truth is practical in the deepest sense. Only unbiased knowledge can lead us aright; and hence to learn to lay aside class, party, or personal bias and to see social facts as they are, is the only method by which we can hope to build a better human world.

The physical sciences have enabled man to attain to a considerable mastery over physical nature, and thus have greatly benefited humanity. They have done this because they explain the relations of phenomena, and when these relations are explained the appearance of definite phenomena in the physical world can be predicted. Thus the physical sciences have given man control over physical forces. They have made such careful investigation and secured such accurate information regarding the working of physical forces that they have given man the key to success in controlling them.

But hitherto our knowledge of social life has remained vague and indefinite. It is just as impossible to explain, predict, and control social phenomena without scientific study as it is physical phenomena. But we have every reason to believe that just as the physical sciences have enabled man to master nature so the social sciences will enable man to control his own nature and his social life. This the World War has demonstrated to be more important for man's happiness and welfare than the control of physical nature.

The ultimate aim of sociology, then, as of all other science, is mastery over life and its conditions; and hence

its practical aim is nothing less than to replace the policy of drift which our civilization has thus far largely followed in social matters by a policy of conscious, scientific mastery over the conditions of our social existence. It is only upon such a scientific basis that social reconstruction can be successful.

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CHAPTER II

THE BEARING OF THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS

SINCE Darwin wrote his *Origin of Species* all the sciences in any way connected with biology have been profoundly influenced by his theory of evolution. It is important that the student of sociology, therefore, should understand at the outset something of the bearing of the theory of evolution upon the social problems.

We may note at the beginning, however, that the word *evolution* refers to two distinct, though related, theories. The first is Darwin's doctrine of descent; the second is Spencer's theory of universal evolution. Let us note somewhat in detail what the theory of evolution means in the first of these senses.

The Darwinian Theory of Descent. — Darwin's theory of descent is the doctrine that all forms of life now existing or that have existed upon the earth have sprung from a few simple primitive types. According to this theory all forms of animals and plants have sprung from a few primitive stocks, though not necessarily one, because even in the beginning there may have existed a divergence between the primitive forms of life. So far as the animal world is concerned, then, this theory of evolution amounts to the assertion of the kinship of all life. From one or more simple primitive unicellular forms have arisen the great multitude of multicellular forms that now exist.

Popularly, Darwin's theory is supposed to be that man sprang from the apes, but this, strictly speaking, is a misconception. Darwin's theory necessitates the belief, not that man sprang from any existing species of ape, but rather that the apes and man have sprung from some common stock. It is equally true, however, that man and many other of the lower animals, according to this theory, have come from a common stock. As was said above, the theory is not a theory of the descent of man from any particular animal type, but rather the theory of the kinship, the genetic relationship, of all animal species.

It is evident that if we assume Darwin's theory of descent in sociology we must look for the beginnings of many peculiarly human things in the animal world below man. Human institutions, according to this theory, could not be supposed to have an independent origin, or human society in any of its forms to be a fact by itself, but rather all human things are connected with the whole world of animal life below man. Thus if we are, according to this theory, to look for the origin of the family, we should have to turn first of all to the habits of animals nearest man. This is only one of the many bearings which Darwin's theory has upon the study of social problems; but it is evident even from this that it revolutionizes sociology. So long as it was possible to look upon human society as a distinct creation, as something isolated, by itself in nature, it was possible to hold to intellectualistic views of the origin of human institutions.

But some one may ask: Why should the sociologist accept Darwin's theory? What proofs does it rest upon? What

warrant has a student of sociology for accepting a doctrine of such far-reaching consequences? The reply is, that biologists, generally, during the last fifty years, after a careful study of Darwin's arguments and after a careful examination of all other evidence, have come universally to accept the doctrine of descent. While modern biology is no longer narrowly Darwinian, yet no biologist of standing now living questions the *fact* of organic evolution, although its *cause* is a matter of dispute. Briefly, the evidence which establishes the fact of organic evolution is as follows:

(1) The homologies or similarities of structure of different animals. There are very striking similarities of structure between all the higher animals. Between the ape and man, for example, there are over one hundred and fifty such anatomical homologies; that is, in the ape we find bone for bone, and muscle for muscle, corresponding to the structure of the human body. Even an animal so remotely related to man as the cat has many more resemblances to man in anatomical structure than dissimilarities. Now, the meaning of these anatomical homologies, biologists say, is that these animals are genetically related, that is, they had a common ancestry at some remote period in the past.

(2) The presence of vestigial organs in the higher animals supplies another argument for the belief in common descent. In man, for example, there exist over one hundred of these vestigial or rudimentary organs, as the vermiform appendix, the pineal gland, and the like. Many of these vestigial organs, which are now functionless in man, perform functions in lower animals, and this is held to show

that at some remote period in the past they also functioned in man's ancestors.

(3) The facts of embryology seem to point to the descent of the higher types of animals from the lower types. The embryo or fœtus in its development seems to recapitulate the various stages through which the species has passed. Thus the human embryo at one stage of its development resembles a fish; at another stage, the embryo of a dog; and for a long time it is impossible to distinguish between the human embryo and that of one of the larger apes. These embryological facts, biologists say, indicate genetic relation between the various animal forms which the embryo in its different stages simulates.

(4) In the earth's crust are found the fossil remains of extinct species of animals which are evidently ancestors of existing species. Until the doctrine of descent was accepted there was no way of explaining the presence of these fossil remains of extinct animals in the earth's crust. It was supposed by some that the earth had passed through a series of cataclysms in which all forms of life upon the earth had been many times destroyed and many times re-created. It is now demonstrated, however, that these fossils are related to existing species, and sometimes it is possible to trace back the evolution of existing forms to very primitive forms in this way. For example, it is possible to trace the horse, which is now an animal with a single hoof, walking on a single toe, back to an animal that walked upon four toes and had four hoofs and was not much larger than a fox. It is not so generally known that it is also possible to trace man back through a series of fossil human remains that have been discovered in the

earth's crust to the time when he is apparently just emerging from some apelike form. The fossil man of Java, *Pithecanthropus erectus*, discovered by Dr. Eugene Dubois in 1892, was a creature of less than two thirds the brain capacity of modern man and with many apelike characteristics. Thus we cannot except even man from the theory of evolution and suppose that he was especially created, as Alfred Russel Wallace, Darwin's contemporary and co-laborer, and others, have supposed.

(5) The last line of argument in favor of the belief that all existing species have descended from a few simple primitive forms is found in the fact of the variation of animals through artificial selection under domestication. For generations breeders have known that by carefully selecting the type of animal or plant which they have desired, it is possible to produce approximately that type. Thus have originated all the breeds or varieties of domestic plants and animals. Now, Darwin conceived that nature also exercises a selection by weeding out those individuals that are not adapted to their environment. In other words, nature, though unconscious, selects in a negative way the stronger and the better adapted. Animals vary in nature as well as under domestication from causes not yet well understood. The variations that were favorable to survival, Darwin argued, would secure the survival, through the passing on of these variations by heredity, of the better adapted types of plants and animals. The natural process of weeding out the inferior or least adapted through early death, or through failure to reproduce, Darwin called "natural selection", and likened it in its effect upon organisms to the artificial selection which

breeders consciously use to secure types of plants or animals that they desire.

A great addition to Darwin's theories has been made by the Dutch botanist, Hugo de Vries, who has shown that the variations which are fruitful for the production of new species are probably great or discontinuous variations, which he terms "mutations," instead of the small fluctuating variations which Darwin thought were probably most important in the production of new species. De Vries's theory in no way affects the doctrine of descent, nor does it take away from the importance of natural selection in fixing the variations. The doctrine of descent, therefore, stands in all of its essentials to-day unquestioned by men of science, and it must be assumed by the student of sociology in any attempt to explain social evolution.

Spencer's Theory of Universal Evolution. — A second meaning given to the word *evolution* is that which Spencer popularized in his *First Principles*. This is a philosophical theory of the universe which asserts that not only have species of animals come to be what they are through a process of development, but everything whatsoever that exists, from molecules of matter to stars and planets. It is the view that the universe is in a process of development. Evolution in this wider sense includes all existing things whatsoever, while evolution in the sense of Darwin's theory is confined to the organic world. While the theory that all things existing have through a process of orderly change come to be what they are, is a very old one, yet it was undoubtedly Spencer's writings which popularized the theory, and to Spencer we also owe the attempt in his *Synthetic Philosophy* to trace the working of evolution in

all the different realms of phenomena. The belief in universal evolution which Spencer popularized has also come to be generally accepted by scientific and philosophical thinkers. While Spencer's particular theories of evolution may not be accepted, some form of universal evolution is very generally believed in. The thought of evolution now dominates all the sciences, — physical, biological, psychological, and sociological. It is evident that the student of society, if he accepts fully the modern scientific spirit, must also assume evolution in this second or universal sense.

The Different Phases of Universal Evolution. — It may be well, in order to correlate our knowledge of social evolution with knowledge in general, to note the different well-marked phases of universal evolution.

(1) *Cosmic Evolution.* This is the phase the astronomer and the geologist are particularly interested in. It deals with the evolution of worlds. In this phase we are dealing merely with physical matter, and it is supposed that the active principle which works in this phase of evolution is the attraction of particles of matter for one another. This leads to the condensation of matter into suns and their planets, and the geological evolution of the earth, for example. Laplace's nebular hypothesis is an attempt to give an adequate statement of the cosmic phase of evolution. While this hypothesis has been much criticized of late, in its essentials it seems to stand. We are not, however, as students of society, concerned with this phase of evolution.

(2) *Organic Evolution.* This is the phase of evolution with which Darwin dealt and which biology, as a science of

evolution of living forms, deals with. The great merit of Darwin's work was that he showed that the determining factor in this phase of evolution is natural selection; that is, the extermination of the unadapted through death or through failure to reproduce. Types unsuited to their environment thus die before reproduction. The stronger and better fitted survive, and thus the type is raised. Natural selection may be regarded, then, as essentially the determining force in this phase of evolution.

(3) *The Evolution of Mind.* This might be included in organic evolution, but all organisms do not apparently have minds. It is evident that among animals those that would stand the best chance of surviving would not be simply those that have the strongest brute strength, but rather those that have the keenest intelligence and that could adapt themselves quickly to their environment, that could see approaching danger and escape it. Natural selection has, therefore, favored in the animal world the survival of those animals with the highest type of intelligence. It cannot be said, however, that natural selection is the only force which has created the mind in all its various expressions.

(4) *Social Evolution.* By social evolution we mean the evolution of groups, or, in strict accordance with our definition of society, groups of mentally interacting individuals. Groups are to be found throughout the animal world, and it is in the human species, as we have already seen, that the highest types of association are found. This is not an accident. Association, or living together in groups, has been one of the devices by which animal species have been enabled to survive. It is evident that

not only would intelligence help an animal to survive more than brute strength, but that ability to coöperate with one's fellows would also help in the same way. Consequently we find a degree of combination or coöperation almost at the very beginning of life, and it is without doubt through coöperation that man has become the dominant and supreme species upon the planet. Man's social instincts, in other words, have been perhaps even more important for his survival than his intelligence. The man who lies, cheats, and steals, or who indulges in other unsocial conduct sets himself against his group and places his group at a disadvantage as compared with other groups. Natural selection operates upon groups as well as upon individuals, and so is at work in social as well as in organic evolution. The group which can command the most loyal, most efficient membership, and has the best organization, is, other things being equal, the group which survives. But the active principle of social evolution is the new and distinct factor of coöperation or coadaptation.

Moreover, the social life of man shows a distinct phase of social evolution, the evolution of culture or civilization. While cultural evolution has an organic basis in man's superior brain, his power of articulate speech, and his consequent greater capacity to learn and to communicate what he learns, it is an evolution, not of hereditary traits, but of acquired habits. Hence it proceeds independently of organic evolution and much more rapidly, depending upon intercommunication, education, religion, and government. But the factors at work in the lower phases of evolution are also at work in its higher phases.

Factors in Organic Evolution. — Hence, as we have just implied, the factors which are at work in organic evolution

generally are also at work in social evolution. We need, therefore, to note these factors carefully and to see how they are at work in human society as well as in the animal world below man. While these factors are not all of the factors which are at work in social evolution, still they are the primitive factors, and are, therefore, of fundamental importance. Let us see what these factors are.

(1) *The Multiplication of Organisms in Some Geometric Ratio through Reproduction.* It is a law of life that every species must increase so that the number of offspring exceeds the number of parents if the species is to survive. If the offspring only equal in number the parents, some of them will die before maturity is reached or will fail to reproduce, and so the species will gradually become extinct. Every species normally increases, therefore, in some geometric ratio. Now, this tendency to reproduce in some geometric ratio, which characterizes all living organisms, means that any species, if left to itself, would soon reach such numbers as to occupy the whole earth. Darwin showed, for example, that though the elephant is the slowest breeding of all animals, if every elephant lived its normal length of life (one hundred years) and to every pair were born six offspring, then, at the end of seven hundred and fifty years there would be nineteen million living elephants descended from a single pair. This illustration shows the enormous possibilities of any species reproducing in geometric ratio, as all species in order to survive must do.

That this tendency to increase in some geometric ratio applies also to man is evident from all of the facts which we know concerning human populations. It is not infrequent for a people to double its numbers every twenty-five years.

If this were continued for any length of time it is evident that a single nation could soon populate the whole earth. Malthus, an English economist at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was the first to study systematically this multiplication of human populations in some geometric ratio and its consequences. He argued from it that there was always a tendency for population to outstrip food supply, and that this was a permanent cause of social misery. Consequently he held that if better wages, and so a larger food supply, were given to the lower economic classes of society, they would multiply so much more rapidly that worse poverty would result than before. While we shall see in a later chapter that Malthus carried his theory too far, yet there is no doubt that under certain conditions in human society there is a tendency for population to press against food supply, and that to this multiplication of numbers in human society is due the competition of our social and economic life, as in the world of life at large.

(2) *Heredity.* Heredity is the factor in organic evolution which insures the persistence of the species or racial type. It is that aspect of the phenomenon of reproduction which we recognize by saying, "Like begets like." Essentially, heredity is the transmission of traits from parents to offspring. Much has been written upon heredity in the past, but only recently have the laws or principles of heredity come to be clearly understood by biologists.

Heredity is not less a fact of human society than of the animal world. Racial heredity especially is one of the most significant facts of human society; while even family heredity counts in its influence far more than some have

supposed. Biologists generally hold that heredity affects in man not only his physical traits, but also his mental and moral traits, so far as these latter are dependent upon the inborn structure of the brain and nervous system.

This brings us to the questions, What traits are transmissible? and, How are they transmitted? That certain things are given us by nature, and that others come to us through nurture, or from the influence of our environment, has long been known. Throughout the world of life certain traits of organisms are inherent in their nature, given in the germ, as we say; while other traits are modifications acquired during the lifetime of the individual. Hence the contrast between inborn and acquired traits, a contrast which is of the utmost significance; for probably only inborn traits are transmitted by heredity.

We cannot go far into the biological theory of heredity in this book. Certain facts and general principles, however, may be pointed out which will save much confusion in the study of social problems. The student of sociology should especially bear in mind three biological facts: (1) The germ cells, out of which the new individual arises, are a separate series of cells, distinct from the body cells. (2) Although the germ cells are separate from the body cells, the body nevertheless affords the environment of the germ cells, and furnishes them with nutrition. (3) In bi-parental reproduction, inheritance is equal from both parents.

From the first fact follows directly Weismann's law of the non-transmissibility of "acquired traits." On account of the separateness of the germ cells from the body cells, there is no way by which specific bodily modifications can be transmitted to offspring. Modifications produced in

organs through use or disuse are not, therefore, transmissible. For example, the blacksmith who develops a strong biceps muscle in his work, does not transmit this modification to his children.

It must not be supposed, however, that the body has no influence upon the germ cells; for it furnishes their nutrition. If the body is poisoned by a drug such as alcohol, or by the toxins produced by certain diseases, this will affect the germ cells, and the offspring may inherit, on this account, a weakened vitality or a degenerate constitution. This, however, is not the transmission of a specific, acquired trait, but is only the effect of the poisoning or malnutrition of the germ cells in the body of the parent. It is sometimes erroneously supposed that Weismann's theory comes to this, that no matter what the parent individual does, it will not affect his offspring; but from what has been said above, it will be seen that this supposition is a gross misunderstanding of the doctrine of the non-transmissibility of acquired traits.

Mendel's law of heredity follows directly from the third fact mentioned, that inheritance from both parents is equal, and from the further fact that hereditary traits are seemingly transmitted as units. It is impossible within our space to explain this very important biological law. It will suffice to say that in consequence of this law there is apparently no permanent blending of different traits, in a series of generations, but that, on the contrary, contrasted traits tend to segregate in definite and regular proportions. For example, if albinos (persons without pigment in hair, eyes, or skin) intermarry with normal persons, their children in the first generation will be apparently all normal persons. But if

these children of albinos and normal persons intermarry among themselves, their offspring will be one-fourth albinos and three-fourths apparently normal persons. And if these latter intermarry, one-third will have only normal offspring, while two-thirds will have offspring again in the proportion of one-fourth albinos and three-fourths apparently normal. This shows that of the second generation one-fourth were albinos, one-fourth pure normals, and one half hybrids which appeared to be normal but were in fact not so, so far as their germ cells were concerned.

Mendel's law thus shows us the manner of transmission of hereditary traits in individual cases. It is highly important for the sociologist, especially in his study of the results of the crossing of races and of normal with abnormal stocks.

To sum up, the factor of heredity in evolution preserves the continuity of the racial or family type, but the minute, personal traits of the individual are not transmissible, and especially not those which are acquired; in a word, nothing is inherited except the characteristics of the stock, the traits which are inherent in the germ plasm. These hereditary traits, however, not only determine to a large extent the physical characteristics of the adult individual, but also, to a lesser degree, his mental and moral character.

(3) *Variation.* This factor in organic evolution means that no two individuals, even though born of the same parents, are exactly like each other. Neither do they exactly conform in their type to Mendel's law, as theoretically they should do. Every new individual born in the organic world, then, while it resembles its parents and belongs to its species or race, varies within certain limits. This variation so runs through organic nature that we are

told that there are no two leaves on a single tree exactly alike. Such variation is of two sorts: First, variations in degree, relatively minute, fluctuating variations which are probably not transmissible by heredity; secondly, variations in quality, or discontinuous variations, also called "mutations." It is these latter which are fruitful for evolution, as they persist in the stock. The causes of this variation are not yet well understood, but the evident result is that individuals are born unequal; for some individuals vary in favorable directions, others in unfavorable directions. Some are born strong, some weak; some inferior, some superior.

It is evident that variation characterizes the human species quite as much as other species, and indeed the limits of variation are wider, probably, in the human species than in any other species. Man is the most variable of all animals, and human individuality and personality owe not a little of their distinctiveness to this fact. No more in human society than in the animal world are individuals born alike, or with equal natural endowments. From a biological point of view there is no truth in the old belief that all men are born equal. It is only in a moral sense that we may hold that men are equals.

(4) *The Struggle for Existence.* Individuals in all species, as we have seen, are born in larger numbers than is necessary. The result is that a competition is entered into between species and between individuals within the species for place and for existence. This competition or struggle results in the dying out of the inferior, that is, of those who are not adapted to their environment. The gradual dying out of the inferior or unadapted through com-

petition results in the survival of the superior or better adapted, and ultimately in the survival of the fittest or those most adapted. Thus the type is raised, and we have evolution through natural selection, that is, through the elimination of the unfit.

Some have thought that this struggle for existence which is so evident in the animal world does not take place in human society. This, however, is a mistake. The struggle for existence in human society is not an unmitigated one, as it seems to be very often in the animal world, but it is nevertheless a struggle which has the same consequences. In the human world the competition, except in the lower classes, is not so much for food, as it is for position and for supremacy. But this struggle for place and power results in human society in the weak and inferior going to the wall, and therefore ultimately in their elimination. In all essential respects, then, the struggle for existence goes on in human society as it does in the animal world. This means that in society, as in the animal world, progress depends upon the elimination of unfit individuals. The unfit in human society, as we shall see, are especially those who cannot adapt themselves to their social environment. Progress in society, in a certain sense, waits upon death, as it does in all the rest of the animal world. Death is the means by which the stream of life is purged from its inferior and unfit elements.

The struggle for existence is especially illustrated in the world of human industry. Not only do individuals lose place and power because they are unadapted to their environment, but also economic groups, such as corporations, show the natural competition or struggle for existence

sometimes in its most intense form. The result in all cases is the weeding out of the least adapted and the survival of the better adapted. Thus through competition and the survival of the better adapted is secured in industry the evolution of higher types of industrial organization, industrial methods, and the like, just as higher types are secured in the same way in the animal world. But in economic matters as in other social affairs coöperation continually comes in to modify competition and to lift it to a higher plane.

A word of caution is perhaps necessary against confusing the economic struggle as it exists in modern society with the natural struggle under primitive conditions. It is evident that in present society the economic struggle has been greatly changed in character from the primitive struggle, and therefore can no longer have the same results. Laws of inheritance, of taxation, and many other artificial economic conditions have greatly interfered with the natural struggle. The rich and economically successful are, therefore, by no means to be confused with the biologically fit. On the contrary many of the economically successful are such simply through artificial advantageous circumstances and from the standpoint of biology and sociology they are often among the less fit, rather than the more fit, elements of society.

(5) *Another Factor in Organic Evolution is Coöperation*, or altruism. As Henry Drummond has said, this is the struggle not for one's own life but for the lives of others. Really, however, it is a device which enables a group of individuals to struggle more successfully with the adverse factors in their environment. Something of coöperation, —

that is, a group of individuals carrying on a common life, — is found almost at the beginning of life, and, as we rise in the scale of animal creation, the amount of coöperation and of altruistic feelings which accompany it very greatly increases. Perhaps the chief source of this coöperation is to be found in the rearing of offspring. The family group, even in the lower animals, seems to be the chief source of altruism. At any rate, sympathetic or altruistic instincts grow up in all animals, probably chiefly through the necessities of reproduction.

It is only in human social life that coöperation, or altruism, attains its full development. Human society is characterized by the protection it affords to its weaker members, and in human society the natural process of eliminating the inferior often seems reversed. As Huxley has pointed out, human society tries to fit as many as possible to survive, and we may add, not only to survive, but to live well. Altruism and its resulting coöperation have come especially to characterize human social evolution. To some extent this is due, no doubt, to the necessities of group survival; for only that nation, for example, can survive that can maintain the most loyal citizenship, the best institutions, and the largest spirit of self-sacrifice in its members. Human social groups, therefore, try to fit as many individuals as possible for the most efficient membership, and this necessitates caring for the temporarily weak, and also for the permanently incapacitated, in order that the sentiments of social solidarity may be strengthened to their utmost.

It is evident, then, that all the factors at work in organic evolution are at work also in social evolution, though in

some part modified and varying in degree. The struggle for existence in human society, for example, has been greatly modified from the condition in the early animal world, while coöperation, or altruism, is much more highly developed. Nevertheless, the factors of organic evolution are at work in social evolution and must be taken into full account by the student of social problems. Social evolution rests upon organic evolution.

Salient Features of Social Evolution from the Biological Standpoint. — In order to sum up and make clear some of the principal applications of the biological principles just stated, let us consider briefly some of the salient features of social evolution from the biological standpoint.

The Origin of Society. Social evolution is rooted in the necessities of organic existence. By biological necessity most species of animals live in groups. The processes of both nutrition and reproduction in all higher forms of life involve more or less association of members of the same species. The association of the sexes and of parents and offspring is necessary among higher animals for the reproduction, care, and rearing of offspring. Among these, too, some degree of association is usually necessary for the procuring of an adequate food supply and for protection against enemies. Thus the basis of social evolution has been this necessary interdependence among organisms of the same species in the organic processes of life. Life, then, has never developed in an isolated way, each individual by himself. From the very start there has been unity, group life, among individuals of the same species.

The Struggle for Existence in Human Society. From the very beginning there has been no such thing as unmitigated

individual struggle among animals. Nowhere in nature does pure individualism exist in the sense that the individual animal struggles alone, except perhaps in a few solitary species which are apparently on the way to extinction. The assumption of such a primitive individual struggle has been at the bottom of many erroneous views of human society. The primary conflict is between species. A secondary conflict, however, is always found between the members of the same species. Usually this conflict within the species is a competition between groups. The human species exactly illustrates these statements. Primitively its great conflict was with other species of animals. The supremacy of man over the rest of the animal world was won only after an age-long conflict between man and his animal rivals. While this conflict went on there was apparently but little struggle within the species itself. The lowest groups of which we have knowledge, while continually struggling against nature, are rarely at war with one another. But after man had won his supremacy over nature and the population of groups increased so as to encroach seriously upon food supply, and even territorial limits of space, then a conflict between human groups, which we call war, broke out and became almost second nature to man. In other words, war was occasioned very largely by numbers and food supply. To this extent at least war primitively arose from economic conditions, and it is remarkable how economic conditions have had a part in bringing about all the great wars of human history.

The Social Effects of War. Along with the obvious destructive effects of war have gone certain effects upon the evolution of human groups which we must note. War has

been the chief agency of group selection among mankind in the past, and as such it has had an immense effect upon human social evolution. We may note five chief effects: —

(1) Intergroup struggle gave rise to higher forms of social organization because only those groups could succeed in competition with other groups that were well organized, and especially only those that had competent leadership.

(2) Government, as we know it in history, was very largely an outcome of the necessities of this intergroup struggle, or war. As we have seen, the groups that were best organized, that had the most competent leadership, would stand the best chance of surviving. Consequently the war leader or chief soon came, through habit, to be looked upon as the head of the group in all matters. Moreover, the exigencies and stresses of war frequently necessitated giving the war chief supreme authority in times of danger, and from this, without doubt, arose despotism in all of its forms. The most primitive tribes are republican or democratic in their form of government; but it has been found that despotic forms of government rapidly develop where a people are continually at war with other peoples.

(3) A third result of war in early society was the creation of social classes. After a certain stage was reached groups tried not so much to exterminate one another as to conquer and absorb one another. This was, of course, after agriculture had been developed and slave labor had reached a considerable value. Under such circumstances a conquered group would be incorporated by the conquerors as a slave or subject class. Later, this enslaved class may have become partially free as compared with some more recently subjugated or enslaved classes, and several classes

in this way could emerge in a group through war or conquest. Moreover, the presence of these alien and subject elements in a group necessitated a stronger and more centralized government to keep them in control, and this was again one way in which war favored a development of despotic governments. Later, of course, economic conditions gave rise to classes, and to certain struggles between the classes composing a people.

(4) Not only were social and political organization and the evolution of classes favored by intergroup struggle, but also the evolution of morality. The group that could be most efficiently organized would be, other things being equal, the group which had the most loyal and most self-sacrificing membership. The group that lacked a group spirit, that is, strong sentiments of solidarity, and harmonious relations between its members, would be the group that would be apt to lose in conflict with other groups, and so its type would tend to be eliminated. The morality which war developed, however, was a narrow, or "group" morality; and it was autocratic rather than democratic. Thus while loyalty, mutual aid, and honor were enforced within the tribe, war encouraged the disregard of the rights of all outside; and while war developed habits of obedience, service, and self-sacrifice on the part of all members of the group, it led to the disregard of the life and personality of individuals.

(5) A final consequence of war among human groups has been the absorption of weaker groups and the growth of larger and larger political groups until in modern times a few great nations dominate the population of the whole world. That this was not the primitive condition, we

know from human history and from other facts which indicate the disappearance of a vast number of human groups in the past. The earth is a burial ground of tribes and nations as well as of individuals. In the competition between human groups, only a few that have had efficient organization and government, loyal membership, and high standards of conduct within the group, have survived. Philologists estimate that for every living language there are twenty dead languages. Remembering that one language not infrequently stands for several groups with related cultures, we can get an inkling of the immense number of human societies that have perished in the past in this intergroup competition.

War, however, is a barbarous means of competition and selection between groups. While once war selected well the stronger, more efficient, more socialized groups, modern wars produce a "reversal of selection" in society, killing off the socially fittest, and tend to rebarbarize moral standards. Hence, higher civilization must find a better method of deciding the competition between groups.

Competition. Even though war passes away entirely, nations can never escape competition. While the competition may not be upon the low and brutal plane of war, it will certainly go on upon the higher plane of commerce and industry and will probably be on this higher plane quite as decisive in the life of peoples in the future as war was in the past.

While the primary struggle within the human species has been in the historic period between nations and races, this is not saying, of course, that struggle and competition has not gone on within these larger groups. On the con-

trary, a continual struggle has gone on between classes, first perhaps of racial origin and later of economic origin. Also there is within the nation a struggle between parties and sects and sometimes between "sections" and communities. Usually, however, the competition within the nation is a peaceful one and does not come to bloodshed.

Again within each of these minor groups that we have mentioned struggle and competition in some modified form goes on between its members. Thus within a party or class there is apt to be a struggle or competition between factions. There is, indeed, no human group that is free from struggle or competition between its members, unless it be the family.

Competition and Coöperation. Evidently, competition and coöperation are twin principles in the evolution of social groups. While competition characterizes in the main the relation between groups, especially independent political groups, and while coöperation characterizes in the main the relation of the members of a given group to one another, still competition and coöperation are correlatives in practically every phase of the social life. Some degree of competition, for example, has to be maintained by every group between its members if it is going to maintain high standards of efficiency or of loyalty. If there were no competition with respect to the matters that concern the inner life of groups, it is evident that the groups would soon lose efficiency in leadership and in membership and would sooner or later be eliminated.

It follows from this that competition and coöperation are both equally important in the life of society. It has been a favorite idea that competition among human beings should be done away with, and that coöperation should be

substituted to take its place entirely. It is evident, however, that this idea is impossible of realization. If a social group were to check all competition between its members, it would stop thereby the process of natural selection or of the elimination of the unfit, and, as a consequence, would soon cease to progress. If some scheme of artificial selection were substituted to take the place of natural selection, it is evident that competition would still have to be retained to determine who were the fittest. A society that would give positions of trust and responsibility to individuals without imposing some competitive test upon them would be like a ship built partly of good and partly of rotten wood, — it would soon go to pieces.

What people may rightfully object to is, not competition, but unregulated or unfair competition. In the interest of solidarity, that is, in the interest of the life of the group as a whole, all forms of competition in human society should be so regulated that the rules governing the competition may be known and the competition itself public. It is evident that in politics and in business we are very far from this ideal as yet, although society is unquestionably moving toward it.

The Necessity of Selection in Society. This leads us to emphasize the continued necessity of selection in society. No doubt natural selection is often a brutal and wasteful means of eliminating the weak in human societies, and no doubt human reason might devise superior means of bringing about the selection of individuals which society must maintain. To some extent it has done this through systems of education and the like, which are, in the main, selective processes for picking out the most competent

individuals to perform certain social functions. But the natural competition, or struggle between individuals, has not been done away with, especially in economic matters, and it is evidently impossible to do away with it until some vast scheme of artificial selection can take its place. Such a scheme is so far in the future that it is hardly worth talking about. The best that society can apparently do at the present time is to regulate the natural competition between individuals, and this it is doing increasingly.

The Sociological View of Morality. A word in conclusion about the nature of moral codes and standards from the social point of view. It is evident that moral codes from the social point of view are simply formulations of standards of conduct which groups find it convenient or necessary to impose upon their members. Even morality, in an idealistic sense, seems from a sociological standpoint to be those forms of conduct which conduce to social harmony, to social efficiency, and so to the survival of the group. Groups, however, as we have already pointed out, cannot do as they please. They are always hard-pressed in competition by other groups and have to meet the standards of efficiency which nature imposes. Morality, therefore, is not anything arbitrarily designed by the group, but is a standard of conduct which necessities of social survival require. In other words, the right, from the point of view of natural science, is that which ultimately conduces to survival, not of the individual, but of the group or of the species. This is looking at morality, of course, from the sociological point of view, and in no way denies the religious and metaphysical view of morality, which may be equally valid from a different standpoint.

Limits of Freedom or Variation in Human Society. Finally, we need to note that natural selection does not necessitate in any mechanical sense certain conduct on the part of individuals or groups. Rather, natural selection marks the limits of variation which nature permits, and within those limits of variation there is a large amount of freedom of choice, both to individuals and to groups. Human societies, therefore, may be conceivably free to take one of several paths of development at any particular point. But in the long run they must conform to the ultimate conditions of survival; and this probably means that the goal of their evolution is largely fixed for them. Human groups are free only in the sense that they may go either backward or forward on the path which the conditions of survival mark out for them. They are free to progress or to perish. But social evolution in any case, in the sense of social change either toward higher or toward lower social adaptation, is a necessity that cannot be escaped. Sociology and all social science is, therefore, a study not of what human groups would like to do, but of what they must do in order to survive, that is, how they can control their environment by utilizing the laws which govern universal evolution.

From this brief and most elementary consideration of the bearings of evolutionary theory upon social problems it is evident that evolution, in the sense of what we know about the development of life and society in the past, must be the guidepost of the sociologist. Human social evolution, we repeat, rests upon and is conditioned by biological evolution at every point. There is, therefore, scarcely any sanity in sociology without the biological point of view.

Yet social evolution must not be confused with organic evolution. Human social evolution is essentially cultural, hence psychic; and organic evolution is only its basis.

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CHAPTER III[1]

THE BEARING OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY UPON SOCIAL PROBLEMS

When mind or consciousness appeared in organic evolution the whole balance of the world of life was changed. Thereafter the determining factors in the life-process became more and more the inner and mental, not the outer and physical. Accordingly, to understand human society we must understand something of the mental life of man, for the interactions of individuals in human society are chiefly interactions of their thoughts, feelings, and will. Hence, psychology, the science of our mental life, must be the immediate basis of the larger part of sociology. Knowledge of the psychology of human conduct, of behavior, is accordingly indispensable to the student of sociology.

Modern Functional Psychology. — The earlier developments of psychological science laid a great deal of stress upon the analysis of the structure or content of the individual mind, that is, upon the analysis of the states of consciousness into their constituent elements. While this part of psychology is recognized to be of very great importance for the understanding of the mind in itself, it is not so important to the sociologist, for he deals with the person in action. What the sociologist needs is a science of the mind

[1] In a brief course of study this chapter may be omitted.

in action. This is usually called functional psychology. It deals with individual human conduct or behavior in the widest sense, thus furnishing the basis for explaining the interactions of individuals and the evolution of social organization.

Modern functional psychology is in its point of view broadly biological; that is, according to modern psychology, mind is not something apart from life, but is a functioning element in the life process. It is subject, like everything else in life, therefore, to the laws of organic evolution which we have just considered. The fundamental attributes of our mental life are not acquired by the individual in his lifetime, but are as much determined by natural selection as the general characteristics of our bodies. Thus our impulses, our feelings, desires, and interests so far as they are inborn are in the long run determined by natural selection. The thought of evolution thus dominates modern psychology as well as modern biology and sociology; but it must be borne in mind, of course, that natural selection is merely the elimination of the least favorable variations and is thus a framework within which a very large amount of free variation is possible; and that only very indirectly has natural selection anything to do with the habits which the individual acquires within his lifetime.

The Function of the Mind. — All biologists and psychologists are agreed that the brain is primarily an adaptive organ. Now, whatever may be the exact relation of mind and body, this means that the function of those higher neural processes which involve consciousness is primarily to aid the organism in adaptation, especially when the process is rapid and complex. Mental processes, in other words,

are chiefly concerned with the guidance and control of complex activities. Not all bodily activities or acts are accompanied by consciousness; but wherever the purely physiological mechanism is insufficient to secure the proper adaptation of the organism to its environment, then consciousness appears, to control and direct movement. All the aspects of the mind present themselves, therefore, from one point of view, as devices to secure the superior adaptation of the organism to the environment. As Professor Angell says, "Mind seems to be the master device by means of which the adaptive operations of organic life may be made more perfect."

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the mind is concerned merely with the passive adaptation of the organism to the environment, that is, bending and shaping activities to meet the requirements of the environment. On the contrary, in its higher development the mind is equally concerned with the adaptation of the environment to the needs of the organism. This results from what is known as the spontaneity or self-activity of the organism. The old conception of human nature, namely, that the individual is passive with reference to his environment and that his behavior is entirely determined by environmental stimuli, is quite entirely given up by modern biology and psychology. The new conception is that the organism is essentially active, that it is a relatively independent center of energy whose activities are directed to sustaining and maintaining itself. These activities of the organism spring from its own organic needs, such as nutrition and reproduction, and are directed to the satisfying of those needs. Accordingly, the immediate sources of activity must be

sought within the organism and not outside. Activities or actions spring from the physiological impulses within the individual organism. And the higher we ascend in the animal scale, the more pronounced becomes this tendency to expend energy, which biologists call the katabolic tendency. Hence, the act begins within in the physiological impulse, but the development of the act depends upon the stimuli which the environment affords.

Now, it follows that the organism is not to any such extent in subjection to its environment as the older social theorists supposed. No activity could develop, to be sure, without some stimulus from the environment. The organism is, therefore, dependent upon the environment for the development and continuance of its activities. But the beginning of the activity is in the self-activity of the organism, and the stimulus which is attended to is selected by the organism from among a countless number. Only indirectly, therefore, through natural selection and acquired habit, is the individual organism in subjection to its environment. Natural selection has fixed in us certain innate or hereditary reactions to stimuli, but even these are not hard and fast in man and the higher animals; while acquired habits create certain pathways in the nervous system which favor persistent forms of activity. But in man conscious choice plays a leading part in determining what habits the individual shall have.

The mind is, therefore, essentially selective in its workings. Its whole business is to select from among the stimuli which surround an organism, those which are needful for the maintenance and development of its activities. The basis of this selection is the inner organization of the organ-

ism, that is, its instincts and acquired habits. Thus it builds up the activities which are needful for maintaining and developing life. The mind presents itself, therefore, as a delicate apparatus for mastering the environment. In the highest development of mental life the subjection to the environment becomes less and less, that is, the power of transforming the environment becomes greater and greater. This is the case with man. It is by might of intelligence that he has conquered the world.

Bearing in mind the fact that the environment to which the human individual has to adapt himself is above all a social environment of other individuals and that the social life consists of a series of complex reciprocal relations or adaptations between individuals, the social significance of the mind becomes manifest. It is evident that the function of the human mind is especially to adjust individuals to one another in a common life, to act as a link between individuals, and to further their better mutual adaptation to one another in the process of living together.

Different levels or aspects of the functioning of the mind in human behavior are conveniently distinguished for the sake of clearness in psychological and sociological analysis. These are the instinctive, the habitual, the feeling, the intelligent, and the rational levels. All of these are found in human social behavior.

The Native Impulses, or the Instincts. — First of all come those hereditary reactions which psychologists call the native impulses or the "instincts." In man, and in all of the higher animals, there is a highly developed nervous system with multitudes of connections between

its elements. These are pathways for nervous currents. Now, many of these connections are inborn — are a part of our human heredity. Hence among our nervous reactions to external stimuli are certain reactions more or less definitely preorganized by heredity. The larger part of these preorganized reactions have been fixed in the species through the operation of natural selection in the same way in which the bodily characteristics of the species have been established. These the psychologists call the " instincts," or native impulses.

Instincts are thus not acquired by the individual, but are the psychological expression, on the side of behavior, of his racial heredity, and like other inborn traits are transmitted from generation to generation with but little variation. In man, however, the instincts differ from those of the lower animals. Not only has man more instincts on account of the more complex hereditary structure of his nervous system, but for this reason they are more variable and alterable. In many of the lower forms of life, such as the insects, the instincts give rise to very fixed forms of behavior. In man there are few, if any, such fixed forms of behavior due to instinct, owing to his much more complex hereditary nervous structure and to the fact that the larger part of the connections in his nervous system are acquired during the lifetime of the individual. The instincts in man are variable also owing to individual differences in nervous structure. Again, in man those complex hereditary reactions which we term "instincts" pass through the higher nervous centers which are concerned with consciousness, and hence are more or less subject to those higher controls over behavior which

we term " feeling " and " intelligence." Finally, instincts get their development only through appropriate stimuli in the environment, and therefore their expression is largely controlled by man's artificial environment, the culture of his group. For all of these reasons those activities which predominantly spring from instinct are more modifiable and alterable in man through experience than in any other animal.

Nevertheless, because the human instincts furnish the nucleus of activities by which the individual begins to master his world, and because all later adaptations are more or less influenced by these original reactions, they are exceedingly important as the basis of man's mental and social life. They are the activities which do not need to be learned, but are in us apart from training and experience by virtue of our human heredity.

The instincts are the origin of certain simpler relations between individuals and so furnish the beginnings of social organization. This may be seen in such typical human instincts as sexual and parental love. Other typical instincts usually recognized by psychologists are gregariousness, imitativeness, constructiveness, acquisitiveness, self-assertion, combativeness, and curiosity. All of these are sufficiently in evidence in human society. It should be pointed out, however, that there is no single social instinct which can be invoked to explain the origin, much less the development, of man's social life, since many instincts must have been concerned in bringing and keeping individuals together even in the primitive forms of association. Nevertheless, sociability itself must be considered an instinctive rather than an acquired trait. Hu-

man society, then, is rooted in human instincts, and the instincts are at the basis of man's social as well as of his mental life.

Accordingly, we must always seek in sociology beneath habits, customs, and traditions in society the original instinctive impulses and reactions of individuals. Since these represent the innate or biological element, and furnish the original basis for the relationships of individuals, they may well be characterized as the primary social forces. No program of social reconstruction can possibly succeed which does not take into consideration these original proclivities of human nature; on the other hand, when their control is understood, they will present no insuperable obstacle to any rational program of social reconstruction. Hence the guidance and control of these native reactions through the education of the individual and through the appropriate organization of social life is one of the great practical problems of human society.

Acquired Habits. — Instincts are inborn, while habits are acquired. Instincts might perhaps be termed race habits, while habits in the strict sense are modifications of inherent activities acquired by individuals or groups of individuals during their lifetime. As we have already seen, instinctive reactions become modified by experience; that is, the hereditary tendencies of the individual are adapted to new situations and new ways of reacting are thus acquired. These new ways of reacting, when they no longer need attention and drop more or less out of consciousness, become habits in the strict sense of the word. The earlier formed habits become, of course, the basis for later ones through their modification by adaptation,

just as instinctive reactions are modified. Thus are built up the countless habits of the mature individual. This process of building up habits out of instincts, or previously formed habits, is from a psychological standpoint the essence of mental growth both in the individual and in society. Acquired habits in time come to be second nature, as we say, and are not less powerful in determining conduct than the original instinctive reactions. This is as true of society as it is of the individual.

Acquired habit, therefore, plays a great part in human society. The character of the adult individual is very largely the result of the habits acquired through early environment and education. The organization of society is also at any given time almost wholly the result of habit; for social organization is the whole mass of reciprocal adjustments which individuals of a group maintain among themselves, and these are largely habitual. The psychological fact of habit is thus the main carrier of all those forms of social life and organization which rise above the merely instinctive level.

Thus habit forms the chief raw material for cultural evolution. Man's capacity to acquire an indefinite number of habits made it possible for him to take on civilization through building up social usages, customs, traditions, and institutions. All of these are forms of habit with varying degrees of social sanction attached to them. Usages, or "folkways," are simply the similar habits of a group of people, usually handed down from generation to generation. The "mores," or customs, of a people are the folkways which have been reflected upon and sanctioned by the group, and hence set up as standards. Institutions are simply more

highly developed and systematized, more definitely sanctioned and established social habits; while social traditions are habitual ways of thinking and feeling handed down from generation to generation. Thus the social order at any given time is largely a matter of habit, and the problem of its reconstruction is the problem of building up new habits adapted to new life conditions to replace old habits which are no longer adapted.

The whole mental and social life of man centers about the psychological facts of habit and adaptation. If we lived in a slowly changing world, we should need no other controls over activity than instinct and habit; but inasmuch as we live in a rapidly changing world we need the higher, inner forms of control over behavior which we call "feeling," "intelligence," and "rationality."

Feeling. — By feeling we mean the agreeable or disagreeable tone which accompanies conscious states. It is practically synonymous with pleasure and pain, using those words in a broad way. Feeling, then, is the "me-side" of activity, or, more accurately, it is the subjective valuation which the organism gives to an activity. When the activity is one which has on the whole in the past history of the organism been advantageous the resulting feeling is usually pleasurable. On the other hand, when the activity is one which has been disadvantageous, the feeling is disagreeable or painful.

Feeling, because it is the me-side of activity, is subject to all the variations to which the individual organism is subject. Conditions of health, habit, and personal idiosyncrasies often make that which is agreeable to one person disagreeable to another. Hence, pleasure and pain are not

good guides as to the rightness or wrongness of actions. The majority of our feelings are attached to our instincts in the forms of emotions. They powerfully reënforce, therefore, the instinctive activities. Now, the instincts, as we have already seen, are the result of selection in the past history of the species. They and the feelings attached to them, or the emotions, are not therefore good guides in the complex life of the present. The instincts, and their correlated emotions, need, therefore, to be controlled and guided by the reason. They are, however, rough monitors which indicate to us without the labor of thought the organically advantageous or disadvantageous.

A mistake of the psychology of the early part of the nineteenth century was its claim that pleasure and pain are the sole springs of action. But, as we have seen, feeling is the accompaniment and not the antecedent of activity. Feeling does, however, modify activity. If the feeling tone raised by the activity is pleasureable, the activity is reënforced, but if it is disagreeable or painful, the activity tends to be inhibited. This is, however, something very different from saying that pleasure and pain are the sole sources of activity.

Nevertheless, it is evident that in securing changes in activities in human society it is well if possible to enlist the feelings on the side of those changes. This can best be done by connecting the change with some instinctive impulse. Now, the instinctive impulses which are most favorable to social change are the altruistic or sympathetic impulses. Hence it is that the sympathetic feelings can usually be appealed to in bringing about any reform or progressive

change in society. Sympathy, by which we mean fellow feeling, or altruistic feeling, is, therefore, the aspect of feeling which is most socialized, and has most to do in furthering social reforms and the reconstruction of civilization upon a basis of justice and humanity. The appeal to feeling is justifiable in society, therefore, only when it is an appeal to our sympathetic or altruistic feelings, and even these need the control of our intelligence. Nevertheless, sympathetic or altruistic feeling, because it tends to harmonize individuals in their relations and to establish mutual good will, must be regarded as one of the foundations of higher civilization.

Intelligence. — Intelligence is the objective, cognitive side of the mind which has to do especially with the adaptation of the activities of the organism to the environment. Instinct and feeling have, as we have seen, chiefly reference to the organism and its past environment, while intelligence on the other hand is turned outward toward the rest of the universe, and so stands more for the present and the future. It functions to evaluate and control activities with reference to the environment. Knowledge, ideas, values, in other words, play the decisive rôle in adapting the organism to its environment.

It is probable that intelligence was developed as an aid in carrying out the instincts and in satisfying the demands of feeling. Nevertheless, in man it can and does act independently of these. The instincts and feelings, as we have already seen, are very insufficient guides in the complex social life of the present. Hence, the need of a higher instrument of adaptation than that which instinct or feeling can furnish. Therefore nature has developed in man the

intellect, and the chief distinction between man and the lower animals is that he has passed through many more stages in intellectual evolution. Man's intellect has been developed, in other words, to control activities in individual and collective life which cannot be controlled in any other way. It is for this reason that man has developed a higher phase of intelligence which no other animal possesses, which we call the "reason."

Rationality. — The reason, or rationality, is that phase of mind which is the supreme device for controlling activity and modifying the environment. The power of abstract thought, of imagination and reasoning, has enabled man to build up a distinctive social life, characterized by "culture," or "civilization." Language, religion, government, science, morality, and education, all these distinctive features of human society, as well as many others, have depended for their development upon this evolution of man's intellectual nature. While it is a mistake to search for primitive social origins in man's reason, or to think that human society is mainly a product of reflective thought, yet later social developments and movements take on more and more a rational character. Reflective thought, which probably played such an insignificant part in primitive society, becomes in the highest social development the decisive element, because upon it depends the control, not only of the forces of physical nature, but also of the feelings and impulses of human nature.

All this is illustrated by the part which invention and discovery have played in social development. Invention and discovery hardly exist below the human level, hence animal societies are not progressive. On the other hand,

civilization in human societies has been built up largely through invention and discovery. The invention of tools, weapons, labor saving devices, the improvements in communication and transportation, along with scientific discovery of the properties and nature of things, have been the material means by which human progress has been effected. But it should be remembered that invention is not confined to the putting together of material forces in new ways, nor is discovery confined to the understanding of the workings of physical nature. Quite as important phases of invention and discovery have been the making of new institutions and forms of association, the discovery of new possibilities in human living, and especially the development of social standards by which individual and social activities have been standardized and controlled. Moral development in human society has depended, therefore, very largely upon intellectual processes. Moral ideas and ideals especially have exerted a powerful influence on social relationships. Since new ideas are the creation of exceptional minds, and, since they may become powerful instruments in social progress, it is evident that the individual has also his place as a factor in social evolution.

In the higher stages of social development, therefore, the human reason plays an increasingly important part. When we remember that all the achievements of science, all of the conquests of the practical arts, all man's mastery over nature and self, are products of his reason, we can scarcely deny the very large part which must be assigned to the intellect in human social evolution and progress. Hope for the social future, moreover, manifestly lies in the possibility of the increasing dominance of intelligence

in our social life. Mastery over the conditions of our social existence can come only through increasing knowledge.

This means, in effect, that only science is adequate to guide the reconstruction of our social life. In proportion as we build our social life upon ascertained facts and laws of human living together, we shall be successful; in proportion as we build upon mere emotionalism, blind tradition, or party prejudices, we shall fail. Only in the development and maintenance of the rational level of behavior lie the safety and security of civilization.

The Social Character of Mind. — It is evident from what has been said that the mind as a whole enters as an active factor into our social life. The forces at work in human social relationships consist not simply of feeling elements, such as desire, but also of all the impulses and intellectual elements which go to make up the mental life of the individual. Beyond this, of course, are also the influence of physical factors, such as heredity, variation, and natural selection, and back of these are the conditions of the physical environment, such as climate, soil, food, and geographical conditions. The physical factors, however, manifest themselves chiefly in our social life through the psychological elements of impulse, feeling, and intelligence. The main thing for the elementary student of sociology to note is that the factors at work in our social life are very complex, and that it is impossible to interpret human society aright through paying attention to only one of these. Our views of the human social life must be large enough, in other words, to include the working of all possible factors. The view of society which will be

presented in this book, therefore, is a synthetic one as opposed to the many one-sided theories which are now prevalent regarding human institutions.

Such a view we get even from a study of the individual mind, because such study shows that human consciousness is very largely a reflection of the complex social medium in which it has been developed and that the mind itself is therefore socially conditioned in all of its aspects. This is true even of the instincts and emotions with which we are equipped by heredity, because careful study of human instincts shows that they presuppose a social medium for their evolution. Even our most abstract thought is in the nature of conversation, and therefore presupposes mental interaction, or society. Man's mental and social life are, therefore, largely one.

Mental interaction, intercommunication, is as necessary for the mind as for social life. If mind is the chief organ of adaptation for individuals, so intercommunication is the means of adjustment between individual minds. The whole mental and social life, therefore, grows together. Through intercommunication society carries on a collective mental life, and the individual mind gets its development largely by participating therein.

These statements must not be interpreted to mean that the individual's mental life is wholly submerged in that of his group. Biological variation and the self-active character of the individual prevent this. So far as science can discover there is no complete social determinism of individual consciousness and behavior. While the individual gets his development, both physical and psychical, in the main, from his connection with a larger life, the

life of his species and of his group, this does not prevent him from developing variations of his own, both physically and mentally. If this were not so, social progress would be impossible, save through the action of natural selection upon groups. As it is, the individual's variations, originalities, and inventions may be taken up by the group through suggestion and imitation and become the acquired habits of the whole group. Thus the individual reacts upon his group. Human society is, then, not a simple mass, but is made up of relatively independent, autonomous individuals. The key to its activities is not, therefore, in some principle which simply applies to the mass as a whole, but rather in the laws and principles of individual behavior.

The Active Factors in Association. — We may now briefly summarize what is said in this and in the preceding chapter about the active factors, or forces, which make human society what it is. We have paid no especial attention to the forces of the geographic environment, because they work in human society chiefly through natural selection and external stimuli. Some sociologists have made the mistake of representing the geographic factors of climate, soil, etc., as directly at work in the social life; but this is rarely the case. Usually they affect social life only indirectly as they affect the impulses, feelings, and ideas of individuals and through acting as selective agencies in human life. Nevertheless, for this very reason, we must include them among the original active factors in the social life of man.

As *original* active factors in human association, we must, then, recognize the following:

I. *The physical factors:*
   (a) Geographic environment, including climate, food, soil, natural resources, topography, etc.
   (b) Biological forces, heredity, variation, selection, etc.

II. *The psychical factors:*
   (a) Impulses, both hereditary (instinctive) and acquired (habitual).
   (b) Feelings, both hereditary (emotions) and acquired (habitual).
   (d) Intellectual elements, including sensation, perception, and ideation (conception, imagination, reasoning, etc.).

Derived, complex *social* factors, compounded out of these simple original factors, are very numerous and have never been very satisfactorily classified, though many attempts have been made. Such are *attitudes*, *desires*, *interests*, and *values*, which are compounds of varying proportions made up of impulses, feelings, and intellectual elements. Their great importance in the social life will be manifest as we take up different problems. Such are also economic goods and the technology of civilization, such as roads, houses, tools, and machinery. These may be regarded as modifications of the geographic environment, effected by man's operations upon physical nature. We shall have occasion to see how these affect every social problem directly or indirectly. Finally there are the institutions of society, such as the family, government, law, morality, religion, and education. While these are very complex in origin, they react upon society. They must also, accordingly, be regarded as active factors in the social life of man.

Summary. — Social life is made up of adaptations between individuals, of coadaptations of individuals to one another. But the master device for controlling the complex adaptations of life is the mind; hence mind is also

the chief instrument for maintaining and perfecting that complex of adaptations between individuals which is our social life. Social life has been created by mind, and in man is largely an intermental life. Intercommunication is the chief means of making interadjustments between individuals, just as the mind is the chief organ of adaptation in the individual. Hence all phases of social and mental life are intertwined. Back of these, however, we must recognize the physical and biological factors. But a sociology which is to be put to practical use must show the significance of the various mental factors for our social life; for it is these factors which can be most easily modified and controlled.

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CHAPTER IV

PRIMARY GROUPS: THE FUNCTION OF THE FAMILY IN HUMAN SOCIETY

Forms of Association. — We may conveniently distinguish between different types of social groups or forms of association. There is first of all the distinction between *temporary* and *permanent* groups. It is evident that the permanent groups are more important both practically and for the purposes of scientific study. The temporary groups, moreover, are usually parts of larger permanent groups.

Another distinction which we may make is that between *voluntary*, purposive groups and *involuntary*, genetic groups. The former are found only in human society and are associations of persons for special purposes. Such are parties, religious sects, trade unions, industrial corporations, clubs, and the like. The latter are natural groupings, such as the family, the neighborhood, the city, the state or province, and the nation. They may be, and usually are, called *communities*, since they are composed of individuals who carry on all phases of a common life. Voluntary, purposive associations always exist within some community, whether large or small. Groups which we call "communities" are, therefore, more embracing, more stable, less artificial and specialized than purely voluntary groups. For this reason communities are of more interest to the sociologist than specialized voluntary groups, and

sociology is in a peculiar sense a study of the problems of community life.

A still more important distinction between groups for sociological purposes is that between *primary* and *secondary* groups. Primary groups are those which involve more or less intimate, face-to-face, personal relations. Such are the family, the neighborhood, and the play group. Secondary groups, on the other hand, are those which do not necessarily involve face-to-face association. Such are the state, the nation, the political party, and the religious sect. They are secondary because they are not original but are the creations of high civilization.

Primary groups, on the other hand, are found in all stages of human development. They are of most interest sociologically, because they exhibit social life at its maximum intensity, and because they are the bearers of the most vital elements in social life, especially the traditions of civilization.

Another very important distinction for sociological purposes among the forms of human association is that between the sanctioned, or *institutional*, and the unsanctioned, or *non-institutional*, forms. Those groupings and relations of individuals which have been reflected upon, approved, and established, or *instituted*, by a large community we call *institutions*. Such are the family, property, the state, the church, and the school. As institutions are dependent on reflective thought and organized authority, they are not found, in the strict sense, below the human level. Their extreme importance in human society is indicated by the fact that they are forms of association which have been reflected upon, sanctioned, and estab-

lished by human communities. They embody the chief consciously recognized values in the social life. Hence sociology is largely a study of institutions in their relations to the social life.

To begin our study of sociology it is evident that we should have, if possible, a more or less permanent, natural, group which is at the same time both a primary group and an institution. There is one such group in human society — the family. It is for this reason that we select the family as the group with which to begin our study of the concrete problems of human society — because it illustrates in a simple way so many phases of social life. Many sociologists would begin with some other social group, such as the nation or the neighborhood; but the nation is not a primary group and is too large and complex to begin with, while the neighborhood is not institutionalized and fails also to illustrate clearly the problems of social origin and development. The study of the family, on the other hand, furnishes clear illustration of the principles and forces involved in social origins, social development, and social organization. But before we consider the family as a human institution, let us note the social function of primary groups in general.

The Social Function of Primary Groups. — The intimate, face-to-face groups of men have always been the chief medium for the development of human social life; for in them social life is most vividly realized. They form the natural environment for the development of the social traits of the individual. Psychologically the stimulus of the presence of other individuals seems necessary for the development of those instincts, habits, feelings, ideas, and

standards which make for social solidarity. Hence the primary groups are the chief means for socializing the individual.

The face-to-face association of primary groups, moreover, is the chief means of preserving and passing along social tradition — that is, the knowledge, ideas, and values handed down from the past. While civilized society has devised specialized institutions for preserving and transmitting social tradition, such as schools, libraries, and museums, yet the continuity of the social life on its psychic side would be very imperfect if society had to depend on such specialized institutions. The primary groups are the chief bearers of social tradition because they furnish the environment of the child from its earliest years. In them the child learns his language, and with his language he gets the fundamental knowledge, beliefs, and standards of his civilization. Moreover, the meaning of essential traditions is clearer in these groups to the young, because they are accompanied usually by the actual behavior correlated with the traditions. In other words, primary groups are also the main carriers of custom, in the sense of sanctioned habits of behavior. A certain tradition regarding government or morality, for example, when accompanied by observable actions, can be gotten by the child better than he can get it from the printed page or even the spoken word.

The chief importance of primary groups in our social life, however, is that they are the source of primary social ideals. They furnish the "patterns" which we attempt to realize in our social life in general. Thus Professor Cooley says we get our notions of love, freedom, justice, and the

like from such simple and widespread forms of society, since "in these relations mankind realizes itself, gratifies its primary needs, in a fairly satisfactory manner, and from the experience forms standards of what it is to expect from more elaborate association." He adds that the ideals of both democracy and Christianity have sprung naturally from the primary groups. The very ideal of social solidarity itself comes from the unity experienced in such groups.

Now, all progress in civilization is essentially a following out and development of "patterns." In the material realm, for example, we have been able to develop the steam engine and the flying machine by following out and improving certain patterns. So in social relations we get our primary patterns from the primary groups, and then strive to realize them in the wider social life. Hence the great significance of these groups for understanding the whole development of human society and of civilization.

The Family as a Primary Group. — The family is the simplest group in human society capable of maintaining itself. It is in an especial sense, therefore, the primary social group. As its members, husband and wife, parents and children, have their places largely fixed in the group by their organic natures and relations, the family seems to be almost as much a biological structure as a social group. For this reason it presents especially clearly the biological forces operating in our social life. The family is not a product of other forms of association, but rather furnishes the possibilities of these. Containing as it does both sexes and all ages, it is not only capable of reproducing itself and society, but of illustrating and developing practically all essential human relationships. Thus the relations

of superiority, subordination, and equality, which enter so largely into all social organization, are illustrated in the family in the relations of parents to children, of children to parents, of parents to each other, and of children to one another. Indeed, all essential relations of social interdependence are so fully illustrated in the family that it has often been justly called "society in miniature."

For this reason the work of the family in the social life has often been compared to that of the cell in the biological organism. Without pushing this analogy, however, it is evident that families do enter very largely as units into our social and industrial life, and we shall see that the character of our social life is very largely determined by the functioning of the family. The full evidence for this conclusion can be given only through the consideration of the origin, historical development, and present condition of the family; but a brief survey of the functions of the family in human society will suffice to show it to be the most important of human institutions. We shall consider these functions under three heads.

The Primary Function of the Family is continuing the life of the species; that is, the primary function of the family is reproduction in the sense of the birth and rearing of children. While other functions of the family have been delegated in a large measure to other social institutions, it is manifest that this function cannot be so delegated. We know of no human society in which the birth and rearing of children has not been the essential function of the family. In present society, at least, the stream of life must flow through the family. The constitution of the family, therefore, determines the heredity of the child as well as

its care and upbringing. If the family performed no other function than this of producing the new individuals of society and furnishing them physical care and nurture until maturity is reached, it would still be the most important of all human institutions. From a sociological point of view the childless family must be judged a failure. While the childless family may be of social utility to the individuals that form it, nevertheless from the point of view of society such a family has failed to perform its most important function and must be considered, therefore, to that extent socially a failure.

The Function of the Family in Conserving Social Possessions. — The family is still the chief institution in society for transmitting from one generation to another social possessions of all sorts, and, therefore, of conserving the social order. Property in the form of land or houses or personal property, society permits the family to pass along from generation to generation. Even the material equipment for industry, that is, capital, is so transmitted in present society. Thus under present conditions the child gets its material possessions, its economic equipment, for its start in life mainly from its family group. While this transmission by the family of the material goods of society from one generation to another is obviously of the highest social importance, even more important is its function of transmitting the spiritual possessions of the race. The family is the chief institutional vehicle of social tradition, because the child gets its language mainly in the family; and in social tradition is embodied all the beliefs, standards, and values of civilization regarding industry, government, law, religion, morality, the family, and general social life.

The Family as a School. So much does the child get his essential social traditions from the family, that many educators hold that the most essential things in social education can never be given in the public schools, but must be given in the home. This is especially true of religious and moral instruction. The real foundations of moral character are laid while the child is yet of tender age in the family circle. In the family the child first learns the meaning of authority, obedience, loyalty, love, service, and all the human virtues. If the child fails to get proper moral standards and ideals from his family life, he gets them with greater difficulty, if at all, from society later. The same is true regarding political ideas and standards. If the child fails to learn in his family life loyalty to his country, respect for law, and the ideals of good citizenship, there are good prospects of his being numbered among the lawless or unpatriotic elements of society later. Even habits of work must be learned by the child largely in the family. Thus the rudiments of morality, of religion, of government, of law, and even of industry are transmitted in the family and learned by the child in his family group.

The family, in brief, furnishes the immediate environment of the child of tender age. Thus it is charged by society not only with producing its new individuals but with training them in the most essential relations and values of life. It is the group which has the greatest power to socialize the individual and to adjust him to the requirements even of a high civilization. If it fails to perform this important task, the chances are that unsocialized individuals will abound, and that social anarchy will in time come to replace social order.

Thus the family is the great conserving agency in society to preserve social order and to transmit from generation to generation both the material and the spiritual possessions of the race.

The Function of the Family in Social Progress. — While the conservative functions of the family in social life are very obvious, the part which it plays in social progress has often been overlooked and even denied. Now, social progress, we shall see later, depends mainly upon two things: the accumulation of knowledge and the accumulation of altruism — regard for others — in society. It is, of course, through the latter that the family life plays a part in social progress. The family is the chief generator of altruism in society, and increasing altruism is necessary for the success of those more and more complex forms of coöperation which characterize higher civilization and upon which it depends. It is chiefly in the family that children learn to love, to be of service, to sacrifice for others, and to respect one another's rights. If the family fails to teach the spirit of service and self-sacrifice to its members, it is hardly probable that they will get much of that spirit from society at large. The amount of altruism in society, therefore, has a very close relation to the quality of its family life. Family affection is the natural root of altruism in society at large. If the family life is the chief teacher of altruism to the individual, and if society depends upon increasing altruism for each forward step in moral progress, then the family life plays a most important part in social progress.

There is another way also in which the altruism and solidarity of the family play a most important part in social evolution. All human history has, from one point

of view, been a struggle to transfer the altruism and solidarity of the family to successively larger and larger groups of men. In other words, as we have already seen, the family is the primary group which has furnished the main moral "patterns" which society at large has set before itself as its goal. Our primary social ideals, in the main, come from the family. Thus the ideal of human brotherhood is manifestly derived from the family. So also the ideals of love, service, self-sacrifice for the sake of service, and the like, in society at large. Higher civilization has set these ideals, which the family life has furnished, before it as the goals of progress.

Thus we have a brief presentation of the claim of the family to be regarded not only as the primary, but also as the most important institution of human society. While primarily its function is the birth and proper rearing of children, yet in performing this function it has become the chief medium for carrying and nourishing the essential values of civilization. It has been the cradle of civilization in the past, and something like its organization at best seems to be the normal goal which men set up for society at large to realize. The nation whose family life decays, therefore, rots at the core; for its chief spring of social and civic virtue dries up.

The Family and Industry. — The family is so dependent upon industrial conditions in performing its functions, and industrial conditions so react upon the family life, that a word must be said about the interrelations of these two before we undertake to trace the origin and development of the family as a human institution.

The Domestic Arts. Primitively all industry centered

in the family. Modern industry is but an enormous expansion of primitive housekeeping; that is, the preparation of food and clothing and shelter by the primitive family group for its own existence is the germ out of which all modern industry has developed. The very word *economics* means the science or the art of the household.

In primitive communities and in new settled districts the family often carried on all essential industrial activities. It produced all the raw material, manufactured the finished products, and consumed the same. This development of household arts greatly aided the development of human culture and at the same time integrated the family, as it made the family a more or less self-sufficing economic unit. The family was in this stage of social and industrial development a more complete miniature society or community, and the tradition grew up that these domestic arts must be maintained in the home if the family was to retain its integrity.

But with the growth of a complex civilization there has come a great industrial division of labor, and the family has delegated industrial activity after activity to some other institution until at the present time the modern family performs scarcely any industrial activities, except the preparation of food for immediate consumption. Even this in modern cities seems about to be delegated to some other institution.

All that need be said at present about the delegation of the industrial activities of the family to other industrial institutions is that the movement is not one which need cause any anxiety so long as it does not interfere with the essential function of the family, namely, the birth and

proper rearing of children. Even though children can no longer learn the domestic arts and the rudiments of industry in their home life, still it is possible through manual, industrial, and domestic science training in our public schools to teach these to all children. And the removal of arts and industries from the home, even such essential industries as the preparation of food, is not to be regarded as necessarily evil. It may be a boon if it gives more time to the parents, especially to the mother, for the proper care and bringing up of the children.

The Wages of Men. This removal of industries from the home, however, while theoretically to be welcomed, has in practice under present economic conditions not always had the beneficent effect of giving more time to parents for the proper care of their children and of securing a better home life. On the contrary, the removal of industries from the home has often been followed by the removal of both parents and children, the rendering of the family's economic situation precarious, and the practical disintegration of home life. The wages of the male worker outside of the home have too often tended to conform to the single man's standard, though government statistics show that the earnings of the husband constitute 80 per cent of the total income of the average wage-earner's family in the United States. Thus the National Bureau of Economic Research in 1927 showed that the average yearly income of all male wage earners in the United States that year was $1205, although researches established at nearly the same time the fact that the least income on which a family consisting of two parents and three young children could maintain a decent standard of living was, for large

cities, $1700 to $1900 a year, and for smaller cities from $1200 to $1500 a year. In the year 1915 investigation showed that four fifths of the heads of wage-earning families received less than $800 a year, while it was estimated that, on account of the rise in the cost of living, from $950 to $1200, according to locality, was necessary to maintain a decent standard of living for a family of five. Evidently modern industry has been quite regardless of the family, and has in many instances made it very difficult to maintain a proper home life.

The Labor of Women. This has been all the more the case because in many instances married women, often mothers, have gone into factories to supplement the insufficient income of the family. Under such circumstances the home has often become a mere lodging place, children have been neglected and allowed to grow up on the streets and hence as unsocialized individuals. In 1930 women wage earners formed 22.1 per cent of the total breadwinners in the United States. Of the ten and a half million women wage earners, 2,416,288 were employed in manufacturing industries. However, only about 23 per cent of all the women at work for wages in 1920 were married. In foreign countries the proportion is much larger, and since 1900 the number has more than doubled in the United States. It is too late to stop this movement, but the labor of married women should be strictly regulated by the state. They should be excluded from certain industries, their hours of labor, wages, and conditions of work should be prescribed, and above all, their employment for a given period before and after the birth of children should be prohibited; for it has been found that wherever

mothers of very young children are employed outside of the home, there is an abnormally high rate of infant mortality.

Even the labor of young unmarried women in factories has many dangers to the family; for they are by such work but poorly prepared for the duties of wifehood and motherhood and in some cases their health may be impaired. These evils can be met, however, by greater attention to education in the domestic arts in our schools and by stricter regulation of the conditions of the labor of women by the state in all respects.

The Labor of Children. Perhaps the climax of the encroachment of modern industry upon the home comes when it takes young children out of the home and puts them to work. Over one million children under fifteen years of age were employed in the United States in 1920 outside of their families, though only about one fourth of these were in factories, shops, stores, and mines. The labor of children outside of the home has sprung very largely from the insufficiency of family income noted above. While child labor is often defended as having the merit of giving the child some industrial training, yet careful and extensive investigations show that its net result is to dwarf the child in body and mind, to lower the wages of adults, and above all, to deprive the child of that education which alone can prepare him for efficient citizenship. The drafting of children who have not yet completed their work in the grades into industry must be regarded, therefore, as altogether an evil.

Yet the remedy for these evils is not to put industrial work back in the home. That, under modern conditions,

produces what we call "the sweat shop," which is perhaps a worse evil than any we have described. The remedy is rather in so organizing industry that it will not needlessly encroach upon our family life — in securing adequate wages, reasonable hours, wholesome conditions of work in industry. This means that our industry must be organized about our family life rather than our family life about industry.

The Subordination of Industry to the Family Life is necessary, therefore, from a social point of view. Industry, as we have seen, was primitively an adjunct of the family life, and all modern industry, if rightfully developed, should be but an adjunct to the family life. Industrial considerations must be, therefore, subordinate to domestic considerations, that is, to considerations of the welfare of parents and their children in the family group. One trouble with modern society is that industry has come to dominate as an independent interest that oftentimes does not recognize its reasonable and socially necessary subordination to the higher interests of society. There can be no sane and stable family life until we are willing to subordinate the requirements of industry to the requirements of the family for the good birth and proper rearing of children. This means that the securing of a normal family life for all classes, rather than mere economic prosperity, should be the first consideration in all attempts at social reconstruction. But the full significance of a normal family life for human welfare and how it can be secured will be evident only when we have considered the origin, history, and present condition of the family.

Summary. — Primary, or face-to-face groups are the key to the understanding of our social life; for in them social

life is at its maximum. They perform three chief functions: (1) they socialize the individual; (2) they are the chief carriers of custom and tradition; (3) they are the source of primary social ideals or "social patterns." The family is the chief primary group and the most important of human institutions, since it controls largely the birth and the rearing of children. Because the family involves such a close association of both sexes and all ages and enlists so many of the forces that make or mar social life, it illustrates the problem of human relations — the "social problem" — in the clearest possible manner. The good and evil of our family life are sure to reflect themselves throughout society. If what has been said regarding the importance of the family as an institution is at all true, then it is evident that the securing of a normal family life for all classes must be the central aim of scientific social reconstruction. All that is involved in a "normal family life" will become evident, however, only as we proceed to the survey of all of our social problems.

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CHAPTER V

THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY

We must understand the biological roots of the family before we can understand the family as an institution, and especially before we can understand its origin. Let us note, then, briefly the chief biological facts connected with the family life.

The Biological Foundations of the Family. — (1) *The Family rests upon the Great Biological Fact of Sex.* While sex does not characterize all animal forms, still it does characterize all except the simplest forms of animal life. These simplest forms multiply or reproduce by fission, but such asexual reproduction is almost entirely confined to the unicellular forms of life. It may be inferred, therefore, that the higher animal types could not have been evolved without sexual reproduction, and something of the meaning or significance of sex in the whole life-process will, therefore, be helpful in understanding all of the higher forms of evolution. Biologists tell us that the meaning or purpose of sexual reproduction is to bring about greater organic variation. Now variation, as we have seen, is the raw material upon which natural selection acts to create the higher types. The immense superiority of sexual reproduction over asexual reproduction is due to the fact that it multiplies so greatly the elements of heredity in each new organism, for under sexual reproduction every new organism has two parents, four grandparents, and so on, each of which perhaps

contributes something to its heredity. The biological meaning of sex, then, is that it is a device of nature to bring about organic variation. From the point of view of the social life we may note also that sex adds greatly to its variety, enriching it with numerous fruitful variations which undoubtedly further social evolution. The bareness and monotony of a social life without sex can readily be imagined.

While the differences between the sexes have been mainly elaborated through the differences of reproductive function, yet these differences have come to be fundamental to the whole nature of the organism. In the higher animals, therefore, the sexes differ profoundly in many ways from each other. Biologists tell us that the chief difference between the male and female organism is a difference in metabolism, that is, in the rapidity of organic change which goes on within the body. In the male metabolism is much more rapid than in the female; hence the male organism is said to be more katabolic. In the female the rapidity of organic change is less; hence the female is said to be more anabolic. Put in more familiar terms, the male tends to expend energy, is more active, hence also stronger; the female tends more to store up energy, is more passive, conservative, and weaker. These fundamental differences between the sexes express themselves in many ways in the social life. The differences between man and woman, therefore, are not to be thought of as due simply to social customs and usages, the different social environment of the two sexes, but are even more due to a radical and fundamental difference in their whole nature. The belief that the two sexes would become like each other in character if given the same environment is, therefore, erroneous.

That sex differences are often inborn, and not acquired, may be readily seen by observing children of different sex. Even from their earliest years boys are more active, restless, energetic, destructive, untidy, and disobedient, while little girls are quieter, less restless, less destructive, neater, more orderly, and more obedient. These different innate qualities fit the sexes naturally for different functions in human society, and there is, therefore, a natural division of labor between them, which indeed may be said to be the fundamental division of labor in human society.

The causes which produce sex in the individual are probably beyond the control of man. Sex seems to be a form of Mendelian inheritance,[1] and is determined by the nature of the germ cells which unite to form the new individual. While the number of the two sexes at maturity varies in different species according to obscure factors, in practically all of the higher species, man included, they are relatively equal. In human society much depends upon this relative numerical equality of the two sexes. Hence it is fortunate that man does not know how to control the sex of offspring, for if he did the numerical equality of the two sexes might be disturbed and serious social results would follow.

(2) *The Influence of Parental Care.* Sex alone could never have produced the family in the sense of a relatively permanent group of parents and offspring. We do not begin to find the family until we get to those higher types where we find some parental care. In the lowest types the relation between the sexes is momentary and the survival of offspring is secured simply through the production of enormous numbers. Thus the sturgeon, a

[1] See Castle's *Heredity*, Chapter X.

low type of fish, produces between one and two million of eggs at a single spawning, from which it is estimated that not more than a dozen individuals survive till maturity is reached. Thus sexual reproduction of itself necessitates no parental care and in itself could give rise in no way to the family; but quite low in the scale of life we begin to find some parental care as a device to protect immature offspring and secure their survival without the expenditure of such an enormous amount of energy in mere physiological reproduction. Even among the fishes we find some that watch over the eggs after they are spawned and care for their young by leading them to suitable feeding grounds. In such cases a much smaller number of young need to be produced in order that a few may survive until maturity is reached. In the mammals the mother, obviously, must care for the young for some time, since mammals are animals that suckle their young. But this care of the young by a single parent only foreshadows the family as we understand it. Among the mammals it is not until we reach the higher types that we find care of offspring by both parents, — a practice, however, which is common among the birds. It is evident that as soon as both parents are concerned in the care of the offspring they have a much better chance of survival. Hence, natural selection favors the growth of this type of group life and develops powerful instincts to keep male and female together till after the birth and rearing of offspring. Such we find to be the condition among many of the higher mammals, such as some of the carnivora, and especially among the monkeys and apes and man.

If it is allowable at this point to generalize from the

facts given, it must be said that the family life is essentially a device of nature for the preservation of offspring through a more or less prolonged infancy. The family group and the instincts upon which it rests were undoubtedly, therefore, instituted by natural selection. Summing up, we may say, then, the animal family group owes its existence, first, to the production of child or immature forms that need more or less prolonged care; secondly, to the prolongation of this period of immaturity in the higher animals, and especially in man; thirdly, to the development, parallel with these two causes, of parental instincts which keep male and female together for the care of the offspring. It is evident, then, that the family life rests, not upon sex attraction, but upon the fact of the child and the corresponding psychological fact of parental instinct. The family, then, has been created by the very conditions of life itself and is not a man-made institution.

The Origin of the Family in the Human Species. — Two great theories of the origin of the family in the human species have in the past been more or less accepted, and these we must now examine and criticize. First, the traditional theory that the human family life was from the beginning a pure monogamy. Secondly, the so-called evolutionary theory that the human family life arose from confused if not promiscuous sex relations. The first of these theories, favored both by the Bible and Aristotle, held undisputed sway down to the middle of the nineteenth century. Then, after the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859, certain social theorists began to put forward the second theory in the name of evolution. In order that we may see precisely what the origin of the human

family life was, and its primitive form, we must now proceed to criticize these two theories, especially the last, which is known as the hypothesis of a primitive state of promiscuity.

The Habits of the Higher Animals. We have already spoken of the origin of the family group in the animal world generally, but it must be admitted that there are some difficulties in arguing directly from the lower animals to man. Man is so separated from the lower animals through having passed through many higher stages of an independent evolution that in many respects his life is peculiar to itself. This is true especially of his family life. If we survey the whole range of animal life and then the whole range of human life, we find that there are but two or three striking similarities between the family life of man and that of the brutes, but a great many striking dissimilarities. The similarities may be summed up by saying that man exhibits in common with all the animals the phenomena of courtship, that is, of the male seeking to win the female, also the phenomenon of male jealousy, and we may perhaps add an instinctive aversion to crossing with other species. These characteristics of his family life man shares with the brutes below him. There are, however, many things peculiar to the human family life that are found in no animal species below man. The most striking of these differences may be mentioned. (1) Man has no pairing season, as practically all other animals have. (2) The number of young born in the human species is on the whole much smaller than in any other animal species. (3) The dependence of offspring upon parents is far longer in the human species than in any other

species. (4) Man has an antipathy to incest or close inbreeding which seems to be instinctive. This is not found clearly in any animal species below man. (5) There is a tendency among human beings to artificial adornment during the period of courtship, but not to natural ornament to any extent, as among many animal species. (6) The indorsement of society is almost invariably sought, both among uncivilized and civilized peoples, before the establishment of a new family — usually through the forms of a religious marriage ceremony. (7) Chastity in married women is universally insisted upon, as the basis of human family life; and among higher civilized peoples there is equal insistence upon the chastity of women before marriage. (8) There is a feeling of modesty or of shame as regards matters of sex among the human beings. (9) In humanity we find, besides animal lust, spiritual affection, or love, as a bond of union between the two sexes.

None of these peculiarities of human family life are found in the family life of any animal species below man. It might seem, therefore, that man's family life must be regarded as a special creation unconnected with the family life of the brutes below him. But this view is hardly probable, rather is impossible from the standpoint of evolution. We must say that these peculiarities of human family life are to be explained through the fact that man has passed through many more stages of evolution, particularly of intellectual evolution, than any of the animals below him. If we examine these peculiarities of man's family life carefully, we will see that they all can be explained through natural selection and man's higher intellectual development. That man has no pairing season, has fewer offspring born,

and a longer period of dependence of the offspring upon parents, and the like, is directly to be explained through natural selection; while seeking the indorsement of society before forming a new family, sexual modesty, tendencies to artificial adornment, and the like, are to be explained through man's self-consciousness and higher intellectual development, also through the fuller development of his social instincts. The gap between the human family life and brute family life is, therefore, not an unbridgeable one.

That this is so, we see most clearly when we consider the family life of the higher apes — man's nearest cousins in the animal world. All of these apes, of which the chief representatives are the gorilla, orangutan, and the chimpanzee, live in relatively permanent family groups, usually monogamous. These family groups are almost human in many of their characteristics, such as the care which the male parent gives to the mother and her offspring, and the seeming affection which exists between all members of the group. Such a group of parents and offspring among the higher apes is, moreover, a relatively permanent affair, children of different ages being frequently found along with their parents in such groups. So far as the evidence of animals next to man, therefore, goes, there is no reason for supposing that the human family life sprang from confused or promiscuous sex relations in which no permanent union between male and female parent existed. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe, with Westermarck, that human family life is an inheritance from man's prehuman progenitor.

The Evidence from the Lower Human Races. — The evidence afforded by the lowest peoples in point of culture

even more clearly, if anything, refutes the hypothesis of a primitive state of promiscuity. The habits or customs of the lowest peoples were not well known previous to the nineteenth century. Therefore it was possible for such a theory as the patriarchal theory of the primitive family to remain generally accepted, as we have already said, down to the middle of the nineteenth century. This was the theory that the oldest or most primitive type of human family life is that depicted in the opening pages of the Book of Genesis, namely, a family life in which the father or eldest male of the family group is the absolute ruler of the group and practically owner of all persons and property. The belief that this was the primitive type of the human family life was first attacked by a German-Swiss philologist by the name of Bachofen in a work entitled *Das Mutterrecht* (The Matriarchate), published in 1861, in which he argued that antecedent to the patriarchal period was a matriarchal period, in which women were dominant socially and politically, and in which relationships were traced through mothers only. Bachofen got his evidence for this theory from certain ancient legends, such as that of the Amazons, and other remains in Greek and Roman literature, which seemed to point to a period antecedent to the patriarchal.

In 1876 Mr. J. F. McLennan, a Scotch lawyer, put forth, independently, practically the same theory, basing it upon certain legal survivals which he found among many peoples. With Bachofen, he argued that this matriarchal period must have been characterized by promiscuous relations of the sexes. In 1877 Mr. Lewis H. Morgan, an American ethnologist and sociologist, put forth again,

independently, practically the same theory, basing it upon an extensive study of the North American Indian tribes. Morgan had lived among the Iroquois Indians for years and had mastered their system of relationship, which previously had puzzled the whites. He found that they traced relationship through mothers only, and not at all along the male line. This method of reckoning relationship, moreover, he found also characterized practically all of the North American Indian tribes, and he argued that the only explanation of it was that originally sexual relations were of such an unstable or promiscuous character that they would not permit of tracing descent through fathers.

From these theories sociological writers put forth the conclusion that the primitive state was one of promiscuity, or, as Sir John Lubbock called it in his *Origin of Civilization*, one of " communism in women." Post, a German student of comparative jurisprudence, for example, summed up the theory by saying that " monogamous marriage originally emerged everywhere from pure communism in women, through the intermediate stages of limited communism in women, polyandry, and polygyny." Even Herbert Spencer in his *Principles of Sociology*, while he avoided accepting such an extreme theory, asserted that in the beginning sex relations were confused and unregulated, and that all forms of marriage — polyandry, polygyny, monogamy, and promiscuity — existed alongside of one another and that monogamy survived through its being the superior form.

Before giving a criticism in detail of this theory let us note whether the evidence from the lowest peoples confirms it. The lowest peoples in point of culture are not

the North American Indians nor the African Negroes, but certain isolated groups that live almost in a state of nature, without any attempt to cultivate the soil or to control nature in other respects. Such are the Bushmen of South Africa, the Australian Aborigines, the Negritos of the Philippine Islands and of the Andaman Islands, the Veddahs of Ceylon, and the Fuegians of South America. Now all these peoples, with a possible exception,[1] practice monogamy and live in relatively stable family groups. Their monogamy, however, is not of the type found in patriarchal times or among civilized peoples, but is a simple pairing monogamy, husband and wife remaining together indefinitely if children are born, but separating easily if childless. Westermarck in his *History of Human Marriage* shows undoubtedly that nothing approaching promiscuity existed among these lower peoples. Promiscuity is apt to be found at a higher stage of social development, and is especially apt to be found among the nature peoples after the white man has visited them and demoralized their family life. But in all these cases the existence of promiscuity is manifestly something exceptional and abnormal. Perhaps civilized peoples such as the Romans of the decadence have more nearly approximated the condition of promiscuity than any savage people of which we have knowledge. At any rate, the lowest existing savages found in the nineteenth century had definite forms of family life, and the type usually found was the simple pairing monogamy mentioned above.

[1] The Australian Aborigines. For evidence of promiscuity among some peoples, see Spencer and Gillen's *Native Tribes of Central Australia*, and Robert Briffault's *The Mothers*, Vols. I and II, Chaps. XI, XII, XIII.

Objections to the Hypothesis of a Primitive State of Promiscuity. — We may now briefly sum up the main criticisms of this theory of a primitive state of promiscuity, not only as we may derive them from inductive study of the higher animals and the lower peoples, but also as we may deduce them from known psychological and biological facts or principles.

(1) In the first place, then, the animals next to man, namely, the higher apes, do not show a condition of promiscuity.

(2) The evidence from the lower peoples does not show that such a condition exists or has ever existed among them.

(3) A third argument against this hypothesis may be gained from what we know of primitive economic conditions. Under the most primitive conditions, in which man had no mastery over nature, food supply was relatively scarce, and as a rule only very small groups of people could live together. The smallness of primitive groups, on account of the scarcity of food supply, would prevent anything like promiscuity on a large scale.

(4) A fourth argument of a deductive nature is that the jealousy of the male, which characterizes all higher animals and especially man, would prevent anything like the existence of sexual promiscuity. The tendency of man would have been to appropriate one or more women for himself and drive away all rivals. Long ago Darwin argued that this would prevent anything like the existence of a general state of promiscuity.

(5) A fifth argument against this theory may be got from the general biological fact that sexual promiscuity tends to pathological conditions unfavorable to fecundity,

that is, fertility, or the birth of offspring. Physicians have long ago ascertained this fact, and the modern prostitute gives illustration of it by the fact that she has few or no children. Among the lower animal species, in which some degree of promiscuity obtains, moreover, powerful instincts keep the sexes apart except at the pairing season. Now, no such instincts exist in man. Promiscuity in man would, therefore, greatly lessen the birth rate, and any group that practiced it to any extent would soon be eliminated in competition with other groups that did not practice it.

(6) We have finally the general social fact that promiscuity would lead to the neglect of children. Promiscuity means that the male parent does not remain with the female parent to care for the offspring and, therefore, in the human species it would mean that the care of children would be thrown wholly upon the mother. This means that the children would have less chance of surviving. Not only would promiscuity lead to lessening the birth rate, but it would lead to a much higher mortality in children born. This is found to be a striking fact wherever we find any degree of promiscuity among any people. Hence, promiscuity would soon exterminate any people that practiced it extensively in competition with other peoples that did not practice it.

From all of these lines of argument, without going over the evidence in greater detail, it seems reasonable to conclude with Westermarck "that the hypothesis of a primitive state of promiscuity has no foundation in fact and is essentially unscientific." The facts put forth in support of the theory do not justify the conclusion, Westermarck says, that promiscuity has ever been a general practice

among a single people and much less that it was the primitive state. Promiscuity is found, however, more or less in the form of sexual irregularities or immorality among all peoples; more often, however, among the civilized than among the uncivilized, but among no people has it ever existed unqualified by more enduring forms of sex relation. Moreover, because promiscuity breaks up the social bonds, throws the burden of the care of children wholly upon the mother, and lessens the birth rate, we are justified in concluding that promiscuity is essentially an antisocial practice. This agrees with the facts generally shown by criminology and sociology, that the elements practicing promiscuity to any great extent in modern societies are those most closely related with the degenerate and criminal elements. Those elements, in other words, in modern society that practice promiscuity are on the road to extinction, and if a people generally were to practice it there is no reason to believe that such a people would meet with any different fate.

The Earliest Form of the Family Life in the Human Species, therefore, is probably that of the simple pairing monogamous family found among many of the higher animals, especially the anthropoid apes, and also found among the lower peoples. This primitive monogamy, however, as we have already seen, was not accompanied by the social, legal, and religious elements that the historic monogamic family has largely rested upon. On the contrary, this primitive monogamy rested solely upon an instinctive basis, and, as we have seen, unless children were born it was apt to be relatively unstable. Permanency in family relations among primitive peoples depended largely

upon the birth of children. Thus we find confirmed our conclusion drawn some time ago that family life rests primarily upon the parental instinct. That it still so rests is shown by the fact, as we shall see later, that divorce is many times more common among couples that have no children than among those that have children.

Some General Conclusions, both of theoretical and of practical bearing, may here be pointed out. We have seen that the biological processes of life have created the family, and that the family, as an institution, rests upon these biological conditions. Hence it is not too much to say, first, that the family is not a man-made institution; and, secondly, that it rests upon certain fundamental instincts of human nature. Both of these statements are also true to a certain extent of human society in general. There is a sense in which social organization is not wholly man-made, and we have already seen that human institutions rest to some extent upon human instincts. This is not saying, of course, that man has not modified and may not modify social organization and human institutions through his reason, but it is saying that the essential elements in human institutions and in the social order must correspond to the conditions of life generally and to the instincts which natural selection has implanted in the species. To attempt to reorganize human society or to reconstruct institutions regardless of the biological conditions of life, or regardless of human instincts, is to meet with certain failure.

A practical conclusion which may be drawn also is that those people who advocate sexual promiscuity in present society, or free love, as they please to style it, are advocating a condition which would result in the elimination of any

group that practiced it. Promiscuity, or even great instability in the family life, as we have already seen, would lead to the undermining of everything upon which a higher civilization rests. The people in modern society who advocate such theories as free love, therefore, are more dangerous than the worst anarchist or the most revolutionary socialist. In other words, the modern attack upon the family is more of a menace to all that is worth while in human life than all attacks upon government and property, although it is not usually resented as such; and it is one of the most serious signs of the times that many intellectual people have indorsed such views. We must reëmphasize, therefore, the fact that the family is the central institution of human society, that industry and the state must subordinate themselves to its interest. Neither the state nor industry has had much to do with the origin of the family, and neither the state nor industry may safely determine its forms independent of the biological requirements for human survival. Moreover, it is evident that human society from the beginning has in more or less instinctive, and also in more or less conscious, ways attempted to regulate the relations between the sexes with a view to controlling the reproductive process. While material civilization is mainly a control over the food process, moral civilization involves a control over the reproductive process, that is, over the birth and rearing of children; and such control over the reproductive process, which has certainly been one of the aims of all social organization in the past, whether of savage peoples or of civilized peoples, evidently precludes anything like the toleration of promiscuity or even of free love.

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CHAPTER VI

THE FORMS OF THE FAMILY

The family as an institution has varied greatly in its forms from age to age and from people to people. This is what we should expect, seeing that all organic structures are variable. Such variations in human institutions are due partly to the influences of the environment, partly to the state of knowledge, and partly to many other causes as yet not well understood. The family illustrates in greater or less degree the working of these causes of variation and of change in human institutions.

The Maternal and Paternal Families. — As regards the general form of the family we have to note first of all the two great forms which we may characterize respectively as "the maternal family" and "the paternal family." As we have already seen, Bachofen, Morgan, and others discovered a condition of human society in which relationship was traced through mothers only, and in which property or authority descended along the female line rather than along the male line. Further investigation and research have shown that up to recent times, say up to a century ago, one half of all the peoples of the world, if we reckon them by nations and tribes rather than by numbers, practiced this system of reckoning kinship through mothers only, and passed property and authority down along the female line. Ethnologists and sociologists have practically concluded, from the amount of evidence now collected, that this ma-

ternal or metronymic system was the primitive system of tracing relationships, and that it was succeeded among the European peoples by the paternal system so long ago that the transition from the one to the other has been forgotten, except as some trace of it has been preserved in customs, legends, and the like.

Among many tribes of the North American Indians this metronymic or maternal system was peculiarly well-developed. Children took their mother's name, not their father's name; belonged to their mother's clan, not their father's clan; and the chief transmitted his authority, if hereditary, not to his own son, but to his eldest sister's son. The relatives on the father's side, indeed, were quite ignored. Frequently the maternal uncle had more legal authority over the children than their own father, seeing that the children belonged to his clan, that is, to their mother's clan.

Now, Bachofen claimed not only that in this stage was kinship reckoned through mothers only, but that women were dominant socially and politically; that there existed a true matriarchy, or rule of the mothers. Do the facts support Bachofen's theory? Let us see. The Wyandot Indians, a branch of the Iroquois, were a typical maternal or metronymic people. Among them, without any doubt, the women had a position of influence socially and even politically which often is not found among peoples of higher culture. For example, among the Wyandots the government of the clan was in the hands of four women councilors (Matrons), who were elected by all the adults in the clan. These four women councilors, however, elected a Peace Sachem, who carried out the will of the clan in all matters

pertaining to peace generally. Moreover, the councilors of the several clans, four fifths of whom were women, met together to form the Tribal Council; but in this Tribal Council the women sat separate, not participating in the deliberations, but exercising only a veto power on the decisions of the men. In matters of war, however, government was intrusted to two war chiefs elected from the tribe generally, the women here only having the right to veto the decision of the tribe to enter upon the warpath. Thus we see that while the women of the Iroquois Indians had a great deal of social and political influence, the actual work of government was largely turned over by them to the men, and especially was this true of directing the affairs of the tribe in time of war. There is no doubt, however, that in the maternal stage of social evolution women had an influence in domestic, religious, and social matters much greater than they had at many later stages of social development. Among the Zuñi of New Mexico, for example, another well-developed maternal people, marriage is always arranged by the bride's parents. The husband goes to live with his wife, and is practically a guest in his wife's house all his life long, she alone having the right of divorce. Indeed, among all maternal peoples the rule is that the husband goes to live with the wife, and not the wife with the husband, the children, as we have already seen, keeping the mother's name and belonging to her kindred or clan.

Nevertheless we cannot agree with Bachofen that a true matriarchy, or government by women, ever existed. On the contrary, among all of these maternal peoples, while the women may have much influence socially and

politically, the men, on account of their superior strength, are intrusted with the work not only of protecting and providing for the families and driving away enemies, but also largely with the work of maintaining the internal government and order of the people. Strictly speaking, therefore, there has never been a matriarchal stage of social evolution, but rather a maternal or metronymic stage.

We have already said that this stage was probably the primitive one. How are we to explain, then, that primitive man reckoned kinship through mothers only? Was this due, as Morgan thought, to a primitive practice of promiscuity which prevented tracing relationships through fathers? The reply is, that among the many maternal peoples now well known, among whom relationships are traced through mothers only, we find no evidence of the practice of general promiscuity now or even in remote times. The North American Indians, for example, had quite definite forms of the family life and were very far removed from the practice of promiscuity, though they traced relationship through mothers only. It is evident that the causes of the maternal family and the maternal system of relationship are not so simple as Morgan supposed. What, then, were the causes of the maternal system? It is probable that man in the earliest times did not know the physiological connection between father and child. The physiological connection between mother and child, on the other hand, was an obvious fact which required no knowledge of physiology to establish; therefore, nothing was more natural than for primitive man to recognize that the child was of the mother's blood, but not of the

father's blood. Therefore, the child belonged to the mother's people and not to the father's people. If it be asked whether it is possible that there could be any human beings so ignorant that they do not know the physiological connection between father and child, the reply is, that this is apparently the case among a number of very primitive peoples, even down to recent times. It is not infrequent among these peoples to find conception and childbirth attributed to the influence of the spirits, rather than to relations between male and female. While, therefore, a social connection between the father and the children was recognized, leading the father to provide in all ways for his children, as fathers do whether among civilized or uncivilized peoples, yet the blood relationship between the father and the child could not have been clear in the most primitive times.

Perhaps an even more efficient cause, however, of the maternal system was the fact that the mother in primitive times was the stable element in the family life, the constant center of the family. The husband was frequently away from home, hunting or fighting, and oftentimes failed to return. Nothing was more natural, therefore, than that the child should be reckoned as belonging to the mother, take her name and belong to her kindred or clan. Moreover, after the custom of naming children from mothers and reckoning them as belonging to the mother's clan was established, it could not be displaced by the mere discovery of the physiological connection between the father and the child. On the contrary social habits, like habits in the individual, tend to persist until they work badly. We find, therefore, the maternal system persisting among peoples

who for many generations had come fully to recognize the physiological connection of father and child. Indeed, the maternal system could never have been done away with if social evolution had not brought about new and complex conditions which caused the system to break down and to be replaced by the paternal system.

The Paternal and the Patriarchal Family. — At a certain stage, then, we find a great change in the organization of the family, which probably took place slowly and largely unconsciously. The family life becomes definitely organized about the male element, and the maternal system disappears. At first the paternal family appears with children taking the father's name and property and titles passing along the male line. Then there develops that extreme form of the paternal family which we know as the *patriarchal* family, in which the authority of the husband and father has become supreme and the position of the wife and children has been reduced, if not to that of property, at least to that of subject persons. Classical pictures of patriarchal family life may be found in the pages of the Old Testament. What, then, were the causes which brought about the breakdown of the maternal system and the gradual development, first of a paternal, and then of a patriarchal system? Some of these causes we can clearly make out from the study of social history.

(1) War was unquestionably a cause of the breakdown of the maternal system through the fact that women were captured in war, held as slaves, and made wives or concubines by their captors. These captured wives were regarded as the property of the captor. Any children born to them were, therefore, also regarded as the property of the captor.

Furthermore, these captured wives were separated from their kindred, and their children could not possibly belong to any clan except their husband's. Manifestly this cause could not have worked in the earliest times, when slave captives were not valuable; but as soon as slavery became instituted in any form, then women slaves were particularly valued, not only for their labor, but because they might be either concubines or wives. It is evident, then, that war and slavery would thus indirectly tend to undermine the maternal system.

(2) Wife purchase would operate in the same way. Among peoples that had developed a commercial life as well as slavery it early became the practice to purchase wives. It is evident that these purchased wives would be regarded as a sort of property, and the husband would naturally claim the children as belonging to him. Among certain North American Indians we find exactly this state of affairs. If a man married a wife without paying the purchase price for her, then her children took her name and belonged to her clan; but if he had purchased her, say with a number of blankets, then the children took his name and belonged to his clan.

(3) The decisive cause, however, of the breakdown of the maternal system was the development of the pastoral stage of industry. Now, the grazing of flocks and herds requires considerable territory and necessitates small and compact groups widely separated from one another. Hence, in the pastoral stage the wife must go with the husband and be far removed from the influence and authority of her own kindred. This gave the husband greater power over his wife. Moreover, the care of flocks and herds accen-

tuated the value of the male laborer, while primitively woman had been the chief laborer. In the pastoral stage the man had the main burden of caring for the flocks and herds. Under such circumstances nothing was more natural than that the authority of the owner of the family property should gradually become supreme in all matters, and we find, therefore, among all pastoral peoples that the family is itself a little political unit, the children taking the father's name, property and authority passing down along the male line, while the eldest living male is usually the ruler of the whole group.

(4) After all these causes came another factor — ancestor worship. While ancestor worship exists to some extent among maternal peoples, it is usually not well-developed for some reason or other until the paternal stage is reached. Ancestor worship, being the worship of the departed ancestors as heroes, seems to develop more readily where the line of ancestors are males. It may be suggested that the male ancestor is apt to be a more heroic figure than the female ancestor. At any rate, when ancestor worship became fully developed it powerfully tended to reënforce the authority of the patriarch, because he was, as the eldest living ancestor, the representative of the gods upon earth, therefore his power became almost divine. Religion thus finally came in to place the patriarchal family upon a very firm basis.

Thus we see how each of these two great forms, the maternal family and the paternal family, arose out of natural conditions, and therefore they may be said to represent two great stages in the social evolution of man. It is hardly necessary to point out that civilized societies

are now apparently entering upon a third stage, in which there will be relative equality given to the male and the female elements that go to make up the family.

Polyandry. — We must notice now the various forms of marriage by which the family has been constituted among different peoples and in different ages. Marriage, like the family itself, is variable, and an indefinite number of forms may be found among various peoples. We shall notice, however, only the three leading forms, — polyandry, polygyny, and monogamy, — and attempt to show the natural conditions which favor each. It is evident that if we assume that the primitive form of the family was that of a simple pairing monogamy, the burden is laid upon us to show how such different types as polyandry and polygyny arose.

Polyandry, or the union of one woman with several men, is a relatively rare form of marriage and the family, found only in certain isolated regions of the world. It is particularly found in Tibet, a barren and inhospitable plateau lying north of India and adjoining China proper on the west. It is also found in certain other isolated mountainous regions in India, and down to recent times also in Arabia. In none of these places does it exist exclusively, but rather alongside of monogamy and perhaps other forms of the family. Thus in Tibet the upper classes practice polygyny and monogamy, while among the lower classes we find polyandry and monogamy. In all these regions where polyandry occurs, moreover, it is to be noted that the conditions of life are harsh and severe. Tibet is an exceptionally inhospitable region, with a climate of arctic rigor, the people living mainly by grazing.

Under such circumstances it is conceivably difficult for one man to support and protect a family. At any rate, the form of polyandry which we find in Tibet suggests that such economic conditions may have been the main cause of its existence. Ordinarily in Tibet a polyandrous family is formed by an older brother taking a wife, and then admitting his younger brothers into partnership with him. The older brother is frequently absent from home, looking after the flocks, and in his absence one of the younger brothers assumes the headship of the family. Under such circumstances we can see how the natural human instincts which would oppose polyandry under ordinary circumstances, namely, the jealousy of the male, might become greatly modified, or cease to act altogether. Certain other conditions besides economic ones might also favor the existence of polyandry, such as the scarcity of women. Summing up, we can say, then, that this rare form of the family seems to have as its causes: (1) In barren and inhospitable countries the labor of one man is sometimes found not sufficient to support a family. (2) Also there probably exists in such regions an excess of males. This might be due to one of two causes: First, the practice of exposing female infants might lead to a scarcity of women; secondly, in such regions it is found that from causes not well understood a larger number of males are born. It may be noted as a general fact that when the conditions of life are hard in human society, owing to famine, war, or barrenness of the soil, a larger number of male births take place. We may therefore infer that this would disturb the numerical proportion of the sexes in such regions. (3) A third cause may be suggested as

having something to do with the matter, namely, that habits of close inbreeding, or intermarriage, might perhaps tend to overcome the natural repugnance to such a relation. Moreover, close inbreeding also, as the experiments of stock-breeders show, would tend to produce a surplus of male births, and so would act finally in the same way as the second cause.

Polygyny,[1] or the union of one man with several women, is a much more common form of marriage. It is, in fact, to be found sporadically among all peoples and in all ages. It has perhaps existed at least sporadically from the most primitive times, because we find that at least one of the anthropoid apes, namely, the gorilla, practices it to some extent. It is manifest, however, that it could not have existed to any extent among primitive men, except where food supply was exceptionally abundant. In the main, polygyny is a later development, then, which comes in when some degree of wealth has been accumulated, that is, sufficient food supply to make it possible for one man to support several families. Polygyny came in especially after women came to be captured in war and kept as slaves or wives. The practice of wife capture, indeed, and the honor attached to the custom, had much to do in making the practice of polygyny common among certain peoples. Wherever slavery has existed, we may also note, polygyny, either in its legal form or in its illegal form of concubinage, has flourished. Polygyny, indeed, is closely

[1] The word "polygamy" is too broad in its meaning to use as a scientific term for this form of the family. "Polygamy" comes from two Greek words meaning "much married;" hence it includes "polyandry" (having several husbands) and "polygyny" (having several wives).

related with the institution of slavery and is practically coextensive with it. In the ancient world it existed among the Hebrews and among practically all of the peoples of the Orient, and also sporadically among our own Teutonic ancestors. In modern times polygyny still exists among the Mohammedan peoples and to a greater or less degree among all semicivilized peoples. It exists in China in the form of concubinage. It even exists in the United States, in clandestine form. In 1852 polygamy was proclaimed a doctrine of the Mormon Church and was practiced openly for many years; the church withdrew its sanction of plural marriages in 1890.

Two facts always need to be borne in mind regarding polygyny: First, that wherever it is practiced it is relatively confined to the upper and wealthy classes, for the reason that the support of more than one family is something which only the wealthy classes in a given society could assume. Secondly, it follows that under ordinary circumstances only a small minority of a given population practice polygyny, even in countries in which it is sanctioned. In Mohammedan countries like Turkey and Egypt, for example, it is estimated that not more than five per cent of the families are polygynous, while in other regions the percentage seems to be still smaller. The reason for this is not only the economic one just mentioned, but that everywhere the sexes are relatively equal in numbers, and therefore it is impossible for polygyny to become a widespread general custom. If some men have more than one wife it is evident that other men will probably have to forego marriage entirely. This is not saying that under certain circumstances, namely, the importation of large

numbers of women, a higher per cent of polygynous families may not exist. It is said that among the negroes on the west coast of Africa the number of polygynous families reaches as high as fifty per cent, owing to the fact that female slaves are largely imported into that district, and that they serve not only as wives, but do the bulk of the agricultural labor, the male negro preferring female slaves, who can do his work and be wives at the same time, to male slaves. But such cases as these are altogether exceptional and manifestly could not become general.

Summing up, we may say that the causes of polygyny are, then:

(1) First of all, the brutal lust of man. No doubt man's animal propensities have had much to do with the existence of this form of the family. Nevertheless, while male sensuality is at the basis of polygyny, it would be a mistake to think that sensuality is an adequate explanation in all cases. On the contrary, we find many other causes, chiefly, perhaps, economic, operating also to favor the development of polygyny.

(2) One of these is wife capture, as we have already seen. The captured women in war were held as trophies and slaves, and later became wives or concubines. Among all peoples at a certain stage the honor of wife capture has alone been a prolific cause of polygyny.

(3) Another cause, after slavery became developed, was the high value set on women as laborers. Among many barbarous peoples the women do the main part of the work. They are more tractable as slaves, and consequently a high value is set upon their labor. As we have already seen, these female slaves usually serve at the same time as concubines, if not legal wives of their masters.

(4) Another cause which we can perhaps hardly appreciate at the present time is the high valuation set on children. We see this cause operating particularly in the case of the patriarchs of the Old Testament. Under the patriarchal family great value was set upon children as necessary to continue the family line. Where the device of adoption was not resorted to, therefore, in case of barrenness or the birth exclusively of female children, nothing was more natural than that polygyny should be resorted to in order to insure the family succession. In the patriarchal family also a high valuation was necessarily set upon children, because the larger the family grew the stronger it was.

(5) Finally, religion came to sanction polygyny. The religious sanction of polygyny cannot be looked upon as one of its original causes, but when once established it reacted powerfully to reënforce and maintain the institution. How the religious sanction came about we can readily see when we remember that very commonly religions confuse the practice of the nobility with what is noble or commendable morally. The polygynous practices of the nobility, therefore, under certain conditions came to receive the sanction of religion. When this took place polygyny became firmly established as a social institution, very difficult to uproot, as all the experience of Christian missionaries among peoples practicing polygyny goes to show. We may note also the general truth, that while religion does not originate human institutions or the forms of human association, it is preëminently that which gives fixity and stability to institutions through the supernatural sanction that it accords them.

Some judgment of the social value of polygyny may not be out of place in connection with this subject. Admitting, as all students of social history must, that in certain times and places the polygynous form of family has been advantageous, has served the interests of social survival and even of civilization, yet viewed from the standpoint of present society it seems that our judgment of polygyny must be wholly unfavorable. In the first place, as we have already seen, polygyny is essentially an institution of barbarism. It arose largely through the practice of wife capture and the keeping of female slaves. While often adjusted to the requirements of barbarous societies, it seems in no way adjusted to a high civilization. Polygyny, indeed, must necessarily rest upon the subjection and degradation of women. Necessarily the practice of polygyny must disregard the feelings of women, for women are jealous creatures as well as men. No high regard for the feelings of women, therefore, would be consistent with the practice of polygyny. Finally, all the evidence that we have goes to show that under polygyny children are neglected, and, at least from the standpoint of a high civilization, inadequately socialized. This must necessarily be so, because in the polygynous family the care of the children rests almost entirely with the mother. While we have no statistics of infant mortality from polygynous countries, it seems probable that infant mortality is high, and social workers in communities with polygynous families quite generally testify that delinquent children are especially found in such households. Fatherhood, in the full sense of the word, can hardly be said to exist under polygyny.

Those philosophers, like Schopenhauer, who advocate the legalizing of polygyny in civilized countries, are hardly worth replying to. It is safe to say that any widespread practice of polygyny in civilized communities would lead to a reversion to the moral standards of barbarism in many if not in all matters. That polygyny is still a burning question in the United States of the twentieth century is merely good evidence that we are not very far removed yet from barbarism.

Monogamy, as we have already seen, has been the prevalent form of marriage in all ages and in all countries. Wherever other forms have existed monogamy has existed alongside of them as the dominant, even though perhaps not the socially honored, form. All other forms of the family must be regarded as sporadic variations, on the whole unsuited to long survival, because essentially inconsistent with the nature of human society. In civilized Europe monogamy has been the only form of the family sanctioned for ages by law, custom, and religion. The leading peoples of the world, therefore, practice monogamy, and it is safe to say that the connection between monogamy and progressive forms of civilization is not an accident.

What, then, are the social advantages of monogamy which favor the development of a higher type of culture? These advantages are numerous, but perhaps the most important of them can be grouped under six heads.

(1) The number of the two sexes, as we have already seen, is everywhere approximately equal. This means that monogamy is in harmony with the biological conditions that exist in the human species. The equal number of the two sexes has probably been established through

natural selection. Why nature should favor this proportion of the sexes can perhaps be in part understood when we reflect that with such proportion there can be the largest number of family groups, and hence the best possible conditions for the rearing of offspring.

(2) Monogamy secures the superior care of children in at least two respects. First, it very greatly decreases mortality in children, because under monogamy both husband and wife unite in their care. Again, monogamy secures the superior upbringing and, therefore, the superior socialization of the child. In the monogamous family much greater attention can be given to the training of children by both parents. In other forms of the family not only is the death rate higher among children, but from the point of view of modern civilization, at least, they are inferiorly socialized.

(3) The monogamic family alone produces affections and emotions of the higher type. It is only in the monogamic family that the highest type of altruistic affection can be cultivated. It is difficult to understand, for example, how anything like unselfish affection between husband and wife can exist under polygyny. Under monogamy, husband and wife are called upon to sacrifice selfish desires in the mutual care of children. Monogamy is, therefore, fitted as a form of the family to foster altruism in the highest degree, and, as we have seen, the higher the type of altruism produced by the family life, the higher the type of the social life generally, other things being equal. It is especially to the credit of monogamy that it has created fatherhood in the fullest sense of the term, and therefore taught the male element in human society the

value of service and self-sacrifice. Under polygynous conditions the father cannot devote himself to any extent to his children or to any one wife, since he is really the head of several households, and therefore, as we have already noted, fatherhood in the fullest sense scarcely exists under polygyny.

(4) Under monogamy, moreover, all family relationships are more definite and strong, and thus family bonds, and ultimately social bonds, are stronger. In the polygynous household the children of the different wives are half brothers and half sisters, hence family affection has little chance to develop among them, and as a matter of fact between children of different wives there is constant pulling and hauling. Moreover, because the children in a polygynous family are only half brothers this immensely complicates relationships, and even the line of ancestors. Legal relations and all blood relationships are, therefore, more entangled. It is no inconsiderable social merit of monogamy that it makes blood relationships simple and usually perfectly definite. All of this has an effect upon society at large, because the cohesive power of blood relationship, even in modern societies, is something still worth taking into account. But of course the main influence of all this is to be found in the family group itself, because it is only under such simple and definite relations as we find in the monogamous family that there is ample stimulus to develop the higher family affections.

(5) From all this it follows that monogamy favors the development of high types of religion and morals, family affection being an indispensable root of any high type of ethical religion. That form of the family which favors the development of the highest type of this affection will,

therefore, favor the development of the highest type of religion. We see this even more plainly, perhaps, in ancient times than in the present time, because it was monogamy that favored the development of ancestor worship through making the line of ancestors clear and definite, and thus monogamy helped to develop this type of religion, which became the basis of still higher types.

(6) Monogamy not only favors the preservation of the lives of the children, but also favors the preservation of the lives of the parents, because it is only under monogamy that we find aged parents cared for by their children to any extent. Under polygyny the wife who has grown old is discarded for a young wife, and usually ends her days in bitterness. The father, too, under polygyny is rarely cared for by the children, because the polygynous household has never given the opportunity for close affections between parents and children. That monogamy, therefore, helps to lengthen life through favoring care of parents by children in old age is an element in its favor, for it adds not a little to the happiness of life, and so to the strength of social bonds, that people do not have to look forward to a cheerless and friendless old age.

In brief, the monogamic family presents such superior unity and harmony from every point of view that it is much more fitted to produce a higher type of culture. From whatever point of view we may look at it, therefore, there are many reasons why civilized societies cannot afford to sanction any other form of the family than that of monogamy.

The Causes which Determine the Form of the Family and Society. — As we have already seen, the form of the

family is undoubtedly greatly influenced by the form of industry. This is so markedly the case that some sociologists and economists have claimed that the form of the family life is but a reflection of the form of the industrial life; that the family in its changes and variations slavishly follows the changes in economic conditions. That such an extreme view as this is a mistake can readily be seen from a brief review of the causes which have produced certain types of family life in certain periods. Thus, the maternal type of the family cannot be said by any means to have been determined by economic conditions. On the contrary, primarily the maternal family, as we have seen, was determined by certain intellectual conceptions, namely, the absence of knowledge of the physiological connection between father and child, though the economic conditions of primitive life tended powerfully to continue the maternal family long after intellectual conditions had changed. Again, it has been said that the patriarchal family owed its existence entirely to a form of industry, namely, pastoral industry, but, as we have seen, other factors also operated to produce the patriarchal type of the family, such as war, religion, and perhaps man's inherent desire to dominate. Moreover, religion continued the patriarchal family in many cases long after pastoral industry had ceased to be the chief economic form.

So too with the forms of marriage. While polygyny has been claimed to be due entirely to economic causes, we have seen that these so-called economic causes have only been the opportunities for the polygynous instincts of man to assert themselves. These polygynous instincts of man have asserted themselves more or less

under all conditions of society, but under certain conditions, when there was an accumulation of wealth, and especially with the institution of slavery, they had greater opportunity to assert themselves than elsewhere. Thus the basic cause of polygyny is not economic, but psychological; and given certain moral and economic conditions of society, these polygynous tendencies assert themselves. Monogamy, on the other hand, is fundamentally determined by the biological fact of the numerical equality of the sexes. This is doubtless the main reason why monogamy has been the prevalent form of the family everywhere. Certain moral and psychological factors which go along with the development of higher types of culture have, however, powerfully reënforced monogamy. It is doubtful if economic conditions can to any extent be shown to have equally reënforced the monogamic life.

Our conclusion must be, then, that the family and all other forms of association are determined, not by the industrial life alone, though that is very influential, but by all the active factors in human association, geographic, economic, intellectual, and moral or cultural.

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CHAPTER VII

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY

While we cannot enter into the historical evolution of the family as an institution among the different civilized peoples, still it will be profitable for us to consider the history of the family among some single representative people in order that we may see the forces which have made and unmade the family life, and incidentally also to a great degree, the general social life of that people. We shall select the ancient Romans as the people among whom we can thus best study in outline the development of the family. While the family life of the ancient Hebrews is of particular interest to us because of the close connection of our religion and ethics with that of the Hebrews, yet in the family life of the ancient Romans constructive and destructive factors are more clearly marked and, therefore, the study of ancient Roman family life is best fitted to bring out those factors. The ancient Romans were among the earliest civilized of the Aryan peoples, and their institutions are, therefore, of peculiar interest to us as representing approximately the early Aryan type. What we shall say concerning Roman family life, moreover, will apply, with some modifications and qualifications, to the family life of other Aryan peoples, especially the Greeks. The Greeks and the Romans, indeed, were so closely related in their early culture that for the purpose of institutional history they may be considered practically one people. Without any attempt, then, to sketch the

history of the family as an institution in general, let us note some of the salient features of the family life of the ancient Romans.

The Early Roman Family. — (1) *Ancestor Worship as the Basis of the Early Roman Family.* What we have said thus far indicates a close connection between the family life and religion among all peoples. This was especially true of the early Romans. It may be said, indeed, that ancestor worship was the constitutive principle of their family life. Among them the family seemed to have lost in part its character as a purely social institution and to have become specialized into a religious institution. At any rate, the early Roman family existed very largely for the sake of perpetuating the worship of ancestors. Of course, ancestor worship could have had nothing to do with the origin of the family life among the Romans. The type of their family life was patriarchal, and we have already noticed the causes which brought about the existence of the patriarchal family. But while ancestor worship had nothing to do with the origin of the family, once it was thoroughly established it became the basis of the family life and transformed the family as an institution.

The early Romans shared certain superstitions with many primitive peoples, which, if not the basis of ancestor worship, powerfully reënforced it. They believed, for example, that the soul continued in existence after death, and that persons would be unhappy unless buried in tombs with suitable offerings, and that if left unburied, or without suitable offerings, the souls of these persons would return to torment the living. Inasmuch as in the patriarchal

family only sons could perform religious rites, that is, could make offerings to the departed spirits, these superstitions acted as a powerful stimulus to preserve the family in order that offerings might continue to be made at the graves of ancestors.

Thus, as we have already said, among the early Romans the family was practically a religious institution with ancestor worship as its constitutive principle. It is supposed by de Coulanges that in the earliest times the dead ancestors were buried beneath the hearth. At any rate, the hearth was the place where offerings were made to the departed ancestors, and the flame on the hearth was believed to represent the spirit of the departed. The house under such circumstances became a temple and the whole atmosphere of the family life was necessarily a religious one.

(2) *The Authority in the Early Roman Family* was vested, as in all partiarchal families, in the father or eldest living male of the family group. Under ancestor worship he became the living representative of the departed ancestors, the link between the living and the dead. Here we may note that the family was not considered as constituted simply of its living members, but that it included also all of its dead members. Inasmuch as the dead were more numerous and were thought to be more powerful than the living, they were by far the more important element in the life of the family. The position of the house father, as representative of the departed ancestors, and as the link between the living and the dead, naturally made his authority almost divine. Hence, the house father was himself, then, almost a deity, having absolute power over all persons

within the group, even to the extent of life and death. This absolute power, which was known in the early Roman family as the "patria potestas," could not, however, be exercised arbitrarily. The house father, as representative of the departed ancestors, was necessarily controlled by religious scruples and traditions. It was impossible for him to act other than for what he believed to be the will of the ancestors. Disobedience to him was, therefore, disobedience to the divine ancestors, and hence was sacrilegious.

(3) *Relationship in the Early Roman Family* was determined by community of worship, inasmuch as only descendants upon the male side could perform religious rites, and inasmuch as married women worshiped the household gods of their husbands' ancestors; therefore, only descendants on the male side could worship the same ancestors and were relatives in the full religious and legal sense. These were known as "agnates." Later, some relationship on the mother's side came to be recognized, but relatives on the mother's side were known as "cognates," and for a long time property could not pass to them. Indeed, in the earliest times the property of the family, as we have already implied, was kept as a unit, held in trust by the eldest living member of the family group for the good of all the family. In other words, the house father in earliest times did not possess the right to make a will but the property of the family passed intact from him to his eldest male heir.

(4) *The Marriage Ceremony among the Early Romans* was necessarily of a religious character. It was constituted essentially of the induction of the bride into the wor-

ship of her husband's ancestors. But before this could be done the bride's father had first to free her from the worship of her household gods, in later times a certificate of manumission being given not unlike the manumission of the slave. After the bride had been released from the worship of her father's ancestors, the bridegroom and his friends brought her to his father's house, where a ceremony of adoption was practically gone through with, adopting the bride into the family of her husband. The essence of this ceremony, as we have already said, was the induction of the bride into the worship of her husband's ancestors through their both making an offering on the family hearth and eating a sacrificial meal together. After that the wife worshiped at her husband's altar and had no claim upon the household gods of her father.

(5) *Divorce.* Under such circumstances it is not surprising that marriage was practically indissoluble. A wife who was driven out of her husband's household or deserted was without family gods of any sort, having no claim upon those of her husband, and became, therefore, a social outcast. Under such circumstances it is not surprising that divorce was practically unknown. It is said, indeed, that for five hundred and twenty years after Rome was founded there was not a single divorce in Rome. While this may be an exaggeration, it is historically certain that divorce was so rare in early Rome as to be practically unknown.

(6) *Adoption.* In case of a failure of sons to be born there was no taking of a second wife, as among the Hebrews. Polygyny was unknown in early Rome. The Roman device to prevent the failure of the family succession was adoption. Younger sons of other families were adopted

if no sons were born, and these adopted sons, taking the family name, became the same legally as sons by birth. Inasmuch as the position of younger sons in the patriarchal household was not an enviable one there was never lack of candidates for the position of eldest son in some family group in which no sons had been born.

Not only was the early Roman family life the most stable that the world has ever known, but it was also of a relatively pure type. Chastity was rigidly enforced among the women, but of course, as in all primitive peoples, was not enforced among the men. Still it was expected that the married men at least should remain relatively faithful to their wives. On the whole, therefore, the early Roman family life must be judged to have been of a singularly high and stable type. While the position of women and children in the early Roman family was one of subjection, the family itself was nevertheless of a high type.

(7) *The Decadence.* But it was inevitable that this type of family should decay, and this decay began comparatively early. Inasmuch as the early Roman family was based upon ancestor worship, a religion which was fitted for relatively small isolated groups, it was inevitable that the family life should decay with this ancestor worship. How early the decay of ancestor worship began it is impossible to say. Perhaps the nature gods, Jupiter, Venus, and the rest, existed alongside of ancestor worship from the earliest times. At any rate, we find their worship growing rapidly within the period of authentic history and undermining the domestic worship, while at a still later period skeptical philosophy undermined both religions. Along with the decay of ancestor worship went many economic

and political changes which marked the dissolution of the patriarchal family. Let us see what some of the first steps in this decadence were.

(8) *Steps in the Decadence.* (*a*) One of the earliest steps toward the breaking down of the patriarchal family which we find is the limiting of the power of the house father. This took place very early — as soon as the Council of Elders, or Senate, was formed to look after matters of collective interest. Gradually the paternal power diminished, until it was confined to matters concerning the family group proper.

(*b*) A second step was when the right to make a will was conceded. This right, as we have seen, did not exist in the earliest Roman times, but with the development of property and of a more complex economic life the house father was given the right to divide his property among his children, at first only on the male side, but later among any of his children, and still later to bequeath it to whom he pleased.

(*c*) Thus women came to be given the right to hold property, a thing which was unknown in the earliest times; and becoming property holders, their other rights in many respects began to increase. Originally the wife had no right to divorce her husband, but in the second century B.C. women also gained the right of divorcing their husbands.

(*d*) The rights of children were increased along with the rights of women, particularly of younger children.

(*e*) The right of plebeians to intermarry with the noble families became recognized. All of these changes we should perhaps regard as good in themselves, but they

nevertheless marked the disintegration of the patriarchal family. The decay of the family life did not stop with these changes, however, but went on to the decay of the family bonds themselves.

Later Roman Family Life. — By the beginning of the Christian era the relations between the sexes had become very loose. Men not only frequently divorced their wives, but women frequently divorced their husbands. Indeed, a complete revolution passed over the Roman family. Marriage became a private contract, whereas, as we have seen, in the beginning it was a religious bond. Many loose forms of marriage were developed, which amounted practically to temporary marriages. In all cases it was easy for a husband or wife to divorce each other for very trivial causes. Among certain classes of Roman society the instability of the family became so great that we find Seneca saying that there were women who reckoned their years by their husbands, and Juvenal recording one woman as having eight husbands in five years.

Women and children achieved their practical emancipation, as we would say. Women, especially, were free to do as they saw fit. Marriages were formed and dissolved at pleasure among certain classes, and among all classes the instability of the family life had become very great.

Along with all this, of course, went a growth of vice. It is not too much to say that the Romans of the first and second centuries A.D. approached as closely to a condition of promiscuity as any civilized people of which we have knowledge.

Causes of the Decadence. When we examine the causes

of this great revolution in Roman family life from the austere morals and stable family of the early Romans to the laxity and promiscuity of the later Romans, we find that these causes can perhaps be grouped under four or five principal heads. (1) First among all the causes we must put the destruction of the domestic religion, namely, ancestor worship, through the growth of nature worship and skeptical philosophy. The destruction of the domestic religion necessarily shattered the foundations of the Roman family, since, as we have already seen, there was the closest connection between the family life of the early Romans and ancestor worship. But it is not probable that ancestor worship was destroyed merely through the growth of nature worship and of skeptical philosophy. As we have already seen, it was a religion which was mainly adapted to isolated groups. Changes in economic and political conditions, therefore, were to some extent prior to the decay of the domestic religion.

(2) Changes in economic conditions, that is, in the form of industry, were, then, among the more important causes of the decay of the early Roman family. The patriarchal family belonged essentially to the pastoral stage of industry, and as soon as settled agricultural life, commerce, and manufacturing industry developed, this destroyed the isolated patriarchal groups, and so also in time affected even the religion which was their basis. Again, the growth of cities going along with these changes in the methods in obtaining a living destroyed the old conditions under which the family had been the social and political unit.

(3) We have therefore as a third cause the breaking up of old political conditions. Family groups were welded

into small cities and the authority of the patriarch was destroyed. Legislation designed to meet the new social conditions, especially such as we have already noted in the steps of the decadence, profoundly affected the whole family group and weakened family bonds.

(4) The growth of divorce and of vice may be put down as a fourth cause of the decay of the Roman family. Some may say that this was an effect of the decay of the Roman family rather than a cause, but it was also a cause as well as an effect, for it is a peculiarity of social life that what is at one stage an effect reacts to become a cause at a later stage; and this was certainly the case with the growth of divorce and vice in Rome, in its effect upon the Roman family. Moreover, much of this came from Greece through imitation. The family life had decayed in Greece much earlier than it had in Rome, and when Rome conquered Greece it annexed its vices also. While the most radical social changes do not usually come about merely through imitation, yet the imitation of a foreign people is frequently, in the history of a particular nation, one of the most potent causes in bringing about social changes. It was certainly so in the case of the growth of divorce and vice in Rome.

The Causes of Social Change. — We see that the causes of the decay of the Roman family life were very complex. This is true of all important social changes. It is impossible to reduce the causes of these changes to any single principle or set of causes. While changes in economic conditions were undoubtedly very influential in bringing about the profound changes in the Roman family, still we have no ground for regarding the economic changes as determinative of all the rest. We know as yet little of the development of industry

in antiquity. What little we do know, however, furnishes good ground for claiming that changes in the methods of getting a living are among the most influential causes of social change in general; but there is nothing which warrants the sweeping generalization of Karl Marx and his followers, "that the method of the production of the material life determines the social, political, and spiritual life process in general." On the contrary, the evolution of the Roman family clearly shows moral and psychological factors at work quite independent of economic causes. The decay of ancestor worship, for example, cannot be wholly attributed to the change in the method of getting a living. The very growth of population and accompanying changes in political conditions probably had quite as much to do with the undermining of ancestor worship. Moreover, while religion may not be an original determining cause of social forms, it is, nevertheless, as we have already seen, especially that which gives them stability and permanency, so much so that the life history of a culture is frequently the life history of a religion. The decay of religious ideas and beliefs, therefore, from any cause, frequently proves the important element working for social change in all societies. So, too, changes in political conditions, especially changes in law through new legislation, frequently prove a profound modifying influence in societies. Lastly, there are certain moral causes inherent in the individual, oftentimes involving perverted expressions of instinct, which lead to profound social changes. Such was the vice which Rome copied very largely from Greece, but which proved the final solvent in its family life.

In general we may say, then, that there is no single principle which will explain the evolution of the family from the earliest times down to the present. Any attempt to reduce the evolution of the family to a single principle, or to show that it has been controlled by a single set of causes, must inevitably end in failure. The economic determinism of Marx and his followers, the ideological conceptions of Hegel, the geographical influences of Buckle and his school, and like explanations, are all found wanting when they are applied to the actual history of the family. It is not different with the theories of recent sociologists, who would strive to explain all social changes through a single principle. Unilateral sociological principles, such as "Habit," "Environment," "Imitation," and "Consciousness of Kind" will not go further in explaining the changes in the family life than some of the older principles that we have just mentioned. Human life is, indeed, too complex to be explained in terms of any single principle or any single set of causes. The family in particular is an organic structure which responds first to one set of stimuli and then to another. Now it is modified by economic conditions, now by religious ideas, now by legislation, now by imitation, and so on through the whole set of possible stimuli which may impinge upon and modify the activity of a living organism. So it is with all institutions.

The Influence of Christianity upon the Family. — While we cannot study further the evolution of the family in any detail, still it is necessary, in order to avoid too great discontinuity, to notice in a few sentences the influence of Christianity upon the family in Western civilization.

Early Christianity, as we have already seen, found the

family life of the Greco-Roman world demoralized. The reconstruction of the family became, therefore, one of the first tasks of the new religion, and while other circumstances may have aided the church in this work, still on the whole it was mainly the influence of the early church that reconstituted the family life. From the first the church worked to abolish divorce, and fought as evil such vices as concubinage and prostitution, that came to flourish to such an extent in the Pagan world. Only very slowly did the early leaders of the church win the mass of the people to accepting their views as to the permanency of the marriage bond. In order to aid in making this bond more stable the early church recognized marriage as one of the sacraments, and, as implied, steadily opposed the idea of the later Roman Law that marriage was simply a private contract. The result was, eventually, that marriage came to be regarded again as a religious bond, and the family life took on once more the aspect of great stability. After the church had come fully into power in the Western world, legal divorce ceased to be recognized and legal separation was substituted in its stead. Thus the church succeeded in reconstituting the family life upon a stable basis, but the family after being reconstituted, was of a semipatriarchal type. Nothing was more natural than this, for the church had no model to go by except the paternal family of the Hebrew and Greek and Roman civilization. Nevertheless, the place of women and children in this semipatriarchal religious family established by the church was higher on the whole than in the ancient patriarchal family. The church put an end to the exposure of children, which had been common in Rome, and protected childhood in many ways. It also exalted the

place of woman in the family, though leaving her subject to her husband. The veneration of the Virgin tended particularly to give women an honored place socially and religiously. Only by the advocacy and practice of ascetic doctrines may the early church be said to have detracted from the social valuation of the family. On the whole the reconstituting of the family by the church must be regarded as its most striking social work. But the thing for us to note particularly is that the type of the family life created by the church was what we might call a semi-patriarchal type, in which the importance of husband and father was very much out of proportion to all the rest of the members of the family group. It was this semi-patriarchal family which persisted down to the nineteenth century.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE PROBLEM OF THE MODERN FAMILY

PASSING over the changes which affected the family during the Middle Ages, and the still more striking changes which came through the Reformation, let us now turn to the study of the problem of the family in the modern world.

Peculiarities of Modern Civilization. — We must note first some of the great movements which have made modern civilization what it is in its moral aspects. The first of these is the rise of individualism and the decline of authority. This movement began, or rather had its first manifestation, in the Protestant Reformation. In the latter years of the eighteenth century it culminated in the French Revolution, and in the subsequent rise of political democracy among all European peoples. This growth of individualism and decline of authority has continued down to the present, until both religious and political authority are perhaps less in the civilized world of to-day than ever before in the history of Western civilization. The result of this upon the family has been that the authoritative type of the family has tended to disappear. The religious theory of the family which prevailed during the Middle Ages, but which was more or less undermined by the Reformation, has given place among large classes of the population to the view that marriage is a private contract. This view of the family has even been embodied to a large extent in our laws.

The second great influence which has affected modern civilization is the revolution in industry, owing to the invention of machinery and the rise of the factory system. This has tended, as we have already seen, to destroy the economic functions of the family and to individualize its members in their economic activities. The individual, in other words, has become the unit in production as well as the political unit. This has tended to destroy the social cohesion between the members of the family group and has even to some extent placed the sexes in competition with each other.

A third influence greatly affecting modern civilization has been the enormous growth of wealth which has resulted from the introduction of machine industry. While this wealth has not extended to all classes of society, it has emancipated certain classes from the fear of want, a factor which in the past put an effective restraint upon conduct. The growth of wealth, in other words, has favored, in certain classes at least, lower moral standards, and increasing laxity in family relations.

Owing to these and many minor causes the nineteenth century was a period of great social change and unrest. It was a period of social disintegration and of social reconstruction, as yet far from complete. Now, in such periods of social disintegration, confusion and instability in institutions are apt to manifest themselves, until some new basis for a stable social order can be found. While the forces making for social dissolution manifested themselves comparatively late in the family, the modern family has suddenly found itself confronted with the need of social readjustment and in the midst of change and confusion.

The Problem of the Family. — Thus it happens that we find the family life at the beginning of the twentieth century in a more unstable condition than it has been at any time since the beginning of the Christian Era. Now, any great instability of the family is manifestly inconsistent with the idea of permanent monogamy. Hence the problem of the modern family is whether permanent monogamy shall continue to exist or to be the standard in Western civilization. There are many who do not hesitate to say that the family, in its present form of permanent monogamy, will soon pass away. While such a statement is wholly unwarranted from a scientific standpoint, the student of the family cannot fail to see that the crux of the problem of the modern family lies in its instability.

The legal expression of the instability of the family is to be seen in divorce. If the whole problem of the modern family centers in the matter of its instability, then the study of the divorce movement should throw more light upon the condition of the modern family than the study of anything else. Just how far we have gone already toward getting rid of permanent monogamy as the standard in modern society will be more or less evident from the divorce statistics. However, the student must bear in mind that divorce statistics never adequately measure the instability of the family life, for divorce is only the legal expression of such instability. In every community a certain number of marriages are dissolved without the formality of legal divorce. Among the very poorest class in American cities, it is found that illegal desertion is about four times as common as legal divorce. Hence it would probably be not far from the facts if we should add 20 per cent to

the number of divorces granted to get an approximate measure of the real instability of the family in American society.

As we have just implied, the instability of the modern family is especially evident in the United States. This is due in part to the freedom with which legal divorce has been granted in the United States; but it is also due in part to the fact that American society has exaggerated the individualism and industrialism which are characteristic of Western civilization in general. Hence, although the disintegration of the family characterizes more or less all modern civilization, it is particularly American conditions that will concern us, because they illustrate best the tendencies of modern society in respect to the family.

Without devoting too much time to the consideration of divorce statistics in their technical aspects, let us note, then, some of the main outlines of the modern divorce movement in this and other civilized countries.

Statistics of Divorce in the United States and Other Civilized Countries. — For a long time the United States led the world in the number of its divorces. Already in 1885 this country had more divorces than all the rest of the Christian civilized world put together. These statistics of the number of divorces granted in different civilized countries in 1885 (taken from Professor W. F. Willcox's monograph on *The Divorce Problem*) are of sufficient interest to cite at length:

United States	23,472	Austria	1,718
France	6,245	Switzerland	920
Germany	6,161	Denmark	635
Russia	1,789	Italy	556

Great Britain and Ireland	508	Sweden	229
Roumania	541	Australia	100
Holland	339	Norway	68
Belgium	290	Canada	12

It will be noted that in this particular year (1885), when the United States had 23,472 divorces, all the other countries mentioned together had only 20,131.

The following statistics are available for the years indicated:

United States (1929)	201,475	Switzerland (1927)	2,500
Japan (1927)	50,626	Sweden (1926)	1,780
Germany (1927)	36,449	Denmark (1928)	2,307
France (1927)	18,487	Australia (1926)	1,637
Austria (1927)	5,350	New Zealand (1927)	540
Great Britain (1927)	3,664	Norway (1927)	589
Belgium (1927)	2,351	Canada (1927)	748

In 1927 the United States had 192,037 divorces, which was exceeded only by Soviet Russia, which was reported to have had the same year 342,924 divorces, or one divorce to every 3.8 marriages. All the rest of the Christian civilized world had less than 90,000. It is evident that the number of divorces is rapidly increasing in all civilized nations. The above statistics show that in Austria there was one divorce to nine marriages, in Japan one to ten, in Switzerland one to twelve, in Denmark one to thirteen, in Germany one to fourteen, in France one to seventeen, in New Zealand one to twenty, in Sweden one to twenty-two, in Norway one to thirty, in Great Britain one to eighty-three, in Canada one to one hundred and eight; but in the United States the rate in 1927 was one divorce to 6.2 marriages. In Oregon in 1927 there was one divorce to every 2.4

marriages, in Wyoming one to 2.9, in Montana one to 4.1, in Missouri one to 3.8, in Texas one to 4.3, in Oklahoma one to 3.7, in California one to 3.8, in Ohio one to 4.0, in Indiana one to 5.0, in Colorado one to 5.0, in Kansas one to 4.9, in Maine one to 4.9. While these rates are those of some of the states in which divorce is most common, yet the number of states in which the divorce rate ranges from one to every four marriages to one to seven marriages are so numerous that they may be said to be fairly representative of American conditions. The divorce census for 1922 gave returns very similar to those of 1927, except that in the intervening period the number of divorces increased very greatly. In 1922 the number of divorces granted was 148,815, or one divorce to every 7.6 marriages. Some states in 1916 already had as high divorce rates as in 1927. Thus in Oregon in 1916 there was already one divorce to every 2.5 marriages and in Washington one to every 4 marriages.

Increase of Divorces in the United States. Not only does the United States lead the world in the number of its divorces, but apparently divorces are increasing in this country much more rapidly than the population. In 1867, the first year for which statistics for the country as a whole were gathered, there were 9937 divorces in the United States, but by 1929, the last year for which we have statistics, the total number of divorces granted in this country, yearly, had reached 201,475. Again, fron 1867 to 1886 there were 328,716 divorces granted in the United States, but during the next twenty years, from 1887 to 1906, the number reached 945,625, or almost a total of 1,000,000 divorces granted in twenty years. Again, from

1887 to 1906 the number of divorces increased 160 per cent, while the population increased only about 45 per cent; from 1906 to 1929 the number of divorces increased 179 per cent, while the population increased about 44 per cent. Thus it appears that divorces are now increasing in the United States four times as fast as the increase of population. It becomes, therefore, a matter of some curious interest to speculate upon what will be the end of this movement. If divorces should continue to increase as they have increased during the past fifty years, it is evident that it would not be long before more marriages would be terminated by divorce than by death. In 1870, 3.5 per cent of all marriages were terminated by divorce; in 1900, 8.1 per cent were terminated by divorce; and in 1929, over 16 per cent. Professor Willcox has estimated that if this increasing divorce rate continues, by 1950 one fourth of all marriages in the United States will be terminated by divorce, and in 1990 one half of all marriages. Thus we are apparently within measurable distance of a time when, if present tendencies continue, the family, as a permanent union between husband and wife, lasting until death, shall cease to be. At least, it is safe to say that in a population where one half of all marriages will be terminated by divorce the social conditions would be no better than those in the Rome of the decadence. We cannot imagine such a state of affairs without the existence alongside of it of widespread promiscuity, neglect of childhood, and general social demoralization. Without, however, stopping at this point to discuss the results or the effects of the divorce movement upon society, let us now consider for a moment

how these divorces are distributed among the various elements and classes of our population.

Distribution of Divorces. It is usually thought by those who have observed the matter most carefully that divorce especially characterizes the wealthy classes and the laboring classes, but is least common among the middle classes. We have no statistics to bear out this belief, but it seems probable that it is substantially correct. The divorce statistics which we have, however, indicate certain striking differences in the distribution of divorces by classes and communities.

(1) The divorce rate is higher in the cities than in their surrounding country districts. The statistics show, for example, that in many cities in the Central West the divorce rates are much higher than in the states in which they are situated. Exceptions to this generalization are cities in which a large proportion of the population are Roman Catholic or of foreign birth.

(2) The census statistics show that apparently the divorce rate is about eight times as high for childless couples as for couples that have children. This doubtless does not mean that domestic unhappiness is eight times more common in families where there are no children than in families that have children, but it does show, nevertheless, that the child is now, as in primitive times, a powerful force to bind husband and wife together.

(3) While we have no statistics from this country telling us exactly what the distribution of divorces is among the various religious denominations, still we know that because the Roman Catholic Church is strongly against divorce, divorces are very rare in that denomination. In Switzerland, where the number of divorces among Protestants and

Catholics has been noted, it is found that divorces are four times as common among Protestants as among Catholics. Some observers in this country have claimed that divorces are most common among those of no religious profession, next most common among Protestants, next among Jews, and least common among Roman Catholics.

(4) From this we might expect, as our statistics indicate, that the divorce rate is much higher among the native whites in this country than it is among the foreign born, for many of the foreign born are Roman Catholics, and, in any case, they come from countries where divorce is less common than in the United States.

(5) For the last forty years two thirds of all divorces have been granted on demand of the wife. This may indicate, on the one hand, that the increase of divorces is a movement connected with the emancipation of woman, and on the other hand it may indicate that it is the husband who usually gives the ground for divorce.

(6) The census statistics show three great centers of divorce in the United States. One is the New England States, one the states of the Central West, and one the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast states. These three centers are also typical centers of American institutions and ideas. The individualism of the New England, the Central West, and the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast regions has always been marked in comparison with some other sections of the country. But during the last twenty years divorce has also been increasing rapidly in the Southern states, and we now find such states as Texas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma well up toward the front among the states with a high divorce rate.

This distribution of divorces among the various elements and classes of the country suggests something as to the causes of divorce, and this will come out fully later in a discussion of the causes of the increase of divorce.

The Grounds for Granting Divorce. — There are no less than thirty-six distinct grounds for absolute divorce recognized by the laws of the several states, ranging from only one ground recognized in New York to fourteen grounds recognized in New Hampshire. For this reason some have supposed that many of the divorces in this country are granted on comparatively trivial grounds. Several states have, for example, what is known as an "Omnibus Clause," granting divorce for mere incompatibility and the like. But the examination of divorce statistics shows that very few divorces are granted on trivial grounds. On the contrary, most divorces seem to be granted for grave reasons, such as adultery, desertion, cruelty, imprisonment for crime, habitual drunkenness, and neglect on the part of the husband to provide for his family. These are usually recognized as grave reasons for the dissolution of the marriage tie. None of them at least could be said to be trivial. Professor Willcox showed that for the twenty year period, 1867 to 1886, over ninety-seven per cent of all divorces were granted for these six principal causes. Moreover, he also showed that over sixty per cent were granted for the two most serious causes of all, — adultery and desertion. Again, of the one million divorces granted from 1887 to 1906 over ninety-four per cent were granted for the six principal causes and over fifty-five per cent for adultery and desertion, while in still other cases adultery and desertion figured in combination with other causes (a total of over

sixty-two per cent in all). Therefore, it seems probable that in nearly two thirds of the cases the marriage bond had already practically been dissolved before the courts stepped in to make the dissolution formal. We must conclude, therefore, that divorce is prevalent not because of the laxity of our laws, but rather because of the decay of our family life; that divorce is but a symptom of the disintegration of the modern family, particularly the American family.

In other words, divorce is but a symptom of more serious evils, and these evils have in certain classes of American society apparently undermined the very virtues upon which the family life subsists. This is not saying that vice is more prevalent to-day than it was fifty years ago. We have no means of knowing whether it is or not, and there may well be a difference of opinion upon such a subject. It is the opinion of some eminent authorities that there has been no growth of vice in the United States along with the growth of divorce, but this would seem to be doubtful. The very causes for which divorce is granted suggest a demoralization of certain classes. While there may not have been, therefore, any general growth of vice in the United States along with the growth of divorce, it is conceivable that it may have increased greatly in certain classes of American society. Be this as it may, it is not necessary to assume that there has been any growth of vice in the American population, for if actual moral practices are no higher than they were fifty years ago that alone would be a sufficient reason to explain considerable disintegration of our family life. It is an important truth in sociology that the morality which suffices for a relatively simple social life, largely

rural, such as existed in this country fifty years ago, is not sufficient for a more complex society which is largely urban, such as exists at the present time. Moreover, recognized moral standards within the past fifty years have largely been raised through the growth of general intelligence. It follows that immoral acts, which were condoned fifty years ago and which produced but slight social effect, to-day meet with great reprobation and have far greater social consequences than a generation ago. This is particularly true of the standards which the wife imposes upon the husband. For centuries, as we have already seen, the husband has secured divorce for adultery of the wife, but for centuries no divorce was given to the wife for the adultery of the husband; and this is even true to-day in modern England, unless the adultery of the husband be accompanied by other flagrant violations of morality. Conduct on the part of the husband, which the wife overlooked, therefore, a generation ago, is to-day sufficient to disrupt the family bonds and become a ground for the granting of a divorce. Even if vice, then, has not increased in our population, if moral practices are no higher to-day than fifty years ago, we should expect that this alone would have far different consequences now than then. The growth of intelligence and of higher and more complex forms of social organization necessitates realization of higher standards of conduct if the institutions of society are to retain their stability.

But there are grave reasons for believing that there has been in certain classes of society a decay of the very virtues upon which the family rests, for the family life requires not only chastity, but even more the virtues of self-sacrifice, loyalty, obedience, and self-subordination. Now there is

abundant evidence to show that these particular virtues which belong to a self-subordinating life are those which have suffered most in the changes and new adjustments of modern society. We have replaced these virtues largely by those of self-interest, self-direction, and self-assertiveness.

Causes of the Increase of Divorce in the United States. — Let us note somewhat more in detail the causes of the increased instability of the American family during the past four or five decades. We have already in a rough way indicated some of these causes in studying the distribution of divorce and the grounds upon which it is granted. But the causes of the instability of the family so affect our whole social life and all of our institutions that they are well worth somewhat more detailed study.

(1) As the first of these causes of the increase of divorce in the United States we should put the decay of religion, particularly of the religious theory of marriage and the family. As we have already seen, no stable family life has existed anywhere in history without a religious basis, but within the last few decades religious sentiments, beliefs, and ideals have become largely dissociated from marriage and the family, and the result is that many people regard the institutions of marriage and the family as a matter of personal convenience. This decay of the religious view of the marriage bond has, however, had other antecedent causes, partly in the moral and intellectual spirit of our civilization, partly in our industrial conditions.

(2) We should put, therefore, as a second cause of the increase of divorces in this country the growing spirit

of individualism. By individualism we mean here the spirit of self-assertion and self-interest, the spirit which leads a man to find his law in his own wishes, or even in his whims and caprices. Now, this growing spirit of individualism is undoubtedly more destructive of the social life than anything else. It makes unstable all institutions, and especially the family, because the family must rest upon very opposite characteristics. Our *laissez-faire* democracy, our industrial organization, and our unsocialized education have all been responsible to some extent for making the individual take his own interests and wishes as his law.

(3) Moreover, this individualism has spread within the last fifty years especially among the women of the population, and has produced a great movement, known in its moderate phases as the "Woman's Movement" and in its more radical phases as "Feminism." The woman's movement has accompanied and in part effected the emancipation of women legally, mentally, and economically. The result is that women, as a class, have become as much individualized as the men, and oftentimes are as great practical individualists.

No one would claim that the emancipation of woman, in the sense of freeing her from those things which have prevented the highest and best development of her personality, is not desirable. But this emancipation of woman has brought with it certain opportunities for going down as well as for going up. Woman's emancipation has not, in other words, meant to all classes of women, woman's elevation. On the contrary, it has been to some, if not an opportunity for license, at least an opportunity for self-assertion and selfishness not consistent with the welfare

of society and particularly with the stability of the family. We may remind ourselves once more that the Roman women achieved complete emancipation, but they did not thereby better their social position. On the contrary, the emancipation of woman in Rome meant woman's degradation, and ultimately the demoralization of Roman family life. While this is not necessarily an accompaniment of woman's emancipation, still it is a real danger which threatens, and of which we can already see many evidences in modern society. As in all other emancipatory movements, the dangers of freedom are found for some individuals at least to be quite as great as the dangers of subjection.

That the woman's movement has had much to do with the growth of divorce in this country gains substantiation from the fact that many of the leaders of that movement, especially the more radical like Mrs. Gilman and Miss Ellen Key, have advocated free divorce, and their inculcation of this doctrine certainly could not have been without some effect.

But the woman's movement would have perhaps failed to develop, or at least failed of widespread support, if it had not been for the economic emancipation of woman through the opening to her of many new industrial callings and the securing for her a certain measure of economic independence. This, again, while perhaps a good thing in itself, has, nevertheless, facilitated the growing tendency to form unstable family relations. But this economic independence of woman, we need hardly remark, is the necessary and, indeed, inevitable outcome of modern industrial development.

(4) The growth of modern industrialism must, then, be regarded as one of the fundamental factors which has brought about the increase of divorce in the United States. By industrialism we mean manufacturing industry. As we have already noticed, the growth of manufacturing industry has opened a large number of new economic callings to woman and has rendered her largely economically independent of family relations. Moreover, the labor of women in factories has tended to disrupt the home, particularly in the case of married women, as we have already seen. For the laboring classes it has tended to make the home only a lodging place, with little or no development of a true family life. Again, such labor has set the sexes in competition with each other, has tended to reduce their sexual differences and to stimulate immensely their individualism. Finally, inasmuch as modern industrialism has tended to destroy the home, the result has been the production of unsocialized children, and especially of those that had no tradition of a family life. Girls, for example, through industrialism, have failed to learn the domestic arts, failed to have any training in homemaking, and therefore when they came to the position of wife and mother, they were frequently not fitted for such a life, and through their lack of adjustment rendered the homes which they formed unstable.

(5) Closely connected with the growth of modern industrialism is the growth of modern cities, and, as we have already seen, divorce is usually much more common in the cities than in the rural districts. The growth of the cities, in other words, has been a cause of the increase of divorce. City populations, on account of the economic

conditions under which they live, are peculiarly homeless. A normal home can scarcely exist in the slums and in some of the tenement districts of our cities. Again, in the city there is perhaps more vice and other immorality, less control of the individual by public opinion, and more opportunity, on account of close living together and high standards of living, for friction, both within and without the domestic circle.

(6) The higher standards of living and comfort which have come with the growth of our industrial civilization, especially of our cities, must also be set down as a cause of increasing instability of the family. High standards of living are, of course, desirable if they can be realized, that is, if they are reasonable. But many elements of our population have standards of living and comfort which they find are practically impossible to realize with the income which they have. Many classes, in other words, are unable to meet the social demands which they suppose they must meet in order to maintain a home. To found and maintain a home, therefore, with these rising standards of living, and also within the last decade or two with the rising cost of living, requires such a large income that an increasingly smaller proportion of the population are able to do this satisfactorily. From this cause, undoubtedly, a great deal of domestic misery and unhappiness results, which finally shows itself in desertion or in the divorce court.

It is evident that higher standards of taste and higher standards of morality may also operate under certain circumstances to render the family life unstable in a similar way.

(7) Directly connected with these last mentioned causes is another cause, — the higher age of marriage. Some have thought that a low age of marriage was more prolific in divorces than a relatively high age of marriage. But a low age of marriage cannot be a cause of the increase of divorce in the United States, because the proportion of immature marriages in most classes is steadily lessening, that is, the age of marriage has been increasing, and all must admit that along with the higher age of marriage has gone increasing divorce; and there may possibly be some connection between the two facts. As we have already seen, the higher standards of living make later marriage necessary. Men in the professions do not think of marriage nowadays until thirty, or until they have an independent income. Now, how may the higher age of marriage possibly increase the instability of the family? It may do so in this way. After thirty, psychologists tell us, one's habits are relatively fixed and hard to change. People who marry after thirty, therefore, usually find greater difficulty in adjusting themselves to each other than people who marry somewhat younger; and every marriage necessarily involves an adjustment of individuals to each other. This being so, we can readily understand that late marriages are more apt to result in faulty adjustments in the family relation than marriages that take place in early maturity.

(8) Another cause of the increase of divorce in the United States that has been given is the popularization of law which has accompanied the growth of democratic institutions. Law was once the prerogative of special classes, and courts were rarely appealed to except by the

noble or wealthy classes; but with the growth of democratic institutions there has been a great spread of legal education, especially through the modern newspaper, and consequently a greater participation in the remedies offered by the courts for all sorts of wrongs, real or imagined. Many people, for example, who would not have thought of divorce a generation ago, now know how divorce may be secured and are ready to secure it. However, it would seem as though this cause of the increase of divorce might have operated to a greater extent twenty-five or thirty years ago than it has during the last two decades, for it cannot be said that since the nineties there has been much increase of legal education among the masses, or much greater popularization of the law.

(9) Increasing laxity of the laws regarding divorce and increasing laxity in the administration of the laws has certainly been a cause of increasing divorce in the United States, though back of these causes doubtless lie all the other causes just mentioned, and also increasing laxity in public opinion regarding marriage and divorce. To assume that laxity of the laws and of legal administration has no influence upon the increase of divorce in a poplation is to go contrary to all human experience. The people of Canada and of England, for example, are not very different from ourselves in culture and in institutions, yet there is almost no divorce in England and in Canada as compared with the United States. Canada has a few dozen divorces annually, while we have over seventy thousand. Unquestionably the main cause of this great difference between Canada and the United States is to be found in the difference of their laws. This is not saying,

however, that instability of the family does not characterize Canada and England as well as the United States, even though such instability does not express itself in the divorce courts.

Interesting statistics have been collected in numerous places in the country to show the laxity of the administration of the divorce laws. In many of the divorce courts of our large cities, for example, it has repeatedly been shown that the average time occupied by the court in granting a divorce is not more than fifteen minutes. In other words, divorce cases are frequently rushed through our divorce courts without solemnity, without adequate investigation, with every opportunity for collusion between the parties, so as to favor a very free granting of divorces. On the other hand, about one fourth of all the applications for divorce which come to trial are refused by the courts, showing that the courts are not so lax in all cases as they are sometimes pictured to be.

Moreover, the divorce courts have two excuses for their laxity. First, the divorce courts are always greatly overburdened with the number of cases before them; and, secondly, public opinion, which the courts as well as other phases of our government largely reflect, favors this laxity. This is shown by the fact that public opinion stands back of the lax divorce statutes of many states, all efforts to radically change these statutes having failed of recent years.

(10) Our study of the family has accustomed us to the thought that the family is an institution which, like all other human institutions, undergoes constant changes. Now at periods of change in any institution, periods of

transition from one type to another, there is apt to be a period of confusion. The old type of institution is never replaced at once by a new type of institution ready-made and adjusted to the social life, but only gradually does the new institution emerge from the elements of the old. In the meantime, however, there may be a considerable period of confusion and anarchy. This social principle, we may note, rests upon the deeper psychological principle, that old habits are usually not replaced by new habits without an intervening period of confusion and uncertainty. In other words, in the transition from the old habit to the new habit there is much opportunity for disorganization and disintegration. It is exactly so in human society, because social institutions are but expressions of habit.

Now, the old semipatriarchal type of the family, which prevailed down to the beginning of the nineteenth century, the type of the family which we might perhaps properly call the monarchical type, has been disappearing for the past one hundred years, — is in fact already practically extinct, at least in America, but we have not yet built up a new type of the family to take its place. The old semipatriarchal family of our forefathers has gone, but no new type of the family has yet become general. A democratic type of the family in harmony with our democratic civilization must be evolved. But such a democratic type of the family can be stable only upon the condition that its stability is within itself and not without. Authority in various coercive forms made the old type of the family stable, but a stable basis for a new type of the family has not yet been found, or rather it has not been found by large elements of our population. Un-

questionably a democratic ethical type of the family in which the rights of every one are respected and all members are bound together, not through fear or through force of authority, but through love and affection, is being evolved in certain classes of our society. The problem before our civilization is whether such a democratic ethical type of the family can become generalized and offer a stable family life to our whole population. It is evident that in order to do this there must be a considerable development, not only of the spirit of equality, but even more, a considerable development of social intelligence and ethical character in the minds of the people. To construct a stable family life of this character, however, which is apparently the only type which will meet the demands of modern civilization, — is not an impossibility, but is a delicate and difficult task which will require all the resources of the state, the school, and the church. There is, however, no ground as yet for pessimism regarding the future of our family life; rather all its instability and demoralization of the present are simply incident, we must believe, to the achievement of a higher type of the family than the world has yet seen. Such a higher type, however, will not come about without thought and effort or without wise social leadership.

The Reconstruction of the Family. — That instability of the family and divorce, so far as it is an expression of that instability, is an evil in society is implied in all that has thus far been said concerning the origin, development, and functions of the family as an institution. While all the preceding chapters amount to an argument on this question, a word further may not be out of place.

It is often said by those who favor free divorce, that such divorce will prevent immorality in society; but it must be pointed out that this has not been the experience in other countries and ages than our own. As we have already seen, in proportion as divorce grew in Rome, for example, sexual immorality of all sorts increased. Weak family ties seem to encourage lax relations between the sexes generally, and destroy the ideal in society of the sanctity of the marriage bond. Again, those who advocate free divorce claim that such free divorce is for the benefit of the children as well as of the husband and wife. While it may be admitted that in many cases it is desirable to dissolve the family bonds for the sake of the children, still all investigations seem to show that the instability of the family is itself one of the greatest sources of child delinquency and dependency in those communities where such instability is pronounced. In an investigation made by the writer in the year 1909, it was found that out of 7575 children in thirty-four State Reform Schools, 29.6 per cent came from families in which there had been divorce or desertion, 33 per cent in which either father or mother were dead, while 38 per cent (including a few cases which overlapped the first two classes) came from homes demoralized by drink, vice, or crime. In only a negligible per cent of the cases did these Reform School children have a normal family life. Out of 4278 children investigated in four juvenile courts, it was found that 23.7 per cent of this number came from families in which father and mother were separated by desertion or divorce, while 27.8 per cent came from families in which one or both parents were dead. Even in thirty-two institutions for dependent children it

was found that 24.7 per cent of the inmates were from homes in which there had been desertion or divorce, while only 47.5 per cent were either orphans or half orphans. Many other statistics have been collected by social workers showing that apparently the children of separated or divorced parents are much more apt to drift into poverty, vice, or crime, that is, into the unsocialized classes, than children who do not come from such disrupted homes. The general conclusion of social workers is that a normal family life in which the child has the care of both parents is the best possible guarantee for the proper adjustment of the child to society; for hitherto all experiments in the proper care and upbringing of children in institutions have been, comparatively speaking, failures. We are not warranted, therefore, in drawing any other conclusion than that the welfare of the child as well as the moral character of adults is bound up with the stability of the family.

If the real evil is not so much divorce as the decay of the family life, however, it is idle to suppose that superficial remedies will suffice. Nothing short of radical social reconstruction, such as will put an end to all of the disintegrating influences which are now affecting the home, whether industrial, political, or moral, will solve the problem of the modern family. The problem of the family, in other words, like all other social problems, is bound up with the total conditions of modern social life. As has often been emphasized, present social problems are all interdependent and really but phases of one larger problem, the "Social Problem," the problem of the relations of men to one another.

Legislation can do little, in one sense, to correct the real evil. That it can do nothing, and that an attitude of

laissez-faire is justified upon this question, is, of course, not true. Legislation, if properly applied, can assist in accomplishing much. Even direct legislation regarding marriage and divorce can accomplish something. As we have already noted, the difference between the few divorces of Canada and the many divorces of the United States is largely due to a difference of laws. But of course we must not assume that there is a like difference in the state of the family life of the two countries. Legislation, in other words, may simply ignore social evils, and prohibit in appearance things which persist in reality. While it is not too much to say that the divorce laws of many of our states are a crime against civilization, because they have set low moral standards, yet the making of these laws stricter may not of itself greatly check the decay of the family. Let us note, however, some of the proposed reforms which seem feasible with reference to marriage and divorce, because they illustrate the difficulties and the principles of scientific social reconstruction in general.

Proposed Legislative and Judicial Remedies for the Divorce Evil. (1) The first of these which might be mentioned is a uniform divorce and marriage law, enacted by the federal Congress and administered by the federal courts. The enactment of such a law, however, would require an amendment to the federal Constitution. Assuming that such amendment is possible, a uniform marriage and divorce law for the whole United States is certainly desirable; for such a fundamental institution as the family should not be left to the regulation of local administrative areas, such as our states are. The family is not a state concern, but a national concern. However, as we have already

implied, the family problem is so deep that a mere transfer of the laws governing marriage and divorce from the statute books of the states to the statute books of the nation would make no material difference in the problem. There can be no question but that the states which now lead in divorce would continue to lead. In Switzerland, for example, where the cantons had the right to regulate divorce prior to 1876, in 1906, after thirty years of uniform law, the canton of Geneva had one divorce to every seven marriages, while the canton of Valais had one divorce to every two hundred and fifty marriages. Nevertheless, while we must not expect too great results to follow, uniform divorce and marriage laws are important enough to be worth working for. It is possible that such uniformity may be brought about through the coöperative action of our states rather than through an amendment to the federal Constitution.

(2) Of more importance than uniformity in divorce laws, however, is reform in judicial procedure in trying divorce cases. We have already seen that very often divorce cases are rushed through our courts, not only without solemnity, but even without adequate knowledge of the merits of the cases. This has resulted, in many instances, in divorce being granted, in effect, upon mutual consent of the parties — something never contemplated by our divorce legislation, lax though it be. Two reforms may be suggested which would undoubtedly correct the worst of these evils. The first is the appointment, in every court which tries divorce cases, of a Divorce Proctor, whose duty shall be to inquire carefully into every application for divorce to see whether the alleged grounds actually exist

and whether there is an absence of collusion or fraud, and then to advise the judge. In Kansas City, Missouri, the appointment of such a divorce proctor resulted in cutting down the number of divorces granted nearly thirty per cent in a single year, a conclusive proof that many divorces had previously been granted upon inadequate grounds or where there was collusion or fraud.

A second reform in judicial procedure in granting divorce, more radical than the first, would be to put the matter of divorce in the hands of special Courts of Domestic Relations. Such courts already exist in several cities, but hitherto their control over divorce cases has been limited. It would seem that all applications for the dissolution of family bonds, whether between husband and wife, or parents and children, should come, in the first instance, before special tribunals which should carefully investigate the cases to see whether the welfare of society would be subserved by the breaking up of the particular family or not. The subordinate officers of such courts could fully establish the facts and make recommendations to the judges, while the judges in turn could, in many instances, reconcile the parties and thus preserve the unity of the family. This has been done very successfully in a large number of instances by the Court of Domestic Relations in the city of Chicago. Similar practices in Switzerland have also been found effective in bringing about the reconciliation of many parties seeking divorce. Such work by the courts is truly reconstructive of the family, and cannot be too highly commended. The trouble is that in a majority of cases it comes too late. As yet, moreover, such Courts of Domestic Relations exist only in very large cities; and even where

they exist, they have only a limited jurisdiction in matters affecting the family.

(3) A third legislative remedy for the divorce evil would be lessening the number of legal grounds for absolute divorce. There can be no question but that such legislation is desirable in many of our states. However, such legislation might easily make the mistake of going too far, and of simply forcing the evil beneath the surface. A practicable divorce law in a majority of our states at the present time would probably have to recognize the five or six most serious grounds for divorce which we have already discussed, and for which over ninety per cent of the divorces are granted. Stricter laws, however, in many of our states, would serve to set higher standards for the family life and indirectly might thus do considerable to lessen the instability of the family.

(4) Restrictions upon remarriage of divorced parties might also do something to reduce the instability of the family. Statistics in the United States seem to indicate that from thirty to fifty per cent of divorced persons remarry, according to the locality. While no large proportion of divorces are sought for the purpose of immediate remarriage, yet some are, and the number is apparently increasing. If restrictions upon remarriage were permanent, this would amount to making divorce merely legal separation, and might be at the present time a practice which would be socially inexpedient. On the other hand, the lax laws of some of our states which permit immediate remarriage upon divorce make possible frequent remarriage on the part of divorce " repeaters " and result in affronts to public decency. Students of divorce, therefore, are practi-

cally unanimous in the opinion that a reasonable time should elapse after a divorce decree has been granted before remarriage is permitted. This is probably best secured by what is known as the *nisi*, or conditional, decree of divorce, which becomes absolute, permitting remarriage, only after a period of one or two years, thus allowing the divorced parties to effect reconciliation within that time without the formality of remarriage.

(5) Restrictions upon marriage are at present advocated by certain writers as a remedy for the instability of the family. It is said that the real evil is not the divorce evil, but the marriage evil, and that we should have very few divorces in society if we had wise marriages. This may be granted without accepting the view that legal restrictions upon marriage would do much to make our family life more stable. Wise marriages should, of course, be in every way encouraged by society, but thus far it has been found possible to do but little in a legal way to bring about such marriages. To be sure, our marriage laws are still lax, and they should do more than they do; but at best marriage laws could act only negatively, that is, they can prevent to some extent unwise marriages, but can do but little to secure wise ones. The laws might safely forbid, not only the marriage of persons of immature age, of defectives, of those afflicted with contagious diseases, but also should probably prevent the marriage of persons of too great difference in age, and of different races. Farther than this the laws could scarcely go with safety. In all countries where property restrictions have been put upon marriage, or where the legal age of marriage has been placed too high, a great increase in illegitimacy has resulted.

Indeed, the general policy of the law should undoubtedly be to encourage marriage among all normal persons in society and certainly not to make marriage difficult for such.

What law cannot accomplish or even safely attempt, however, education, public opinion, and social standards can. It is to the power of these rather than of mere legislation that we must look for stable and adequate reconstruction of any institution; for back of all institutions stand the habits, opinions, and standards of the mass of individuals. The chief thing which is wrong with American family life is after all the "mores," the social standards, of the American people in regard to the family. Now, the "mores" of a people can be changed for the better only in one way — and that is through a process of *learning* on the part of the mass of the people. There are several ways, of course, in which a people may learn, but the safest and most economical way is through the systematic education of all the people in social matters. The social education of individuals, especially of the young, is the key to the scientific reconstruction of society. Let us consider, then, more in detail social education as a means of reconstructing our family life.

Social Education and the Reconstruction of the Family. Education, unlike legislation, can easily change the habits, opinions, and standards of individuals, because the whole process of education is essentially a process of taking on certain habits, ideas, and ideals as preparation for life. Legislation, on the other hand, is necessarily external and coercive. It affects the individual for the most part too late in life to change radically his habits or even his opinions. It is for this reason that legislation has so many short-

comings as an instrument of social reconstruction or reform. Of course, neither education nor legislation should be neglected in social reconstruction. Both are necessary and supplement each other. Wise legislation must rest upon the opinions, ideals, and habits of the people already formed through education. On the other hand no public system of education can exist unless it is supported by appropriate legislation.

In this matter of reconstructing our family life, therefore, the main reliance must be placed upon the education which the school, the church, and the home can give to the rising generation. Until children are taught to look upon the family as a socially necessary and therefore sacred institution, until they are taught to look upon marriage as something other than an act to suit their own convenience and pleasure, we must expect that our family life will be unstable. While the reconstruction of our family life practically involves the reconstruction of our whole social life, as we have already pointed out, yet the key to the situation in any event is the social education of the young, because only through such education can right ideals concerning marriage and the family be acquired. The importance of a pure and wholesome family life should, therefore, be emphasized by our whole system of public education from beginning to end. This can readily be done even in the lowest grades through throwing the emphasis upon the importance of the home and the family in all social activities and relationships. Here, of course, would enter instruction in the domestic sciences and arts in our public schools; also education for parenthood so far as it is practicable to give such education in the public school.

The institution in society, however, which is especially charged with the task of conserving and propagating social ideals is the church. It is evident that a large responsibility for right ideals concerning marriage and the family must rest upon the church. Unless the church teaches such ideals, other institutions in society will not teach them to any extent. So far as the Christian church is concerned, it may be suggested that the first social task of the present church should be, as it was of the primitive church, the reconstituting of a stable and pure family life.

It may be admitted, however, that the chief education along these lines must come in the home itself. Only there can the truest respect for marriage and the family be effectively inculcated in the young. Many homes are, however, already so demoralized in this respect, that we cannot expect that children will receive the right ideas from their home life. Hence the importance of supplementing the moral education along these lines which has hitherto been given mainly in the home, by explicit education in our public schools and in our Sunday schools. The situation is, however, not so difficult as might seem, for we must remember that imitation in society moves from the socially superior to the socially inferior classes. Proper social leadership in this matter of educating the child adequately in the school, the church, and the home in everything which pertains to the family would insure a great improvement within a single generation. There is no reason, then, for pessimism; but it is evident that effective work along this line has hardly yet begun.

A Normal Family Life evidently requires not only proper physical conditions, sufficient income to maintain a decent

standard of living,[1] and ethical, democratic relations between its members, but, above all, consideration of the child. It is this last which marks the fully socialized family; for the welfare of the race and of society is bound up with the welfare of the child. Child welfare may, indeed, in one sense be said to be the central problem of civilization. For this reason, the child has always been and must continue to be the center of gravity, so to speak, in any normal family life. Any discussion of the family, therefore, which fails to make the welfare of the child that is, or may be, born, the matter of the highest importance in the family life misses the whole point. On the other hand, any discussion of child welfare which fails to recognize the family as the normal environment of the child also misses the point. For so-called children's institutions, juvenile courts, and other child-saving agencies are very inadequate substitutes for a normal home. The securing of a normal family life for all classes is, then, the indispensable thing needed for child welfare; and, on the other hand, a normal family life must be centered in the child.

From this point of view the way which must be followed to secure the solution of the many problems connected with our family life becomes clear. For example, whether a particular family should be dissolved or not is a matter which should be decided upon the basis, not primarily of the happiness of husband and wife, but rather of the welfare of the children involved; and society, of course, cannot afford to set up one standard for couples with children and another standard for couples without children, as that

[1] The student should review what was said in Chapter IV about the influence of industrial conditions in undermining a normal family life.

would place a premium upon childlessness. Again, the labor of married women outside of the home, the labor of children themselves, wages and hours of breadwinners, and even the building of our cities must be regulated upon the basis of child welfare. Finally, the unsocialized individualism of our "mores" with reference to marriage and the family must be modified for the sake of the child. This last is the most needed reform of all, for the instability of the American family is rooted, not so much in our industrial conditions as in our "mores," as is shown by such facts as that divorces usually increase with economic prosperity, and that American industrial development is of the same general type as that of European countries which have a more stable family life.

It may be pointed out that in emphasizing child welfare as the basis for deciding problems of the family, there is no necessary sacrifice of the moral and social welfare of adults. Any system of morality which is social in its aim must place a premium upon the development of altruism. The moral character of adults, in other words, can best be safeguarded by emphasizing the claims which society and the race have upon the individual; and the child stands, as we have said, for society and the race, and so for the development of the higher altruism.

Conclusions for Social Reconstruction. — The study of the problem of reconstructing our family life furnishes certain conclusions regarding social reconstruction in general which are worth emphasizing. Social reconstruction, as we have seen from the problem of reconstructing our family life, always involves reconstructing the "mores." But this cannot be accomplished by mere force or coercive

legislation. It can be accomplished only by a process of educating the whole people. The press, the school, and the church must be the prime agents for accomplishing such a process of education. Free public discussion and the free formation of public opinion under the guidance of social leaders are also necessary before a definite social decision can be reached which will change social standards. Only when public opinion and public sentiment have so crystallized that social standards have already practically changed, is it wise to pass coercive laws. Even then laws must be supported by the active forces of government, education, morality, and religion, if they are to be effective and the habits of the people definitely changed. All agencies of social control, in other words, must be enlisted. Moreover, economic conditions and conditions in the physical environment must also be so changed as to be favorable to the new standards if they are to be successful. If, on the other hand, laws are enacted without such a process of popular education and without the free formation of a public opinion, they will not represent the popular will and must sooner or later prove a failure. The same thing is evidently true if they are not actively supported by political, educational, moral, and religious agencies after enactment, and if appropriate changes in the material conditions of life are not made. In stable social reconstruction society must move as a unit; but social education is the key to its successful prosecution.

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CHAPTER IX

THE GROWTH OF POPULATION

Mass as a Factor in Social Evolution. — Mass is a factor in the survival of a social group. Other things being equal, that group will stand the best chance of surviving which has the greatest numbers. In a large and growing population also, competition will be keener, selection more stringent, and hence the level of efficiency will tend to rise.

"Civilization is a function of numbers and of the contact of numbers," as Professor Keller says, however, not so much because of the two facts just mentioned, as because of the fact that the larger the mass of a given group the greater can be the industrial and cultural division of labor. This means higher, more complex social coöperation and so greater progress in industry and in civilization. With the proper organization and division of labor of large numbers the mastery over nature becomes easier. For this reason the higher types of industry and of civilization have depended upon the growth of numbers as *one important factor*. As we pass from savagery to civilization we find population constantly increasing. The lowest savage hordes have scarcely ever more than forty or fifty individuals, while not until high civilization is reached do we find nations numbering many millions. There is thus

an intimate connection between numbers and a high state of civilization.

Perhaps the chief reason for this is that the human mind gets practically all of its development through contact with other minds, and hence the multiplication of mental contacts is favorable to both mental and cultural development. Provided there is relatively free intercommunication maintained between individuals, mental interstimulation can be immensely more rich, varied, and intense in a large population than in a small one. The number and variety of ideas in circulation in a large group is greatly increased, and hence the opportunities for the selection of valuable ideas is also increased. Hence inventions of all sorts are stimulated by the increased contacts and needs of great masses of men.

On the other hand, it is obvious that population may exceed resources, that its increase makes the social life and its problems more complex and may greatly intensify the struggle or competition between individuals and groups.

The questions which center around the growth of population, accordingly, are among the most important with which sociology has to deal. These questions are, of course, closely connected with the family life, since the growth of population in the world as a whole is dependent upon the excess of births over deaths. However, the growth of population has so long been looked upon as a national question that perhaps it will be best to study it from the standpoint of the national group. The population of modern national groups, the influences which augment and deter the growth of population, and the laws of population in general, will be what will concern us in this chapter.

Population Statistics of Some Modern Nations. — The following table of statistics will show the growth of population in the largest nations of Europe and America since the beginning of the nineteenth century:[1]

	Population 1801	Population 1901	Population 1928–1930	Annual Rate of Increase, per cent
Russia (Soviet)	40,000,000	97,000,000	158,484,000	2.39
United States	5,308,000	75,994,000	122,775,000	1.61
Italy	17,500,000	32,475,000	41,509,000	0.94
Germany	24,000,000	51,000,000	64,600,000	0.70
Spain	10,500,000	18,618,000	22,760,000	0.67
Great Britain and Ireland	16,345,000	41,976,000	48,852,000	0.37
France	26,000,000	38,961,000	41,130,000	0.17

The table shows that while the population of nearly all of these nations increased rapidly within the nineteenth century, the rate of increase has been relatively unequal. If we project Russia's increase of population to the year 2000 A.D., we shall find that its probable population will be in the neighborhood of 400,000,000; Germany's probable population, say 100,000,000; while France's probable population in the year 2000, if it continues to increase only at its present slow rate, will be but 45,000,000. While the World War rendered all forecasts of population uncertain, and while these cannot be considered certain in any sense, still they are sufficient to show that the growth

[1] In the above table the populations of Russia and Germany for 1801 and 1901 are estimates. The population of the United States is that of continental United States in 1900 and 1930. The populations of Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Spain in the 1928–30 column are each official or semi-official estimates for some one of the three years indicated.

of modern nations in population is relatively unequal. Inasmuch as the mere element of numbers is one of the greatest factors for the future greatness of any nation, this is a highly important matter. A nation of only 40,000,000 a century hence, it is safe to say, will be no more important than Holland and Belgium are now. On the other hand, it is very probable that a century hence the civilized nations that lead in population will also lead in industrial and cultural development. Many other factors, of course, enter into the situation, but the factor of mere numbers should not be neglected, as all practical statesmen recognize.

A century hence it is probable that the population of continental United States will be about 200,000,000. It would be considerably more than this if the present annual rate of increase were to continue, but inasmuch as that is not likely, an estimate of 200,000,000 is sufficiently high.[1] We have already seen that it is probable that Russia's population may equal 300,000,000 by the year 2000. It seems probable, therefore, that the United States and Russia may be the two great world powers a century hence, — particularly if Russia emerges from its present social and political troubles and takes on fully Western civilization, — while the other nations may tend to ally themselves with the one or the other of these great world powers. Of course, China is the X — the unknown

[1] Estimates of the future population of the United States vary with different authorities. Prof. Raymond Pearl estimates that the population in the year 2000 will be about 175,000,000. The Census Bureau's estimate is 249,000,000. Dr. W. S. Thompson, in *American Mercury*, April, 1930, estimates a population of 185,000,000 for the United States in the year 2000.

quantity — in the world's future. Should its immense population absorb Western civilization, this would certainly bring into the theater of the world's political evolution a new and important factor.

The population and vital statistics of the various civilized countries show: —

(1) The population of all civilized countries, with one or two exceptions, has been increasing rapidly since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Previous to that time we have no statistics that are reliable, but it seems probable that the population of Europe stood practically stationary during the Middle Ages and increased only slowly down to the nineteenth century; but during the nineteenth century the population of the leading industrial nations increased very rapidly. This was due primarily, without doubt, to improved economic conditions, which made it possible for a larger population to subsist within a given area. Back of these improved economic conditions, however, has been increased scientific knowledge of ways of mastering physical nature, and accompanying them has been a very greatly decreased death rate, due in part at least to the advance of medical science.

(2) This increase in population has been due, not to an increase in birth rate, but to a decreased death rate. During the nineteenth century the death rate decreased markedly in practically all civilized countries. As we have already noted, this was due primarily to improved living conditions, particularly in the food, clothing, and shelter for the masses, but it was also due in no small part to the advance in medical science, especially that branch of it known as "public sanitation." Because the death rate decreases with improved

material conditions, and probably also with improved moral conditions, it is a relatively good measure, at least of the material civilization or progress of a people. We may note that the death rate is measured by the number of deaths that occur annually per thousand in a given population. The death rate of the countries most advanced in sanitary science and in industrial improvement apparently tends to establish itself around fifteen per thousand annually.[1]

(3) The birth rate of civilized countries also declined markedly during the nineteenth century, especially during the latter half. On the whole, this was a good thing. The birth rate should decrease with the death rate. This leaves more energy to be used in other things; but when the birth rate falls more rapidly than the death rate or falls beyond a certain point, it is evident that the normal growth of a nation is hindered, and even its extinction may be threatened. While an excessively high birth rate is a sign of low culture on the whole, on the other hand an excessively low birth rate is a sign of physical and probably moral degeneracy in the population. When the birth rate is lower than the death rate in a given population, it is evident that the population is on the way to extinction. Such a birth rate is manifestly abnormal. In order that a birth rate be normal, therefore, it must be sufficiently above the death rate to provide for the normal growth of the population. On the whole, it seems safe to

[1] The most competent authorities in vital statistics hold that under present conditions of knowledge, the corrected death rate cannot go much below fifteen for any considerable length of time. Even a death rate of fifteen in a stationary population would mean an average length of life of sixty-six and two thirds years.

conclude that we have no better index of the vitality of a people, that is, of their capacity to survive, than the surplus of births over deaths. Such a surplus of births over deaths is also a fairly trustworthy index of the living conditions of a population, because if the living conditions are poor, no matter how high the birth rate may be, the death rate will be correspondingly high, and the surplus of births over deaths, therefore, relatively low.

Vital statistics are, therefore, an indication of more than the mere health or even the material condition of a given population. Probably there are no social facts from which we may gather a clearer insight into the social conditions of a given population than vital statistics.

Without going into the vital statistics of modern nations in any detail, the following table of birth rates and death rates in three leading European nations will serve to illustrate the decrease in the death rate and the birth rate among civilized people in general, the birth rate being computed the same as the death rate, that is, the number of births per thousand annually of the population:

DEATH RATE

	1871–1890	1900–1909	1927
England and Wales	20.3	15.8	12.3
Germany	26.0	19.5	12.0
France	22.8	19.8	16.5

BIRTH RATE

	1871–1890	1900–1909	1927
England and Wales	34.0	27.6	16.6
Germany	38.1	34.0	18.4
France	24.6	20.8	18.2

The preceding table shows, not only that birth rates and death rates have been declining among civilized peoples, but that the decline has been unequal in different peoples. In the case of England the excess of births over deaths in the decade 1900–1909 was 11.8 per thousand of the population annually; in the case of Germany, 14.5; while for France it was only 1.0. In the years just before the World War the excess of births over deaths in Germany was larger than in any other great European nation. During the same period the excess of births over deaths in France was insignificant, and in some years the number of deaths in France actually exceeded the number of births. During the War the birth rate of France fell nearly one half — to 10 per thousand annually.

The causes of the stationary population of France are probably mainly economic, although all the factors which influence the family life in any degree must also influence birth rate. For a number of years the economic conditions of France have not been favorable to the growth of a large population, and at the same time the law necessitating the equal division of the family's property among children has tended to encourage small families, especially in the agricultural population. Unquestionably, however, other factors of a more general social or moral nature are also at work in France as well as in all other populations that are decreasing in numbers.

There are no vital statistics in the United States comparable with those we have cited of representative European countries. In the "registration area" of the United States, containing more than 90 per cent of the total population, the average death rate for the five years 1923–1927

was 11.9, while the average birth rate for the same period was 21.9.

The Decrease in the Native White Stock in the United States. Certain classes in the United States also show a very slight surplus of births over deaths and in some cases absolutely declining numbers. In general the United States Census statistics seem to indicate that the native white stock in the Northern states is not keeping up its numbers. This is suggested by the decreasing size of the average family in the United States. The average size of the family in the United States in 1850 was 5.6 persons; in 1860, 5.3; in 1880, 5.0; in 1890, 4.9; in 1900, 4.7; in 1910, 4.5; and in 1930, 4.1. If we include only private families in 1900, the average size of the family was only 4.6. Thus, between 1850 and 1900 the size of the average family in the United States decreased by one full person. This decrease is most evident in the Pacific Coast and North Central states. In the Pacific Coast states, according to the census of 1930, the average size of the family was only 3.6 persons.

Moreover, the vital statistics kept by the state of Massachusetts for a long number of years seem to show that the older native white stock in that state is tending to die out. In 1919, for example, in Massachusetts the native born had a birth rate of only 14.9, while the foreign born had a birth rate of 43.4. But the death rate among the native born in Massachusetts in 1920 was 12.8; while among the foreign born it was 15.5. Thus among the native born the number of births was greater than the number of deaths by 2.1 per thousand of their population annually; while among the foreign born the excess of births over

deaths was 27.9 per thousand of their population. The following table of birth rates and death rates for 1890 in the city of Boston [1] for the native born and sections of the foreign born shows that the decline of the birth rate of the native born in the United States is not new:

	Birth Rate	Death Rate
Native born	16.40	17.20
Irish	45.60	25.20
Germans	48.00	15.00
Russian Jews	94.60	15.90
Italians	104.60	25.30

Until recently the birth rate among the foreign born in the United States has often been at least twice as high as among the native born. In part this was due to the fact that the foreign-born population was made up largely of persons in the prime of life. But it was also due to the native born artificially limiting their numbers. The foreign born now have a larger number of persons of advanced age, and many of them have also adopted the custom of artificially limiting the size of the family. Hence, their birth rate is also rapidly falling. Thus in Massachusetts in 1930 the birth rate of the foreign born was only 23.9, while their death rate was 17.1; among the native born the birth rate was 15.2 and the death rate 9.8.

[1] Taken from Bushee's *Ethnic Factors in the Population of Boston*, Publications American Economic Association, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1903. More recent statistics indicate very different results. Thus in 1930 the birth rate among the native born in Boston was 20.2, while among the foreign born it was 30.2. The death rate among the native born in 1930 was 11.9; among the foreign born, 19.0.

These latter figures, however, indicate that the older stock in Massachusetts is dying out, as a death rate below 15 can only be temporary.

Moreover, so far as vital statistics concerning different classes can be gathered in the northern tier of the states, practically everywhere the same tendencies are manifest; that is, everywhere we find the older native-born white population failing to hold its own alongside the recent immigrant stock. Apparently, therefore, we must conclude that the birth rate of the older white stock in the United States is declining to such an extent that that element in our population threatens to become extinct if present tendencies continue. Only the Southern whites present an exception to this generalization. The Southern white people, from various causes not well understood, — partly, perhaps, from family pride, partly, perhaps, from racial instinct, but even more probably on account of certain economic conditions, — keep up their numbers, increasing more rapidly even than the negro population which exists alongside of them.

Causes of the Decrease in Birth Rate in the Native White Stock in the United States. What, then, are the causes of this decrease in the birth rate of the native white stock in the United States? It is worth our while to inquire briefly into these causes, for they illustrate the factors which are at work in favoring or deterring the growth of population. They are not only of special interest to us as affecting conditions in our own country, but they are typical of the influences which determine the survival or extinction of peoples.

(1) Economic conditions are without doubt mainly at

the bottom of the decreasing birth rate in the native white American population. Certain unfavorable economic conditions have developed in this country of recent years for this particular element; especially have higher standards of living increased among the native white population in the United States more rapidly than their income. This has led to later marriages and smaller families. Again, more intense competition along all lines has forced certain elements of the native stock into occupations where wages are low in comparison with the standard of living. This has, perhaps, especially come about through the increased competition which the foreign born have offered to the native white element. The foreign born have taken rapidly all the places which might be filled by unskilled labor and many of the places filled by skilled labor. The native born have shrunk from this competition and have retired for the most part to the more socially honorable occupations, such as clerkships in business, the professions, and the like. In many of these occupations, however, as we have already said, the wages are low as compared with the standards of living maintained by that particular occupational class; hence, as we have already said, later marriages and fewer children. Rising standards of living and rising costs of living have, therefore, impinged more heavily upon the native born than upon the foreign born. It is difficult to suggest a remedy for this condition of affairs. No legislator can devise means of encouraging a class to have large families when by so doing that class would necessarily have to sacrifice some of its standards of living. However, it may be that the native born can be protected to some extent

from the competition of the foreign born through reasonable restrictions upon immigration, and it may also be that unreasonable advances in standards of living may be checked, but both of these propositions seem to be of somewhat doubtful nature.

(2) No doubt the pressure of economic conditions is not responsible for small families in some elements of the native white population in the United States, for oftentimes the smallest families are found among the wealthy, among whom there could be no danger of a large family lowering the standards of living or pressing upon other economic needs. We must accept as a second factor in the situation, therefore, the inherent selfishness in human nature which is not willing to be burdened with the care of children. In other countries, and apparently in all ages, the wealthy have been characterized by smaller families than the poor. The following table from Bertillon,[1] showing the number of births per thousand women between fifteen and fifty years of age in Paris, Berlin, and London among the various economic classes, shows conclusively that it is not altogether the pressure of economic wants which leads to the limiting of a population:

BIRTHS PER THOUSAND WOMEN PER ANNUM

	Paris.	Berlin.	London.
Very poor	108	157	147
Poor	95	129	140
Comfortable	72	114	107
Rich	53	63	87
Very rich	34	47	63

[1] Quoted by Newsholme, *Vital Statistics*, p. 75.

(3) Besides economic conditions and individual selfishness we must unfortunately add another cause of decreasing birth rate in our population which has been definitely ascertained, and that is vice. Vice cuts the birth rate chiefly through the diseases which accompany it. About 20 per cent of American marriages are childless, and medical authorities state that in one half of these childless marriages the barrenness is due to venereal diseases. All authorities in medical sociology agree that a large per cent of the young men of the United States become addicted to sex vice before marriage. This serves to disseminate venereal diseases among the general population, especially among innocent women and children. The consequence is, on the one hand, a considerable number of sterile marriages and on the other hand a high infant mortality. It need not be assumed, as we have already said, that vice is more prevalent to-day than in previous generations, but on account of the conditions of our social life diseases which accompany vice are now more widely disseminated than they have been at any time in our previous history; therefore, even the physical results of vice are different to-day than they were a generation or more ago.

(4) Education has been alleged as a cause of decreasing birth rate in the native white American stock. This, however, is true only in a very qualified sense. While it is a fact, as collected statistics have shown, that if Harvard and other universities depended on children of their alumni for students their attendance would actually decrease in numbers, it is not true that college graduates have had a lower birth rate than the economic and social

classes to which they belong. So far as statistics have been collected, indeed, they seem to indicate that the wealthy uneducated are producing fewer children than the educated classes who associate with them. The influence decreasing the birth rate among the educated is, therefore, not education itself, but the high standards of living and the luxury of the classes with whom they associate.

On the other hand, the higher education of women seems to be, down to the present time, operating as a distinct influence to lessen the birth rate among the educated classes for the reason that apparently a majority of educated women do not marry. The higher education has not yet gone far enough, however, to give us any definite facts with which to judge what the ultimate effect of woman's higher education will be. If the higher education of woman is going to lead to a large per cent of the best and most intellectual women in society leading lives of celibacy, then, of course, ultimately the higher education of woman will be disastrous to the race. But probably the relative infrequency of marriage among women who are college graduates is a transitory phenomenon due to the fact that neither women nor men are as yet adjusted to the higher education of women.

(5) Some phases of the "woman's movement" have without doubt tended to lessen the birth rate in certain sections of American society. Some of the leaders of the woman's movement have advocated, for example, that women should choose a single life, while others have advocated that families should not have more than two children. Some "birth-control" advocates have gone so far as to claim that if families would have but two children this

would be a cure-all for many social troubles. Indeed, this ideal of two children in the family has been so widely disseminated in this country that it is often spoken of as the "American Idea." Of course, such teachings could not be without some effect. Without attempting to reply to the advocates of this theory of but two children to a family, it will be sufficient to remark that for a population simply to remain stationary three children at least must be born to each family on the average; otherwise, if only two children are born, as one of the children is apt to die or fail to marry, the population will actually decrease in numbers. Under the best modern conditions one out of three children now born either fails to live to maturity or fails to reproduce. There must be, therefore, more than three children born to the average family for a population to grow. From the sociological point of view the ideal family would seem to be one in which from three to six children are born.

(6) Finally, not all of the childless and small families in the native American stock are due by any means to voluntary causes, or even involuntary causes of the kind that we have mentioned. There are also certain other obscure physiological causes at work producing sterility in American women. The sterility of American women is greater than that of any other civilized population, even apart from the causes which have just been mentioned. Some say this is due to physical deterioration in the native white American stock, and there are other things which seem to point in that direction. It may be, however, that this deterioration is in no sense racial, but only individual, affecting certain individuals who lead a relatively unnatural life.

Our American civilization puts a great strain upon certain elements of our population, and this strain in many cases falls even more upon the women than upon the men. The social life of the American people, in other words, is oftentimes such as to produce exhaustion and physical degeneracy, and this shows itself in the women of a population first of all in sterility. It is evident that the remedy for this cause is a more natural and more simple life on the part of all, if it is possible to bring this about.

Thus, the causes which influence birth rate are evidently very complex. In the main they are doubtless economic causes among all peoples, but there is no reason to believe that these economic causes act alone in determining birth rate, nor is there any reason to believe that the other psychological and biological causes may be in any way derived from the economic. So far as we can see, then, industrial conditions are mainly responsible for the lessened birth rate in the native white American stock. But mingled with these industrial conditions, operating as causes, are certain psychological (or moral) and biological factors that have to be considered as in the main independent. It is furthermore evident that the causes which lead to the decline and extinction of any population, whether civilized or uncivilized, are complex. All efforts to explain the extinction of peoples of antiquity, or modern nature peoples, such as the North American Indians and the Polynesians, through any single set of causes, must be looked at as unscientific. It can readily be shown that in all these cases the causes of the decline of the birth rate and the ultimate extinction of the stock are numerous and are not reducible to any single set of causes.

Causes which Influence the Death Rate. Before we can fully understand the causes of the growth of a population, that is, of the surplus of births over deaths, we must understand something also about the things which influence the death rate as well as the things which influence the birth rate, because, let it be borne in mind, the growth of a given population (excluding immigration always) is due to the combined working of these two factors.

Within certain limits the death rate is more easily controlled than the birth rate. It is very difficult for society deliberately to set about to increase the birth rate, but it is comparatively easy for it to take deliberate measures to decrease the death rate, because all individuals have a selfish interest in decreasing the death rate; but the increase of the birth rate does not appeal to the self-interest of individuals. Modern medical science, as we have seen, has done much to decrease the death rate in civilized countries, and it promises to do even more. A century ago a death rate of fifty or sixty per thousand population in urban centers was not unusual, but now a death rate of thirty in a thousand in the same communities is considered an intolerable disgrace, and the time will shortly come, no doubt, when even a death rate of twenty per thousand of the population will be considered disgraceful to any community. As we have already seen, the normal death rate of the most enlightened European and American communities tends to establish itself around fifteen per thousand.

Of course the sanitary and hygienic conditions which influence the death rate are so numerous that we cannot enter into and discuss them. We can only mention

some of the more general social causes which are often overlooked and which are of particular interest in sociology.

(1) The World War demonstrated once more that war, next after famine and pestilence, is the greatest destructive agency known to man. While previous recent European wars, such as the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871, had comparatively small effects upon the death rates of the countries involved, the reverse was true of the World War. In all the chief belligerent nations the death rate was enormously increased, while the birth rate was greatly decreased. Thus France suffered a loss of about seven per cent of its total population in the years 1914–1918, losing 1,427,000 through deaths in its military forces, and over 1,000,000 through the excess of deaths over births in its civilian population, during the four years of the War. Germany, it is estimated, suffered a total loss, within its geographical boundaries of 1914, of about 3,500,000 in its population during the four years of the World War, of which number, however, only 1,611,000 was from deaths in its military forces. It is estimated that about 10,000,000 men died in the armies of the whole of Europe during the War, while almost as many more were permanently disabled — the total wounded being estimated at over 20,000,000. In addition, perhaps 10,000,000 died in Europe from the diseases and starvation caused by the War. Thus we see that even in modern war disturbances in economic and sanitary conditions cause more deaths than wounds received in battle.

(2) As already implied, then, economic conditions exercise a very great influence upon death rate, particularly

when economic conditions cause increased cost of the necessities of life and widespread scarcity of food. This cause produces far more deaths in modern nations than any other preventable cause. The doubling of the cost of bread during the World War was one of its greatest calamities. While in peace modern civilized peoples fear famine but little, there are many classes in the great industrial nations that live upon such a narrow margin of existence that the slightest increase in the cost of the necessities of life means practically the same as a famine to these classes. Statistics, therefore, of all modern countries, and particularly of all great cities, show an enormous increase in sickness and death among the poorer classes in times of economic depression.

(3) Other economic causes also greatly affect the death rate, especially industrial accidents and occupational diseases. It is estimated by reliable authorities that in the United States alone 25,000 are killed annually by industrial accidents, and 1,000,000 maimed and wounded, and that there are as many as 3,000,000 cases of illness in a year produced by harmful industrial conditions. It is evident from these figures that modern industry is more bloody than many a war, and that in all industrial communities, unless there are the most advanced sanitary and safety appliances, it must swell the death rate considerably.

(4) Climate and season are rather constant factors in the death rate of all communities. The rule here is that in northern countries the death rate is higher in winter, while in southern countries the death rate is higher in summer. Taking 100 as an arbitrary standard, in Sweden in February

deaths rise to 113, in August they go down to 79; but in the United States in 1926 in March deaths were at 130 as compared with the standard, and in August at 91, while in June and October deaths were at 86 and 85 respectively, — the period of minimum death rate in the United States being in the spring and autumn. In other words, in months of most moderate temperature the mortality is least.

(5) The biological fact of sex also influences death rate. Males in general are shorter-lived than females. This is in part due to the fact that men are more exposed to the dangers of industry in earning a livelihood, while women are more secluded in the home. But this does not explain entirely the discrepancy in the death rate of the two sexes, for boy babies die more frequently than girl babies. As we have already seen, the female organism is the more stable, biologically, and hence females, while having less physical strength, have more vitality than males. In the registration area of the United States the death rate in 1926 for the males was 13.0 per thousand of the male population, while the death rate for the females was only 11.6 per thousand of their population.

(6) Conjugal condition is also a factor which affects death rate. The differences between the death rates of the married and unmarried have long been noted. The following table of the death rates (per thousand) of males and females of different conjugal classes between the ages of forty and fifty years (in Germany, 1876–1880), taken from Professor Mayo-Smith's *Statistics and Sociology*, illustrates this:

Single males....	26.5	Single females....	15.4
Married males ..	14.2	Married females ..	11.4
Widowed males .	29.9	Widows.....	13.4

It will be seen from these figures that in the more advanced years of life the death rate among the single is higher than among the married. The probable explanation of this, however, is not that the married state is better physiologically, as has been so often claimed, but that it is better socially. These figures are a testimony, in other words, to the social advantages of the home. Single persons, particularly in the more advanced years of life, who are without homes, are more liable to fall sick, and when sick are less likely to receive proper care. That these figures show the great social advantage of the home in preserving life is evident from the fact that among the widowed males, whose homes have been broken up, the death rate is higher even than among the single males. Moreover, in interpreting such statistics we must bear in mind that the unmarried in the higher ages of life are made up very often of those who are relatively abnormal, either physically or mentally, that is, of those who are biologically unfit. Inasmuch as the single persons include many of this class, and also lack the comforts of home, it is not surprising that the death rate is much higher among them.

(7) Infantile mortality is one of the most interesting phases of vital statistics. We have already said that the death rate is a good rough measure of a people's civilization. Even more can we say that the death rate among children, particularly those under one year of age, is an index to a people's sanitary and moral condition. Taking the world as a whole, it is still estimated that one half of all who are born die before the age of five years. This represents an enormous waste of energy. Even in many of the most civilized countries the death rate among chil-

dren, and especially among infants under one year of age, is still comparatively high. Most of this death rate is unnecessary, could be avoided, and, as we have already said, represents a waste of life. According to Dr. Newman,[1] during the decade 1894–1903, in Russia 27 per cent of all children born died the first year; in Germany, 19.5 per cent; in France, 15.5 per cent; in England, 15 per cent; in Norway, 9.4 per cent; in New Zealand, 9.7 per cent; and in the United States, about 16 per cent. Probably the chief factor in causing a high infant mortality is the ignorance of parents as to proper methods of child care; but this is closely correlated with economic conditions. The Federal Children's Bureau has shown that the highest death rate of children in the United States is generally in families with very low income, while the lowest death rate was found in families with an income above $1200 annually. What proper measures can do to reduce infant mortality is shown by recent statistics. Thus, in 40 leading states of the registration area in the United States in 1927 only 6.5 per cent of the children born died the first year, while in New Zealand in 1927 the per cent was only 3.9.

The Laws of the Growth of Population. — Can the growth of population be reduced to any principle or law? This is a problem which has puzzled social thinkers for a long time. Many have thought that the growth of population can be reduced to one or more relatively simple laws, but we have seen from analyzing the statistics of birth rate and death rate that this is hardly probable. A formula that would cover the growth of population would have to cover all of the variable causes influencing birth rate and death rate

[1] In his work on *Infant Mortality*.

and so entering into the surplus of births over deaths. It is evident that these causes are too complex to be reduced to any such formula among modern civilized peoples. In the animal world and among uncivilized peoples, however, conditions are quite different, and the growth of population is regulated by certain very simple principles or laws. Thus it is probable that for centuries before the whites came, the Indians of North America were stationary in their population, for the reason that under their stationary condition of culture a given area could support only so many people. In conditions of savagery, and even of barbarism, therefore, we can lay down the principle that population will increase up to the limit of food supply, and will stop there and remain stationary until food supply increases. This is the condition which governs the growth of the population of all animal species, and, as we have already said, of the savages and barbarians among the human species. But among civilized men who have attempted the control of physical nature, and to some extent even the control of human nature, many other factors enter in to influence both birth rate and death rate, and so the growth of the population.

Nevertheless, many social thinkers of the past have conceived, as has already been said, that the growth of population might be reduced to very simple and definite laws. Among the first who proposed laws governing population was an English economist, Thomas Robert Malthus, whose active career coincides with the first quarter of the nineteenth century. In 1798 Malthus put forth a little book which he entitled *An Essay on the Principle of Population as it affects the future improvement of society.* This essay went through numerous editions and revisions, and

in it Malthus elaborated his famous economic theory of the growth of population. Inasmuch as this theory of Malthus has been the storm center of sociological and economic writers for the past one hundred years, it is worth our while to note very briefly what Malthus's theory was, and why it is inadequate as a scientific statement of the laws governing the growth of population.

Malthus's Theory of Population. In the first edition of his essay Malthus contended that population tends to increase in geometric ratio, while food at best will increase only in arithmetical ratio; and that this means that constant discrepancies between population and food supply would appear, with the result that population would have to be cut down to food supply. Later Malthus saw how crude this statement of his theory was and abandoned any attempt at mathematical statement, presenting substantially the following theory: (1) Population is necessarily limited by food; (2) Population always increases where food increases and tends to increase faster than food; (3) The checks that keep population down to food supply may be classified as positive and preventive. Positive checks are those which increase the death rate, such as famine, poverty, war, disease, and the like. Preventive checks are those that decrease the birth rate, such as late marriage and prudence in the birth of children. Inasmuch as Malthus believed that the positive checks must always operate where the preventive checks did not, he advocated the use of the preventive checks as the best means to remedy human misery. The inherent tendency of population to outstrip food supply, Malthus believed to be the main source of human misery in all of its forms.

Criticisms of Malthus's Theory. (1) It is evident that Malthus's theory applies only to a stationary society, that is, a non-progressive society, because in a progressive society human invention and, therefore, food supply, may far outstrip any increase of population. This was the case in practically all civilized countries during the nineteenth century, where improvements in machinery and agriculture greatly increased the food supply. If it be replied that this increase of food is but temporary, and that sooner or later Malthus's theory must operate, then it may be said, on the other hand, that as yet we see no limit of man's mastery over nature, and that apparently we are just entering upon the stage of material progress. We have just begun to conquer physical nature, and in the United States in particular scientific agriculture tells us not half of the actual fertility of the soil is utilized. Malthus, of course, did not foresee the inventions and agricultural progress of the nineteenth century. For this reason his theory was a static one and it cannot be made to apply to a progressive society.

(2) Similarly, the theory makes no allowance for the increased efficiency which may come with increased population, because increase of population makes possible better coöperation. As we have already seen, coöperation and division of labor in a society depend upon the size of the group to a certain extent, that is, the larger the group there is for organization the better can be the organization and division of labor in that group. Every increase of population, therefore, opens up new and superior ways of applying labor; and coöperation and the division of

labor make it possible for men to do more as a group than they could possibly accomplish working as individuals. Improved means of coöperation, therefore, operate very much the same way in human society in controlling nature as new inventions.

(3) The theory of Malthus makes no allowance for the general law of animal fertility, which is that as the rate of individual evolution increases the rate of reproduction decreases. Of course, Malthus's theory antedates this law of animal fertility, which was first stated by Herbert Spencer. Some scientists declare that this law does not apply within the human species, and it must be admitted that we are not yet certain that it does. As we have already seen, however, the lower and less individualized classes in human society reproduce much more rapidly than the upper or more individualized classes. Increase of food supply, or of wealth, does not necessarily mean increase of population, and the fatal error in Malthus's theory is that he assumes that wherever food increases population always increases unless deliberate checks are applied.

(4) The overpopulation which Malthus feared, so far from being an evil, has been shown by the labors of Darwin to be the condition essential to the working of the process of natural selection in the human species. Overpopulation, at least until artificial selection arrives, is not an evil, but a good in human society. Without it there would not be sufficient elimination of the unfit in human society to prevent wholesale social degeneration. Even with artificial selection, however, some overpopulation would be necessary for the working of any scheme of selection. We must conclude, then, that Malthus's theory, either as

an explanation of the growth of modern populations or as an implied practical ethical doctrine, is of little value.

This is not saying, of course, that Malthus's theory does not have elements of truth in it. Undoubtedly Malthus's theory does apply to stationary, non-progressive peoples, to savages and lower civilized in certain stages of culture, and also perhaps to certain classes in modern society who fail to participate in modern social progress. But these lower classes or elements in human society are constantly decreasing, especially in America, where the tendency to individual improvement is so marked. Again, Malthus's theory has certain elements of truth in it, so far as it depends upon the economic law of diminishing returns in agriculture, and in so far as it merely asserts that the struggle for existence in human society is, in the last analysis, a struggle for food. Finally, Malthus meant his theory chiefly as a criticism of socialistic and communistic schemes, which would equalize wealth and do away with competition in society. Unquestionably any such scheme to equalize wealth and do away with competition in society would result in the enormous increase of the lower and more brutal element of society — those that have not yet participated in modern culture. Malthus's theory as a criticism of socialistic schemes that would do away with competition (which, however, is not an aim of genuinely scientific socialism) is unquestionably as good to-day as when it was written.

Summary and Conclusion. — Most modern economists and sociologists recognize the failure of Malthus to formulate a successful theory of population, and therefore, some have attempted to form theories independent of Mal-

thus; but it must be said that they have succeeded no better than Malthus. In its practical aspects also Malthusianism must be judged to be an inadequate doctrine. In practice Neo-Malthusian ideas have served merely as an excuse for the socially fortunate classes to restrict their birth rate. Modern eugenics makes a much closer approach to a rational population policy. According to eugenics, society needs birth release among the strong, the intelligent, and the economically fortunate, while it needs birth restriction among the weak, the unintelligent, and the economically depressed. But there are insuperable difficulties at present in the way of carrying out such a program. It may be accepted, however, as a standard upon which to base a rational reconstruction of our population policy; for Malthusianism in practice has worked the opposite and produced a "reversal of selection" in society.

As to economic influences, they are, as we have seen, powerful influences in determining the growth of population, but they are not the only ones. The factors which enter into determining the excess of births over deaths are much too complex to be lumped together and called "economic conditions." So far as the birth-rate side of the population equation is concerned, it would be more nearly correct to say that in a very broad sense the problem is psychological.

In conclusion, we may say that we are unable to formulate any laws of population which are worthy of the name of laws as yet, and it seems probable, that while we may understand clearly enough the factors which enter into the growth of population, we shall never be able to reduce these factors to a single formula or law. Social phenomena,

we may here note, are too complex to be reduced to simple formulas or laws as physical phenomena are reduced. Indeed, it is doubtful whether laws exist among social phenomena in the same sense in which they exist among physical phenomena, that is, as fixed relations among variable forces. Human society has in it another element than mechanical causation or physical necessity, namely, the psychic factor, and this so increases the complexity of social phenomena that it is doubtful if we can formulate any such hard and fixed laws of social phenomena as of physical phenomena. This is not saying, however, that social phenomena cannot be understood and that there are not principles which are at work with relative uniformity among them. It is only saying that the social sciences, even in their most biological or physical aspects, cannot be reduced to the same exactness as the physical sciences, though the knowledge which they offer may be in practice just as trustworthy.

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CHAPTER X

THE IMMIGRATION PROBLEM

In new countries population may increase by immigration as well as by the surplus of births over deaths. Immigration is, therefore, a secondary means of increasing the population of a country, and in new countries is often of great importance.

History and Causes of Migrations. — Immigration, or the migration of a people into a country, along with its correlative emigration, constitutes a most important social phenomenon. All peoples seem more or less migratory in their habits. Man has been a wanderer upon the face of the earth since the earliest times. According to modern anthropology the human species probably evolved in a relatively narrow area and peopled the earth by successive migrations to distant lands. In all ages, therefore, we find more or less migratory movements of populations. But the movements in modern times, particularly in the nineteenth century, probably exceed, in the number of individuals concerned, any other migratory movements of which we have knowledge in history. Ancient migrations were, moreover, somewhat different from modern immigration and emigration. Ancient migrations were largely those of peoples or tribes, while in modern times migration is more of an individual matter. The Huns, for example, came into Europe as a nation, but the immigration into the United States at the present

time is wholly an individual movement. The causes of migration are more or less universal, but corresponding to the difference in ancient and modern migrations we find the causes varying somewhat in ancient and modern times. The causes of ancient migrations and the primary causes of all migrations seem to be: (1) lack of food; (2) lack of territory for an expanding population; (3) war. In modern times we find other causes operating, such as, (4) the labor market, — men now migrate chiefly to get better economic opportunities; (5) government, — in modern times the oppression of unjust governments has often caused extensive migration; (6) religion, — religious persecution and intolerance have in modern times been important among the causes of migration.

Migration as a Factor in Social Evolution. — Migration as a factor in social evolution has had most important consequences in human history. The process of migration has been a selective process which has had much to do with the creation of existing social types. It is generally held, by students of social history, that migration exercises a selective effect in favor of the stronger, more energetic, more restless types of people. Hence peoples descended from migrants are more apt to show energy and restlessness in their social life.

Another effect of migration of the utmost social consequence has been the intermingling of peoples. This has gone on to such an extent in the world's history that ethnologists tell us that there are no longer any pure races. The crossing of races has had such profound social effects that we cannot stop here to discuss the matter, except to say that undoubtedly one result has been to add to the variability,

and hence to the plasticity, of human types. This increased variability resulting from the crossing of races, in the opinion of many writers, has favored social progress. This seems to be the case when the crossing is between types not too far removed either in biological constitution or in culture.

Of equal importance with these biological effects of human migration, however, have been the cultural effects. As a result of migration different peoples with different cultures have been brought into contact with one another. In this way peoples have come to borrow much from one another by imitating the folkways, customs, and institutions of one another. Thus the " cake of custom," as Bagehot says, has been broken up. In other words, social habits have been prevented from becoming too inflexible by the contact of different peoples. Civilization has thus been very largely spread by migrations in the past.

Again, from the union of two dissimilar cultures, an impetus usually results toward the development of a new and higher type of civilization. This is, at least, usually the case when the cultures are not too dissimilar. Sociologists are, therefore, generally agreed that the intermingling of peoples in the past has been a great stimulus to progress. This would necessarily result, under normal conditions, from the breaking up of tradition and custom, which we have spoken of as one of the important consequences of migration.

Still other important sociological phenomena flow from the intermingling of peoples of different traditions and of different races. Here we can see in the clearest possible way the importance in human society of the " consciousness of kind," and of physical and mental resemblance, among

the different elements which make up a national group. Here we can also see in connection with the intermingling of peoples the important phenomena of social assimilation through imitation. Without discussing further, however, in an abstract way these important sociological principles, let us now turn to the current problem of immigration into the United States; for all historical examples of the intermingling of peoples are relatively of little value compared to the actual phenomena which we find going on in our own country, if it be desired to make our study of sociological principles at all concrete.

History of Immigration into the United States. — The great economic opportunities offered by the settlement of the vast territory of the United States, together with a combination of causes in Europe, partly political, partly religious, and partly economic, have caused, during the past century, a flood of immigrants from practically all European countries to invade the United States, greater in number of individuals than any recorded migration in history. Between 1820, the first year for which we have immigration statistics, and 1930, 37,762,000 immigrants sought homes, temporarily or permanently, in this country, — over one half of them coming since 1890. Before 1820 it is improbable that immigration into the United States assumed any large proportions. Even up to 1840 the number of immigrants was comparatively insignificant. Thus in 1839 the number was only 68,000, and not until 1842 did the number of immigrants first cross the 100,000 mark. Owing to the potato famine in Ireland in the forties, however, and to the unsuccessful revolution in Germany in 1848, the number of immigrants from Europe began greatly

to increase. From 1851 to 1860 inclusive no less than 2,598,000 immigrants sought homes in this country. The number fell off greatly during the Civil War, and did not reach the same proportions again until the seventies. In the decade, 1881–1890, the volume of immigration rose to 5,246,000. The number of immigrants again declined during the nineties, owing largely to the financial depression in the United States, to 3,687,000; but during the decade 1901–1910 it surpassed all former records, and amounted to 8,795,000.

It is curious to note how the maximum periods of immigration have hitherto been about ten or twenty years apart. Thus the first noteworthy maximum of 427,000, in 1854, was not surpassed again until 1873, when another maximum of 459,000 was recorded; in 1882 another maximum was reached of 788,000, and in 1903 another maximum of 857,000. After 1903, however, immigration went on increasing until 1907. These fluctuations in immigration correspond to the economic prosperity of the country, and, as Professor Commons has shown, are almost identical with the fluctuations in foreign imports. This shows very conclusively the prevailing economic character of modern migration.

During 1905, 1906, and 1907, indeed, the United States received more immigrants than its total population at the time of the Declaration of Independence. In 1905 the number was 1,027,000; in 1906, 1,100,000; in 1907, 1,285,000. However, about twenty-five per cent must be deducted from these immigration statistics in prosperous years to allow for emigrants returning to their home countries. In years of economic depression and public calamity,

a much greater deduction must be made. During the four years of the World War, the emigration from the United States almost equalled the immigration.[1]

Previous to 1890, nearly all the immigrants who entered came from the countries of Northern Europe. It has been claimed that as high as ninety per cent came from Teutonic and Celtic countries, and were, accordingly, almost of the same blood as the early settlers; but after 1890 the character of our immigration changed, so that after that time nearly seventy per cent came from non-Teutonic countries, such as Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Greece. The period of maximum immigration for the Irish to this country was the forties and fifties; the period of maximum immigration for the Germans was the fifties and eighties; and for the English, the seventies and eighties. But the period of maximum immigration for the Italians can scarcely as yet be reckoned by decades at all. The Italians first began coming in numbers exceeding 100,000 only in 1900, but in 1907, 285,000 of our immigrants were Italians, and in 1914, 283,000. These numbers are larger than those of the immigrants from any other single European nation in a single year, unless we count as one nation the immigrants of various nationalities sent to us by Austria-Hungary or by Russia. The immigration from Austria-Hungary, also, did not exceed 100,000 until the year 1900, but by 1905 it had reached 275,000, and in 1907, 338,000. The immigration from Russia, consisting largely

[1] The number of immigrant aliens, according to the reports of the Commissioner of Immigration, admitted to the United States in the decade 1921–1930 was 4,107,000, an average of 410,720 a year. In 1930 it was 241,700. In this chapter the year 1907, the year of maximum immigration thus far, is taken for purposes of discussion.

of Russian Jews and Poles, began to be considerable, if we include Poland in Russia, by 1892, when it reached 122,000. In 1903, after falling off, it reached 136,000; in 1907, 258,000; and in 1913, 291,000.

The "Old" and the "New" Immigration. These statistics have been cited to show the change in the sources from which we are receiving immigrants. This can be brought out still more clearly by contrasting a typical year previous to 1890 with one of the later years. The year 1882 was the year, previous to 1890, of maximum immigration into this country. During that year we received 788,000 immigrants. Nearly all, as the table which we are about to give will show, came from countries of Northern Europe. In order to contrast the "old" immigration of a quarter of a century ago with the "new" immigration, let us compare the year 1882 with the year 1907, which thus far has been the year of maximum immigration into the United States, — the total number of immigrants for 1907 being 1,285,000:

IMMIGRATION, 1882

		Per cent.
Great Britain and Ireland	179,423	22.8
Germany	250,630	31.7
Scandinavia	105,326	13.3
Netherlands, France, Switzerland, etc.	27,795	3.5
Total Western Europe		71.3
Italy	32,159	4.1
Austria-Hungary	29,150	3.7
Russia, etc.	22,010	2.7
Total Southern and Eastern Europe		10.5
All other countries [1]		18.2
		100.0

[1] Of the immigration from "other countries" 98,295 was from British North America, or 12.4 per cent of the total. This, added to the 71.3 per cent from Western Europe, makes a total of 83.7 of the immigrants in 1882 of West European stock.

IMMIGRATION, 1907

		Per cent.
Great Britain and Ireland	113,567	8.8
Scandinavia	49,965	3.9
Germany	37,807	2.9
Netherlands, France, Switzerland, etc.	26,512	2.1
Total Western Europe		17.7
Austria-Hungary	338,452	26.3
Italy	285,731	22.2
Russia	258,943	20.1
Greece, Servia, Roumania, etc.	88,482	6.9
Total Southern and Eastern Europe		75.5
All other countries		6.8
		100.0

It will be noted that while in 1882, 71.3 per cent of our immigrants came from the countries of Western Europe, only 10.5 per cent came from the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe. In 1907 the situation was very nearly reversed. In 1907 Great Britain and Ireland, and Scandinavia, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Switzerland — the countries which had furnished 71.3 per cent of our immigrants in 1882 — furnished only 17.7 per cent, while Austria-Hungary, Italy, Russia, Greece, Servia, Roumania, and Turkey in Europe — the countries which had furnished but 10.5 per cent in 1882 — furnished 75.5 per cent. This matter of changed sources from which we receive our immigrants evidently is one of first importance in any consideration of the present immigration problem of the United States.

The Distribution of Immigrants. If immigrants would distribute themselves evenly over the United States, the immigration problem would be quite different from what it is. Instead of this, there is a massing of immigrants in some states and communities, and very little evidence to

show that these immigrants ever distribute themselves normally over the whole country. In 1907, for example, the Commissioner of Immigration reported that 65 per cent of the 1,285,000 immigrants who came that year went to the North Atlantic states; 23 per cent to the North Central states; 6 per cent to the Western states; and 4.5 per cent to the Southern states. If these figures are at all trustworthy, they indicate a congestion of our recent immigrants in the North Atlantic states and in certain states of the Central West. The census reports tend to confirm these statistics of the Commissioner of Immigration. According to the census of 1930 the number of foreign born in the United States was 13,366,000, or 12.3 per cent of the white population. But these foreign born were confined almost entirely to the Northern states; that is, the North Atlantic states and North Central states. In 1930 the Southern states (South Atlantic and South Central) contained but 4 per cent of the total foreign born of the country. The reason why so few of our immigrants have thus far settled in the South is perhaps chiefly because of the competition which the cheap negro labor of the South would offer to them, and also because the South is still largely agricultural, offering few opportunities for the industrial employments, into which a majority of our immigrants go. In 1930 over one fourth of the white population in the North Atlantic states was foreign born, and 18.4 per cent in the Pacific Coast states.

The influence of the foreign born in the United States is perhaps better shown if we consider the number who are of foreign stock, that is, the foreign born and their children. In a large number of states more than half of the popula-

tion is of foreign stock. Thus in 1930 more than one half of the population was of foreign stock in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and North Dakota. For the United States as a whole the number of foreign stock in 1930 amounted to 35.6 per cent, or 38,727,000 out of a white population of 108,864,000. Many of our large cities have a still higher percentage of foreign stock in their population. The following percentages were indicated by the census of 1930:

	Per cent.
New York	74.8
Chicago	64.5
Philadelphia	50.7
Detroit	57.8
Cleveland	64.9
Boston	71.6
Pittsburgh	51.0
Los Angeles	44.5
San Francisco	60.0

These figures show the tendency of our immigrants to mass together in our great cities. More than three fourths of our foreign born live in the cities. The census of 1930 showed that only 21.7 per cent of the people of New York city were of native white stock, while of the foreign white stock 945,000 were Russian, 1,070,000 were Italian, 600,000 were German, and 613,000 were Irish.

Census statistics indicate that the foreign born mass in certain states. Only British immigrants distribute themselves relatively evenly over the country; all other nationalities have certain favorite sections in which they settle, these favorite settlements being found especially in New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Jersey,

Wisconsin, Illinois, and Michigan. The census statistics indicate that the congestion of later immigrants in colonies in these states is serious, and it is a question whether such colonies of foreign born will easily be assimilated to the American type. The claim that there is no serious congestion of the foreign-born stock in this country, and that immigrants distribute themselves through the operation of normal economic influences in the places where they are most needed is not well borne out by the facts of ordinary observation and experience.

The Distribution of Immigrants in Industry. Four fifths of the immigrants who entered the United States in 1900–1910 belonged to the unskilled class of laborers. It is claimed by those who favor the policy of unrestricted immigration that this country needs a large supply of unskilled laborers, but the difficulties of finding employment for the mass of unskilled laborers and even, in periods of depression, for the skilled, has shown conclusively that the policy of no restriction is a mistake.

Moreover, the foreign born have distributed themselves very unevenly in different classes of occupations, the vast majority going into manufacturing, transportation, and mining, and very few into agriculture. Government commissions during the war showed, moreover, that the foreign born formed about one half of the labor force in our basic industries. While this has enabled American capitalists to develop these industries faster than they would otherwise have been developed, it has given, at the same time, opportunity for the exploitation of the labor of the foreign born and has in the long run proved a hardship to the native-born American laborer.

Some Other Social Effects of Immigration. — (1) The influence of immigration on the *proportion of the sexes* in this country has without doubt been considerable. In 1907, out of a total of 1,285,349 immigrants, 929,976 were males and 355,373 were females. For a long period of years about two thirds of all the immigrants into the United States have been males. This has greatly affected the proportion of the sexes in the United States, making the males, in 1930, 1,500,000 in excess in our population. The influence of such a discrepancy in the proportion of the sexes is difficult to state, but it is obvious, from all that has previously been said about the importance of the numerical equality of the sexes in society, that the influence must be a considerable one, and that not for good.

(2) The table on the following page shows how far the *increase of population* in the United States in the decennial periods since 1800 has been due to immigration and to reproduction. Until 1840 the increase by immigration was so small as to be hardly noticeable, and therefore no account of it is taken.

This table shows that it is not certain that immigration has increased the total population of the United States, as a decrease of the natural birth rate seems to have accompanied increasing immigration. For this reason Professor Francis A. Walker held that it was doubtful that immigration had added anything to the population of the United States. At any rate, the population of the country was increasing just as rapidly before the large volume of immigration was received as it increased at any later time. Again, the Southern states, which have received practically no immigrants since the Civil War, have increased their

population as rapidly as the Northern states, that is, the increase of population among the Southern whites has been equal to that of the Northern assisted by immigration. These two facts suggest that the immigrants have simply displaced an equal number of native born[1] who would have

Year.	Total Increase. Per cent.	By Immigration. Per cent.	By Birth. Per cent.
1800	35.70		
1810	36.38		
1820	34.07		
1830	33.55		
1840	32.67	4.66	28.01
1850	35.87	10.04	25.83
1860	35.58	11.12	24.46
1870	22.63	7.25	15.38
1880	30.08	7.29	22.79
1890	25.50	10.46	15.04
1900	20.73	5.86	14.87
1910	21.02	11.57	9.45

been furnished by birth rate if the immigrants had never come.

(3) Immigration has very largely aided in maintaining a considerable amount of *illiteracy* in the United States in spite of the effects of the propaganda for popular education which has been carried on now for the last fifty years or more. In 1930 there were still 4,283,753 illiterates above the age of ten years in the United States, which was 4.3 per cent of the population above that age. Of these, 1,103,134 were native whites, while 1,304,084 were foreign-

[1] This oft-cited table must not be taken as an accurate statement of facts, since it makes no allowance for the return of immigrants or their death before the census year. Thus, in the decade ending 1910 the actual increase of the population of the United States by birth was about 15 per cent instead of 9.45. The table does, however, roughly show the decline of the birth rate with increasing immigration.

born whites. Nearly all of the native white illiterates in the United States are found in the Southern states, the white illiteracy in the Northern states being practically confined to the foreign born. Thus, in the state of New York 3.7 per cent are illiterate, but of the native whites only 0.5 per cent are illiterate, while 10.8 per cent of the foreign population can neither read nor write. Again, in Massachusetts 3.5 per cent of the population are illiterate, but of the native whites only 0.4 per cent are illiterate, while 10.7 per cent of the foreign born are illiterate. Statistics of illiteracy for our cities show the same results. Thus, in the city of New York 4.5 per cent of the population are illiterate, but only 0.4 per cent of the native whites are illiterate, while 10.7 per cent of the foreign born are illiterate. In Boston 3.2 per cent of the total population are illiterate, but only 0.2 per cent of the native white population are illiterate, while 8.7 per cent of the foreign-born population are illiterate. Of the total immigration in 1907, 30 per cent were illiterate. The number of illiterates from different countries varies greatly, but is greatest from the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe.

(4) *Crime and Poverty.* It is said that crime is apt to accompany migration. However, down to 1930 our immigrants have not shown any exaggerated tendency to crime. The special prison census of 1910 showed that 26.2 per cent of the male white prisoners were foreign born, while 24.5 per cent of the general male white population above the age of fifteen years were foreign born. This shows a tendency to crime among the foreign born not greatly out of proportion to their numbers in the population. The same census, however, showed that 33.8 per cent of na-

tive white prisoners committed during 1910 were born of foreign parents, while this element constituted only 27.6 per cent of the native white population. Thus, among the children of the foreign born there appears to be a greater tendency toward crime than among the foreign born themselves. The probable explanation of this is that the children of the foreign born are often reared in our large cities, and particularly in the slum districts of those cities. Thus the high criminality of the children of the foreign born is perhaps largely a product of urban life, but it may be suggested also that the children of the foreign born lack adequate parental control in their new American environment. Certain nationalities among our immigrants, however, seem strongly predisposed to crime. This is especially true of the Southern Italian. For example, the census of 1910 showed that 36.5 per cent of the foreign-born prisoners committed for homicide during 1910 were Italians, whereas in 1900 Italians constituted only 9.9 per cent of the total foreign-born population. Again, in New York city in 1907–1908 the Italian born constituted 26.9 per cent of those convicted of crimes of personal violence, while they constituted but slightly over 7 per cent of the entire population of the city in 1910.

In the matter of poverty and dependence the foreign born make a more unfavorable showing. In the special census report on paupers for 1904 the proportion of foreign born among almshouse paupers was about twice as great as among the native born. Again, in a special investigation conducted by the Commissioner of Immigration in the year 1907–1908, out of 288,395 inmates of charitable institutions there were 60,025 who were foreign born, or about 21 per

cent, and out of 172,185 inmates of insane hospitals, 50,734, or about 29 per cent, were foreign born. Inasmuch as the foreign born did not constitute in 1907–1908 more than 15 per cent of the total population of both sexes, it is seen that the foreign born contribute out of their proportion both to inmates of charitable institutions and to the number of the insane. The experience of Charity Organization Societies in many of our large cities, on the whole, confirms these findings.[1] It is not surprising, indeed, that many of our immigrants should soon need at least temporary assistance after landing in this country, inasmuch as a very large proportion of them come to the United States bringing little or no money with them. Thus, for a number of years the amount of money brought by immigrants from Russia varied from nine to fifteen dollars per head. On account of the difficulties of economic adjustment in a new country it is not surprising, then, that many of the immigrants become more or less dependent, some temporarily and some permanently.

Immigration into Other Countries. — It has been suggested that with the opening up of other new countries the immigration problem of the United States would solve itself, and that so many emigrants from Europe will soon be going to South America, South Africa, and Australia that this country will be in no danger of receiving more than its share. Down to recent years, however, there have been little or no signs of such a diversion of the stream of immigration from Europe into those countries.

[1] For further evidence on this point, see Professor Fairchild's *Immigration*, Revised Edition, pp. 309–329; also the reports of the Immigration Commission.

The principal countries which receive immigrants, other than the United States, are Brazil, Argentina, Canada, and Australia. While Brazil has received between 1820 and 1928 a total of 4,351,000 immigrants, the present number of immigrants into Brazil seems to be comparatively small; in 1929 it was only 100,424. Argentina, next to the United States, receives the most considerable immigration from Europe. From 1857 to 1927 Argentina received 6,580,000 immigrants. In 1927 the number was 294,000, of whom over 60 per cent were from Italy and Spain. The foreign immigration into other South American countries is comparatively insignificant. In 1929 Australia received 82,248 immigrants, most of whom were British, but the emigration from Australia almost equaled the immigration into Australia in that year. Again, in 1929 the Dominion of Canada received 167,772 immigrants, very largely from Great Britain and the United States. An unknown number, however, of Canadians migrate across the border into the United States, — no record being kept of Canadian immigration into the United States since 1885, except of those who come by way of seaports. Thus it is certain that the United States received more immigration, prior to the War, than all the other countries of the world combined, and, as we have said, there is as yet little or no evidence that the stream of European emigration will be diverted to these other countries. The problem of immigration in the United States is not merely a problem of the past, but is still a problem of the future. Therefore, the question of reasonable restrictions upon immigration into this country and of the assimilation of the immigrants that we admit is still a problem in our national life.

Arguments for the Restriction of Immigration. — There are no good moral or political grounds to exclude all immigrants from this country. The question is not one of the prohibition of immigration, but one of reasonable restrictions upon immigration, or, as Professor Commons has said, of the *improvement* of our immigration.

There can be no question as to the moral right of the United States to restrict immigration. If it is our duty to develop our institutions and our national life in such a way that they will make the largest possible contribution to the good of humanity, then it is manifestly our duty to exclude from membership in American society elements which might prevent our institutions from reaching their highest and best development. All restrictions to immigration, it must be admitted, must be based, not upon national selfishness, but upon the principle of the good of humanity; and there can be no doubt that the good of humanity demands that every nation protect its people and its institutions from elements which may seriously threaten their stability and survival. The arguments in favor of restrictions upon the immigration into this country may be summed up along four lines:

(1) *The Industrial Argument.* Many of the immigrants work for low wages, and, as we have already seen, offer such competition that the native born, in certain lines of industry, are almost entirely eliminated. This has been, no doubt, a hardship to the native-born American workingman. While we have been zealous to protect the American workingman from the unfair competition of European labor by high protective tariffs, yet inconsistently we have permitted great numbers of European laborers to

compete with the American workingman upon his own soil. With unrestricted immigration it is impossible to maintain a minimum wage or other means of protecting the standard of living of the American workingman. On the other hand, this large supply of cheap labor, as we have already seen, has enabled American capitalists to develop American industries very rapidly, to dominate in many cases the markets of the world, and to add greatly to the wealth of the country. It has been chiefly the large employers of labor in the United States, together with the steamship companies, who have opposed any considerable restrictions upon immigration, and before the World War their power with Congress prevented the passing of stringent immigration laws. On the whole, it is probably true that if industrial arguments alone are to be taken into consideration upon the immigration problem, the weight of the argument would be on the side of unrestricted immigration. But industrial arguments are not the only ones to be taken into consideration in dealing with the immigration problem, and this has been hitherto one of the great mistakes of many in discussing the problem.

(2) *The Social Argument.* Many of our recent immigrants are at least very difficult of social assimilation. They are clannish, tend to form colonies of their own race in which their language, customs, and ideals are preserved. The " consciousness of kind," which is such a great factor in social life, while it binds them together, works at the same time to keep them separate and distinct from the rest of the American people. This is especially true of the illiterate immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe. As we have already seen, the rate of illiteracy among certain of our

recent immigrants is so high that they can scarcely be expected to participate in our social life. Just the social effect of such colonies of different peoples and nationalities upon our own social life and institutions cannot well be foreseen, but it can scarcely be a good effect. The public school, it is true, does much to assimilate to American ideals and standards the children of even the most unassimilable immigrants. The public school is not as yet, however, a perfect agency of socialization, and even when attended by the children of these immigrants they fail to receive from it, in many cases, the higher elements of our culture and still continue to remain essentially foreign in their thought and actions.

(3) *The Political Argument.* Many of these immigrants are, therefore, incapable of understanding and appreciating our free institutions. They are not fit to vote intelligently, but often vote even before naturalization and form a very large per cent of our voting population, especially in our large cities. As a rule, they do not sell their votes, but their votes are often under the control of a few leaders, and thus they are able to hold, oftentimes, the balance of power between parties and factions. It is questionable whether democracy can work successfully under such conditions. It must be admitted, moreover, that hitherto democracy has been successful only in communities in which there has been a good degree of mental and moral likeness among citizens, that is, in communities not too heterogeneous in their elements.

(4) *The Racial or Biological Argument.* The strongest arguments in favor of restriction upon immigration into the United States are of a biological nature. The peoples

that were coming to us in largest numbers before the World War belong to a different race from ours; namely, to the Slavic and Mediterranean subraces of the white race. Now, the Slavic and Mediterranean races have not shown the capacity for self-government and free institutions which the peoples of Northern and Western Europe have shown. It is doubtful if they have the same capacity for self-government. Moreover, the whole history of the social life and social ideals of these people shows them to have been in their past development very different from ourselves. Of course, if heredity counts for nothing, it will only be a few generations before the descendants of these people will be as good Americans as any. But this is the question, Does heredity count for nothing? or does blood tell? Are habits of acting and, therefore, social and institutional life, dependent, more or less, on the biological heredity of peoples, or are they entirely independent of such biological influence? There is much diversity of opinion upon this question, but perhaps the most trustworthy opinion inclines to the view that racial heredity, even between subraces of the white race, is a factor of great moment and must be taken into account. It is scarcely probable that a people of so different racial heredity from ourselves as the Southern Italians, for example, would maintain our institutions and social life exactly as those of our blood would do. It is impossible to think that the Latin temperament would express itself socially in the same ways as the Teutonic temperament. Certainly the coming to us of vast numbers of peoples from Southern and Eastern Europe would in time change our physical type, and it seems also probable that, if permitted to go on, it would change our mental and social type

also. Whether this is desirable or not must be left for each individual to decide for himself.

Another phase of this biological argument is the necessity of selection, if we are to avoid introducing into our national blood the degenerate strains in the oppressed peoples of Southern and Eastern Europe. If selection counts in the life of a people, as practically all biologists agree, then the American people certainly have a great opportunity to exercise selection on a large scale to determine who shall be the parents of the future Americans. While it is undesirable, perhaps, to discriminate among immigrants on the ground of race, it would certainly be desirable to select from all peoples those elements that we could most advantageously incorporate into our own life. The biological argument alone, therefore, seems to necessitate the admission of the importance of rigid selection in the matter of whom we shall admit into this country. Hitherto little has been accomplished in the way of insuring adequate health and physique among the immigrants admitted into the United States. All that has been attempted thus far has been to debar the very least fit.

The Reconstruction of Our Immigration Policy. — An adequate scientific immigration policy requires, first, reasonable restrictions upon the admission of immigrants, and secondly, positive measures to insure their Americanization after their admission. The general principle which should guide all immigration legislation is that only such number should be admitted as we can successfully assimilate fully in our national life. For this reason a law which would limit the maximum permissible annual immigration from any people to a certain per cent (say, from

two to ten) of those from that nationality who have already become naturalized citizens — the per cent to be fixed each year by a commission according to the demand for labor and other national circumstances — would be a scientific law.

The second principle which should guide our immigration legislation is that economic adjustment is fundamental for successful assimilation; hence we should admit only as many immigrants as we can give employment to at reasonable wages. Scientific control over immigration must take into account the demand for labor and other economic conditions. This could be done by a permanent immigration commission of experts to calculate the labor needs of the country each year in advance.

The third principle in a scientific immigration policy should be to give preference to those immigrants who come to make permanent homes in the United States. Hence preference should be given to those who come as families, rather than as single men. Hence also preference should be given to those who are willing to declare their intention to become citizens of the United States.

Certain tests of physical, mental, and moral fitness for citizenship should also be employed. Among these tests the value of a literacy test for a democracy, such as ours, is hardly questionable. The chief advance made during the World War toward a more rational immigration policy was the enactment of the immigration law of 1917, which among other things provides for the exclusion of illiterate immigrants (those who cannot read in some language) who are over sixteen years of age. There has been much contention over this feature of the law, but from the socio-

logical point of view there can be little doubt as to its wisdom. The ability to read, and thus to participate more or less fully in the life of the society about one, is a necessary foundation not only for social assimilation, but for social progress. Democracy means government by public opinion; but the chief means of forming and disseminating public opinion is now the press. Hence, those who cannot read can scarcely function in a democracy, especially not in its rational progress. Moreover, it has been shown that the illiterate immigrant is most liable to suffer from exploitation and adjusts himself to his environment with greatest difficulty. Finally, a literacy test will probably react to better educational and social conditions in Europe. Those fleeing from religious persecution, the law provided, were to be exempted from the test, also purely political offenders, wives and daughters of immigrants, and certain near relatives above fifty-five years of age.

The laws of 1921 and 1924, restricting immigration on a percentage basis, were designed chiefly to limit the number of immigrants, and were not based wholly on scientific principles. The law of 1924 made the basis of admissions the census of 1890, and provided that a quota of two per cent of the number living in the United States in 1890 born in a given European country might be admitted each year. Children under 18, wives, returning immigrants, students, and some professional classes were not to be counted in the quota. These are admitted on a non-quota basis. The effect of this law was greatly to reduce the number of immigrants admitted from the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe.

A permanent provision of the law of 1924, called the

national origins system, went into operation in 1929. This limits the number of immigrants from the Old World to 150,000 a year, and provides that each country of the Old World can send such proportion of the 150,000 as that country has already contributed to our total white population.

The Americanization of Our Immigrants. — Even more important than the question of the proper selection of our immigrants is the question of the Americanization of those that we admit. While we perhaps cannot be too careful as to whom we admit into our national household, we cannot do too much for those to whom we allow a share in our national destinies. Hence our attitude toward the immigrant admitted should be positive and helpful, not negative. Hitherto the treatment accorded to the immigrant has been too often one of neglect. In the past we maintained the open-door policy with respect to European immigration of all sorts. But after the immigrants arrived, we were content to let their labor be selfishly exploited by their employers, and to let them live and rear their children in the slums of our great cities. We lacked, in other words, a fine sense of hospitality toward the immigrant and of responsibility for him and his children. Many immigrants, indeed, have had to submit to hardships and evils in American life which they would never have experienced had they remained in their European home lands.

Now we are waking up to the importance of Americanization, of making the immigrant one with us in tradition, ideals, and loyalty. The problem is a complex one and there is danger of making many mistakes. The American-

ization of the immigrant means his social assimilation into American society. Now social assimilation, the successful incorporation of new elements into a social group, can come about only through enlisting the will and the loyalty of the newcomers. It cannot be brought about through compulsion. The newcomers need to have presented to them the best ideas and habits, the best traditions and customs, of American life. Moreover, the ideas and habits which they bring with them should be carefully evaluated. The process of assimilation is not wholly one-sided; it should be a process of give and take. Such a process leads to the comparison of the ideas, beliefs, standards, and values of both groups. It develops the critical-mindedness of both groups, and usually results in the selection of the best in traditions and customs of both.

Certain conditions must be observed if the process of social assimilation is to go on in this happy way.

In the first place, an atmosphere of tolerance and of hospitality must be maintained by Americans toward all immigrant groups admitted. If this cannot be maintained toward any group, it is better not to admit such a group. Any attempt at coercion of new elements, or any attitude of unfriendliness toward them, is almost certain to create in them attitudes which will hinder their assimilation.

It follows, secondly, that sympathy and consideration should be cultivated between immigrants and Americans; for these mental attitudes assist greatly in the mutual adjustment of individuals.

Thirdly, there must be frequency of personal contact between immigrants and Americans, so that there may be opportunity for mutual acquaintance, mutual under-

standing, mutual imitation, and the free exchange of ideas. Territorial isolation interferes with such social contact and should be reduced to a minimum by proper distribution of the immigrants. Caste and class lines also are fatal to the assimilation of the foreign born, and they must be carefully guarded against.

Fourthly, there should be association to some extent in common work; for the division of labor will tend to keep the new elements separate from the old and prevent the personal contacts of which we have just spoken.

Fifthly, linguistic isolation must be overcome, or at least minimized. Linguistic isolation is fatal to social assimilation. It is obvious that a common language is needed for communication and as the vehicle of the essential traditions of Americanism. The foreign born in America should be taught, not only to speak, but to read English as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is a mistake, if their mother tongue has a rich tradition of culture, to discourage its preservation. Americans are already too much a people with knowledge of only a single language. Every facility should be made to learn English, but it should be remembered that persons with a knowledge of several languages may make more valuable citizens on that account.

If these principles of social assimilation are true, it is evident that a free, democratic society in which there is substantial equality among all members in respect to legal rights and economic and educational opportunities should show the greatest power of assimilation; and this the history of the United States abundantly proves. For this is why the American people have hitherto shown such

wonderful capacity to assimilate the greater part of their foreign immigration. When the American people have failed to assimilate their foreign born, it is because they have departed from the conditions for successful assimilation which we have just laid down, or because they have admitted immigrants in such numbers that they could not assimilate them.

Machinery for Americanization. Probably the first machinery needed for the proper Americanization of our immigrants, after they have been carefully selected in the way already indicated, is a Federal Bureau for their better distribution, both geographically and industrially. This should work in coöperation with similar state bureaus. The federal and state authorities should see that the immigrants are sent where they have the best chance, not only for employment, but to become American citizens. The federal and state bureaus should coöperate with private employers and employment agencies, carefully supervising both to see that they in no way exploit the immigrant. It should always be remembered that economic adjustment is necessary for successful social assimilation.

Equally important is the proper use of the public schools for the Americanization of the immigrant and his children. In every community where there are sufficient numbers of foreign born, night schools should be opened for the instruction of immigrant adults in English, in trades, and in the rudiments of citizenship. More important still, the public schools should pay much more attention to social and political education, particularly in American social and political ideals, than they have hitherto done. This is needed in every community; for not only do the children

of the foreign born need to be Americanized in this sense, but also the children of American parents.

Finally, the aid of many private agencies must be enlisted in the education and in the general social and economic adjustment of immigrants. Immigrant aid societies, the Y. M. C. A., the Y. W. C. A., churches, and philanthropic agencies should all have special machinery to help the immigrant. In some ways these private agencies can do much more for the real social assimilation of our immigrants than the public schools, or government bureaus. Obviously, they come into more vital personal contact with the immigrant, and the service which they render is more efficient because it is voluntary. Through this service, moreover, they help to overcome the indifference of the American born toward the assimilation of the immigrant. We should not forget that the key to the assimilation of the immigrant is largely in changing the social attitude of the American people. We must be willing to give those whom we receive into our national household equal opportunity with ourselves, and to receive them on a footing of equality.

Asiatic Immigration. — The statement that there is no good social or political argument for the *prohibition* of immigration does not apply to Asiatic immigration. Here the importance of the racial factor becomes so pronounced that it seems certain that a policy of practical exclusion toward the immigration of Asiatic laborers would be the wisest in the long run for the people of this country.

It is true that but few Asiatic immigrants have as yet come to this country, but there are grave reasons for

believing that if the policy of exclusion had not been adopted in the nineteenth century, Asiatic immigrants would now constitute a very considerable proportion of our total population. Between 1851 and 1900 the Chinese sent us a total of only 310,000 immigrants; and in 1882, the year the first Chinese Exclusion Law was enacted, there were about 130,000 Chinese in the United States. In 1930 the census showed only a total of 74,954 Chinese in this country, exclusive of Hawaii. The Chinese in continental United States were massed chiefly in the Pacific Coast states, there being 44,883 Chinese in the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast states, of which number 37,361 were in California alone. The Japanese in continental United States in 1930 numbered 138,843, of whom 121,659 were in the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast states, 97,456 being in California alone.

In judging this question of Asiatic immigration we should accept to a certain extent the opinion of the people of the Pacific coast regarding the problems which Asiatic immigrants create. There are probabilities of error on the part of the distant observer of conditions as well as on the part of those who stand very close to a social problem. Now the people of the Pacific coast have numerous objections to Asiatic immigrants, similar to the various lines of argument which have already been given in favor of the restriction of immigration generally.

(1) They say that Asiatic laborers work for wages below the minimum necessary for maintaining the white man and so reduce the standard of living and crowd out the white working man. As they do not become citizens, they come here to exploit the country economically, and

when they attain a competence often return to their home land. They therefore make no contribution to the permanent welfare of the country.

(2) The Asiatic immigrants do not readily assimilate. They tend to keep their language, religion, and customs. They live largely by themselves, and are often more completely isolated from American social life than the negro, because of their completely different culture.

(3) The Asiatic immigrants differ so much from us racially that there is danger of racial antagonism and conflicts. This last is probably the strongest argument in favor of the general exclusion of Asiatic laborers from this country. It is certain that if we should open our doors to the mass of Asiatic immigrants, we should have another racial problem in the West, such as we now have in the South with the negro. We are not yet ourselves civilized enough to undertake the work of civilizing and Christianizing any very considerable number of people alien to ourselves in race as well as in culture. The importance of the element of racial heredity must not be discounted altogether in social problems.

For the above reasons, and some others, it is probable that a policy of practical exclusion toward the immigration of Asiatic laborers will be best, not only for the United States, but for the whole world in the long run. While the attitude of extremists is to be deplored, it would seem that in the main the people of the Pacific coast are justified in their fears of the results of Asiatic immigration. This is true, not only of the immigration of laborers from China, but also from Japan. For the peace of the world, therefore, the influx of Japanese laborers into our Western states

should be prevented. This could best be accomplished by a general law which would apply to all nations alike, limiting the maximum permissible annual immigration from any people to a certain per cent of those from that nationality in the United States who have already become naturalized citizens. This would make no explicit discrimination against Asiatic peoples. The law of 1924, however, arbitrarily excluded all Asiatic laborers, as all Eastern Asia was made a non-quota region, from which all immigrants were debarred except certain favored classes, such as merchants and students.

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CHAPTER XI

THE NEGRO PROBLEM

ALREADY we have been brought in our study of the immigration problem to race problems — problems of the relations of races to one another and of their mutual adjustment. The negro problem is one of many race problems which the United States has, but because it is the most pressing of all of our race problems it is frequently spoken of as *the race problem*. An unsolved element in all race problems is the influence of the biological factor of racial heredity, and this factor we must seek to understand and estimate at the very outset of any scientific study of the negro problem.

Racial Heredity as a Factor in Social Evolution. — We have already seen that racial heredity is the most important and at the same time the least known factor in the problem of immigration. While there is still much disagreement among scientific men as to the importance of racial heredity in social problems, it can be said that the weight of opinion inclines to the view that racial heredity is a very real factor, and one which cannot be left altogether out of account in studying social problems. The view of Buckle that racial heredity counts for nothing in explaining the social life of various peoples is not upheld by modern biologists. On the contrary, the biological view would emphasize the importance of species and racial heredity in all problems connected with life; thus no

one denies that between different species of animals heredity counts for practically everything in explaining their life activities. But man no longer lives a purely animal life, and racial heredity as a factor in his social life may be easily exaggerated. Civilization is a complex of acquired habits, and hence the appeal to racial heredity to explain human social conditions must be only as a last resort. Nevertheless, since heredity affects the conduct of each individual, so must racial heredity affect the conduct of a race. No such thing as biological uniformity exists even among individuals of the same race, and hence their responses to the same stimuli vary according to their hereditary peculiarities. Even more is there diversity among the human races. Each of the great human races was specialized in a different geographic area under peculiar conditions of life. This caused their hereditary or instinctive reactions to vary considerably in degree, though probably not in quality, and gave to each race its peculiar temperament or hereditary disposition. Whether human races vary much in the capacity for developing intelligence is uncertain, but it is obvious that the natural disposition or temperament of each would color their feelings, ideas, and modes of conduct.

Indirectly also racial heredity affects social evolution, because of the obvious physical differences it produces between races. Through the "consciousness of kind" likes attract, while unlikes usually repel. Hence obvious racial differences tend to develop racial separation and racial antagonisms.

It may be noted, however, that taking racial heredity into full account by no means leads to an attitude of fatalism as regards racial problems. On the contrary modern biology clearly teaches that racial heredity is modifiable

both in the individual and in the race. It is modifiable in the individual through education or training; it is modifiable in the race through selection. Therefore racial heredity does not foredoom any people to remain in a low status of culture; only it must be taken into account in explaining the cultural conditions of all peoples, and especially in planning for a people's social amelioration.

The Racial Heredity of the Negro. — It is generally agreed by anthropologists and biologists that mankind constitutes but a single species, developed from a single pre-human anthropoid stock. The various races of mankind have had, therefore, a common origin, but having developed in different geographical areas they each present certain peculiar racial traits adapting each to the environment in which it was developed. Now, the negro race is that part of mankind which was developed in the tropics. In all the negro's physical and mental make-up he shows complete adaptation to a tropical environment. The dark color of his skin, for example, was developed by natural selection to exclude the injurious actinic rays of the sun. The various ways in which the negro's tropical environment influenced the development of his mind, especially his natural impulses, cannot be entered into in detail. Suffice to say that the African environment of the ancestors of the present negroes in the United States deeply stamped itself upon the innate traits and tendencies of the race. For example, the tropical environment is generally unfavorable to severe bodily labor. Persons who work hard in the tropics are, in other words, apt to be eliminated by natural selection. On the other

hand, nature furnishes a bountiful supply of food without much labor. Hence, the tropical environment of the negro failed to develop in him an energetic nature, and favored the development of socially undesirable traits. Again, the extremely high death rate in Africa necessitated a correspondingly high birth rate in order that any race living there might survive; hence, nature fixed in the negro strong sex tendencies in order to secure such a high birth rate.

It is not claimed that the socially undesirable traits of the masses of the American negroes to-day can be wholly attributed to hereditary influences, but it would be a great mistake to suppose that the tropical environment did not have something to do with the social characteristics of the present American negro. We might go through the whole list of the conspicuous traits and tendencies of the American negro, and in practically every case we would find good reason for believing that these traits and tendencies are at least in part due to the influence of racial heredity. This factor must not be discounted altogether.

The question is frequently raised whether the negro is inferior by nature to the white man or not. It is obvious from what has been said that the negro may, on the side of his instinctive or hereditary equipment, be inferior to the white man in his natural adaptiveness to a complex civilization existing under very different climatic conditions from those in which he was evolved. This does not mean, however, that the negro is in any sense a degenerate. On the contrary, from the point of view of a tropical environment, the negro may be regarded as the white man's superior in the capacity to survive. It is only

in countries out of his own natural environment, under strange conditions of life to which he has not yet become biologically adapted, that the negro is inferior to the white man. In Africa he is the white man's superior if we adopt survival as the test of superiority.

Influence of Slavery on the Negro. — There is no longer any doubt that the influence of slavery on the negro, as a form of industry, was both beneficent and maleficent. The negroes brought to America by the slave traders were subject to a very severe artificial selection, which, perhaps, secured a better type of negro physically on the whole, and a more docile type mentally; but the chief beneficent influence of slavery on the negro was that it taught him to work, to some extent at least. Moreover, it gave the negro the Anglo-Saxon tongue and the rudiments of our morality, religion, and civilization.

On the other hand, slavery did not fit the individual or the race for a life of freedom, and did not raise moral standards much above those of Africa. The monogamic form of the family was, to be sure, enforced upon the slaves, but the family life was often broken up; for even when the owner of the slaves was kind-hearted and humane, on his death his property would be sold and the families of his slaves scattered. Under such conditions it is not surprising that the negro learned little of family morality. Again, being property himself, the negro could not be taught properly to appreciate the rights of property. Finally slavery failed to develop in the slave that self-mastery and self-control which are necessary for free social life. Admirable as slavery was in some ways as a school for an uncultivated people, it failed utterly in other

ways; and it surely should not be difficult to devise methods of training at the present time which are superior to anything that slavery as a school for the industrial training of the negro could possibly have accomplished.

Statistics of the Negro Problem in the United States. — The following table will show the percentage of negroes in the population of the United States at different decades ("negro," in census terminology, includes all persons of negro descent):

	Per cent.
1790	19.27
1800	18.88
1810	19.03
1830	18.10
1840	16.84
1850	15.69
1860	14.13
1870	12.60
1880	13.12
1890	11.93
1900	11.63
1910	10.69
1920	9.89
1930	9.68

In 1860 the total number of negroes in the population of the United States was 4,441,000. Forty years later, in 1900, the number had almost doubled, having reached 8,840,000. In 1930 the total number of negroes had reached 11,890,000. Nevertheless, it will be seen from the above table that the percentage of negroes in the total population has steadily diminished, although the negro population doubled between 1860 and 1900. Between 1920 and 1930 the comparative rates of increase for the whites and negroes were: whites, 15.7 per cent; negroes, 13.6 per cent.

Geographical Distribution of the Negroes. The negro problem would not be so acute in certain sections of the

country if negroes were distributed evenly over the country instead of being massed as they are in certain sections. Nearly eighty per cent of the total number of negroes in the country still live in the South Atlantic and South Central states. Moreover, nearly seventy per cent live in the so-called " Black Belt " states, — the " Black Belt " being a chain of counties stretching from Virginia to Texas in which over half of the population are negroes. The following table shows the percentage of negro population in these states of the " Black Belt " in 1930:

	Per cent.
Alabama	35.7
Arkansas	25.8
Florida	29.4
Georgia	36.8
Louisiana	36.9
Mississippi	50.2
North Carolina	29.0
South Carolina	45.6
Tennessee	18.3
Texas	14.7
Virginia	26.8

While in only one of these states is there an absolute preponderance of negroes, yet these statistics give no idea of the massing of negroes in certain localities. In Washington County, Mississippi, for example, the negroes number 39,125, the whites 14,793; in Tunica County, Mississippi, the negroes number 18,224, the whites 2,986. In many counties in the " Black Belt " more than three fourths of the population are negroes. It is in these states, especially in the Black Belt itself, that the negro population is increasing by birth.

Increase of Negroes in States since 1860. The following table will show the percentage of negroes in the population

in the former slave-holding states of the country in 1860 and in 1930:

States	1860 Per cent.	1930 Per cent.
Alabama	45.4	35.7
Arkansas	25.6	25.8
Delaware	19.3	13.7
Florida	44.6	29.4
Georgia	44.0	36.8
Kentucky	20.4	8.6
Louisiana	49.5	36.9
Maryland	24.9	16.9
Mississippi	55.3	50.2
Missouri	10.0	6.2
North Carolina	36.4	29.0
South Carolina	58.6	45.6
Tennessee	25.5	18.3
Texas	30.3	14.7
Virginia	42.0	26.8

It will be noted that in none of the above has the relative negro population increased since 1860 except in Arkansas, although in Mississippi the proportion of negroes has declined but slightly.

In the decade from 1920 to 1930, Delaware, Maryland, and West Virginia showed a more rapid increase of their negro population than of their white population. But in the Southern states of Kentucky, Virginia, South Carolina, and Georgia, the negro population decreased absolutely.

In most Northern states the census of 1930 showed the negro population to be increasing more rapidly than the white population. In New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois, for example, the negro population increased much more rapidly than the white population, and the

number of negroes in the North in 1930 was 2,409,000, New York having 412,000. Pennsylvania, 431,000; Ohio, 309,000; and Illinois, 328,000. This increase of negro population in the Northern states is, of course, due to the immigration of the negro into those states. In the decade 1920–1930 it is estimated that over 1,000,000 negroes migrated to the North. The immigration of the negro into the North might have a greater effect in distributing the negro population more evenly over the whole country, were it not that negro vital statistics in these Northern states show that the negroes in these states do not increase their numbers by birth, and, were it not for immigration, would gradually decrease.

The Urban Negro Population. 43.7 per cent of the total negro population in 1930 lived in cities, while the remainder lived in small towns and country districts. The following great cities had a high percentage of negroes:

Memphis	38.1
Birmingham	38.0
Atlanta	34.4
Richmond	29.0
New Orleans	28.3
Nashville	27.8
Washington	27.2

Some smaller Southern cities have, of course, a much higher percentage of negroes in their population. It will be seen that the mass of the negroes in the United States still live in rural districts. This is fortunate; for on the whole statistics show that the most prosperous and socially adjusted negro is the negro on the farm. Within recent years there has been a considerable movement of the negroes to the cities. This is extremely significant for the

social condition of the negro, because the mass of negroes, not yet adapted in general to an industrial civilization, are still less adapted to the environment which the modern city affords them.

The Social Condition of the Negroes in the United States. — (1) *Intermixture of Races.* Ever since the negro came to this country he has been having his racial characteristics modified by the infusion of white blood. The census of 1920 attempted to make an estimate of the number of negroes of mixed blood in the United States. The number returned as being of mixed blood was 1,660,000, but the best authorities agree that this number understates the actual number. Experts in ethnology have estimated that from one third to one half of the negroes in the United States show traces of white intermixture. The lower estimate, that one third of the negroes of the United States have more or less white blood, is quite generally accepted by those who have carefully investigated the matter. Of course the proportion of negroes of mixed blood varies greatly in different localities. In communities in the border states frequently more than one half of the negroes show marked traces of white intermixture. But in the isolated rural regions of the South, where the negroes predominate, the full-blood negro is by far the more common type.

This infusion of white blood into a portion of the negro population is significant sociologically. It is the negroes of mixed blood who are ambitious socially and who present some of the most acute phases of the negro problem. It is from the mixed bloods that the leaders of the race in this country have come. The pure negro without intermixture of white blood has hitherto seemed incapable of leadership.

Such men as Booker T. Washington, Professor Du Bois, and most other negro leaders have had a considerable mixture of white blood. Dr. E. B. Reuter has shown that out of 4267 prominent negro leaders in various lines only 447, a little over 10 per cent, can be considered as probably pure blood negroes. Indeed, practically all of the negroes who have been eminent in literature, science, art, or statesmanship have come from the class of mixed bloods.

But the infusion of white blood has also in some ways been a detriment to the negro. The illegitimate offspring resulting from the unions of white fathers and negro mothers are frequently the product of conditions of vice. The consequence is that the child of mixed origin frequently has a degenerate heredity and, coming into the world as a bastard, is more or less in disfavor with both races; hence the social environment of the mulatto as well as his heredity is oftentimes peculiarly unfavorable. It is not surprising, therefore, to find among the mulattoes a great amount of constitutional diseases and a great tendency to crime and immorality. Again mulatto women are more frequently debauched by white men than the pure blood negro women, and for this reason negro women of mixed blood are more apt to be immoral. So we see that while the mixed bloods have furnished the leaders of their race, they have also furnished an undue proportion of its vice and crime. This is exactly what we should expect when we understand the social conditions existing between the races and the origin and social environment of the mulatto.

The crime and vice and constitutional diseases of the

mulatto do not prove that degeneracy results from the intermixture of the two races, as was once supposed. On the contrary, as we have already seen, all of these things result from the fact that the crossing of the races takes place under socially abnormal conditions, that is, under conditions of vice. This is not, however, true in all cases and particularly it was not true of all intermixture that took place under the regime of slavery. Rather intermixture under such circumstances approached not vice, as we understand the word, but polygamy. Consequently some of the best blood of the South runs in the veins of some of the mulattoes. Again, we have examples from other countries of the crossing of the two races, negro and white, without physical degeneracy. In the West Indies and in Brazil this crossing is frequently taking place, and many of the best families of those countries have a slight amount of negro blood in their veins. From instances like this, gathered from all over the world, it has generally been concluded by anthropologists that no evil physiological results necessarily follow the intermixture of races, even the most diverse, but that all supposed physiological evils coming from the intermixture of races really come from social rather than from physiological causes.

From the point of view of the white race and from the point of view of the negro race such racial intermixture, outside of the bounds of law, may be for many reasons undesirable. But we are here concerned with noting only the social effect of the intermixture that has gone on in the past; and we see that on the one hand it has resulted in creating a class of so-called negroes in whom white blood and the ambitions and energy of the white race

predominate, and on the other hand it has also resulted in creating a degenerate mixed stock who furnish the majority of criminals and vicious persons belonging to the so-called negro race.

(2) *Criminality of the Negro.* One of the most important features of the negro problem in the United States is the tendency toward crime among the negroes; and this, as we have just seen, is especially manifest in those of mixed origin. The census of 1910 showed that in 1910 there were in the South five white prisoners to every ten thousand whites, but thirty-two negro prisoners to every ten thousand negroes, while in the North there were nine white prisoners to every ten thousand whites, but eighty negro prisoners to every ten thousand negroes. These statistics show that the negro is everywhere more criminal than the white, and that his tendency toward crime increases as we go North, doubtless largely because in the North he lives in cities in a more complex environment and finds greater difficulty in making social adjustments. Moreover, negro crime has been increasing. In the city of Chicago the number of negro men 21 years of age and over charged with felonies rose from 333 per 10,000 of their population in 1915–1919 to 741 in 1925–1929; while the number of negro men charged with misdemeanors rose in the same decade from 1,587 per 10,000 to 5,210. Moreover, in five other great Northern cities the number of negro men and boys charged with felonies in 1930 was 490 per 10,000 of their population, as against 84 for the native whites. Negro crime is doubtless largely a matter of social environment, because we see that negro crime increases in cities and in the more complex Northern com-

munities; but it is also to a large extent a matter of the negro's cultural condition and traditions.

Of course vice accompanies crime among the American negroes. The statistics of illegitimacy for the Registration Area of the United States in 1928 showed that the percentage of illegitimate births among the white population that year was 1.67 per cent, while the percentage among the negroes was 13.66. In other words, over one eighth of all the negro births in the United States that year were illegitimate, as against one sixtieth among the whites. In some Southern states the percentage of illegitimate births in the negro population was as high as one fifth, and in a few Southern cities it was even higher. Of course, statistics of illegitimacy are not exactly the same thing as statistics of vice, but they, at any rate, throw a light upon the moral condition of the negro in this regard, and particularly show the demoralization of his family life.

(3) *Negro Pauperism.* We have no good statistics on negro pauperism, but such as we have seem to indicate that the state of dependence of the negro is very great. In the city of Washington, where 29 per cent of the population is made up of negroes, 84 per cent of the pauper burials are those of negroes; and in Charleston, where 53 per cent of the population are negroes, 96 per cent of the pauper burials are those of negroes. In nearly all communities where organized charities exist the negroes contribute to the dependent population far out of proportion to their numbers. It is safe to say that from 50 to 75 per cent of the total negro population of the United States live in poverty as distinguished from pauperism.

(4) *Negro Vital Statistics.* The negro death and birth rates in the South are both very high. Accurate statistics from Southern states, however, are meager, except as to negro death rates. In Alabama in the rural registered districts in 1927 the negro birth rate was found to be more than twice the negro death rate. On the other hand in the North it is uncertain whether the negro can continue to increase by the excess of births over deaths. Often in Northern states the negro fails to reproduce sufficiently to keep up his numbers. In Missouri in 1928, for example, there were 3,686 negro births and 4,733 negro deaths. Careful study of the vital statistics of Northern states supports this conclusion.

The vital statistics of Southern cities show that the negro death rate is very much higher than the white death rate. In ten Southern cities in 1890–1894, Hoffman found the average death rate for whites to be 20 per thousand of the white population, and for negroes to be 32.6 per thousand of the negro population. The same Southern cities had in 1926 an average death rate for the whites of 13.4 and for the negroes of 25.8. In several cities the negro death rate was nearly twice that of the whites. When these mortality statistics are analyzed, moreover, while they show that negro mortality at all ages is greater than white mortality, it is greatest among negro children under fifteen years of age. This is of course largely because of the ignorance of negro mothers of the proper care of children, but it also indicates that natural selection is at work among the American negroes rapidly eliminating the biologically unfit.

Conclusions from Negro Vital Statistics. Three important conclusions may be drawn from the negro vital and

population statistics which are well worth emphasizing. (1) The negro population is not increasing so fast as the white, owing largely to its high death rate, yet it is increasing, and there is no indication as yet that the negro population will decrease. It is probable, indeed, that at the end of the twentieth century the negro population of the United States will be in the neighborhood of twenty millions. The view of some students of the negro problem that the negro is destined to an early extinction in this country is an hypothesis, as yet not substantiated by statistical facts.

(2) While the negro is destined to be with us always, so far as we can see, yet owing to the fact of intermixture of races he will be less and less a pure negro, so that at the end of the twentieth century the negroes in the United States will be much nearer the white type than at the present time.

(3) The high death rate among the negroes indicates that a rapid process of natural selection is going on among them. Now, natural selection means the elimination of the unfit, — the dying out of those who cannot adapt themselves to their environment. This selective process will tend toward the survival of the more fit elements among the negroes, and, therefore, towards bringing the negro up to the standard of the whites. The misery and vice which we see among the present American negroes are simply in a large degree the expression of the working of a process of natural selection among them. It would be preferable, however, if the white race could by education and other means substitute to some degree at least artificial selection for the miseries and brutality of the

natural process of eliminating the unfit. This the superior race should do to protect itself as well as to raise the negro.

Industrial Conditions Among the Negroes. — In 1903 it was estimated that the total taxable wealth of the negroes of the United States in 1900 was only about $300,000,000. In 1930, however, reliable estimates placed the taxable wealth of the negroes at $2,500,000,000, or about $200 per head. This is, of course, a small sum compared with the $2,900 per capita estimated to be owned by the whites. However, the advance of the negro in accumulating property since his emancipation has been steady. At the close of the Civil War the negro had no property whatever, with the exception of the few freedmen and of those few cases in which old masters had set up their emancipated slaves as small farmers. In 1920, negroes owned 218,612 farms, valued at $522,178,000, more than half of which were owned unencumbered, while they operated as tenants or managers 707,096 more — an increase in the total farms owned and operated by negroes of 23.5 per cent over 1900. Nearly half of the negroes gainfully employed are still in agricultural occupations. While they have met with success in other occupations, negroes have been most successful in agriculture, and where conditions are favorable, negro farmers have made rapid progress. This doubtless mainly accounts for the comparatively rapid accumulation of property made by negroes in some Southern states, as in North Carolina, where the value of taxable property owned by negroes increased between 1917 and 1928 over 300 per cent, or from $36,000,000 to over $110,000,000.

It must be said here, as Booker T. Washington urged, that the negro problem is largely of an industrial nature. It is the unsatisfactoriness of the negro as a worker, as a producing agent, that gives rise largely to the friction between the two races. The negro has not yet become adapted to a system of free contract and is frequently unreliable as a laborer. This breeds continued antagonism between the races. When the negro becomes an efficient producer and a property owner, a long step will have been taken toward the solution of the negro problem.

Educational Progress Among the Negroes. — The educational progress among the negroes has been more satisfactory than their industrial progress. At the time of the emancipation 90 per cent of all the negroes in the United States were illiterate, since nearly all the slave states had laws forbidding the education of negroes. Since the emancipation there has been a rapid decrease of illiteracy. In 1880, 70 per cent of the negroes above the age of ten years were still reported as illiterate; in 1900, 44.5 per cent; and in 1930, 16.3 per cent. The number of illiterate negroes of voting age in the United States in 1920 was 27.4 per cent of the total number of negroes of that age. The per cent of illiterate negroes of voting age ranged all the way in former slave-holding states from 43.8 per cent in Louisiana to 14.3 per cent in Missouri, while in New York the percentage was only 3.4 per cent.

In the school year 1926–27, in seventeen Southern states there were 2,289,000 negro children enrolled in the public schools, this number being 68.8 per cent of the negro population of the school age (five to seventeen). The number of white children enrolled was 7,443,000, or 81.8

per cent of the white population of school age. But the average daily attendance of the white school children was 63.6 per cent, while the average daily attendance of the negro school children was only 49.6 per cent. These statistics fail to indicate the utter inadequacy of much of the present education of negro children. In many districts of the South, negro schools are open only five months in a year. The equipment of the schools is often very inadequate, and, according to the Federal Bureau of Education, "a considerable proportion of the teachers are deficient in proper training." Of the total number of pupils in negro schools, 48.8 per cent are in the first two grades, and 75.2 per cent are in the first four grades. According to the Federal Bureau of Education, in the Southern states in 1927, the amount expended for teachers' salaries in public schools for white children was $32.57 per child, while for negro children, it was only $11.78. The Bureau furnishes the following statistics of schools for negroes in 1927: public high schools for negroes numbered 508 with 96,107 students in the high school grades proper. In 1926 there were 77 colleges and institutions of higher learning for negroes, 22 of them being supported by public funds. The combined income of these institutions was $8,560,000, and they had 13,860 students of college grade. Nevertheless, the Bureau found that these institutions were not producing enough teachers, physicians, ministers, and skilled craftsmen to meet the needs of the race. It concluded that the immediate need of the American negro is "more education, better education, and higher education."

Political Conditions. — The Mississippi constitution of 1890 provided that voters must be able to read or interpret

a clause in the constitution of the United States. Since then a majority of the Southern states and practically all of the states of the "Black Belt" have embodied either in their constitutions or in their laws provisions for disfranchising the negro voter. Louisiana made the provision that a person must be able to read and write or be a lineal descendant of some person who voted prior to 1860. This is the famous "Grandfather Clause," which proved popular in a number of Southern states. These laws and constitutional provisions were evidently designed to disfranchise the negro voter. The Federal Supreme Court in 1915, however, declared "grandfather laws" invalid, reaffirming the validity of the Fifteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

Regarding all of this legislation it may be said that it has had perhaps both good and bad effects. In so far as it has tended to eliminate the negro from politics this has been a good effect, but it has oftentimes rather succeeded in keeping the negro question in politics; and the evident injustice and inequality of some of the laws must, it would seem, react to lower the whole tone of political morality in the South. Again, the very provision of these laws to insure the disfranchisement of the illiterate negro has tended in some instances, at least, to discourage negro education, because the promoters of these laws in most cases did not aim to exclude simply the illiterate negro vote, but practically the entire negro vote. It is evident that a party designing to disfranchise the negro through this means would not be very zealous for the negro's education.

Reconstruction of our Policy Toward the Negro.— Many solutions have been proposed for the negro problem.

Among them are (1) admission at once of the negroes to full social equality with the whites; (2) popular education of the negroes along literary and intellectual lines; (3) deportation to Africa or to South America; (4) colonization in some state or in territory adjacent to the United States; (5) extinction through natural selection. It must be said at once that all of these solutions are either impossible or fatuous. The negro is destined to remain a part of our nation. This is the first perception upon which a sound policy toward the negro must be based. Accordingly, any sane solution of the negro problem must look toward the harmonious adjustment of the relations of the two races within the nation. The proposed solutions just mentioned fail to accomplish this result, and must be discarded in favor of a more rational and scientific policy.

The second perception necessary for a sound policy toward the negro is that the so-called negro problem is essentially the same as the Indian problem or the problem of any backward people or race. It is the problem of how a relatively large mass of people, inferior in culture and possibly also inferior in nature, can be adjusted to the civilization of a people much their superior in culture; how the socially and industrially inefficient "nature man" can be made over into the socially and industrially efficient civilized man. Without any injustice to the negro we may say roughly that the negro masses of this country are still essentially an uncultivated or "nature" people, though surrounded by civilization. Slavery failed to render the mass of negroes capable of participating fully in our civilization, and all that has been done for the negro since emancipation has likewise relatively failed. Accordingly the

problem still remains of how we can get the mass of negroes to assimilate fully the social standards, ideals, and values of our civilization. The problem is not greatly different from what it would be if the present American negroes were descendants of savage aborigines that had peopled this country before the white man came. We must find a way of making them a harmonious and helpful element in our national household; or, as we say of the immigrant, of Americanizing them.

Mr. Booker T. Washington said that the negro is bound to become adjusted to our civilization because he is surrounded by the white man's civilization on every hand. This optimistic view, which seems to dismiss the negro problem as requiring no solution, is, however, not well supported by many facts, as we have just seen. Everywhere we have evidence that the negro when left to himself reverts to a condition approximating his African barbarism, and the statistics of increasing vice and crime which we have just given show quite conclusively that the negro is not becoming adjusted to the white man's civilization in many cases in spite of considerable efforts which are being put forth in his behalf. While the writer is very far from taking a pessimistic view of this or any other social problem, he believes that most of the solutions that have thus far been tried have relatively failed, and that more radical methods need to be adopted if the negro is to become a useful social and industrial element in our society.

Undoubtedly the primary adjustment to be made by any backward people is the adjustment on the economic side. Only when the negro becomes adjusted to the economic side of his life will there be a solid foundation for the develop-

ment of something higher. People must be taught how to be efficient, self-sustaining, productive members of society economically before they can be taught to be good citizens. The American negro in other words must be taught to be "good for something" as well as to be good. The failure of common-school education with the negro has been largely for the reason that it has failed to help him in any efficient way to adjust himself industrially. Oftentimes indeed it has had the contrary effect, and the slightly educated negro has been the one who has been least valuable as a producer. The common-school education has not been such a failure with the white child, for the reason that the white child has been taught industry and morality at home, but these the negro frequently fails to get in his home life. Moreover, the common-school education of the white child has usually been simply the foundation upon which after school days he, as a citizen, has built up a wider culture. But the negro, on account of his environment, if not naturally, has proved incapable of going on with his education and building on it after getting out of school. Moreover, as we have already noted, under the present complex conditions of our social life the common school is no longer an efficient socializing agent, even for the white children. The present school system is a failure, not only for the negro race, but also, though not in the same degree, for the white race. Popular education on the old lines can never do very much to solve the negro problem.

This does not lead, however, to the conclusion that all training and education for the negro race is foredoomed to failure. On the contrary all the experiments of mission-

aries in dealing with uncivilized races has led to the conclusion that an all-round education in which industrial and moral training are made prominent can relatively adjust to our civilization even the most backward of human races. Wherever the missionaries have introduced industrial education and adjusted their converts to what is perhaps the fundamental side of our civilization, the economic, they have met with the largest degree of success. This success of missionary endeavors along this line has led to the establishment of similar industrial training schools for the negro in this country, and it may be said regarding such schools for the negro as Hampton and Tuskegee that they have proved an even more unqualified success than their predecessors originated by the missionaries. But these schools are as yet very far from solving the negro problem in this country, for the reason, as we have already seen, that they affect such a small proportion of the negro population. Only about one per cent of negro children at the present time are probably receiving industrial training.

It should be emphasized that industrial training in no way precludes an all-round education. It is not meant that industrial education shall replace all other forms of education, but rather that it shall be added to ordinary education in order to enrich the educational process; and it should be added also that industrial training, while of itself having a strong uplifting moral influence, is not sufficient to socialize without explicit teaching of social ideals and standards. Schools that attempted to give such an all-round education to negro children would, of course, in no way cut off the possibility of higher and professional education for the small number who are especially fitted

to become leaders, and who should be encouraged to go on with advanced studies.

Positive Constructive Measures. If we accept the view that what the American negro needs to adjust him to our civilization is an all-round, socialized education which will emphasize industrial training, especially training for those agricultural and other rural occupations in which the negro masses find their best success, let us note the concrete measures which are necessary to realize this program.

(1) There must be adequately equipped common and higher schools to give such training. Such schools equipped for industrial training — that is, for training in agriculture and mechanical arts for the boys and in household arts for the girls — will doubtless cost a good deal of money. While the investment of money in such schools will undoubtedly repay many fold in the increased productive capacity of the negro population, and so in the increased productive power of the whole nation, yet the Southern states should not be asked to carry this burden alone. They should not, because the condition of the negro is a national, and not a local, responsibility. Properly equipped schools for the education of the negro can scarcely be secured without federal aid. This means federal subsidies for education, and ultimately, perhaps, a national system of education. But as this is needed also for the whites, especially for the large mass of illiterate whites in the South, there can be little objection to such a policy. The War should have taught us not to be niggardly in spending money on socially necessary projects. The cost of a dozen modern battleships would furnish ample funds for the industrial education of the negro for a decade.

(2) There must be secured properly trained teachers to give such education. A sufficient number of such teachers cannot at present be found among the negroes. While negro teachers should be preferred whenever they are competent, and should be trained as rapidly as possible, yet white teachers must be enlisted for the training of the negro if any adequate educational policy is to be entered upon. There are the gravest reasons, indeed, why white teachers should be more extensively employed in negro schools if education of the negro is to be a success. The mass of negro teachers now employed are far below even the low standards set for teachers of white schools. They are unqualified for the task of civilizing and socializing their race. Under such circumstances any scheme of education for the negro is bound to be a failure; for it is well recognized that the vital element in the success of any scheme of education is the teacher. "Sound policy," says the Federal Bureau of Education, "requires white management and white teachers to have some part in the education of the race."

If, therefore, industrial and social training is to be generally introduced into the schools for negroes — if negro education is to aim at the social adjustment of the negro — then a way must be found of reintroducing white teachers in some measure into negro schools. Directly after the Civil War Southern white teachers were extensively employed in negro schools; but as a result of increasing race friction and of the negroes foolishly demanding the positions for themselves, white teachers have come gradually to be excluded from negro schools. It would seem, however, that recognition on the part of both races of the

exigencies of the educational situation and of the need of an attitude of mutual service might easily remove the difficulties in the way of securing an enlarged coöperation of white teachers in negro education. *Unless, indeed, opportunities are maintained for working together in the higher tasks of civilization,* such as education, *the social separation of the two races must finally result in disaster to both.*

(3) This brings us to the third thing which is the most necessary of all for the solution of the negro problem, and that is intelligent coöperation by the members of both races, especially their leaders. Without such coöperation it is idle to think that properly equipped schools and properly trained teachers for the education of the negro can be obtained, or that the new education for the negro can be successfully inaugurated. Most of the negroes, often misled by unwise leaders, still prefer the education of the older type, failing to see that industrial training coupled with all-round education offers the one secure pathway of social advance for their race. The masses of unenlightened Southern white people, on the other hand, also do not wish the new education for the negro, because they believe that it will give him an advantage. For this reason many would probably oppose federal aid in the education of the negro. They fail to see that anything that is done for a depressed element in society will ultimately benefit all society. In particular, they fail to see that the one great impediment to the economic and cultural development and enrichment of the South is its untrained negro population. Says the Southern University Race Commission: "The inadequate provision for the education of

the negro is more than an injustice to him; it is an injury to the white man. The South can not realize its destiny if one third of its population is undeveloped and inefficient."

But it is the white man who must lead the way in this matter. He must persuade the negro that rightly directed education is the way out, and extend to the negro all needed help and good will. The question, therefore, ultimately becomes a question of educating the whites and of forming a proper public opinion regarding the education of the negro. When the leaders of both races once see the need of working together in harmony and in good will, the difficulties in the way of securing proper education for the negro will be easily surmounted. While, therefore, the negro problem is from one point of view largely a question of the industrial training and adjustment of the negro, from another point of view it is a moral question which can be solved only when the socially superior race takes the right attitude toward the socially inferior race — namely, the attitude of service.

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CHAPTER XII

THE PROBLEM OF THE CITY

THE city is, from one point of view, the peculiar problem of our civilization. The urbanization of population in the typical nations of the modern world has greatly intensified all social problems. At the same time the growth of the city has brought about conditions of living which are relatively new to the race. Whether humanity can adapt itself to the new biological and psychological conditions which city life presents remains to be demonstrated. For this reason it has been said that "the growth of large cities constitutes, perhaps, the greatest of all the problems of modern civilization."

The Origin and Development of the City. — The first cities were military strongholds and places of worship. Comparatively few of the total population of a country lived within their walls, except in times of danger from enemies. From being military and religious centers, cities became, also, markets or commercial centers. Such were the walled towns of the Middle Ages. The typical cities of western Europe remained surrounded by high walls down to the modern era, while within their walls dwelt a comparatively dense population, living mainly by trade and commerce. It was not until the industrial revolution,

early in the nineteenth century, had transformed industry and transportation, that we find the modern type of city, which is an industrial center, emerging.

Thus, while the city is as old as civilization itself, the present problem of the city is comparatively new. No great proportion of the population of any country previous to the nineteenth century lived in cities, for the people got their living mainly through occupations carried on in country districts. The modern city, then, is a product of modern industrial development, not of the mere increase of numbers. So true is this, that in a very populous country like India, which has not yet been greatly affected by modern industrial methods, we still find over ninety per cent of the population living under rural conditions.

In all probability this was also true of the people living in classic antiquity. While we know that there was a considerable development of cities in the later phases of Greco-Roman civilization, probably the proportion of the total population of the Roman Empire living in cities was comparatively small. Moreover, the populations of ancient cities have often been exaggerated. Probably at the height of its power, the population of Athens did not exceed 100,000; Carthage, 700,000; Rome, 500,000; Alexandria, 500,000; Nineveh and Babylon, 1,000,000. All the great cities of the ancient world practically disappeared with the fall of Rome. After Rome's fall, Constantinople was the only large city with over 100,000 population in all Europe for centuries. Down to 1600 A.D., indeed, there were only fourteen cities in all Europe with a population of over 100,000; and even in 1800, at the beginning of the nine-

teenth century, there were only twenty-three such cities. But at the end of the nineteenth century, in 1900, there were one hundred and forty-six such cities in Europe, representing twelve per cent of the entire population, while in 1930 there were no less than two hundred and thirty-two such cities. Moreover, while in 1800 less than three per cent of the total population of Europe lived in cities, in 1930 the total urban population was over forty per cent. Again, all of the great European capitals developed their present enormous populations almost wholly within the nineteenth century. Thus, the population of London in 1800 was 964,000, while in 1930 it had reached 4,417,000, or in the total area policed, 7,900,000; the population of Paris in 1800 was 547,000, in 1930 it was 2,871,000; the population of Berlin in 1800 was only 172,000, in 1930 it was 4,024,000; the population of Vienna in 1800 was 232,000, in 1930 it was 1,842,000. These figures are cited to show that from four fifths to nine tenths of the growth of the greatest cities of the world has taken place since the beginning of the nineteenth century.

The Growth of Cities in the United States. — According to the terminology of the United States Census Bureau, a place with a population of 2500 or over is counted as *urban*. Places of from 2500 to 25,000 are called small cities; places from 25,000 to 100,000 medium-sized cities; and places over 100,000 large or great cities. It will be well to bear these distinctions in mind in discussing the problem of the city, because the problem of city life becomes much more intense when the population of a place exceeds 100,000. It is mainly the problem of the great city which we shall discuss in this chapter. For purposes of comparison, we

shall also exclude, temporarily, from the category of cities, places between 2500 and 10,000 population.

In 1800 there were only five cities in the United States of more than 10,000 population. These cities contained a fraction less than four per cent of the total population. In 1900, on the other hand, there were 447 cities in the United States with a population of over 10,000, and these cities contained nearly 32 per cent of the total population, while nearly 20 per cent lived in 38 great cities of over 100,000 population. By 1930 the number of cities in the United States of more than 10,000 population had increased to 982, and these cities contained over 47 per cent of the total population, while over 29 per cent lived in 92 cities of more than 100,000 population each.

Moreover, during the whole of the nineteenth century the cities of the United States grew much more rapidly than its rural population, and this was especially true in the closing decades. From 1920 to 1930 the urban population of the United States increased from 54,304,000 to 68,954,000, or 27.0 per cent, while the " rural population," including in that phrase not only the population living in the open country, but also in all towns under 2500 inhabitants, increased from 51,406,000 to only 53,820,000, or 4.7 per cent. If, however, we take only the population living in the country on the farm, excluding all other country-dwellers, we find that the farm population between 1920 and 1930 decreased 5.1 per cent, while the urban population gained 27 per cent. In other words, between 1920 and 1930 the farm population lost to the cities all of its natural increase and 1,201,000 besides. This means that in the last decade the urban population grew at the expense of the strictly

rural population more rapidly than in any previous decade. Between 1920 and 1930 the cities which grew the fastest in the United States were those of over 1,000,000 population.

Distribution of the Urban Population of the United States. If the urban population of the United States were distributed relatively uniformly among the several states, the problem of the city would be very different from what it is; but the urban population is largely concentrated in a few states. Nearly 40 per cent of the urban population is found in the New England and Middle Atlantic states; and if we add the East North Central states, nearly two thirds of the urban population is in these three divisions. The six states of New York, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Illinois, Ohio, and California contain one half of the urban population of the whole country.

The states with over half their population urban in 1930 were Rhode Island, 92.4 per cent; Massachusetts, 90.2 per cent; New York, 83.6 per cent; New Jersey, 82.6 per cent; California, 73.3 per cent; Illinois, 73.9 per cent; Connecticut, 70.4 per cent; Pennsylvania, 67.8 per cent; New Hampshire, 58.7 per cent; Ohio, 67.8 per cent; Michigan, 68.2 per cent; Maryland, 59.8 per cent; Washington, 56.6 per cent; Delaware, 51.7 per cent; Indiana, 55.5 per cent; Wisconsin, 52.9 per cent; Missouri, 51.2 per cent; Florida, 51.7 per cent; Colorado, 50.2 per cent; Utah, 52.4 per cent; Oregon, 51.3 per cent.

It will be noticed that these states with a large urban population are the great manufacturing states of the Union. The proportion of urban to rural population is, indeed, directly proportionate to the industrialization of the population. It will also be noticed that only three of these states

with a population more than one half urban are southern, namely, Maryland, Delaware, and Florida. This is due to the fact that heretofore the South has been largely agricultural; consequently only a few of the great cities of the country are found within its borders, though within the past decade several Southern states have rapidly increased their urban population.

There are but few countries in Europe that come up with the most urban of our American states. The following European countries had in 1930 a very large per cent of urban population: England and Wales, 70.3 per cent; Scotland, 77.3 per cent; Germany, 65 per cent; Italy, 68 per cent; France, 51 per cent; Holland, 47.3 per cent. On the other hand, in European Russia in 1926 only 17.3 per cent of the population was urban. It will be noted that the most urban of our states, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, and New York, now surpass all European countries in the percentage of population living in cities. This is due to the fact that these states have specialized in manufacturing industry more than any European country, with the exception of England and Wales.

Before leaving the statistics of the growth of cities, it may be worth our while to note that there are developing in this country certain great urban centers which promise to show, even in the near future, the most extensive urbanization of population known to the world; for example, a line of cities and suburban communities is now developing which will in the near future connect New York and Boston on the one hand and New York, Philadelphia, and Washington on the other hand. Thus in a few years, stretching from Washington to Boston, a distance of five

hundred miles, there promises to be a continuous chain of urban communities with practically no rural districts between them. In a sense, this will constitute one great city with a population of twenty millions or upwards. Other urban centers, though not so extensive, are also developing at other points in the United States. It is safe to say that at the end of the twentieth century this country will have at least a dozen cities with a population of over one million. Moreover, as far as we can see at the present time, there is no end in the near future to this growth of the urbanization of our population; for the causes of this great growth of cities seem inherent in our civilization.

The Rural Problem. — The reflex of the city problem is the rural problem. All this growth in our urban population has meant, to a certain extent, a depletion in our country districts of both population and social life. In 1880 the rural population of the United States was still 70.5 per cent; while in 1930 it was only 43.8 per cent, with over 10 per cent of that number not strictly rural. Moreover, as we have seen, for a number of decades the rural population has been increasing very slowly, while the urban population has been increasing very rapidly. In many communities and states, indeed, there has been a positive decrease in the rural population. Thus, between 1920 and 1930, while every state but one in the Union increased its urban population, some even 75 per cent, the more populous states, excepting California, increased their rural population less than 10 per cent, and twelve states, including six great agricultural states in the Central West, showed an absolute decrease in their rural population. These six states were Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Minnesota, and Iowa.

Along with the removal of the older and more substantial families in country communities to the cities has gone an increase in the number of rented farms, until the number of farms worked by tenants in 1930 was 42.4 per cent of the total. The number of tenant farmers has been increasing rapidly since 1890. But only indirectly is the rural problem economic. The country districts have suffered most from a loss of social leadership along all lines. While it is not true, save in a few communities, that the movement to the cities has left behind in the country districts only unambitious and even degenerate elements, still practically all rural communities have suffered much from the movement to the cities through the loss of many of their strongest and most ambitious young men and women. As a consequence, the country church, the country school, and practically all other rural institutions have suffered.

This is the more significant for our civilization sociologically because it must be emphasized that the city is still an experiment in human living. Hitherto, civilization seems to have derived a very large proportion of its leaders, of its most capable men and women, from the country districts. It is a question whether, with the increased urbanization of our population and the consequent social impoverishment of the country districts, the country can still continue to furnish the cities the able leaders which it has given in the past.

Causes of the Growth of Great Cities. — There may be distinguished two classes of causes of the growth of cities: (1) general or social causes, and (2) minor or individual causes. It is the social causes, the causes inherent in

our civilization, which are of particular interest to us. Among these social causes we shall place:

1. *The Diminishing Importance of Agriculture in the Life of Man.* Once agriculture was the all-embracing occupation. Practically all goods were produced upon the farm. Now, however, man's wants have so greatly increased that the primitive industries of the farm can no longer satisfy these wants, and in order to satisfy them men have developed large manufacturing industries. Moreover, fewer men are needed on the farms to produce the same amount of raw material as was produced formerly by the labor of many. This has come about mostly through labor-saving machines. The invention and application of labor-saving machines to the industries of the farm has made it possible to dispense with a great number of men. It is estimated that fifty men with modern farm machinery can do the work of five hundred European peasants without such machinery. Consequently, the four hundred and fifty who have been displaced by farm machinery must find other work, and they find it mainly in manufacturing industries. Again, the scientific and capitalistic agriculture of the present has much the same effect as labor-saving machines. They have greatly increased agricultural production and at the same time lessened the amount of labor. The opening up also of new and fertile regions which were very productive in the nineteenth century had a similar effect.

Every improvement in agricultural industry, instead of keeping men on the farm, has tended to drive them from it. Scientific agriculture carried on with modern machinery necessarily lessens the need of employing a great propor-

tion of the population to produce the foodstuff and other raw materials which the world needs. Hence it has tended to free men from the soil and to make it possible for a larger and larger number to go to the city. Therefore the relatively diminishing importance of agriculture has been one of the prime causes of the growth of the cities in the nineteenth century; and so far as we can see this cause will continue to operate for some time to come.

2. *The Growth and Centralization of Manufacturing Industries.* This is perhaps the most vital cause of the growth of cities. The great city, as we have already said, is very largely the product of modern industrialism. Improved machinery, improved transportation, and enlarged markets, together with the increased wants of men, not only have made possible a great growth of manufacturing industries, but also these same factors have tended to centralize manufacturing industries in the cities. Let us note briefly why it is that manufacturing industries are grouped together in great cities rather than scattered throughout the rural communities. In centralizing manufacturing plants in cities, certain industrial economies are secured, such as: (1) economy in motor power, whether it be water or coal; (2) economy in machinery — it is not necessary to duplicate machines; (3) economy in wages — one superintendent, for example, can oversee a large plant; (4) utilization of by-products — when many factories are grouped together, by-products, which are sometimes more valuable than the main products, can be better utilized. (5) There is economy in buying raw material and in selling finished products when many factories are grouped together. For all these reasons, along with the further reason that those who labor

in factories must live close to them, manufacturing has been a prime cause of the modern city, and, so far as we can see, will continue further to urbanize our population in the future.

3. *The Increase of Trade and Commerce.* Between different communities there developed during the nineteenth century, upon the growth of better transportation, a great increase of trade and commerce, for along with the better transportation went a specialization in industry, on the part of both communities and classes. The modern city is often largely a product of modern transportation. We find all the great cities located at natural breaks in transportation. The cities of the Middle Ages were largely centers of trade and commerce where goods were distributed to various minor centers. The modern city has not lost this characteristic through developing into an industrial center. On the contrary, the status of the city in trade and commerce makes it at the same time a valuable center for the development of manufacturing industries. The break between land and water transportation is particularly favorable to the development of large cities. Thus, we find New York located where goods shipped to Europe must be transferred from land to water transportation; Chicago, located at the head of the water transportation of the Great Lakes; St. Louis, at the head of the navigation of the Mississippi River. Only a few of the great cities of the United States in 1910 were not located on a river or some other navigable water.

This brief discussion of the general causes of the growth of cities shows in the clearest possible manner the tremendous importance of economic conditions in our civilization. We have seen that our civilization is especially charac-

terized by a tendency to the predominance of the urban over the rural. We have also seen that the great general causes of this tendency are undoubtedly economic. However, when we have acknowledged that general economic conditions have shaped the main outline of our civilization, that is certainly as far as we are warranted in going. The existing social problems of both the city and the rural districts are certainly dependent upon many other factors than the economic. Moreover, the growth of cities has been influenced also by certain minor factors which deserve mention, though they are in large measure the outcome or the reflex of the general causes which we have just discussed. Let us note these.

Minor Causes of the Growth of Cities. (1) The first of these minor causes is the better wages and better economic opportunities which cities have offered to individuals. To be sure, wages are often only nominally better in the city than in the country; but it can scarcely be doubted that with the growth of modern industry the great economic opportunities of our age have been mainly in the cities. The more ambitious elements in the country districts have not been slow to see this, and to take advantage of these opportunities. This is, of course, simply looking at the three general causes which we have already discussed, from the standpoint of individual economic interest.

(2) A second minor cause of the growth of cities has been the superior intellectual and educational advantages which city life affords. The cities have usually had superior schools and other educational facilities, while in the country the development of these facilities has lagged behind. Circles of people with intellectual interests exist very fre-

quently in the cities but very seldom in the country. The city pulpit has been supplied, as a rule, with the ablest ministers of every sect, while the country church has too often lacked even a resident pastor.

(3) Still another cause of the growth of the modern city has been the superior opportunities for pleasure and amusement which it affords. Such opportunities for pleasure and amusement, if they have not attracted many people to our cities, have certainly kept many people in them. Our country districts, on the other hand, have too often been deficient in opportunities for wholesome play and amusement. Lack of opportunities for sociability and reasonable recreation is one of the great deficiencies of most rural communities.

(4) The superior comforts and conveniences of city life have also attracted to our cities many who have amassed a fortune and wish to retire from active life. Until recently modern conveniences scarcely existed in country homes, and even now but few country homes can compare in their comforts and conveniences with those occupied by people of the same class in our cities.

(5) Systems of taxation have also had something to do with encouraging the growth of cities. Hitherto, American systems of taxation have operated unfavorably for the farmer. This is especially true of the general property tax, under which most of the personal property in cities, especially that in the form of securities, has hitherto escaped taxation. On the other hand, the general property tax falls most heavily upon the farmer because his personal property is of such a character that it rarely escapes the assessor's notice.

(6) As a last minor cause of the growth of cities we shall mention the ambition and restlessness of the rural population which has sprung from our present system of education. Our rural education has been until recently almost entirely of an intellectual character, but poorly fitted to adjust the individual to rural life. Moreover, it has so emphasized individual success as to give rise to unwise ambitions and unreasonable discontent in many individuals. The education of farmers' sons and daughters has frequently resulted, therefore, in their removal from the country to the city.

Social and Moral Conditions of City Life. — Certain social conditions in our cities are worthy of attention in order that we may understand the effect of the city upon social and racial evolution.

1. *City Populations have a Larger per cent of Females than Rural Populations.* While in the country as a whole the male population exceeded the female in 1930 by about 1,500,000, in the cities the female population exceeded the male by over 645,000. The percentage of males in the country as a whole was 50.6, of females 49.4; while in the cities the percentage of males was 49.0, and of females 51.0. Many of our larger cities show an excess of females in their population. Thus New York city showed an excess of 15,000 in 1930, Philadelphia an excess of 14,000, St. Louis an excess of 18,500. Where cities do not have an excess of females, it is apparently due to the locating in our cities of male immigrants. The chief cause of this excess of females in cities is to be found in the fact that in cities there are many more economic opportunities for women than in the rural districts. Other causes are the larger

infantile mortality among males than among females in cities, and the larger proportion of female children born in cities than in the rural districts.

2. *People in the Active Period of Life, from Fifteen to Sixty-five Years of Age, predominate in the City.* In 1920, out of every 1000 individuals in the United States as a whole there were 318 under fifteen years of age, 634 between fifteen and sixty-five, and 48 above sixty-five years of age. But out of every 1000 in the cities there were only 276 under fifteen years of age, and only 45 above sixty-five years of age, while 679 were between fifteen and sixty-five years. On the other hand, in the rural districts there were 362 out of every 1000 under fifteen years, 51 over sixty-five, while there were only 587 between fifteen and sixty-five. The cause of the predominance in the cities of those in the active period of life is undoubtedly due to the immigration into the cities from the country districts. This makes the life of cities more energetic and active, more strenuous than it would otherwise be.

3. *The Great Cities in the United States have three times as many Foreign Born in Their Population as the United States as a whole.* This has been sufficiently discussed under the head of immigration.

4. *The Birth Rate is Higher in the Cities than in the Rural Districts.* This is primarily due to there being more women of child-bearing age in the cities. In the United States it is also due to the presence of so many foreign born in the cities. The marriage rate is also higher in the cities than in the rural districts. The following statistics based on a thousand population show the relative difference between the cities and the rural districts of the State of

Massachusetts in marriage rate, birth rate, and death rate for the year 1930:

	Marriage Rate	Birth Rate	Death Rate
Boston.....	16.0	23.1	14.1
Cities over 100,000.....	13.2	18.9	11.6
Rural Districts.....	12.0	14.8	11.2

5. *The Death Rate in Cities is also Higher than in the Rural Districts,* as the above table has just shown. In 1926 the crude death rate in the rural districts of the "registration area" of the United States was 11.1, while in the urban districts it was 13.4. The real death rate of cities is, however, much higher than the crude statistics indicate. If we allowed for the rapid growth of many of our cities by immigration into them of persons in the prime of life, the comparison would be still more unfavorable to the cities. The high death rate of cities is undoubtedly due to the poor sanitary and living conditions of the larger cities.

6. *The Physical Condition of City Populations.* Measurements by Dr. Beddoe and others show that the stature and other measurements of men of the great cities of Great Britain are far below those of the rural population. The latest English commission to investigate the conditions of city life also report that the population of the British cities at least shows marked signs of physical deterioration.

7. *Mental and Moral Degeneracy in our Cities.* (1) A larger number of insane are found in our cities than in the rural districts. The United States Census of 1910 showed

that out of every 100,000 persons from urban communities 86 were in hospitals for the insane, as compared with only 41 out of every 100,000 from rural communities.

(2) The suicide rate is much higher in the cities than in rural districts. In 1930 the suicide rate in the United States was for registration cities 20.0 per 100,000 of their population, while for the rural districts it was 12.1.

(3) Poverty and pauperism are much more common in our cities than in rural districts. About one third of the population of great cities may safely be said to live below the poverty line, while in such cities as New York and Boston from ten to fifteen per cent of the population require more or less charitable assistance during the year.

(4) The amount of crime in the cities is about twice as great as in the rural districts.

(5) Illegitimacy in the cities is from two to three times as great as in rural districts, and it is well known that vice centers very largely in our cities.

All these facts show that mental and moral degeneracy is much more common in our urban population than in our rural population, and that the biological and social aspects of our city life present pressing problems.

8. *Educational and Religious Conditions in Cities.* We have already seen that illiteracy among the native white population is much less in our cities than in the rural districts. This is undoubtedly due in the main to the better facilities for education in our cities, and it is here chiefly that we find the bright side of city life; for the cities are not only centers of the evil tendencies of our civilization, but are also the centers of all that is best and uplifting. The urban schools in general are open much longer than

the rural school, the attendance in them is better, and the teaching is much more efficient. In 1930 the urban schools held 184.5 days in the year, while the rural schools held only 160.6 days. The attendance in the urban schools was 84.4 per cent of the enrollment, while in the rural schools it was only 81.3 per cent. Besides the schools, of course, must be mentioned many other educational facilities to be found in our cities, such as those in connection with social settlements, lecture and concert halls, theaters, libraries, art galleries, and museums, — all of which, practically, are found only in the city.

The Census Bureau in 1926 took a religious census, and it seemed to show that on the whole religious conditions were better in our cities than in the country districts. In cities the church membership was 51 per cent of the population, while it was only 36.7 per cent of the rural population. Again, in cities above 25,000 it was 54.8 per cent of their total population, while in the four largest cities — New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit — it was 55.2 per cent of their total population. Some other studies, however, while not extensive enough to justify a conclusion, seem to indicate that in some of the largest cities the church is losing its hold, and that more and more the population of our largest urban centers is becoming churchless, if not without religion. Even if this is so, however, it also remains a fact that the various religious denominations put forth their best efforts in these largest urban centers, and that more is being done for the people religiously and morally in these centers than perhaps for any other portion of the world's population.

Finally, it must be noted that philanthropic activities

center largely in our cities. Most of the agencies of remedial and preventive philanthropy, such as charity organization societies, hospitals, and social settlements are still to be found only in the city. Therefore, very much more is done for city populations to prevent or to overcome social maladjustment than is done for rural populations.

The Reconstruction of Our City Life. — The proposals for dealing with the evils of city life illustrate the foolish and the wise methods of dealing with social problems. The foolish method is to try to get away from the problem. The wise method is to meet the problem by fuller and more intelligent control of the social situation. Of the six methods which we shall mention for dealing with the evils of city life, the first four would try to check the growth of cities, and so avoid the problem; while the last two, recognizing that the cities are here to stay, would reconstruct city life through scientific control over its conditions.

(1) The first method is to make agriculture more attractive and remunerative. This is a good thing in itself, but, as we have seen, it will not check the growth of the cities; rather, every improvement in the conditions of agriculture in the way of making it more productive and remunerative will drive more to the cities.

(2) A second method, akin to the first, is to make village life more attractive. Like the first method, this is good in itself, but it is hardly probable that it will stop the growth of cities; rather, it might be urged that village improvement will give people a taste of the higher comforts and conveniences to be found in cities and will tend to send them to the city.

(3) The third proposed method is to colonize the poor

of the cities in the country. This is the so-called " back to the land " movement, which has recently been advocated, especially by some leaders in agriculture. This plan, however, while it may benefit individuals, cannot do much toward helping solve the problem of the city. It is a difficult thing to get any large number of the poor in the city adjusted again to rural life, and the probability is that in many cases they would be worse off in the country than in the city. Moreover, the vacant places they left would soon be filled by others, and in general the whole plan seems to be against human nature as well as against the social forces of the time.

(4) Administrative decentralization may be mentioned as a plan adopted by some state legislatures to prevent the growth of cities, that is, to scatter the state institutions through the rural sections of the state instead of locating them in the cities. On the whole, this is a foolish plan. The cities will not be checked in their growth by this, while on the other hand it is the cities which most need the presence of the state institutions.

(5) The most important remedy for the cure of the evils of the cities, and one which meets these evils on their own ground, is what has been called " improved municipal housekeeping "; that is, the supervision and control by the city of all those things which are used in common by the people. The idea is that the city is not in its social conditions comparable to the rural community; rather it is more like one big household, and it is necessary, therefore, that there be collective housekeeping, so to speak, in order to keep those things which the people use in common at least in good order. This has also been called " municipal social-

ism." It is not socialism, however, in the strict sense, for it does not advocate the ownership in common of all capital, but rather municipal control of public utilities. We cannot enter into this large subject, upon which many books have been written; to a few of these the student will find references at the end of this chapter. Here it is only necessary to say that all of this civic improvement implies that the city must own or control adequately its sewer system, its water supply, its streets; that it must control the housing of the people, the disposal of garbage, the smoke nuisance, general sanitary and living conditions; that it must provide adequate protection against fire, an adequate park system, an adequate free school system, with public playgrounds for children, free libraries, free art galleries and museums, municipal theaters, public baths, and gymnasiums.

But the city should do even more than this in its collective capacity. It should also control the moral conditions under which the people live. It should inspect and censor public recreations and amusements, and see to it that conditions favorable to moral and social welfare are everywhere preserved for all classes. Vice and lawlessness must be sternly repressed if city life is not to breed disorder and degeneration. The work of the Board of Public Welfare of Kansas City, Mo., may be especially cited as a splendid example of what a city can do to meet the higher social and moral needs of its people.

All of this is of course a species of socialism in the sense that it is collective control of the conditions of living together. It advocates, however, that the city should take over only those things that are used in common. The trouble

with this so-called municipal socialism is that it presupposes a pretty high degree of intelligence on the part of the people. Whether or not a municipality shall own and operate its own street railways and electric light and gas plants, is largely a question of the development of the social consciousness and intelligence in that particular community. In some communities such municipal undertakings have been made a success; in others they have failed. But it is evident that with a large mass of people living together the common conditions of living must be subject to intelligent collective control if human life and character are to have a proper environment in which to develop.

(6) The last remedy proposed for the evils of the city is the development of the suburbs through rapid transit. This is already being rapidly accomplished in many of our larger cities. The solution of the mechanical problem of rapid transit will probably, in other words, tend greatly to relieve automatically the present congestion which we find in many of our large cities. Probably the best form of such rapid transit is underground electric roads, or subways. Transportation upon these roads must be made cheap enough to enable workingmen to live at a distance from their labor. With the solution of the problem of rapid transit it should be possible to scatter a city's population anywhere within a radius of thirty miles. But it would be a mistake to think that rapid transit alone will solve the problems of city communities. Stringent regulation by law of sanitary and housing conditions and, as has just been said, of all the things used in common, is necessary to put order and healthfulness into that vast household which we call a modern great city.

In conclusion we would emphasize again that the era of the city is just beginning; that a larger and larger proportion of our population must come to live in the cities, and that, therefore, the city will dominate the society of the future. Hence, humanity must solve the problem of the city if social progress is to continue. And the problem is by no means insoluble. Man is not yet adjusted to city life. The city is so new even to civilized man that he has carried into it the habits which he practiced in isolated rural communities. These are the sources of trouble in our cities, and, as we have already seen, new adjustments have to be made by individuals in order to secure harmonious social relationships under the crowded conditions of the city. The city requires, therefore, a higher degree of intelligence on the part of the individual than the rural social life, and a great part of the solution of the problem of the city must come through the development of such higher intelligence and morality by means of education. At any rate, it is foolish to decry the city or to attempt to stop its growth. That is impossible and, we think, undesirable. The ideal social life of man has never been the isolated life of the rural community. The city has always been in a sense man's ideal, as is shown by the fact that nearly all attempts to depict a perfect human society have been pictures of cities. Man's ideal, as Dr. Weber says, is not the city or the country, but the city and the country blended, and this is what the city of the future should become. No doubt the time will come when present cities will be looked back upon with horror, as we look back on eighteenth-century cities. The city of the future need not present any of the hideous, disagreeable, and unwholesome aspects of

our present cities. They have been, perhaps not altogether unjustly, characterized as "monuments of human greed." Their condition has been due, however, not so much to the deliberate selfishness of individuals, as to ignorance, wrong laws, wrong industrial conditions, wrong systems of taxation, of party politics, and of city government, along of course with our commercialized "mores." There is much, however, in the greater solidarity and intensity of social life in the city which contains the promise of a higher social life for mankind, once the problems of city life are understood and mastered. Through scientific control over the conditions of life, the city can be made a place in which human beings may find their ideal society.

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CHAPTER XIII

POVERTY AND PAUPERISM

While the many social problems arising from the presence in society of abnormal or socially unadjusted classes, namely, the dependent, defective, and delinquent classes, cannot be discussed in this book adequately, yet they must be briefly noticed in order to correlate them with other social problems, and even more in order to call the attention of the student to the vast literature which exists concerning these problems.

Definitions of Poverty and Pauperism. — Poverty is a relative term, difficult to define, but as generally employed in sociological writings at the present it means that economic and social state in which persons have not sufficient income to maintain health and physical efficiency. All who do not receive a sufficient income to maintain the minimum standard of living necessary for efficiency are known as the "poor," or are said to live below the poverty line.

Pauperism, on the other hand, is the state of legal dependence in which a person who is unable or unwilling to support himself receives relief from public sources. This is, however, legal pauperism. The word as popularly used has come to mean a degraded state of willing dependence. A pauper in this popular sense is a person unwilling to support himself and who becomes a social parasite.

Poverty is closely related to dependence or pauperism, because it is frequently the anteroom, so to speak, to pauperism, although only a small proportion of those who live in poverty actually become dependent in any one year. That is to say, paupers are usually poor people who have failed in their struggle to support themselves without public aid.

The Extent of Poverty and Pauperism in the United States. — The census reports indicate that in the year 1920 there were about 1,000,000 dependents in institutions in the United States. While the number who received relief outside of institutions from public and private sources is not known, it is certain that it is many times the total of those in institutions. It is generally estimated that about five per cent of our population are recipients of some sort of charitable relief in a single year. In our large cities the number who receive relief from public and private sources, even in average years, is very much higher. Many estimates place the total number of persons who receive some sort of relief in a single year in New York city above ten per cent. It seems probable, therefore, that taking the country as a whole nearly five per cent of our population require some sort of help every year. That would make the number who received relief in 1928, say, 6,000,000, and probably this is not an excessive estimate. Upon the basis of these and other known facts it has been estimated that the number of people in the United States living below the poverty line is more than 18,000,000 in years of average prosperity. If negroes of insufficient income are included in this estimate of those below the poverty line, it is certainly not excessive. Probably this estimate

understates rather than overstates the number of persons in the United States who live upon such a low standard that they fail to maintain physical and mental efficiency.

Moreover, investigations in the countries of Europe show that the estimate of fifteen per cent of our population living in poverty is far from excessive. Mr. Charles Booth, in his *Life and Labor of the People of London*, says that about thirty per cent of the population of London live below the poverty line, and Mr. B. S. Rowntree found in the English City of York about the same proportion. While poverty is more prevalent in the old world than in the United States, still it is reliably estimated that at least half of the families of the United States are practically propertyless, which again indicates that an estimate of from ten to fifteen per cent below the poverty line is conservative.

Moreover, when we extend our view in history we find that poverty has been oftentimes in the past even much more prevalent than it is at present. This question of poverty is, in other words, a world-old question and is intimately bound up with the question of material civilization — that is, man's conquest of nature — and with social organization, — the relations of men to one another. At certain times in history certain institutions like slavery have either obviated or concealed poverty, and particularly its extreme expressions, in dependence and legal pauperism. Nevertheless we can regard these questions of poverty and pauperism as practically existing in all civilizations and in all ages. This is not saying, however, that modern poverty and pauperism may not have certain peculiar foundations in modern social and industrial conditions. It is only saying that it is useless to search

wholly for the causes of poverty in conditions that are peculiar to the modern world, because poverty and pauperism are not peculiarly modern problems.

The Genesis of the Depressed Classes. — So complex a problem, it might be said at once, cannot manifestly have a simple explanation, yet this has been the mistake of many social thinkers of the past. They have sought some single simple explanation of human misery, and particularly in its form of economic distress or poverty. Malthus, as we have already seen, attributed all human misery to the fact that population tends to increase more rapidly than food supply, and that it is the pressure of population upon food which sufficiently explains poverty in human society. Karl Marx offered an equally sweeping explanation when he attributed all poverty to the fact that labor is not paid a sufficient wage; that the capitalist appropriates an unjust share of the product of labor, leaving to the laborer just enough to maintain existence and reproduce. Henry George in the same spirit, in his *Progress and Poverty*, attributed all poverty to one cause, — the landlord's appropriation of the unearned increment in land values. There is, of course, some truth in all of these sweeping generalizations, but it must be said that there is not sufficient in any of them to stand the test of concrete investigation; rather these men have made the mistake of attempting to explain a very complex social phenomenon in terms of a single set of causes, which, as we have already seen, has been the bane of social science in the past. Even the theory of evolution itself fails to explain, as ordinarily stated, the genesis of the depressed classes in human society. It may explain it in part,

however. As we have already seen, biological variations are always found in individuals, making some naturally superior, some naturally inferior, and in the struggle for existence we know that the inferior are more liable to go down; they are less apt to maintain a place in society, and hence more readily fall into the depressed classes. Many well-endowed persons, however, also fall into the dependent classes through accidents and causes inherent in our social organization but in no way natural. Thus, owing to our industrial system and to our laws of property, inheritance, and the like, it often happens that a superior person through sickness or other accident gets caught in a mesh of causes which bring him down to the dependent classes, and on the other hand inferior individuals, through inheritance or "social pull," oftentimes enjoy a very large economic surplus all their lives. It may be admitted, however, that slight defects in personal character or ability enter into practically all cases of dependence. This is more apt to be the case also in a progressive society like our own, where rising standards of efficiency make the economic struggle more severe all the time. Formerly, for example, any employee could drink and retain his position, but now the drinker quickly loses his position in many industries and gives place to the sober man. Oftentimes, however, such defects that give rise to dependence are not inherent but are produced by social conditions themselves, like faulty education, bad surroundings, and the like. Through the improvement of social conditions, therefore, there is no doubt that much of the present poverty of the civilized world can be wiped out. This is not saying, however, that poverty and dependence will

ever be wholly eliminated. Probably, no matter how ideal social conditions might be, even under the most just social organization, there would be some accidents and variations in individuals which would produce a condition of dependence. Moreover, the elimination of poverty and pauperism is not so simple as some suppose. It is not wholly a question of the improvement of social conditions; it also involves the control of physical heredity, because many of the principal defects that give rise to dependence are inherent in heredity. But man can control to some extent even the birth of the inferior or unfit classes. This may seem, however, so far in the future that it is idle to discuss it, although, as we shall see, society is undoubtedly taking steps to prevent the propagation of the unfit. In the meantime, however, so long as humanity progresses through natural selection we shall have poverty, to some extent at least, no matter how much industrial and social conditions may be improved. Yet without the control of physical heredity or the substitution of artificial for natural selection, poverty can be undoubtedly greatly lessened, and it is the rational aim of applied social science to discover how this may be done. It would seem that the existence of 18,000,000 persons in the United States living below the poverty line cannot be justified upon either moral or economic grounds; that it represents a great waste of human life and human resources, and that much of the social maladjustment of which this poverty is an expression might easily yield to wisely instituted remedial measures. If the social maladjustment which is undoubtedly the cause of the bulk of modern poverty were done away with, it is safe to say that

it would be reduced to less than one third of its present dimensions.

The Concrete Causes of Poverty. — It is necessary to inquire somewhat more minutely into the concrete conditions, social and individual, which give rise to poverty and dependence. Manifestly the poor do not constitute any single class in society. All classes, in a sense, are represented among the poor, and the causes of poverty which are manifest will depend very greatly upon the class of the poor that is studied. If, for example, we should study the causes of dependence among defective classes, naturally personal defects of various sorts would be emphasized. Again, if we should study almshouse paupers, we should expect to find the causes of their dependence different from the causes of the temporary dependence of those who are dealt with outside of institutions and largely by private societies, especially the charity organization societies of large cities. It is especially, however, this latter class of temporary dependents that we are most interested in, because they show most clearly the forces operating to produce the various classes of permanent dependents.

There are two great classes of causes of poverty: objective causes, or causes outside of the individual, that is, in the environment; and subjective causes, or causes within the individual. We shall take up first the objective causes.

The Objective Causes of Poverty. The objective causes of poverty may be again divided into causes in the physical environment and causes in the social environment. The causes in the physical environment should not be overlooked, even though to a great extent they may not be amenable to social control. Much poverty in certain

regions is caused simply by the unpropitious physical environment, such as unproductive soil, bad climate, and the like. Added to these unpropitious factors in the environment we have also great natural calamities, such as tornadoes, floods, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. Every one is familiar with the great amount of misery which is caused, temporarily at least, by such calamities. Again, certain things in the organic environment, particularly in the way of disease-producing bacteria, are also productive of much poverty. Certain bacteria exist, we now know, plentifully in nature, such as the malaria germ, to which rightfully has been ascribed the physical degeneracy of people living in certain sections of the earth.

But the most important objective causes of poverty are undoubtedly those found in the social environment, — those which spring from certain social conditions or faults in social organization. Among these we may mention:

(1) *Economic Causes.* Defective industrial organization and economic evils of various sorts are thought by many persons to be the main productive causes of poverty and dependence in modern society, and there can be no doubt that a very large per cent of poverty may be traced directly to economic evils. This is shown by the fact that in the schedules of all charity organization societies "lack of employment" figures as the first or second most conspicuous cause of distress in the cases with which such societies deal. It is usually estimated that from twenty to forty per cent of all such cases of dependence may be attributed to lack of employment, not due to the employee. It is well known that in periods of industrial depression the number of applicants for aid in our large cities increases

enormously, and local strikes and lockouts frequently have the same effect. Again, changes in methods of production through the introduction of new machinery frequently displace large numbers of workingmen, who, on account of age or other reasons, fail to get employment along new lines. Changes in trade brought about through changes in fashions have to some extent at least a similar effect. Again, fluctuations in the value of money may undoubtedly depress a debtor class to the point of dependence. Unwise methods of taxation, such as levying heavy taxes on the necessaries of life, produce a great deal of poverty and economic distress. Systems of land tenure such as prevail in England and even to some extent in the United States, may also be another economic cause of poverty. The free land which has up to the present time existed in this country has been a great aid against poverty. The employment of women and children in factories is another cause of poverty which needs to be mentioned under this head. As we have already seen, this breaks up the home, and in the case of the employment of children stops the development of the child. Still another economic cause of poverty is unhealthful and dangerous occupations. The disease-begetting occupations in modern industry are very numerous, such as hat making, glass blowing, the grinding of tools, and the like — any work in which there is a great deal of dust. Among dangerous occupations must also be included those in which there are numerous accidents, such as mining and railway occupations. The accidents in mines and on railways in the United States each year cause as many deaths and serious injuries as have often resulted in many a petty war. Thus, on the railways of the United

States in 1929 there was a total of 6,496 persons killed and 76,995 injured, including the industrial accidents of employees, — one trainman being killed in every five hundred and twelve, and one injured in every fourteen. While it is improbable that our great industries can be carried on without some sacrifice of health and life, it seems reasonable to believe that the number of those who are sacrificed at present is far greater than is necessary, and that reasonable precautions in industry might greatly increase the healthfulness of the occupations and diminish the number of accidents to employees.

On the whole, it is probable that these economic causes of poverty figure in from 50 to 80 per cent of all cases, not operating alone, to be sure, but often in connection with faults of character or physical or mental defects in the individual; for it is always to be remembered in discussing the causes of poverty that one never finds a case which can be fairly attributed to a single cause. The complexity of causes operating in the case of a single dependent family frequently makes it impossible for any one to say with certainty what is the chief and what are the contributing causes. Oftentimes what appears to be the chief cause, such as lack of employment, has back of it defects in individual character which are not apparent to the investigator. Researches along this line have shown that the number of cases of distress in periods of prosperity which may be attributed to lack of employment may be very greatly reduced when all individual defects are taken into consideration.

But such statements do not hold in periods of industrial depression. Then unemployment becomes the overwhelm-

ingly preponderant cause of distress. The United States has passed through five severe depressions since 1893 — the depressions of 1893–96, 1907, 1914–15, 1920–21, and the one beginning in 1929. This last depression has been the most severe and most prolonged in recent history, partly because it is a post-war depression affecting the whole world, and partly because of the radical readjustments now made necessary in the world of labor by the coming of the machine age. In the United States from 1929 to 1932 the number of the unemployed rose to between 6,000,000 and 10,000,000, whereas the number of unemployed in normal times is usually not more than one seventh of this amount. Between 1929 and 1931 the number of dependent families increased in the United States, it is estimated, over 285 per cent, and the amount needed for relief of families and individuals outside of institutions increased over 230 per cent. In an industrial depression, while at first those who are laid off are the more inefficient and less skilled, yet as the depression advances the skilled and efficient are also found in great numbers among the unemployed. Periodic industrial depressions must therefore be recognized as one of the great causes of continuing poverty in our civilization; for these depressions pull down to the level of the dependent not merely those with defective skill or character, but many of the ablest and most efficient. Many of these, moreover, through the demoralization and sickness which often accompany prolonged unemployment, are never able again to secure satisfactory places in the world of industry. Thus, the effects of a prolonged industrial depression may be felt for many years after recovery. Here, then, is a serious defect in our economic system which is responsible for much

poverty and distress and which evidently must be removed if we are to deal with the problem of poverty scientifically.

(2) Unsanitary conditions of living are frequent causes of poverty. Among these unsanitary conditions may be mentioned especially the housing of the poor. The housing of the poor in badly ventilated, poorly lighted, and unsanitary dwellings greatly increases sickness and death and undoubtedly contributes greatly to their economic depression. In New York City in 1904 in the first ward, where there was only one house on each lot, the death rate was 29 per 1000 of the population, but where rear tenements had been erected it was 62 per 1000 of the population. The importance of public sanitation, and especially of the prevention of overcrowding and the securing of properly lighted and ventilated dwellings for the people, is so great that we need not enlarge upon it.

(3) Defects in our educational system are certainly productive of poverty. Ignorant and illiterate persons are much more liable to become dependent. In particular the lack of industrial training in our public schools is a prolific cause of dependence in our complex industrial civilization.

(4) Defects in government, permitting corruption and failing to check economic or sanitary evils, on the one hand, or on the other hand, fostering ill will and conflict between classes, nations, or races, are manifest causes of poverty. Perhaps no single cause has produced more poverty among European peoples recently than the World War. As all conflict between individuals, classes, nations, or races, is non-productive, it is one of the great reasons for the continued existence of poverty. Government exists to regulate

the whole social order, and wherever it fails to perform this work properly, economic distress must ensue.

(5) Corruption in social institutions and customs is certainly a cause of poverty: such, for example, is the custom of social drinking, and such also the unwise and indiscriminate charity which has so often existed in the past.

(6) Unrestricted immigration, especially in our Eastern states and cities, is, as we have already seen, a prolific cause of dependence.

The Subjective Causes of Poverty are the causes within the individual. Among these must be enumerated: (1) Physical and mental defects of all sorts, especially those arising from sickness and accidents. Sickness causing temporary or permanent disability figures in from 15 to 30 per cent of all cases applying for relief in our large cities. Probably it is the most common and most important single cause of poverty with which charity workers have to deal. Back of sickness, however, are often remote causes in the environment or in personal character. We have already spoken of accident as a cause of poverty in connection with dangerous occupations. It is only necessary to add that good authorities estimate that there are over 1,000,000 serious accidents in the United States every year, in order to see that disabilities resulting from accident are prolific as causes of poverty, especially in our large industrial centers. The physical and mental defects which manifest themselves in the defective classes proper, such as the feeble-minded, the insane, the epileptics, the deaf-mutes, and the blind, do not need to be dwelt upon as causes of dependence.

(2) Next after sickness in the list of subjective causes of poverty comes intemperance. While the effect of intemper-

ance in producing poverty has often been exaggerated, there can be no doubt that intemperance is one of the most important causes with which we have to deal. Back of intemperance, of course, may often be again causes in the social environment, or other remote causes, but these do not detract from the fact that practically one fourth of all the cases of distress with which charity organization societies have to deal are attributable, more or less, to intemperance. The Committee of Fifty who investigated this subject found that, in thirty-three cities, out of thirty thousand cases dependence was due to personal intemperance in 18.46 per cent, and due to the intemperance of others in 9.36 per cent, making a total of 27.82 per cent of cases in which intemperance can be traced as a cause of poverty. Other investigations conducted in American cities give substantially the same results, although certain other investigations in English cities give higher percentages. It is noteworthy also that in an investigation conducted by the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor 39 per cent of the cases of poverty were attributed directly or indirectly to drink. Again the Committee of Fifty found that in the case of almshouse paupers a considerably higher per cent owed their condition to the influence of drink either directly or indirectly, the percentage being 41.55.

These statistics of the Committee of Fifty have never been successfully refuted, and still stand as a conservative and careful estimate of the influence of intemperance on the production of poverty. Later statistics on the whole tend to confirm these. Thus, in 1912 in several leading American cities it was found that intemperance was an important factor in dependency in 14.8 per cent of the cases.

These were, however, cases of temporarily dependent families, relieved in their own homes, and the statistics concern cities in which prohibition of the drink traffic had not begun. After the enactment of the National Prohibition Law, these same cities in 1920 showed only 4.2 per cent of the cases of dependent families in which intemperance was an important factor. This per cent, however, began to rise after 1920, and in 1927 it was found that in thirty-seven American cities intemperance was an important factor in the production of distress in the case of 9.5 per cent of dependent families.

(3) Sexual vice is undoubtedly a prolific cause of poverty, although it is very hard to trace concretely in the study of specific cases. Dr. Dugdale, however, in his study of the Jukes family places sexual vice even ahead of intemperance as a cause of their degradation, and other similar studies of similar families have reached substantially the same results.

(4) Shiftlessness and laziness are frequently found in the lists of causes of dependence used by charity organization societies, from 10 to 15 per cent of the cases of distress being attributed more or less to these causes. It is now generally agreed, however, that in most cases these causes may be resolved into more remote causes, laziness being oftentimes attributable to a degenerate or at least undervitalized physical condition.

(5) Old age, which has not been rendered destitute by vice, drink, or other faults of character, is frequently in itself a cause of dependence. Old age seems to figure more largely as a cause of dependence in the European statistics than in American; nevertheless, even in America we frequently find old persons who have worked hard all their lives and yet

come to poverty in their old age through no fault of their own. It is for this reason that many are urging old-age pensions as a means of preventing dependence among the aged.

(6) Neglect and desertion by relatives, or the disregard of family ties, in America at least, may be put down as one of the important causes of dependence. From five to ten per cent of all the cases of distress, for example, which charity organization societies in our large cities deal with are those of deserted wives. Again, it is particularly common in America for children to fail to support aged parents and even the desertion of children by parents is of frequent occurrence.

(7) Death of main support must also be mentioned as an important cause of dependence. Widows and their children always figure largely among those helped by charitable societies and institutions. Probably from 10 to 20 per cent of all cases dealt with by societies for relieving temporary distress are cases in which the death of the breadwinner has temporarily rendered the family dependent.

(8) Crime, dishonesty, ignorance, and the like are manifest frequent causes of dependence, and as such need no discussion.

We have enumerated in detail some of the more important objective and subjective causes of poverty and dependence in order that the student may see that such causes are very complex, and, as we have already said, there rarely exists a dependent family in which three or more of these causes are not found to be active. Certain questions arise from such a brief presentation as this which we may mention but cannot hope adequately to deal with. Such, for example,

is the question whether the subjective causes of poverty can all be reduced to objective causes. In our opinion this cannot be done, because the subjective causes have their roots in biological and psychological conditions, which cannot be attributed directly to causes in the environment. No doubt, however, many of the subjective causes of poverty are characteristics which have been acquired by individuals from the influence of their environment. When we attribute a certain per cent of poverty to intemperance, for example, it is probable that that particular personal defect may be ascribed almost wholly to the environment. On the other hand, there are other personal defects, such as sickness, vice, and mental deficiency, that cannot always with certainty be traced to environmental factors. It is safest to conclude that while personality is built up largely out of social influences, society is, on the other hand, also rooted in human nature, so that both objective and subjective causes combine to produce practically all social phenomena, and especially the phenomena of poverty and dependence. It is unscientific, therefore, to disregard either the subjective or the objective causes of poverty.

Another question which is frequently raised in connection with poverty or dependence is, whether it is due to misconduct or misfortune. This question really has not much meaning in it when it is analyzed. As we have already seen in practically every case of poverty, personal defects and bad environment combine. Only a few of these personal defects, however, can by any proper use of language be regarded as misconduct. The great mass of poverty, therefore, seems attributable to misfortune rather than to misconduct, — using these words in their popular sense.

But such a conclusion as this necessarily rests upon a somewhat superficial examination of the causes of distress which does not enter into the remote springs of personal character and development. On the whole, it seems unwise to attempt to divide the poor into the "worthy" and "unworthy" poor, as has often been done, for no one can say who is the worthy and who is the unworthy in a moral sense. The only sense in which these words may be used scientifically in charitable work is to mean "needy" and "not needy."

Pauperism and Degeneracy. In order to see more clearly the biological roots of dependence we must notice briefly the relation of habitual pauperism to degeneracy. Studies like that made by Dr. Dugdale of the Jukes family show that unquestionably there is in many instances a close relation between habitual pauperism of various types and degeneracy. Out of 709 in the Jukes family studied by Dugdale 500 had been aided. Pauperism was $7\frac{1}{2}$ times as common among the Jukes as in the ordinary population. Along with the pauperism of the Jukes went prostitution, illegitimacy, crime, and physical disease and defects. Many other studies have shown the same intimate relation between physical degeneracy and habitual dependence or pauperism. There can be no doubt, therefore, that general physical degeneracy, or biological unfitness, is, as we have already asserted in the beginning, a conspicuous factor in the worst cases of chronic pauperism.

The Influence of Heredity upon Pauperism. Similar studies to those already mentioned have shown that dependence is oftentimes hereditary in families from generation to generation. This is doubtless based upon the

inheritance of physical and mental defects. Indirectly, therefore, there is such a thing as hereditary pauperism. Now we know from Weismann's law that acquired characteristics are not inherited, but only congenital, or inborn characteristics. It is not the characteristics, in other words, which are acquired from the influence of environment that are transmitted to offspring, but the characteristics that arise through variations in the germ, caused by forces which are not yet well understood. Defects that are acquired by the individual in his lifetime, in other words, will not be transmitted; but the defects that arise through accident or other means in the germ are transmitted. This being so, it follows that acquired pauperism or dependence is not transmitted but only the pauperism which rests upon congenital defects. This is illustrated by the case of the deaf. Deaf-mutes are of two sorts: persons who are born deaf, or the congenital deaf-mutes, and persons who become deaf-mutes through diseases affecting the ear in early childhood. These latter are styled adventitious deaf-mutes. Now when congenital deaf-mutes marry, they show a strong tendency to transmit their defect to offspring, but the children of adventitious deaf-mutes are normal. Dr. Fay, in his investigations into the marriages of the deaf in the United States, shows that only 0.3 per cent of the children born from the marriages of persons adventitiously deaf and having no deaf relatives are born deaf; while on the other hand, 30.3 per cent of the children born from the marriages of persons congenitally deaf, both parents having deaf relatives, are born deaf. In other words, the number of deaf-mutes born where both parents are congenitally deaf and have deaf relatives is one hundred times

greater than where both parents are adventitiously deaf and have no deaf relatives. This is pretty conclusive proof that it is only the congenital defects which are transmissible, but these are so highly transmissible that they may express themselves in pauperism from generation to generation.

The marriage of all persons in whom there is an hereditary taint of feeble-mindedness, insanity, epilepsy, and the like ought, therefore, to be forbidden by law. But unless these defective classes were segregated in institutions, the only result of this might be to increase illegitimacy; therefore, any step in eradicating degeneracy and pauperism must look to the isolation and custodial care through life of the hopelessly defective classes. All this gives point to our conclusion that poverty and pauperism have roots which are quite independent of defects in economic conditions, and that, until heredity itself can be controlled, we cannot expect to eliminate poverty entirely.

Proposed Remedies for Poverty and Pauperism. — The scientific remedies for poverty and pauperism, that is, the scientific methods of dealing with the various dependent classes and of preventing their existence, now form the subject-matter of a great independent science, the science of philanthropy, which, as we have already seen, may be considered a branch of applied sociology. We have not room in this book to discuss these remedies adequately, but we may call the attention of the student again to the vast literature existing upon the subject, and may point out the trend of modern scientific philanthropy in developing scientific methods for removing the causes of dependence and of preventing the existence of the various dependent classes.

As we have already seen, poverty is an economic expression of biological or psychological defects of the individual on the one hand, and of a faulty social and industrial organization on the other hand. This implies that the remedies must be along the lines of the biological and psychological adjustment of the individual and of the correction of the faults in social organization.

Where biological defects of the individual are the cause of dependence, we have just implied that, unless these defects are relatively superficial, the scientific policy for treating these classes of defective individuals would be that of segregation in institutions. The feeble-minded, the chronic insane, the chronic epileptic, and other hopelessly defective persons, in other words, should be permanently kept in institutions where tender and humane care should be provided, but in such a way that they will not reproduce their kind and burden future generations. The policy of segregating the hopelessly defective is one of the most scientifically approved policies of modern philanthropy. In this way, to a certain extent, the reproduction of unfit elements in society might be lessened, and the spread of degeneracy checked. In the case of slightly defective adults, such as the congenitally deaf and the congenitally blind, it is difficult to say exactly what the policy should be. It would seem that many of these persons may be relatively adjusted to free social life, although if they marry and have offspring we know, if their defect is congenital, that a certain proportion of the offspring, according to Mendel's law, will inherit the defect.

In the case of those individuals whose dependence is due to psychological defects, or defective character, it is

evident that we have a different problem. Here, in general, the wise policy would seem to be, not to segregate, but to overcome the defective character. Psychological defects, we know, are much more frequently acquired than biological defects and much more easily remedied. The work of scientific philanthropy in dealing with this class of individuals must be, therefore, a work of remedying defects in individual character. This is, perhaps, best done through personal relations between the dependent person and those who may help him. Defective character is, on the whole, therefore, best remedied by such means as education, religious influences, friendly visiting, and the like. The class of dependents whose condition is due to defective character may be on the whole, therefore, best treated outside of institutions, and probably better through voluntary private charity than through public relief systems.

There remains another class of dependents whose condition is not due either to biological or to psychological defects in themselves, but to faulty social and industrial conditions. For these, the best method of treatment consists in remedying the faulty conditions or in removing them, if possible, from them. This means that, in many cases, society must provide pensions, insurance against accident and sickness, legislation to check social abuses, and, above all, proper facilities for education. Here comes in the need of child-labor legislation, of better housing, of industrial insurance, of industrial education, and the like.

In the light of these principles, let us review very briefly the different methods of dealing with dependent classes at the present time.

Public and Private Outdoor Relief. By outdoor relief we mean relief given to the poor outside of an institution. Usually, outdoor relief refers simply to the public relief of dependents outside of institutions, but we shall use the phrase to cover both public and private relief. It is evident from what has already been said that the class of persons to whom this form of relief is appropriate are those in temporary distress, whose condition of dependence is not a permanent one and, therefore, usually those whose condition is due either to defective personal character or to faulty social organization. If the temporary dependence is due to defective personal character, it is evident that the aid may be so given, if given wisely, as to stimulate the overcoming of the moral defect. Hence the need of carefully planned measures of relief in all such cases. Hence, also, the need of the friendly visitor, who by personal contact with such a family will help them to become socially adjusted. If, on the other hand, the temporarily dependent person is simply a victim of circumstances, there is, then, also, the need of wise charity in order to overcome those adverse circumstances without impairing the character of the individual who is helped by destroying his self-respect and the like.

Charity Organization Societies and the Red Cross. It is evident that the task of relieving temporarily dependent persons outside of institutions is a delicate and difficult one, and requires carefully trained workers to do it successfully. For this reason, many have argued that outdoor relief should not be undertaken by the state in any of its branches, such as the city or county. In general, it must be admitted that the private society is, in many cases, naturally better fitted

to accomplish this delicate and difficult task of restoring the temporarily dependent person. But, on the other hand, it must be said that the whole matter is simply a question of administration. Private societies may be quite as lax and unscientific in their charity as the state, and it is conceivable that the state can develop a system of outdoor relief which will be administered by experts quite as carefully as any private organization could administer it. Indeed, this is what has been practically done in Germany under the *Elberfeldt System*, which is a state system for dispensing outdoor relief to the temporarily indigent.

In the United States the work of relieving the temporarily dependent in their own homes has, in our cities, been undertaken by Charity Organization Societies, also called Associated Charities, and sometimes Family Aid Societies. In general, these private societies have done the work with more regard for the scientific principles of relief-giving than public agencies. The function of these societies has been to bring about coöperation and organization among the private relief-giving agencies, with the public agencies sometimes included, so that their work will proceed in a more scientific and systematic way. These societies have therefore had to emphasize the work of *investigation*, not so much to exclude impostors as to secure knowledge of the causes of the distress, and the character and circumstances of the applicant. Such investigation is not for the sake of detecting imposition, but rather for the finding out how a case can best be helped; and of course this can be done only through thorough knowledge of the facts.

A second principle of these societies is *registration*. Careful records are kept of all cases, not only that knowledge

may be preserved from year to year, and so give continuity to the work, but also that means may be provided through which the facts of any case shall be accessible to those interested in helping the case, though the records are not open to the general public. Such records prevent the overlapping of relief and give continuity to the plan of relief.

A third principle emphasized by charity organization societies is *coöperation*, or *coördination*, though this work is also sometimes undertaken by councils of social agencies. In every community there are always a number of sources of relief, and unless these are carefully organized and brought to coöperate, they will work at cross purposes with the consequent demoralization of the poor.

In general, these societies have sought to proceed upon scientific principles, and to see that charitable relief is individualized, that is, suited to the character and needs of the case; that it is personal and based upon social sympathy, not mechanical and impersonal as it too often is when dispensed by government officials; and finally, that it is intelligent, proceeding upon full knowledge of the character and circumstances of the applicant.

Charity Organization and Public Welfare Societies are usually local. A national organization proceeding upon somewhat similar principles is the American Red Cross, which works in close coöperation with the Federal Government. In the division of labor among charitable agencies, the Red Cross has taken chiefly the field of emergency relief connected with public disasters and calamities, and the relief of soldiers and sailors, whether active or ex-service men. The country is divided by the Red Cross into thirteen districts and each local community is supposed

to have a chapter. In peace times these chapters look mainly after the relief of former soldiers and sailors, working usually in coöperation with the local public welfare societies or associated charities. On account of the central organization of the Red Cross and the relatively large funds which it has at its disposal, it has been found particularly efficient in the case of public disasters which come from floods, fires, tornadoes, earthquakes, and the like. The Red Cross has also carried on health centers, and extensive education of the public in matters of public health.

State Charitable Institutions. Indoor relief, or relief within institutions, for the permanently dependent classes is probably best undertaken by the state. Originally, the only institution of this sort was the almshouse or the poor house; but with the development of our complex civilization many of the permanently dependent have been provided for in other institutions than the almshouse, and it would seem that ultimately all the permanently dependent would be cared for in specialized state institutions. Thus, the permanently dependent, through various sorts of defects, such as the feeble-minded, chronic epileptic, chronic insane, and the like, are properly cared for in institutions especially provided for the purpose by the state and manned by experts. Into the details of public care of the unfit and defective of various types it is not necessary to go further than to say that such public care should be of the most scientific character, and with the double aim of reclaiming all those that can be reclaimed, and of providing permanently tender and humane care for those who cannot be fitted for free social life. State institutions,

then, should be manned by experts, and their activities should be coördinated by some central board. In accordance with this principle, it would seem that the best state policy would be to provide expert commissions for the care of different classes, such as the insane, and the like, and a supervisory board to watch over the work of these commissions and the institutions.

Dependent Children. The care of dependent children is manifestly one of the most important forms of remedial philanthropic work, for it is manifest that the dependent child will make a dependent adult unless proper measures are taken to secure his adjustment to the social life. The dependent child is rarely biologically defective. The problem is, usually, in his case, the development of character under proper social conditions. For this reason, both the state and private societies have claimed the field of care of dependent children. While private societies have accomplished in this respect some of the most notable work, it would seem, however, that the work is one which properly belongs to the state in its capacity of legal guardian of all dependent children. The state, through a properly organized system of child helping, could conceivably guarantee that every neglected and dependent child should have normal opportunities to become adjusted to the social life. The system in the state of Michigan, with its Public School for Dependent Children at Coldwater, and its plan of placing these children, after a few months, in good homes, is a system which cannot receive too high commendation. In general, it is practically agreed by experts that the dependent child cannot be well adjusted to the social life by being reared in an institution, but that

the better plan is to find suitable homes in which these children can be placed and reared under state supervision. In this way, practically every dependent child can be guaranteed a good chance in life. In the United States, private societies called "Children's Home Societies" are also doing this work with great success.

Public and Private Charity. As has already been indicated, the ordinary line to be observed between private charity and public relief is that to private charity should be given the more delicate and difficult tasks, such as readjusting the temporarily dependent persons, the care of, in some cases, dependent children and the like, while to public charity should be given the cases which need permanent relief in institutions. This is only a conventional line, however, between private charity and public relief. As has already been pointed out, the state can conceivably undertake, also, the more delicate and difficult tasks of charitable aid, and probably it should do so as rapidly as it demonstrates its fitness to undertake this work, as the state, when once it has achieved certain standards, is a more certain and reliable agency than private institutions or societies. But there is in philanthropic work, a large place for the private society or institution. There will probably always be debatable cases which may better be looked after by private agencies than by public. There is, therefore, in every well-developed community, room for both public and private agencies, although there should be close coöperation where both exist one with the other. The church, through all its history, has undertaken philanthropic work with notable success, and it would be regrettable if the philanthropic activities of the church

were to cease at this time, when they are needed as never before, in spite of the large development of public philanthropy. Church charity should, however, be made as scientific as any other form of charity, and should be carefully coördinated with the work of the state and other secular agencies. Among the secular agencies, we have already mentioned the charity organization society as typifying in many ways the highest type of philanthropic activity of the present. It would seem that this society, organizing as it does all the philanthropic forces and agencies of the community, could scarcely be displaced by state activity; and that there would remain to this society, as well as many other private philanthropic societies, a very large field of activity in the future. State activity in the field of charity is, therefore, to be encouraged, but it must not be supposed that such activity can take the place of private charity.

Social Insurance and the Relief of the Unemployed. We have seen that the three chief causes of poverty in modern society are unemployment, sickness, and old age. European nations have very generally adopted the policy of compulsory insurance of the laboring classes against these contingencies of life. We have seen that unemployment is one of the most serious defects in our modern economic life. Practically all the European countries have inaugurated some form of social insurance to cover this contingency. The source of the insurance funds varies in different countries. In some countries a small per cent of the wage is deducted weekly, while the employer contributes an equal amount. The government may add a subsidy or may merely administer the funds. In England the fund is pro-

vided by contributions from employers and employees plus a contribution from the government. The total number of wage workers insured in Great Britain now exceeds twelve million, and insurance has been extended to non-manual workers whose wage is less than $1200 per year. The age of insurance is from sixteen to sixty-four, and the benefits range from $1.25 per week to $4.25 per week. Somewhat similar insurance systems exist in Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Italy; while in Belgium, Denmark, France, and Norway, state subsidies are granted to trade unions which provide unemployment benefits.

There has been much criticism of this system in the United States, both on the part of industrial corporations and trade unions. The unemployment benefits in these countries have been called "doles." Strictly speaking, however, a "dole" is a gift to the poor by the public authorities. It should not be confused with regular unemployment insurance, which is very generally approved by economic experts who have made a careful study of the problem, in spite of the practical difficulties of putting such a system in operation in this country. In the United States a few of our states, especially Wisconsin, have undertaken some form of unemployment insurance. A number of industrial corporations and of labor unions have also endeavored to establish private systems of unemployment insurance. But these benefit but a small number of workers, and the great mass of the unemployed in the United States are cut adrift to carry as individuals the entire burden.

Practically all European countries have also developed some sort of health insurance for wage workers. This is

a payment in lieu of wages provided during sickness. In the United States the plan has been widely discussed and bills have been introduced into state legislatures, but have been opposed, not only by employers, but also by some of the labor unions. Some industrial corporations and some labor unions provide, however, some form of sickness insurance on a private basis. The American Medical Association has also strongly opposed compulsory government health insurance for wage workers, because physicians lack confidence in the ability of our government to administer a system of health insurance efficiently. In European countries, especially in Germany and Great Britain, the system has worked well under state administration. There is usually a compulsory contribution by the employer and by the employee, and an additional amount contributed by the government as a subsidy. The system of health insurance is supplemented in these countries by systems of old-age pensions or old-age insurance, available for workers past sixty-five years of age. By 1931 eleven American states had adopted some form of old-age pension or old-age insurance. Again, the systems vary. In Germany, the contributions of the workers are graded in accordance with their wages. In France, uniform contributions are required within different groups of workers. A person is required to have made a minimum number of contributions before becoming eligible to the benefits of the old-age insurance or pension fund; but special provisions have to be made for those who have been unable to make the minimum number of contributions.

It is evident that all of these schemes of social insurance, if they are to be successful, require a long period in which to

accumulate sufficient funds to meet the demand. Such schemes should therefore be undertaken in periods of relative prosperity when such funds for relief of the unemployed, the sick, and the aged may be more easily accumulated. It is hardly necessary to add that the various social insurance systems of the European governments have been greatly tried by the World War and the succeeding post-war depression.

Economic Planning and the Prevention of Unemployment. As we have just said, the time to prevent poverty is in periods of relative prosperity, and the students should turn at this point to the program of scientific social reconstruction, outlined at the end of Chapter XV. Economic planning to furnish work for all able and willing to work at a living wage is one important aspect of a scientific program of social reconstruction. The advantages of central economic planning for any country have been emphasized by the economic planning of the Soviet government of Russia. But the use of ruthless and arbitrary force in putting such a scheme into effect, which has been the Russian method, could not well be applied in the United States, without disastrous effect to all our institutions. In this country, and in democratic countries generally, such economic planning must have in it a large element of voluntary coöperation on the part of industrial organizations and leaders. However, our Federal Government might well coöperate in such a scheme as well as our state governments. They should take the lead in efforts to stabilize industry and prosperity. That falls within the function of government as the regulative and controlling agency of our social order. While no government has yet been able to recog-

nize the so-called " right to work," or to make such a right universally realizable in practice, yet every government which functions for social welfare should take steps to initiate and supervise plans to stabilize employment by industrial agencies. Such plans have already been undertaken in a number of European countries outside of Russia. Thus France in 1925 established a National Economic Council, while Germany established an Economic Council as early as 1920. These councils are made up of representatives of the various branches of industry, with professional, legal, and technical experts added, and they are appointed by the government. They are made up of representatives of both employers and employees. A better example, however, is the War Industries Board which was appointed in the United States at our entrance into the War, to make the nation effective in the crisis presented by the War. A staff of 1500 business men, economists, engineers, and statisticians were assembled to direct this plan, with 350 specific industries represented. It is safe to say that without the work of the War Industries Board, the United States could not have assembled, fed, equipped, and trained successfully approximately three million men in a very short time.

Public works which are needed should undoubtedly be pressed in periods of unemployment and industrial depression; but these should be carefully supervised to prevent economic waste, the squandering of public funds, and unnecessary dependence of workers upon government jobs. It should be possible, however, to safeguard all of these matters. Manifestly, our economic and industrial life, if it is to avoid industrial depression and the needless crea-

tion of poverty among the masses, must be more scientifically organized and controlled. But this matter requires much more than is usually supposed. It requires government that is infused with the scientific spirit, that respects the opinions of scientific experts, and that is directed towards securing the maximum of social welfare. Above all in a democracy, it requires the intelligent coöperation and freedom from political corruption of the masses of people.

Other Preventive Agencies. A very large task for both private societies and the state is to be found in the field of prevention. This field is so broad, however, that we cannot attempt to even mention the many different movements alone which characterize our present social development. Such are the movements for better housing, for better sanitation, for purer food, for juster economic conditions, for the prevention of disease, and the like. The main thing to be said with respect to these movements is that they need to be guided by the larger social view, they need synthesis in order that they may work toward a common goal, and in harmony, also, with the activities of the state. In the field of prevention the state has much to do, especially in forwarding education along lines of social need and in creating juster economic conditions.

We may, perhaps, sum up this chapter by saying that it is evident that the cure of poverty is not to be sought merely in certain economic rearrangements, but in scientific control of the whole life process of human society. This means that, in order to get rid of poverty, the defects in education, in government, in religion and morality, in philanthropy, and even in physical heredity, must be got

rid of. Of course, this can only be done when there is a scientific understanding of the conditions necessary for normal human social life. What some of these requirements for a normal life are will be seen in a subsequent chapter, and it is only necessary to say in conclusion that the wisest measures for removing pauperism will be directed toward the prevention of its causes rather than toward the reclaiming of those who have already been caught in its meshes.

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CHAPTER XIV

CRIME

THE problem of crime is one of the great problems of social pathology. There have been developed, in order to deal with this problem scientifically, a number of subsidiary sciences, especially Criminology and Penology, which are sciences dealing with the causes, nature, and treatment of crime. We cannot, therefore, deal with this problem adequately in this chapter, but again must refer the student to the literature on the subject.

The Definition of Crime. — The best definition of crime and the simplest is that it is a violation of law. It is evident from this definition that crime is primarily a legal matter; and as laws vary from age to age and from country to country, so too the definition of crime varies. Nevertheless, because crime is a variable quantity that does not make it impossible of scientific treatment; for law itself is only one aspect or phase of the social life, namely, that which has to do with the control of conduct through organized social authority. Therefore, while crime is primarily a legal matter, it is also a social matter and has at the same time psychological and biological implications. While crime is an expression of social maladjustment defined by the law differently under different circumstances, it nevertheless has psychological and biological roots; and these we must take into account in a scientific study of crime.

The simplest and best definition of the criminal accordingly is a violator of the law. However, because the criminal lacks social adjustment the causes of this lack of adjustment are very often in certain psychological and biological conditions of the individual. While the criminal is defined by the law differently from age to age, he is nevertheless under all circumstances the socially peculiar and sometimes the psychologically and biologically peculiar person. Under all circumstances he is a variation from his group; and whether the causes of his variation are psychological or biological is the problem that concerns us.

But in the group of socially maladjusted persons whom we call criminals are many classes and it is necessary to note the chief of these classes before we can understand the many causes of crime.

The classification of criminals. The legal classification of criminals according to the nature of their crime is manifestly of no use for scientific purposes. What we need is a classification of criminals according to their own peculiar nature. Inasmuch as the nature and conduct of a criminal person is largely a matter of his psychology the most scientific classification of criminals must be upon a psychological basis; and a simple psychological classification can be made upon the basis of habit, that is, as to whether the basis of crime is inborn, acquired, or just forming. According to this classification there are three main classes of criminals: (1) The *defective* criminal. This is a person in whom the tendency to crime is due to hereditary mental defect. The most common type of the defective criminal is the criminal imbecile or moron. Here belong also the criminal insane, when insanity is due to hereditary defects.

It is evident that in the defective criminal class biological causes of crime predominate. This class is however relatively small among the general criminal class, and it is estimated by experts that it constitutes not more than from 15 per cent to 35 per cent of our prison population. (2) The *habitual* criminal. The habitual criminal is a normal person who has acquired the tendency to crime from his environment. The most marked type of the habitual criminal is the professional criminal, who is frequently a person above the average in ability and who deliberately chooses a career of crime, taking the risks of his calling. It is evident that the professional criminal class is the most dangerous class of criminals with whom society has to deal. A more common type of habitual criminal, however, is the occasional habitual criminal, a weak person who drifts into crime through temptation and who has not strength of character enough to throw off the habit. It is estimated that habitual criminals of both types mentioned constitute from 30 per cent to 40 per cent of our prison population. (3) The *single offender*. The single offender is a normal person who commits only a single crime through some sudden stress or temptation, but lives ever after a law-abiding life. The two types of the single offender are the criminal by passion and the accidental criminal. The criminal by passion is a moral, and oftentimes a conscientious, person who commits a crime through some sudden stress of passion, under great provocation. The accidental criminal, on the other hand, is the weak type of moral person who yields once through some sudden temptation, but who regrets it ever afterward. It is estimated that single offenders constitute from 30

per cent to 40 per cent of our prison population. Strictly speaking, they are only legal criminals, and not criminals in the sociological sense, being relatively moral and law-abiding citizens whose variation from the normal is confined to some single offense. Nevertheless, single offenders constitute, as we have already seen, a very considerable proportion of our prison population.

This classification of criminals is very important both in studying the causes of crime and in devising practical measures for dealing with the criminal class; for the defective criminal, the habitual criminal, and the single offender manifestly need very different methods of treatment. One of the gravest faults of the criminal law and of penal institutions hitherto is that they have not provided for the different treatment of different classes of criminals.

The Extent of Crime in the United States. — According to the Census Bureau, there were in prisons on July 1, 1922, a total of 163,889 prisoners serving sentences or awaiting trial. Of this number 154,075, or 94.1 per cent, were males, and 9,814, or 5.9 per cent, were females. Classified according to the prisons in which they were found, 84,213 were in federal and state penitentiaries or in state reformatories, 57,000 were in county jails or on road gangs, and 21,635 were in city prisons. It must be remembered that this was the prison population on a single day, July 1, 1922. On the same day in 1917 the total number of prisoners reported was 146,161, of whom 74,460 were in federal or state prisons. The number of institutions covered by the census varied somewhat in 1917, 1922, and 1929.

According to the prison census of 1929, there were on

January 1, 1929, 116,626 prisoners serving sentences in federal and state prisons. The number of such prisoners per 100,000 of the population rose from 74.2 in 1923 to 98.8 in 1929. In addition the Federal Bureau of Education reported in 1927 84,317 juvenile delinquents confined in juvenile reform schools, of whom 65,174 were boys and 19,143 were girls. In 1910 there were 56,663 juvenile delinquents cared for in these schools. To the above must be added the number who pass through our city and county prisons. It is estimated that over 2,000,000 persons, mostly minor offenders, were locked up in these prisons in the year 1930.

These prison statistics, however, give us little idea of the actual amount of crime in the United States, because they include only the persons committed to prison to serve sentences and do not include the vast number who escape the meshes of the law or who simply pay fines, or whose sentences are suspended. It is estimated by competent authorities, basing their estimate upon the number of known convictions of crime in certain large cities, that there are not less than 1,500,000 convictions for crime annually, in the United States — including, of course, convictions for both felonies and misdemeanors. That this is not an excessive estimate may be indicated by the fact that in the state of New York alone in 1910, there were 95,444 persons committed to prison (of whom 48,270 were committed after conviction in the courts) while in 1915 the total number committed was 121,110.

All these figures, however, fail to give us any very correct idea of the amount of serious crimes in the United States — the prison statistics because they understate the matter,

the statistics of convictions because they overstate. A peculiarity about serious crimes in the United States, it must be remembered, is that so many persons escape through the meshes of the law, and this is particularly true in the case of the characteristic American crime of homicide. Our census authorities estimate that only about one third of those guilty of this crime are convicted in our courts. Thus the census showed that in 1923 there were 3,220 persons in the United States committed to prison upon sentence for homicide, while the estimated total number of homicides committed was about 9,000 (estimate based upon census mortality statistics) that year. For a number of years the death rate from homicide has increased in the registration area. Thus it was 5 per 100,000 population in 1906, and 8.8 per 100,000 in 1928, but this increase was due in part to the addition to the registration area of Southern and Western states where the homicide rate is high. However, the homicide rate in thirty-one of the largest cities rose from 5.1 per 100,000 in the decade 1895–1904 to 10.4 in the decade 1921–1930. The homicide rate varied in the United States in 1927 all the way from 0.7 per 100,000 in New Hampshire to 35.6 per 100,000 in Florida. Among the negroes of Florida the homicide rate was 81.7 per 100,000 in 1927. In individual cities of the registration area, the rate was higher than in any state, being highest in 1927 in Memphis, Tennessee, where the rate was 66. The number of homicides is far greater in the United States than in other civilized countries, not excepting Italy, Spain, and other countries of the Mediterranean region. England and Wales, for example, had about two hundred cases of homicide in 1929 as com-

pared with our about ten thousand, although England's population was nearly 40,000,000 as against nearly 120,000,000 for the United States. The greatest number of the homicides take place in the Southern and Western states, Florida leading, according to the statistics of 1927, with Mississippi second in the list of states. This suggests that to some extent our high homicide rate is due to the survival of frontier conditions in a large number of the states, although it is probably even more due to American individualism and lawlessness, the tendency of every man to take the law into his own hands.

There can be no doubt that the amount of serious crime in the United States is relatively high, and there is reason to believe that the serious crimes against property are as numerous as the serious crimes against persons.

The Cost of Crime in the United States. The Wickersham National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement in 1931 estimated that the total cost of crime in the United States is approximately $3,000,000,000 annually. This estimate was based on studies of 82 per cent of the large cities of the United States, and included not only the direct costs of crime, such as police, criminal courts, prisons, and the depredations of the criminal class, but also the indirect costs due to fraud, extortion, and "racketeering," and to the use of devices to protect against theft, robbery, embezzlement, dishonesty, and other crimes. Enormous as this sum is, it is probably an underestimate. Conservative students have estimated the cost as high as $4,000,000,000 annually. In 1920 Dr. William Healy estimated that the direct cost of crime in the United States in one year was not less than $900,000,000. He

says, "When we consider the expenses of police forces, courts, probation systems, jails, and many other institutions for offenders, we can understand the reason for the magnitude of the figures and perhaps appreciate that in these forms of public service there is little suggestion of over-spending."

We may compare the amount of the cost of crime with certain other figures. The cost of the public school system in the United States in 1930 was about $2,800,000,000; the cost of supporting our churches and religious work was about $750,000,000; the annual value of our wheat crop and our cotton crop is each about $1,000,000,000. It is evident that the problem of crime is worthy of serious study even from a financial standpoint alone.

Is Crime Increasing? How we answer this question will, of course, depend upon the length of time considered. We have no statistics going back further than about 1850 in this country. Moreover, it is entirely possible to hold that while crime has decreased during the historic era among civilized peoples it has increased during the last twenty-five or fifty years. All statistics of crime in the United States seem to show that it has increased. In 1850 for example, the number of prisoners was 6737, which was one prisoner to every 3442 of the population. But the census of 1850 was seriously defective, and we would better take the census of 1860 as the basis of our comparison. In 1860 the census showed a total prison population of 19,086, which was one prisoner to every 1647 of the population. In 1890 the census showed 82,320 prisoners in the total population, which was one in every 757. In other words, between 1860 and 1890 the total popu-

lation of the country just doubled, while the number of prisoners quadrupled.

The value of these statistics has often been questioned, but it has been questioned chiefly by people who have not taken other corroborative evidence into account. The chief corroborating evidence is to be found in the statistics of prisoners in our state prisons from 1880 to 1922. Now only those are sent to state prisons who are guilty of felonies, and the length of term of sentence in our state prisons has steadily shortened during the last twenty-five years, while within the last few years the practice of suspending sentence on probation for first felons has been largely introduced. We should expect, therefore, a decrease in the state prison population in proportion to the general population. But we find that the number in state prisons rose from 30,659 in 1880, to 45,233 in 1890, an increase of 47.5 per cent, while the general population increased only 24.86 per cent. From 1910 to 1929 the number rose from 68,735 to 116,626, an increase of 70.5 per cent, while the population increased 33.5 per cent. Apparently, therefore, the amount of serious crime in the United States has increased more rapidly than the population, although from 1890 till 1923 the increase was slight. Corroborating evidence is also found in the statistics of negro crime (one of the main elements in the increase), which increased very rapidly from 1870 to 1890. Other evidence has been cited, but the statistics of our state penitentiaries may be considered conclusive when all facts are taken into consideration.[1] There is apparently no escape from the conclusion

[1] See the writer's article on this question in the *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, Vol. I, pp. 378–385; also an article in Vol. III, pp. 754–769.

that serious crime during the last sixty years has increased more rapidly than the population.

For several years prior to the World War the statistics of most European countries indicated an increase in minor offenses, as did also some fragmentary American statistics. During the War, crime decreased temporarily in most of the belligerent nations. England is the only country in which over a long term of years there was, down to 1921, a decrease in proportion to population of both serious crimes and minor offenses. This decrease of crime in England must be attributed largely to England's excellent prison system, and also to the swiftness and certainty of English courts of justice.

The Causes of Crime. — The causes of crime may be classified best, as we classified the causes of poverty, into objective and subjective. Objective causes are those outside of the individual, in the environment; subjective causes are causes in the individual, whether in his bodily make-up or his mental peculiarities.

The Objective Causes of Crime. The objective causes of crime may be divided into causes in the physical environment and causes in the social environment. The causes in the physical environment are relatively unimportant, but are worthy of note as showing how many various factors enter into this social phenomenon of crime. Climate and season seem to be the two chief physical factors that influence crime; and in connection with these we have two general rules, abundantly verified by statistics; namely, crimes against the person are more numerous in southern climates than crimes against property; and again crimes against the person are more numerous in summer than in winter, while crimes against property are more numerous

in winter than in summer. All this is of course simply an outcome of the effect of climate and season upon general living conditions.

The causes of crime in the social environment are of course much the most important objective causes of crime, and, many students think, altogether the most important causes of crime in general. Let us briefly note some of the more important social conditions that give rise to crime.

(1) Conditions connected with the family life have a great influence on crime; indeed, inasmuch as the family is the chief agency in society for socializing the young, perhaps domestic conditions are more important in the production of crime than any other set of causes. We cannot enter into the discussion of the matter fully, but we have already seen in former chapters that demoralized homes contribute an undue proportion of criminals. It is estimated by those in charge of reform schools for delinquent children that from 85 to 90 per cent of the children in those institutions come from more or less demoralized or disrupted families. Illegitimate children notoriously drift into the criminal classes, while dependent children who grow up in charitable institutions are prone also to take the same course. Domestic conditions have of course an influence on the criminality or non-criminality of adults. This is best shown perhaps by the fact that the great proportion of criminals in our prisons are unmarried persons. Thus the United States prison census of 1923 showed that 60.2 per cent of all prisoners were single persons. Statistics from other countries are practically the same. This means that, on the one hand, the family life

is a preventive of crime, and on the other that the socially abnormal classes who drift into crime are not apt to marry.

(2) Industrial conditions also have a profound influence upon criminal statistics. Economic crises, hard times, strikes, lockouts, are all productive of crime. Quetelet, the Belgian statistician, thought that the general rule could be laid down that, as the price of food increases, crimes against property increase, while crimes against persons decrease. At any rate, increase in the cost of the necessities of life is very apt to increase crimes of certain sorts.

The various industrial classes show a different ratio of criminality. In general among industrial classes the least crime is committed by the agricultural classes, while the most crime is committed by the unemployed or those with no occupation. The prison census of 1923 showed that 31.0 per cent of all prisoners committed that year were unemployed at the time their crime was committed, or were persons of no occupation.

The investigations of the Wickersham Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement found that there was a very close connection between unemployment and crime. From forty to fifty per cent of the men admitted to Sing Sing Prison in the year ended February 28, 1930, were found to be unemployed. Lack of employment seemed especially to conduce to crimes against property, such as robbery, larceny, and burglary. Another investigation in Cincinnati about the same time showed that forty per cent of all misdemeanor arrests were of the unemployed classes, although it was estimated that the unemployed at that time constituted only eight per cent of the total population of Cincinnati.

Economic conditions, moreover, not infrequently foster crime in other ways than through poverty and unemployment. The practices of the business world have been too frequently in the United States of such a nature as to encourage the development of a professional criminal class. The Wickersham Commission declared "the first thing to be realized in the study of the professional criminal is that he responds to the prevailing philosophy and the prevailing attitudes of an acquisitive society. He is after the same great good for which so many others are striving — money." It quotes with approval, "The unpleasant truth is that the racketeer has simply taken an American political and social ideal, wealth, and tried to achieve it in a minimum of time according to his peculiar lights," and adds that the sole inspiration and objective of the racketeer is the possession of wealth. "Racketeering" has recently become one of the gravest forms of criminal activity in our large cities. It is simply a new name for the securing of money through various forms of extortion and intimidation. It is a name also applied sometimes to various forms of fraud. It is asserted that in some of our larger cities various lines of business and industry have fallen under the control of racketeers, who extort from the business men in these lines millions of dollars every year for alleged protection. This is of course one of the gravest forms of professional crime, and on account of its alliance with corrupt politics it has proved to be one of the most difficult to deal with.

(3) Urbanization and other conditions concerning the distribution and density of the population have an influence upon crime. In general there is more crime in the cities than in the country districts. The statistics of all

civilized countries seem to show about twice as great a percentage of crime in their large cities as in the rural districts.

(4) The influence of race and nationality seems to be marked in criminal statistics. We have already noted that the ratio of criminality among the negroes in the United States is from four to five times higher than among the whites. We have also seen that among our recent immigrants the Southern Italians have a pronounced tendency to crime, especially serious crime. Among our older immigrants the Irish, on the other hand, owing largely to their love of liquor, have a pronounced tendency toward minor offenses. Even in 1910, 29.9 per cent of all foreign-born committed to prison were Irish, while the Irish constituted but 10.1 per cent of the total foreign-born population.

(5) Defects in government and law are among the most potent causes of crime. These are so numerous that we cannot attempt even to mention all. It is obvious that such things as too great leniency on the part of our judges and shortness of sentence if convicted; difficulty or uncertainty in securing justice in criminal courts; costliness of obtaining justice in our civil courts; bad prison systems in which first offenders and hardened criminals mingle; lack of police surveillance of habitual criminals; corrupt methods of appointing the police; partisanship in the administration of government, and the like, all conduce to crime. And many of these things, we may add, have been especially in evidence in America.

(6) Educational conditions have undoubtedly a great influence upon crime. While education in the sense of school education could never in itself stamp out crime,

still defective educational conditions greatly increase crime. This is shown sufficiently by the fact that illiterates are much more liable to commit crime than those who have a fair education. The prison census of 1923 showed that 10.7 per cent of the prisoners were illiterate, while only 7.1 per cent of the general population twenty-one years of age or over were illiterate. Of major offenders a still higher per cent are generally found to be illiterate.

The defects in our educational conditions which especially favor the development of crime in certain classes are chiefly: lack of facilities for industrial education, lack of physical education, and lack of specific moral instruction. The need of these three things in a socialized school system need not here be more than emphasized.

The influence of the press and the motion picture as popular educators must here be mentioned as among the important stimuli to crime. The excessive exploitation of crime in the sensational press and in motion picture shows conduces to increased criminality in certain classes, for it has been demonstrated that crime is often a matter of suggestion or imitation. When a large proportion of the motion picture shows are taken up with depicting crime and immorality, it is not to be wondered at that the contagion of crime is sown broadcast in society.

(7) The influence of certain social institutions in producing crime must be mentioned. Here comes in especially the lack of opportunities for wholesome social recreation among our poorer classes, particularly in our large cities. Lacking these, the masses resort to the saloon, gambling-houses, cheap music and dance halls, and vulgar theatrical entertainments while their children have to play in the

streets. The influence of all of these conditions is undoubtedly to spread the contagion of vice and crime.

(8) The influence of manners and customs upon crime cannot be overlooked. The custom in certain communities, for example, of carrying concealed weapons undoubtedly has much to do with the swollen homicide statistics of the United States. Vicious and corrupting customs, such as compulsory social drinking, and the like, undoubtedly greatly influence crime. Even the luxury and extravagance of the rich might easily be shown to have a demoralizing effect, both upon the upper and the lower classes of society.

The list of causes of crime in the social environment might be indefinitely extended until the student would perhaps think that practically everything was a cause of crime in one way or another; and it is true that everything that depresses men in society is a cause of crime. However, if the student has gained an impression of the great complexity of the causes of crime, that is the main thing.

A question may here be raised whether it is possible to reduce all the causes of crime to causes in the social environment — that is, all subjective causes to objective. Many writers have contended that this is possible, but we shall see that there are causes in heredity and causes in psychological conditions, to say nothing of some possible free will in individuals, which cannot be derived from social conditions and which would produce crime quite independent of objective social conditions, unless these subjective factors were also controlled. There is no reason to believe that a perfectly just social organization which did not attempt to control heredity and the moral character of

individuals would succeed in eliminating crime. On the contrary, biological variation alone arising from influences independent of the environment would produce a certain amount of crime. Crime, in other words, is, to a certain extent, like pauperism, an expression of the elimination of the inferior variants in society, and will continue to exist as long as we allow the process of evolution by natural selection to go on.

Nevertheless, it is true in a certain sense, as Lacassagne says, that "every society has the criminals it deserves;" that is, every society could, by taking proper means, practically eliminate crime and the criminal class. This would have to be done, however, by something more radical than a mere reorganization of human society in an industrial way. Three things are necessary for society practically to eliminate crime: first, the correction of defects in social conditions, particularly of economic evils in society; second, the proper control of physical heredity by a rational system of eugenics; third, the proper education and training of every child for social life from infancy up.

The Subjective Causes of Crime. In order to see all that is involved in the above program let us study somewhat the subjective causes of crime. These may be divided into biological and psychological. Among the biological causes of crime, and one which certainly cannot be reduced to the environment, is sex. As we have already seen, crime is a social phenomenon which is chiefly confined to the male sex. In 1929, for example, 96.3 per cent of the prison population in the United States were males, and in the statistics of convictions it is estimated that ninety-one men are convicted for every nine women. The statistics for all civilized

countries show practically the same conditions, although in most European countries the proportion of female prisoners is somewhat higher, owing, undoubtedly, to certain influences in the social environment.

Another subjective factor in crime, which again cannot be reduced to environment, is age. Practically all crime falls in the active period of life, and the bulk of it between the ages of twenty and forty years. The average age of men in our state penitentiaries is usually not above twenty-six or twenty-seven years.

Certain abnormal biological conditions that favor crime may be summed up under the word " degeneracy." These abnormal conditions, however, we shall examine later.

Intemperance as a Factor in Crime. Among the psychological conditions of the individual that foster crime are anti-social habits, aims, and ideals. Of peculiar interest among personal habits that have an influence upon crime, is intemperance in the use of alcoholic beverages, and this is such an important cause of crime that we must stop to examine it in some detail. It has sometimes been said that 95 per cent of crime is the result of this cause alone. Scientific investigations before the establishment of National Prohibition failed to show that this was true. For example, the Committee of Fifty investigated the cases of 13,402 convicts late in the Nineties with reference to this matter, and found that intemperance was a cause of crime in the cases of 49.95 per cent. It was a chief cause of crime, however, only in the cases of 31.18 per cent. In the remaining cases the intemperance was that of ancestors or associates. These investigations of the Committee of Fifty still stand as the best evidence which

we have of the influence of intemperance in causing crime in pre-prohibition days. The wonder is that intemperance could figure in so many cases when there are so many and varied factors in the production of crime. These figures still demonstrate that the unrestricted use of alcoholic beverages is a potent factor in the production of crime.

It is often claimed that the National Prohibition Law has resulted in increasing crime rather than in decreasing it. This, however, seems to be a very doubtful claim. There is much reason for believing that if there had not been a National Prohibition Law after the War, we might have had a much greater increase of crime than we did have. All of this, however, is merely a matter of opinion, and cannot be demonstrated one way or the other. What is true is that arrest for public intoxication in forty-eight American cities went down immediately after the enactment of National Prohibition. Thus in 1915 the number of arrests for public intoxication in these cities per hundred thousand of their population was 177.51. In 1918 under war time restrictions the number of such arrests had decreased to 140.01 per hundred thousand of the population. In 1920 after the National Prohibition Law became effective the number of arrests for public intoxication in these cities declined to 67.80 per hundred thousand of their population. After 1920, however, the number of arrests began slowly to increase, and by 1928 it had reached 146.14 per hundred thousand of the population of these same cities, a figure not so high as the pre-prohibition figure, but sufficiently high to indicate that the prohibitory law was not effectively enforced. Moreover, in the great increase of prisoners in state and federal penitentiaries between 1920 and 1930,

only a small part of that increase can be attributed to the Prohibition Law. In 1930 less than five per cent of the prisoners in state prisons were there on account of the violation of liquor laws, and less than one half of those in federal prisons. It will be remembered, of course, that the violators of liquor laws were dealt with mainly by the federal authorities, and were liable to be sent to federal prisons. The total number of federal prisoners in the year 1930 was a little over 8,000.

Probably the influence of the National Prohibition Law on crime was indirect rather than direct. It was the opinion of a majority of the Wickersham Commission that the National Prohibition Law had indirectly fostered crime through making the bootleg traffic in liquor very profitable. According to the statement of one member, " the power of the murderous criminal organizations flourishing all over the country has been fostered by the enormous profits made in bootleg liquor traffic. These profits are the main source of the corruption funds which cement the alliance between crime and politics and corrupt the law-enforcing agencies in every populous city." In other words, the toleration of the bootleg liquor traffic by our law-enforcing authorities so enormously enriched the underworld that it became powerful enough to defy state and city governments, to seek to make bargains with law-enforcing officers and thus gain immunity from prosecution for its crimes. It is the old story that a law poorly enforced is frequently more demoralizing to a people than no law.

Influence of Physical Degeneracy upon Crime. By degeneracy we mean, to use Morel's definition, " a morbid deviation from the normal type." That is, degeneracy is

such an alteration of organic structures and functions that the organism becomes incapable of adapting itself to more or less complex conditions. Ordinary forms of degeneracy that are well recognized are feeble-mindedness, chronic insanity, chronic epilepsy, congenital deaf-mutism, habitual pauperism, and the like. Now there can be no doubt that criminality in some of its forms is related to these functional forms of degeneracy. Even ordinary people have noticed its similarity to insanity, while Lombroso has traced an elaborate parallel between criminality and epilepsy. Without accepting extreme views, it may be claimed that criminality is, in some cases, a form of biological degeneracy for the following reasons:

(1) The investigations of criminal anthropologists have already established the fact that criminals as a class present a much larger number of structural and functional abnormalities than does the average man. The prisoners in our state prisons, for example, with few exceptions, could not measure up to the requirements laid down by the United States Army authorities for the enlistment of soldiers, although in a majority of cases their abnormalities are probably acquired.

(2) Investigations, like that of the Kallikak family undertaken by Dr. Goddard, and that of the Jukes family undertaken by Dr. Dugdale, have established the fact that criminals, paupers, imbeciles, drunkards, prostitutes, and other degenerates frequently spring from the same family stock. A very large percentage of the prisoners in our prisons have come from more or less degenerate family stocks. But here again a bad environment parallels a bad heredity.

(3) Criminals show other forms of degeneracy than criminality more often than does the average population; that is, criminals often belong to one of the well-recognized degenerate classes, such as imbeciles, epileptics, and insane.

These three arguments may be considered to be conclusive proof that criminality is in some cases a manifestation of physiological degeneracy; but they do not show that the bulk of criminals come from physiologically degenerate stocks. On the contrary it is highly probable that the marks of physiological degeneracy are not to be seen in from more than 25 to 35 per cent of our criminal class. These marks of degeneracy of course especially characterize defective or "born" criminals, but to some extent they are found among the habitual criminals also.

The Influence of Heredity on Crime. A word must be said about the influence of heredity on crime. The student will remember that, according to the modern theory of heredity, acquired characters, or characteristics, are not transmissible. Accordingly, when we find crime running in a family for generations, as in the Jukes or Kallikak families, we must assume either that the criminal tendency is transmitted by the social environment or that it is due to some congenital variation in some ancestor. In other words, if a person is a criminal by hereditary defect, if the tendency to crime is born in him, as it may be in the defective criminal, he will transmit the tendency toward crime to his offspring; but if a normal person becomes a criminal by acquired habit he will transmit no tendency toward crime to his children, although his children may of course acquire the tendency from their social environment.

This is not saying, however, that in such cases as habitual drunkenness and habitual vice an impaired constitution may not be transmitted to offspring. But this, strictly speaking, is not the transmission of any specific acquired characteristic, but only a general transmission of impaired vitality which may show itself in crime and in various forms of degeneracy. The germ cells are of course a part of the body, and anything that profoundly impairs the nutrition of the body generally, such as alcoholism and constitutional diseases, may also impair the nutrition of the germ cells, and result in a weakened constitution in offspring.

Lombroso's Theory of Crime. Lombroso, and the Italian school of criminologists generally, attribute crime chiefly to atavism, that is, reversion to primitive types. They claim that the criminal in modern society is merely a biological reversion to the savage type of man; that the criminal constitutes therefore a distinct "anthropological variety"; and that there is a marked "criminal type" which can be made out even before a person has committed a crime. They say further that the criminal type is marked physically by having five or more of the stigmata of degeneration, and that it is marked mentally by having the characteristics of the savage or nature man. We cannot stop to criticize in full this completely biological theory of crime which is offered by Lombroso and his followers. Undoubtedly crime has biological roots, and these we have attempted to point out in discussing the influence of degeneracy upon crime. But to claim that the criminal constitutes a well-marked "anthropological variety" of the human species, as Lombroso argues, is

to set up a claim for which there is no foundation. What Lombroso thinks are the marks of the criminal are simply the marks belonging to the degenerate classes in general. That is, they are found among the insane and feeble-minded, for example, as well as in some classes of criminals. There is then no criminal type which clearly separates the criminal from other classes of degenerates, and which will mark a man out as belonging to the criminal class even before he has committed a crime. Lombroso and some of his school have altogether overemphasized the physical and anatomical side of the study of the criminal, and slighted the sociological side of such study. Moreover, Lombroso's statements, which he makes in very general terms, apply, if they apply at all, not to criminals as a class, but only to what he called "born" criminals, as indeed he himself acknowledged.

Remedies for Crime. — The remedies for crime are dealt with by the subsidiary science of penology, which may be regarded as a branch of scientific philanthropy. We can only direct the student's attention here to the vast literature on the subject and remark that the cure for crime consists not in some social panacea or in social revolution, but in dealing with the causes of crime so as to prevent the existence of the criminal class. In a general way, we have already indicated in discussing the remedies for poverty and pauperism what the steps must be to eradicate crime. In order practically to wipe out crime in society, as we have already said, three things are necessary. First, every individual must have a good birth; that is, heredity must be controlled so that only those who are physically and mentally sound are allowed to marry and

reproduce. The difficulties of doing this we have already noted. Second, every individual must have a good training, both at home and at school, so as to adjust him properly to the social life. His education must fit him to take his place among other men, make him able to take care of himself, and to help others; and make him, in every possible way, acquainted with the social inheritance of the race. Last but not least, just social conditions must be provided. Everything in the social environment must be carefully looked after in order to insure the best development of the individual and to prevent his environment from being in any way a drawback to him.

These things, if it were possible to bring them about, would wipe out crime, or, at least, minimize it to the lowest terms. Of course, this cannot be done in a generation, perhaps not in many generations, but it is evident that the problem of crime is in no way an insoluble problem in human society. With time and care and scientific knowledge, crime, as well as poverty and pauperism, could be wiped out.

But curative measures are important, also, in dealing with the criminal, and each distinct class must be dealt with differently. We noted in the beginning of the chapter the three great character types in the criminal class: the defective criminal, in whom the tendency toward a life of crime is inborn; the habitual criminal, who acquires the habit of crime from his surroundings; and the single offender, who, while committing a single offense, never becomes a criminal in the strictest sense. These three distinct classes of criminals, whom we might style the degenerates, the derelicts, and the accidental offenders,

need to be recognized in our criminal law and to be dealt with differently by our criminal courts and correctional institutions. The defective criminal can scarcely be adjusted to normal social life. He is, as we have already seen, usually more or less feeble-minded. Reformation in the fullest sense of the word is almost out of the question in his case. The proper policy for society with reference to the defective criminal class, which constitutes but a small portion of our total criminal population, would be segregation for life. Practically, of course, this may have its difficulties until we perfect our means of discovering slight mental defects in individuals which make them incapable of social adjustment, but practically, also, we have found means of recognizing this type by such marks as incorrigibility, recidivism, and the stigmata of degeneracy.

The habitual criminal, who originally was a normal person, can be, at least in the early part of his career, fully reformed. Children and adolescents, even though habitual offenders, are easily susceptible of reformation, but this is difficult with the adult habitual offender past thirty years of age who has a long criminal record behind him. Like the defective criminal, he is scarcely capable of reformation. Hardened habitual offenders, and especially professional criminals, should, therefore, be sentenced upon indeterminate sentences, terminable only when adequate evidence of their reformation has been secured. This can best be accomplished by what is known as the "habitual criminal act," providing that persons guilty of three or four felonies shall be sent to prison for life, to be released only upon satisfactory evidence of reformation.

The single offender, who is usually a reputable citizen who commits crime through passion or through great temptation, can usually best be dealt with outside of prison walls. The young single offender, if not properly handled, may be easily transformed into an habitual criminal. On the whole, a young single offender who has had no criminal record is, perhaps, best dealt with by the system of probation which we will note later. On the other hand, certain single offenders past thirty years of age, such as bribe-givers and bribe-takers, may have to be punished by society in order that they may be an example for others. Exemplary punishment is, undoubtedly, still necessary in some cases, and in the main it should be reserved for this class of mature offenders in society who have otherwise lived reputable lives. Just how far exemplary punishment should be used in society as a deterrent to crime is a disputed question among penologists. Whether, as in cases of homicide, it should ever go to the extent of capital punishment or not depends very much upon the civilization of the group. In a civilization like ours, where blood vengeance is so often demanded by mobs, it is probably unwise, for the present at least, to seek the abolition of capital punishment for murder in the first degree.

The Prison System. Every state should have at least six distinct sets of institutions to deal with the criminal class.

1. County and city jails for the detention of offenders awaiting trial.

2. Reform schools for delinquent children under sixteen years of age who require institutional treatment.

3. Industrial reformatories for adult first offenders

between sixteen and thirty years of age who require institutional treatment.

4. Special reformatories for vagrants, inebriates, and prostitutes.

5. A hospital prison for the criminal insane.

6. County and state penitentiaries for incorrigible, hardened criminals.

If any one of these sets of institutions is lacking in a state, it is impossible for the state to deal properly in a remedial way with the problem of crime. All these institutions, of course, need to be manned by experts and equipped in the best possible way. The present condition of our jails, of our penitentiaries, and to some extent of our reform schools, frequently makes them schools of crime. Nothing is more demoralizing in any community than a bad jail where criminals of all classes are herded together in idleness. Again, the administration of some of our state penitentiaries with an eye to profit only, makes them places for the deformation of character rather than for its reformation. Again, the lack of special institutions to deal with habitual vagrants, drunkards, and prostitutes, is one of the great reasons why we find it so difficult to stamp out crime. Into the details of the organization, construction, and management of these institutions we cannot go in this book. It is sufficient to say that all these institutions should furnish specialized scientific treatment for the various delinquent classes with which they deal, and to do this they should aim to reproduce the conditions and discipline of free life as far as possible. These institutions, in other words, with the exception of the penitentiaries and other institutions for segregation,

should aim at overcoming defective character in individuals. Their work is mainly, therefore, a work of remedying psychical defects in the individual which prevent his proper adjustment to society. In the case of penitentiaries, however, the work is one mainly of segregation, of providing humane care under such conditions as least to burden society, and at the same time give such opportunity as there may be for reformation.

Substitutes for Imprisonment. We have already noted that some classes of offenders may be reformed outside of prison walls. This is especially true of children, of the younger misdemeanants, and of those who have committed their first felony. It has been found that by suspending sentences in such cases, giving the person liberty upon certain conditions, and placing him under the surveillance of an officer of the court who will stand in the relation of friend and quasi-guardian to him, that reformation can, in many cases, be easily accomplished. This is known as the probation system. It has been characterized as "a reformatory without walls." Originating in Massachusetts, it has been increasingly put into practice of recent years in many states with much success. The system, however, will not work well without trained probation officers to watch over those who are given conditional liberty. The practice of placing upon probation without probation officers is a questionable one and is liable to bring in disrepute the whole system. Probation is not mere leniency, as some suppose, but is rather a system of reformation in line with the most scientific approved methods.

Coupled with probation should often go fines and restitution to injured parties. In such cases, when the person

is placed upon probation, the fine or restitution may often be paid in installments, and it has been found to have a decidedly reformatory effect upon the character of the offender. Fines without probation are, however, but little more than retribution, or exemplary punishment.

Delinquent Children. The treatment of delinquent children constitutes a special problem in itself. It has recently come to be well recognized that criminal tendencies nearly always appear in childhood, and that if we can overcome these tendencies in the delinquent child, we shall largely prevent the existence of an habitual criminal class. Strictly speaking, of course, the child is a presumptive rather than a real criminal. The delinquent child is socially maladjusted and is scarcely ever to be considered an enemy of organized society. Delinquent children should be dealt with, therefore, as presumptive rather than as genuine criminals. In general, therefore, they should not be arrested, should not be put in jail with older offenders, and should be tried by a special court in which the judge representing the state plays the rôle of a parent. For the most part, delinquent children may be dealt with, as we have already seen, by putting them upon probation under the care of proper probation officers. When the home surroundings are not good, such children may often be placed in families and their reformation may thus be more easily secured than if they were placed in institutions. In any case, they should never be sent to the reform school except as a last resort. The parent or guardian, also, should be held responsible for the delinquency of the child if he is contributory thereto by his negligence or otherwise.

The Liquor Problem and Crime Prevention. Alcoholic beverages and other narcotics have been so productive of anti-social conduct that practically all civilized governments have attempted some form of restriction of their use. In the modern world, this movement began to rise in the eighteenth century after the use of distilled liquors as beverages had been popularized. The whole of the nineteenth century witnessed ineffectual attempts at the solution of the problem. Prohibitory laws were passed in a great number of American states, even before the Civil War, but they were never enforced. Among English-speaking peoples, the prohibition movement gained great impetus during the early years of the twentieth century, and the World War resulted in an attempt to carry out prohibition of the use of alcoholic beverages in the United States, Canada, and some other countries. The National Prohibition Law became effective in the United States, January 16, 1920, and as we have seen from statistics already presented, it was at first apparently fairly well enforced and observed, with great resulting benefits in decrease of the amount of alcohol consumed and of cases of public intoxication, and in increase in financial saving for the whole people, especially the working classes.

But this law was an idealistic law which required high social ideals on the part of our people for its enforcement and observance. It must be remembered that law is nothing but the habits and convictions of a majority of the people, and that in a democracy laws can be enforced only in proportion as they are generally observed. The difficulty of enforcing the prohibition law in the United States was chiefly connected with the habits of a large element of

the American people who did not change their attitude toward drink. Believing that it was right for them to drink personally, they made it practically impossible to enforce prohibition laws, whether state or national. Consequently, a bootleg liquor traffic sprang up which, as we have seen, became intimately allied with the criminal underworld, and served to finance the operations of criminal gangs. The fact that other countries failed to pass prohibition laws and that our nearest neighbor, Canada, abandoned prohibition, made it particularly difficult to enforce the law in the United States. Probably the gravest reason for the failure of prohibition in the United States, however, was that the law was tried at a time when there was a general decline in moral idealism among the American people. Obviously, an idealistic law will not be observed by a people who do not possess a great deal of social idealism. These statements are particularly true of our upper classes. It was the educated and privileged classes who in the main led the fashion, borrowed from the customs of the European society, of using alcoholic beverages to promote sociability. The fashion of drink in these classes thus fostered the bootleg traffic and at the same time undermined respect for law among the young. Consequently, after 1920, the amount of alcohol consumed by the American people and the number of arrests for intoxication, as we have already seen, slowly increased.

It was this situation which led the Wickersham Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement to recommend certain changes in the National Prohibition Law. After careful study the Commission came to three principal conclusions:

1. It opposed the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment.

2. It opposed the restoration in any manner of the legalized saloon.

3. It opposed the federal or state governments going into the liquor business.

The Commission also made numerous recommendations for the improvement of the enforcement of the Prohibition Law by the coöperation of state and federal governments.

The opposition of the Commission to the federal or state governments going into the liquor business was based upon the experience of Canada and of some of our states, such as South Carolina. We have seen that Canada abandoned federal prohibition in 1923. After that the Canadian provinces experimented with a system of control, which, while varying in different provinces, yet essentially created a state monopoly of the sale of alcoholic beverages. The results in Canada can scarcely be claimed to have been satisfactory, for under the system of so-called state control, violation of liquor laws between 1923 and 1929 nearly doubled, while convictions for public drunkenness greatly increased.

The Wickersham Commission in their second conclusion also condemned by implication the systems found in Great Britain, France, and Germany. In these countries the licensing system of private dealers still obtains, with relatively stringent regulations as to the conditions under which liquor may be sold. While drunkenness has decreased in these countries since the War, it seems probable that this decrease is due more to the increased cost of alcoholic beverages than to the restrictions which have been put upon their sale.

A number of the prominent members of the Wickersham Commission, led by Mr. Henry W. Anderson, endorsed for this country the Swedish or " Bratt " System. Under this system the government grants a monopoly for the distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages to a central private corporation which is held strictly responsible to the government. The general government chooses a majority of the directors of the central corporation, and local governments have the same control over subsidiary local selling corporations. Under this system there is local option and any state, county, or city would have the right of total prohibition. Purchases may be made only by holders of permits, the granting of which is strictly regulated. Thus the amount of liquor which may be sold to any individual or family is very limited. This system, which has been enforced in Sweden for more than ten years, is claimed to be by far the most successful of any system of liquor control. The element of private profit is taken out of the traffic by the fact that all profits above interest on investment go to the government treasury, to be used for promoting public welfare through sanitation, education, and other indirect means of combating intemperance. It is claimed that this system will work in the United States because it is very similar in principle to the system of joint state and federal regulation of railroads, and even to the federal reserve bank system. Members of the Commission who recommended this system held that it is adapted to our system of government and to social and economic conditions in America. It seems to have all of the advantages of government monopoly with very few of its disadvantages.

However, the Commission as a whole did not recommend the Swedish System; but the Commission unanimously recommended the modification of the Eighteenth Amendment so that it should read substantially as follows:

"Section 1. The Congress shall have power to regulate or to prohibit the manufacture, traffic in or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into and the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes."

This revision of the Eighteenth Amendment, the student will note, practically reverses its working. It would give Congress the power to prohibit the liquor traffic or not, as it might see fit. It would also give Congress the power to regulate, or to try any experiments in regulation, which it saw fit. It would open the way to the trial of the Swedish System, the Canadian System, or even the reëstablishment of the legalized saloon. Therein would lie the danger of such revision. But, on the other hand, it would place the whole matter within the will of the people.

Perhaps this discussion of the attempt to prohibit the manufacture and sale of alcoholic beverages in the United States by law cannot better be concluded than to say that the whole experience emphasizes the necessity of social education in a democracy before we can make any law effective. The weakness of the Prohibition Law is like the weakness of all law when it fails to reach the evil which it seeks to remedy. No law will be obeyed until the vast majority of the people *want* the law obeyed. It is the task of the school and the church to get the people to want just laws and to want to see them obeyed. The Prohibition

question and the crime question generally show that the deeper problems of social control fall in the field of morals, religion, and education. No law can be effective until it is backed by the convictions of the vast mass of the people; and probably no law should be enacted until it has the intelligent support and will of the people behind it. The failure to eliminate crime and vice from civilized society is not evidence that these cannot be eliminated, but rather that the right way to eliminate them has not yet been found.

We may sum up this chapter, then, by repeating that the problem of crime is in no way an insoluble problem in human society, though, perhaps, a certain amount of occasional and accidental crime will always exist. The solution of the problem, as we have seen, only demands that man should secure the same mastery over his social environment and over human nature that he has already practically achieved over physical nature; and the gradual development of the social sciences will certainly make this possible some time in the future.

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CHAPTER XV

SOCIALISM IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIOLOGY

THERE have been many "short cuts" proposed to the solution of social problems. Among these the various schemes for reorganizing human society and industry, brought together under the general name of "socialism," have attracted most attention and deserve most serious consideration. In criticizing the most conspicuous of these schemes of social reconstruction, Marxian or "scientific" socialism, it should be understood at the outset that there is no intention of questioning the general aims of socialists. Those aims, as voiced by their best representatives, are in entire accord with sound science, religion, and ethics. That humanity should gain collective control over the conditions of its existence is the ultimate and highest aim of all science, all education, and all government. No student of sociology doubts that human society has steadily moved, though with interruptions, toward a larger control over its own processes; and no sane man doubts that such collective control over the conditions of existence is desirable. These general aims, which the socialists share with all workers for humanity, are not in question. What is in question is the social philosophy which lies back of revolutionary socialism and also the methods by which it proposes to solve the social problem. In order to criticize socialism we must see a little

more exactly what socialism is, both in the narrow and in the broader senses, and what it proposes to do.

Socialism Defined. — As a recent socialist writer has declared, socialism, like Christianity, is a term which has come to have no definite meaning. It is used by all sorts of people to cover all sorts of vague and indefinite schemes to improve or revolutionize society. In the broadest sense, we may define socialism as the name of a political and economic program which aims at the public ownership of all or of a majority of income-producing property. More narrowly, however, the word has been used particularly to designate the program and social theories of the party founded by Karl Marx and his associates. Prior to the World War, at least, Marx's theories dominated the socialist parties of both Continental Europe and America. Thus the theories of the Bolsheviki or Maximalist party in Russia were those of radical Marxian socialism.[1] In general, Marxian socialism seeks to solve the social problem by means of a proletarian revolution which will put the ownership of the means of production (capital) in the hands of the laborers. Other forms of socialism, more moderate in their character, would simply aim at a gradual realization of the following program: (1) the common ownership of the means of production (land and principal industries); (2) common management of the means of production (industry) by democratically selected authorities; (3) distribution of the product by these common

[1] Bolshevism, or the doctrines of the Bolsheviki, should of course not be confused with the Soviet government in Russia (*Soviet* is the Russian word for Council), which is a government by the representatives of occupational groups.

authorities in accordance with some democratically approved principle; (4) private property in incomes (consumption goods) to be retained.

But Marxian socialism does not stop with this political and economic program, but develops a whole social philosophy, which has perhaps been more widely taught than any other. It is for this reason that we are concerned with it. Briefly this social philosophy advocates (1) "economic determinism," (2) the class struggle view of history, and (3) a cataclysmic theory of social evolution.

The Theoretical Basis of Marxian Socialism. — Marxian socialism is frequently called scientific socialism, because its followers believe that it rests upon a scientific theory of social evolution. This theory is best stated in Marx's own words, as he gives it in his *Critique of Political Economy*, namely, that "the method of the production of the material life determines the social, political, and spiritual life process in general." We find it stated in other words, though in substance the same, by Engels, Marx's friend and coworker. Engels says, "In every historical epoch, the prevailing mode of economic production and exchange, and the social organization *necessarily* following from it, form the basis upon which is built up, and from which alone can be explained, the political and intellectual history of that epoch." In other words, according to Marx and his followers, the economic element in human society determines all other elements; if the other elements cannot be fully derived from the economic, their form and expression are at least determined by the economic. This is the so-called "materialistic conception of history" upon which Marxian socialists believe their program to

have a firm scientific foundation.[1] The followers of Marx, indeed, declare that with this principle Marx explains social evolution quite as fully as Darwin explained organic evolution through natural selection; and they do not hesitate to compare Marx's work in the social sciences with Darwin's work in the biological sciences.

It may certainly be agreed that this social philosophy which is best characterized as "economic determinism," is the logically necessary foundation of Marxian socialism. If the change of the economic or industrial order of human society is going to work such wonders as the Marxists claim, then it must follow that the economic element is the fundamental and determining element in the social life. If what is wrong with human society is chiefly wrong economic conditions, then the changing of those conditions should, of course, change the whole social superstructure. It would seem, therefore, that the dominantly economic program of Marxian socialists must stand or fall with the economic interpretation of social organization and evolution which Marx proposed. If it can be shown that an economic philosophy of society is essentially unsound, then the proposition to regenerate human society simply by economic reorganization is also unsound. Let us see whether the positions of the Marxian socialists are tenable in the light of the sociological principles which have been emphasized in the previous chapters of this book.

[1] In several utterances of his later years Marx qualified considerably his "materialistic conception of history," but the more radical or revolutionary wing of his followers have always adhered to the extreme form of the theory.

Criticism of Marxian Socialism. — The student has already been told that human society is a complex of living organisms, responding now this way, now that, to external stimuli in the environment. These stimuli in the environment we have roughly, but inaccurately, spoken of as causes, though they are not causes in a mechanical sense. The responses which are given to these stimuli by individuals and groups vary greatly according to heredity, instincts, and habits, — the inner nature, in other words, of the organisms composing society. Now, the stimuli in the environment which give rise to the activities of individuals and societies, though not in any mechanical way, may be classified into several great groups, such as the economic, the reproductive, the political, the religious, and so on. The economic stimuli would be those that have to do with the processes of production, distribution, and consumption of wealth; that is, the economic stimuli are those which are concerned with economic values. Now, while the student has been barely introduced to the psychological theory of human society, he probably knows enough of individual human nature to see that there is no reason in the nature of things why one's responses to economic stimuli, those connected with economic values, should determine his response to all other stimuli; and this is what scientific sociology and scientific psychology exactly find; namely, that *there is no reason for believing that economic stimuli determine in any exact way, or to any such extent as Marx thought, responses to other stimuli.* It is true that our habits of response to a certain class of stimuli affect to a certain extent our habits of response to all other classes. Thus it follows that the economic phase of human soci-

ety affects to a very great degree all other phases of human society. But this is simply the doctrine of the unity of personality and the interdependence of all phases of the social life, and it is very different from Marx's theory that the economic determines all the other phases; for under the doctrine of social interdependence we can see it is quite as reasonable to state that the religious and political phases of the social life determine the economic as it is to state that the economic determines the political and religious.

Let us bring the discussion down to more concrete terms. The student has seen that in every social problem there are a multitude of factors or stimuli (causes) at work, and that in no problem is the economic factor so all important that it may be said that the other factors are simply subsidiary. On the contrary, in such a problem as crime the methods of production and distribution of material goods, while important factors in the problem of crime, in no way determine that problem; and ideal conditions of the production and distribution of wealth would in no way solve the problem of crime. So, too, the negro problem is hardly touched by the question of the forms of industry or the economic organization of society. We might go on with a whole list of social problems and show that in every case the economic factor is no more important than many other factors, and that the economic reorganization of society would in some cases scarcely affect these problems at all. *The social problem, therefore, — the problem of the relations of men to one another, — is not simply nor fundamentally an economic problem; rather it is fundamentally a biological and psychological problem,* — if you please, a moral problem.

This brings us to a *second* criticism of socialism, namely, that *it proposes to reorganize human society upon an economic basis, not upon a sociological basis.* The program of the Marxist looks forward to the satisfaction of economic needs, but it has failed to take into account all the requirements for social existence. It would be far more scientific to reorganize society upon the basis of the needs of the family than to reorganize it simply upon the basis of industry. The reproductive process which the Marxian socialists ignore, or leave unregulated almost entirely, is far more important for the continued existence of human society than all its economic processes, — if by the reproductive process we mean the rearing as well as the birth of offspring; and if by the economic process we mean merely the forms and methods of the production and distribution of material goods.

In other words, the Marxist program leaves the future out of account, and aims simply to satisfy the present generation with a just distribution of material goods. If it could be shown that a just distribution of material goods would insure the future of the race and of civilization, then, of course, the Marxist plea would be made good. But this is just what is doubtful. On the whole, it must be said that the Marxist program is based upon the wishes and desires of the adult, not upon the needs of the child or of the race.

The extreme emphasis which Marxian socialism throws upon economic and industrial conditions in human society is, therefore, not justified by the scientific facts which we know about collective human life. Rather it must be said that this is the vital weakness of Marxian socialism, —

that it over-emphasizes the economic element. Of course, we are not saying that control over economic conditions is not necessary to collective control over the general conditions of existence, which society is undoubtedly aiming at, but it is saying that conceivably collective control over the social life process might be upon some other basis than the economic. It might emphasize, for example, the health and continuity of the race, or individual moral character, far more than the distribution of economic values. Marxian socialism proposes simply to carry a step further our already predominatingly economic social organization by frankly recognizing the economic as the basis of all things in the social life. A dominantly economic socialism is, therefore, rightfully judged as materialistic. It is really an expression of the industrial and commercial spirit of the present age. When the perspective of life becomes shifted again to the more important biological and spiritual elements in life, socialism will lose its dominatingly economic character, or it will cease to exist.

It must be emphasized here that all the material and economic progress of the modern world has not added greatly to the happiness or betterment of man. It is true that material progress is important, yes, necessary for spiritual progress. But material progress alone does not lead to spiritual progress, and therefore mere material progress can never add anything to the real happiness and social betterment of the race. On the contrary, it is possible to conceive of a society in which every one has an economic surplus, — a society rolling in wealth, approximately equally divided, and yet one in which human misery in its worst forms of vice and crime,

pessimism and self-destruction, prevail. It is an old truth, and one which cannot be too often emphasized, that making men "better-off" does not necessarily make them "better," but the modern socialist often becomes angry when this is mentioned to him. It is therefore a matter of comparative indifference, from the standpoint of the happiness and ultimate survival of the race, whether economic goods are distributed relatively evenly in human society or not. We say comparative indifference, because, of course, no one can be indifferent to the material needs of life, inasmuch as they are the basis of its higher development. But after a certain minimum is assured it is extremely doubtful whether a surplus will be of benefit or not, and this minimum necessary for the higher spiritual development of the social life can be secured through the reform of present society without trying the doubtful social revolution which the socialists advocate.

A *third* criticism of Marxian socialism is that *it stands for the internecine or conflict theory of society.* The implication of Marx's economic determinism is, of course, *an egoistic theory of human nature.* Hence if the economic interests of classes conflict, class war must result. Human history has been nothing but a series of class conflicts, according to the Marxians, and must continue to be such as long as one class controls the means of livelihood of another class. Class war can be abolished, they say, not through ethical ideals of brotherhood, but through the seizure of political power by the dispossessed classes, the abolishment of classes, and equalization of economic conditions for all.

This brings us to a *fourth* criticism of Marxian socialism, that *traditionally Marxian socialism has been revolutionary*

socialism; it has looked forward to a proletarian revolution, which shall transfer the ownership of all capital to the working classes, as the solution of the social problem. In brief, it proposes to invoke the power of one class, the workers, over other classes to secure economic justice. Marx's own formula was "evolution through revolution." As to how this revolution is to be brought about, Marxian socialists differ. Some say through peaceful political means; others say, by force if necessary. Whether brought about peacefully or by force, however, it is evident that if this revolution were suddenly accomplished it is highly uncertain whether its results would be permanent. For all that we have learned concerning human society leads us to say that social organization at any particular time is very largely a matter of habit. Now collective habits are less easily changed than individual habits, because any change in collective habits practically necessitates the consent of all the individuals who make up the social group. Hence groups usually change their "habits," their "mores," slowly. We know also that even in individual life old habits are not easily supplanted by new ones and that there is always a tendency to revert to the old. All historical evidence shows that revolutions are always followed by periods of reaction, and that this reaction is usually proportionate to the extent and suddenness of change in social organization.

Nor is it true that normally social evolution or development takes place through cataclysmic changes — "revolutions." Great social changes have often come about, it is true, suddenly, but if they have been of a progressive character it has been because men have suddenly learned

from some crisis. Progressive social changes involve learning by the whole group, and normally they are brought about by public discussion, by the deliberate formation of a public opinion and of a group will. This is usually a gradual process. Profound social changes, in other words, require preparation in individual character and proceed by a series of gradual steps. The slow progress of Christianity and democracy illustrates this. When social changes are brought about suddenly by the exercise of the power of one class over other classes, the only probable result will be the collapse of the new order sooner or later because it rests upon insufficient foundations in individual character. Thus a lasting radical social reconstruction by means of revolution is scarcely possible.

But the great menace of Marxian socialism is its implied threat of force. The logic of Marxian socialism leads straight to revolution by force if its program cannot be realized by peaceful political means. The student can hardly fail to see the close connection between the doctrines of Marxian socialism and the practical program of the Bolshevist party in Russia. Actual war between classes is the natural result of such doctrines. As to revolution by force, sociology can offer but one judgment, and that is that it is the most costly method of change which a nation can employ. It is a justifiable method only when a governing class is hopelessly out of adjustment with its group, when its power is a mere survival blocking the path of progress. Revolution by force is objectionable as a method of social reconstruction because it stimulates so greatly the forces of social disorder. Russia illustrates this; but in a more urban, and so more fragile civilization like

that of the United States, its effect would probably be even more frightful. Moreover, in a democracy, where political power is in the hands of the people, revolution by force is particularly unnecessary and objectionable as a method of change. The method of democracy is government through discussion, the formation of a public opinion, and of a group will; and this sociology finds to be the normal method of social change. The social problem is a problem of right, not of might, and it can be solved only by discussion, rationality, and good will. This is the scientific method of social reconstruction, therefore, and not revolution.

It is not the place in this book to take up the practical objections to Marxian and other forms of socialism. These practical objections are for the most part of a political and economic nature, and they accordingly can be better dealt with in treatises on politics and economics than in one on sociology. It is perhaps sufficient to say that the political and economic objections to socialism must be accorded not less weight in any practical view of the matter than the sociological objections. Government, for example, exists in human society to regulate, and not to carry on directly, social activities. It may carry on successfully certain industries which have been reduced to routine, which require little initiative, or which for public reasons are more conveniently conducted by the state in its various branches. But if under state socialism the state in its various branches or forms were to own and manage all productive industry, it is extremely probable that such an experiment at the present time would break down of its own weight, since the state would be attempting

that which, in the nature of things, as the chief regulative institution of society, it is not fitted to do. But it is not our purpose, as has just been said, to go into the political and economic objections to Marxian or other forms of socialism. To understand these the student must consult the leading works on economic and political science.

Non-Marxian Forms of Socialism. — All that has been said thus far regarding socialism applies only to Marxian socialism. Brief mention must be made of other forms, though their adherents are not nearly so numerous as those of Marxian socialism. The moderate socialists, in general, repudiate economic determinism, the class struggle theory of history, the hedonistic ethics, and the revolutionary methods of Marxian socialism. This is especially true of the moderate English socialists. Such socialism, in other words, disregards the whole social philosophy which has hitherto been made more or less a part of the socialist movement, especially by the Marxians. The moderate socialists limit their socialism to the practical proposal of the ownership and control of a majority of all business by the workers or by society collectively, and the political and economic changes necessitated by such ownership. Moreover, the moderate socialists do not claim that the carrying out of their program would usher in a social millennium or even solve the social problem. They claim that such economic reorganization of society is simply the most important step toward the solution of the social problem.

It must be said that the sociological objections which have been urged against Marxian socialism do not apply as against this moderate type of socialism which makes itself

sponsor for no particular social philosophy. The objections to the program of moderate socialism, in other words, are wholly of a practical nature, and therefore they fall within the realm of economic and political objections, rather than of sociological.

On the other hand, more extreme forms of socialism than the Marxian type have developed within recent years. These extreme forms of socialism are known on the continent of Europe, generally, as Syndicalism. Syndicalism, unlike Marxian socialism, would not rely at all upon political methods, but rather upon the use of such methods as "the general strike," and various forms of violence, such as the destruction of capital. Syndicalism aims at accomplishing its results, in other words, not by peaceful revolution, but by the use of violence, if that is necessary. The syndicalists, however, avow themselves to be socialists, and aim at the coöperative carrying on of industry by groups of workingmen. The chief representatives of Syndicalism in the United States are the Industrial Workers of the World. The Russian Bolsheviki also in some respects approximate the program of the syndicalists.

Thus we see that socialism tends to divide itself into a moderate group and an extreme group, with the moderate Marxians at the present time occupying a midway position. Whether the socialists will become united in their social philosophy and in their program in the near future it is impossible to say. At present they seem united only in their opposition to the existing order of society and in their common belief in the essential doctrine of socialism, namely, the doctrine of the common ownership and management of the instruments of production.

The Program of Scientific Social Reconstruction. — Certain steps sociology and the social sciences already indicate as necessary for a normal social life. These steps, however, aim not at the destruction of the existing social order, but at removing certain demonstrated causes of social maladjustment which exist in present society; and as in the solution of special social problems we have seen reason to reject "short-cuts" and "cure-alls," so in a scientific reconstruction of human society we have good reason to reject the social revolution which the followers of Marx advocate, and to offer as a substitute in its stead some social reforms which will make more nearly possible a normal social life.

Perhaps the necessary steps for bringing about such a normal social life have never been better summed up than by Professor Devine in his book on *Misery and its Causes*. Rather than offer a program of our own we shall therefore give a brief résumé of the conditions which Professor Devine names as essential to normal social life, believing that these offer a program upon which all sane social workers and reformers can unite. Professor Devine names ten conditions essential to a normal social life: (1) the securing of a sound physical heredity, that is, a good birth for every child, by a rational system of eugenics; (2) the securing of a protected childhood, which will assure the normal development of the child, and of a protected motherhood, which will assure the proper care of the child; (3) a system of education which shall be adapted to social needs, inspired by the ideals of rational living and social service; (4) the securing of freedom from preventable disease; (5) the elimination of professional vice and

crime; (6) the securing of a prolonged working period for both men and women; (7) a general system of insurance against the ordinary contingencies of life which now cause poverty or dependence; (8) a liberal relief system which will meet the material needs of those who become accidentally dependent; (9) a minimum standard of life for all sufficiently high to insure full nourishment, reasonable recreation, proper housing, and the other elementary necessities of life; (10) a social religion which shall make the service of humanity the highest aim of all individuals.

It is sufficient to say, in closing this chapter, that if these ten essentials of a normal social life could be realized — and there is no reason why they cannot be — there would be no need to try the social revolution which Marxian socialism advocates. The scientific reform of taxation is the method by which the economic inequalities of our present social order can be overcome and such a normal social life be made possible for all. The experience of the War points clearly to the way how to secure ample funds for the social purposes mentioned by Professor Devine.

There can be no question that the ultimate aim of the social sciences is to provide society with the knowledge necessary for collective control over its own life-processes. Sociology and the special social sciences are aiming, therefore, in an indirect way to accomplish the same thing which Marxian socialism aims at accomplishing through revolution. There would seem to be no danger in trusting science to work out this problem of collective control over the conditions of existence. There are no risks to run by the scientific method, for it proceeds experimentally, adequately testing theories by facts as it goes along. The

thing to do, therefore, for those who wish to see "a humanity adjusted to the requirements of its existence," is to encourage scientific social research along all lines. With a fuller knowledge of human nature and human society it will be possible to indicate sane and safe reconstructions in the social order, so that ultimately humanity will control its social environment and its own human nature even more completely than it now controls the forces of physical nature. But the ultimate reliance in all such reconstruction, as we will try to show in the next chapter, must be, not revolution, not even legislation, but education.

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CHAPTER XVI

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL PROGRESS

As has just been said, the ultimate reliance in all social reform or social reconstruction must be upon the education of the individual. Social organization can never be more complex or of a higher type than the individual character and intelligence of the members of the group permits. At any given stage of society, therefore, the intelligence and moral character of its individual members limits social organization. Only by raising the intelligence and character of the individual members of society can a higher type of social life permanently result.

Another fact to which the student needs his attention called is that all progress in human society, it follows from what has just been said, depends upon the relation between one generation and its successor. Only as new life comes into society is there opportunity to improve the character of that life. If at any given time intelligence and character limit the possibilities of social organization, then it is equally manifest that only in the new individuals of society can that intelligence and character be greatly improved.

There are, of course, two possible ways of bringing about such improvement: — first, through the selection of the hereditary elements in society, eliminating the unfit and preserving the more fit; but, as we have repeatedly pointed

out, such a scheme of artificial selection is far in the future, and in any case its inauguration would have to depend upon the *second* method of improving individual character, which is through education and training. As we have insisted, not only may the natural instincts and tendencies of individuals be greatly modified by training but through education the habits and hence the character of individuals can be controlled. Therefore the main reliance of society in all forward movements must be upon education, that is, upon artificial means of controlling the formation of character and habit in individuals.

The finality of education in social betterment can be, perhaps, further illustrated by reconsidering for a moment some of the social problems which we have just studied. Take for example the problem of crime. There are only three possible means, as we have already seen, of eliminating crime from human society: — first, through changes in individual human nature, brought about by biological selection, that is, through a system of selective breeding, eliminating all who show any criminal tendencies. This method would, perhaps, eliminate certain types of criminals as we have already seen, namely, those in whom the hereditary tendency to crime is dominant. A second means of attacking the problem of crime would be by improving social and economic conditions by means of the interference of the organized authority of society in the form of the state. Legislation and administration directed to social ends might accomplish much in reducing the temptations and opportunities for crime in any group. The correction of evils in social and industrial organization would, no doubt, again greatly lessen crime but it is en-

tirely conceivable, from all that we know of human nature and human society, that crime might still persist under a just social and industrial organization. Crime could be completely eliminated only through a third means, namely, the careful training of each new individual in society as he came on the stage of life, so that he would be moral and law-abiding, respecting the rights of others and the institutions of society. Moreover, neither selective breeding nor governmental interference in social conditions could accomplish very much in eliminating crime unless these were backed by a wise system of social education.

Now what is true of crime is equally true of all social problems. They may be approached from either of three sides: — first, from the biological side, or the side of physical heredity; second, from the side of social organization, or the improvement of the social environment; third, from the side of individual character, or the psychical adjustment of the individual to society. As Professor Ward and many other sociologists have emphasized, it is this latter side which is the most available point of attack on all social problems; for when we have secured a right attitude of the individual toward society all social problems will be more than half solved. Thus, as we said at the beginning of this book, education has a bearing upon every social problem, and every social problem also has a bearing upon education. Just how important this reciprocal relationship between education and social life is, we can appreciate only when we have considered somewhat more fully the nature of social progress.

The Nature of Social Progress.— Social progress has been defined in many ways by the social thinkers of the past.

Without entering into any formal definition of social progress, it is evident that social progress consists in learning better ways of doing and of living. It brings greater control on the part of man over physical nature, on the one hand, and over human nature and human relations, on the other. Hence it means increasing control over all the conditions of life. We regard those things as progressive, whether they be moral, intellectual, or material, which bring about a better adaptation of individuals to one another in society and of man to physical nature. The goal of human progress is complete mastery, complete control, over all of the conditions of existence. Well-balanced progress means, therefore, that man comes into increasing harmony with his own nature, with his fellow men, and with physical nature. It gives man greater efficiency in performing physical work, because he utilizes the laws of physical nature. It gives him greater ability to survive, because he knows how to control both nature and himself. Finally, it brings about greater harmony in human relations, because it gives control over human behavior.

Now it is evident that progress in this sense of increasing control over physical nature and over human behavior depends mainly upon two things, the increase of knowledge and the increase of good will among men. It is further evident that these can be brought about only through training the intelligence and the moral character of individuals. Heredity and biological conditions may count, but they also can be controlled only through increasing knowledge and good will. Therefore, the whole question of progress turns upon the question of education. If we wish to bring about progress in human society in a rational, deliberate

way, we can do so only through a rational program of education. To be sure, men have often learned in the past better ways of living through the hard lessons of experience, sometimes through disasters and calamities. But there is a better way of learning to solve the problems of life, and that is through the scientific method of rationally planned education which will fit individuals to solve their problems through scientific knowledge, rather than by mere trial and error, or "muddling" through them. The key to social progress is evidently an education which will give man an understanding of how he can control himself, his civilization or culture, and physical nature; and which will at the same time supply him with motives to utilize this knowledge. The key, in other words, is rational *social* education.

The whole matter becomes simple as soon as we understand that progress, both for the individual and for society, depends upon the learning process, and is not automatic. It is, therefore, a matter of taking thought, of effort, and of education. But education may be misdirected or may be illy balanced. The problem involved in education, if we wish to make education a means to progress, is to find just the sort of education which is needed. Evidently an education which overemphasizes the value of the past will not favor progress. Again, an education which stresses too much the physical sciences or the control of physical nature, while it may lead to great progress in materialistic ways, will not favor progress in social and moral ways. If we want balanced progress, we must have balanced education, with social education, the education of the individual for his human relations, as the core of the educational process.

The Social Function of Education. — We are now pre-

pared to understand the meaning of educational systems in civilized society and to see what the true function of education is. Education exists to adapt individuals to their social life. It is for the purpose of fitting the individual to take his place in the social group and to add something to the life of the group. Educational systems exist not to train the individual to develop his powers and capacity simply as an individual unit, but rather to fit him effectively to carry on the social life before he actively participates in it. In other words, the social function of education is to guide and control the formation of habit and character on the part of the individual, as well as to develop his capacity and powers, so that he shall become an efficient member of society. This work is not, at least in complex civilizations like our own, one which we carry on simply in order to achieve social perfection, but it is rather something which is necessary for the survival of large and complex groups. Otherwise, as we have pointed out, the conflicts in the acquirement of habit and character on the part of individuals would be so great that there would be no possibility of their working together harmoniously in a common social life. Just so far as the system of education is defective, is insufficient to meet social needs, in so far may we expect the production of individuals who are socially maladjusted, as shown in pauperism, defectiveness, and crime.

Education is, then, the great means of controlling habit and character in complex social groups, and as such it is the chief means to which society must look for all substantial social progress. It is the instrument by which human nature may be apparently indefinitely modified,

and hence, also, the instrument by which society may be perfected. The task of social regeneration is essentially a task of education.

Education as a Factor in Past Social Evolution. — Does past social history justify these large claims for education as a factor in social development? It must be replied that the history of human society undoubtedly substantiates this position, but even if it did not, we should still have good ground for claiming that education can be such an all-powerful factor in the social future. The sociological study of past civilizations, however, shows quite conclusively that all of them have depended in one way or another upon educational processes, not only for continuity, but largely, also, for their development. As we have already seen, the life history of a culture or a civilization is frequently the life history of a religion. But religious beliefs, together with the moral and social beliefs, which become attached to them, were effectively transmitted only through the instruction of the young. The religious element did scarcely more than afford a powerful sanction for the moral and social beliefs upon which the social organization of the past rested; hence, when we ascribe great importance to the religious factor in social evolution, we also ascribe, at the same time, great importance to education, because it was essentially the educational process, together with religious sanction, which made possible most of the civilizations and social progress of the past.

Indeed, we have no record of any people of any very considerable culture that did not employ educational processes to the largest degree to preserve and transmit

that culture from generation to generation. Culture has been passed down in human history, therefore, essentially by educational processes. These educational processes have controlled the formation of habits and character, of ways of thinking and ways of acting, in successive generations of individuals. The educational processes have had much more to do, therefore, with the civilizations and social organization of the past than industrial conditions. Industrial conditions have been rather relatively external factors in the social environment to which society has had to adapt itself more or less. In the same way, political authority has rested on, and been derived from, the social traditions rather than the reverse. It is therefore not too much for the sociologist to say, agreeing with Thomas Davidson, that education is the last and highest method of social evolution. The lowest method of evolution was by selection, and *that*, as we have already emphasized, cannot be neglected. The next method of social evolution apparently to develop was the method of adaptation by organized authority, and, as we have already seen, organized authority in society, or social regulation by means of authority, must indefinitely persist and perhaps increase, rather than diminish; but the latest and highest method of social evolution is not through biological selection nor through the exercise of despotic authority, but through the education of the individual, so that he shall become adjusted to the social life in habits and character before he participates in it. Human society may be modified, we now see, best through modifying the nature of the individual, and the most direct method to do this is through education.

The Socialized Education of the Future. — If what has been said is substantially correct, then education should become conscious of its social mission and purpose. The educator should conserve education as the chief means of social progress, and education should be directed to producing efficient members of society. The education of the future must aim, in other words, not at producing lawyers, physicians, engineers, but at producing citizens. Education for citizenship means that there must be radical reconstruction in the educational processes of the present. The education of the nineteenth century aimed at developing largely power and capacity in the individual as such. Its implicit, and oftentimes its avowed, aim was individual success. The popularity of higher education in the nineteenth century especially rested upon the cult of individual success. It became, therefore, largely commercialized, and emphasized chiefly the professions and occupations which best assured the individual a successful career among a commercial and industrial people.

It is needless to say that the individualistic, commercialized education of the latter years of the nineteenth century very often failed to produce the good citizen. On the contrary, with its ideal of individual power and success, it frequently produced the cultured freebooter, which our modern industry has so often afforded examples of. Education, instead of being a socializing agency and the chief instrument of social regeneration, became an individualizing agency dissolving the social order itself. It is this education which in part produced our present social problems.

Very slowly our educators are becoming conscious of the fact that this type of education is a social menace, and that our educational system needs reformation from bottom to top in order to become again equal to the social task imposed upon it by the more complex social conditions of the twentieth century. Hence the demand for a socialized education, which is proceeding, not only from sociologists and social workers. but from the progressive leaders of education itself.

What the socialized education of the future should be we can outline only in its more essential and general characteristics. The curriculum is the vital thing in education, and the consideration of what sort of curriculum is demanded by the social situation, from elementary school to university, will serve better perhaps to define socialized education than a formal definition.

First of all, let us recall that in man the chief organ of adaptation, both in his physical and in his social life, is the mind. The freeing of the mind, the development of its powers, and the disciplining of it to social use has been, in general, the fundamental aim of modern education; and this aim a socialized education would fully reaffirm. Only it would throw the accent upon the social purpose involved in this aim. Through the freeing of the mind, the development of its powers, and the disciplining of these to social use, a social life which is plastic, adaptable, and *progressive* is practically assured. Hence a socialized education means, first of all, a liberalizing and liberating education of the mind; and subjects which are especially adapted to achieve this end should receive primary consideration.

Secondly, a socialized education will aim at the diffusion

of definite social information. We cannot solve our social problems without more social intelligence; and the surest way to secure social intelligence is to have more social and political education in our schools. We live in a social world more than in a world of material objects. Our chief adjustments must be made to men and to institutions, not to things. Human relationships, in other words, make or mar the world we know. They count for more in human happiness than everything else put together. We can no longer trust common sense to adjust the individual to this world of human relationships; for our civilization has become such a complex system of relationships that no one can play his part in it well without a very considerable amount of general and specific social information. Therefore, the study of the relationships of men to one another must be the essential element in a system of social education. Such studies as history, government, economics, ethics, and sociology must occupy a larger place in the education of the future if we are to secure a humanity adjusted to the requirements of its existence.

Moreover, many new experiments are being tried throughout our civilization which depend for their success upon a general diffusion of social intelligence. Democracy is such an experiment. The attempt to establish democracy without providing adequate social and political education for the mass of citizens must result in disaster. If we want democracy to succeed, we must educate for democracy. It is treason to our democratic institutions to send forth from our schools young men and women who know little or nothing of the responsibility, duties, and privileges of citizens in a democracy, and of the social conditions and

ideals which are necessary for the success of democratic society. In a socialized education, then, social and political studies will occupy the most conspicuous place in the curriculum.

All this implies that the older idea that education can be given regardless of content is, from the social point of view, a great mistake. Social knowledge is necessary for intelligent and efficient social service, and education should have efficiency in service as its chief end. Therefore, sociological knowledge in the broadest sense should be required in the education of every citizen, and particularly of those who are to become social leaders. Professor Ward has ably argued that if sufficient information of the facts, conditions, and laws of human society could be given to all, that alone would bring about in the highest degree social progress. Whether we agree or not that the mere giving of information will of itself lead to progressive or dynamic action in society, it must be admitted that right social information is indispensable for right social action. As Professor Cooley has said, "We live in a system, and to achieve right ends, or any rational ends whatever, we must learn to understand that system." Hence, the commanding place which sociology and the social sciences should occupy in the education of all classes.

In the higher education, the social sciences should be especially emphasized, because it is those who receive higher education who become the leaders of society, and it is important, no matter what occupation or profession they may serve society in, that they understand the bearings of their work upon social welfare. They must know their duties as citizens and understand how society may best be

served. In other words, our higher education should put to the front the ideal, not of individual power and success, but of social service; and this means that, in addition to the technical or professional education which the more highly educated are given, there must be given them a sufficient knowledge of social conditions and the laws and principles of social progress to enable them to serve society rightly. Intelligent social service, we repeat, cannot exist without social knowledge.

But a socialized education cannot stop with the giving of mere information regarding social facts. Its *third* task will be to point out and seek to inculcate social values, standards and ideals, as soon as adequate scientific knowledge of social facts has been ascertained on which to base scientific social standards and ideals. Thus as soon as we have ascertained the conditions and effects of such a matter as child labor, we have the knowledge on which we can base and inculcate a scientific standard regarding it. If this were not so, social education would be useless. The approach to moral education must be through the social sciences. Morality cannot be taught as an abstraction. The trouble with most of the instruction in morality in our schools in the past is that it has been divorced from the facts of our social life. If we will base such instruction upon scientific social knowledge, we can as readily inculcate ideals regarding government, law, sanitation, family life, business, and human relations generally as we can standards of vocational excellence.

Socialized education means, then, moral education; for it means education into social, national, and humanitarian ideals; not simply into those ideals as they are, but as they

ought to be in the light of full knowledge regarding human relationships. It will aim, not simply at the development of the individual, but "to create social solidarity by means of a social type marked by service." It will lead directly to that consecration of life to the service of humanity which is the essence of true religion.

Fourthly, socialized education will make adequate provision for the vocational training of every citizen, no matter how poor he may be. To be a good citizen or to serve humanity at large, one must be usually self-supporting, must find one's work in the world, and be able to do it well. We are beginning to perceive that the service ideal of life demands that everybody in normal health be occupied at some useful work, and that in a democracy there is no place for a class of idlers. Moreover, we are also beginning to perceive that all service, all constructive labor, is of social value, and perhaps more nearly of equal social worth than we had supposed. Socialized education would of course be a failure if it did not culminate in the individual's finding his life work, his proper vocation in society.

But enthusiasts in vocational education have often made one of two mistakes. First, they have often wished to vocationalize the whole educational system, or to place specialized vocational training too early in the curriculum. But specialized vocational training should come at the end of a socialized curriculum, not at its beginning; it should be its crown, not its foundation. Preceding all vocational education should come the liberation of the mind, the understanding of social facts, and the appreciation of social values. The second mistake which some enthusiasts for vocational education make is that they

confuse it with socialized education in general. But *vocationalization* is only a part of the process of *socialization*. To mistake the part for the whole would be an unpardonable error, for it would land us in worse difficulties than before. An efficient lawyer, or farmer, or engineer, the common experience of life shows, is not necessarily a good citizen. To think that good citizenship consists simply in vocational excellence is to misconceive the whole nature of the social life and of socialized education. Vocational education obviously can be made safe for democracy and higher civilization only by attaching it to a general program of socialized education. A large part of our grade work, our high school work, and our undergraduate work in college should therefore be kept free from vocational training. We must, however, have a system of vocational education, open even to the child of the humblest citizen, as the crown of our whole educational system; but we must never forget that all men in a democracy are citizens first before they are members of any calling, trade, or profession.

Of course, much more is involved in the socialization of education than these changes in the curriculum. The teacher, for example, must have the social point of view and be imbued with the spirit of social service. The teacher should realize that he is a social creator and that, at bottom, his work is nothing less than the shaping of the social future. But the attitude of the teacher goes back largely to the training he has received in the high schools, colleges, and universities. It is upon these latter that the responsibility must rest for socializing our education and making it a conscious agency of social reconstruction; for they train the teachers and the educational leaders. It

is not our purpose, however, to trace in detail all that is involved in the socialization of education, but rather merely to point out the essential marks of a socialized education and the need of it as the only basis for enduring social progress.

Summary on Education and Social Reconstruction. — Social education is the foundation and essential means of all other methods of social reconstruction in a democracy. It is the distinctive method of social evolution in its higher, more conscious phases, and is the only means by which human society can perfect itself. But social education must be scientific, that is, it must diffuse knowledge of social facts and laws and of methods by which social evils may be overcome. It must also be imbued with the humanitarian spirit, taking the ideal of social service as its chief end. Such social education, as a foundation for progressive policies along every line, is the only way out in our civilization. It alone can transform our "mores" into those of a higher humanitarian civilization. It will insure the development of true moral freedom in our social life; for social science implies searching but impersonal criticism of social institutions and public policies. It will check the exaggerated individualism which hitherto, as we have seen, has been one of the most menacing tendencies of our civilization; for social education will show the solidarity of society and the interdependence of all its parts. Finally, it will lessen the practical materialism of modern civilization; for it will throw emphasis upon the importance of the relations of men to one another. The social sciences, aiming at the control of social conditions and of social progress, necessarily emphasize the higher life of man, and

they therefore set before the student the goal, not of material achievement or individual success, but of the service of mankind.

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CHAPTER XVII[1]

THEORETICAL SUMMARY

We shall now try briefly to summarize the theoretical principles which have been more or less brought out in the discussions of the preceding chapters. Of course, for any adequate treatment of the principles of social organization and evolution, the student must turn to the standard texts on sociological theory. This book, however, would be incomplete without directing the student's attention, in some measure at least, to the theoretical principles implied in our concrete discussions.

The Origin of Society. — We have tried to show that society is something which springs from the very processes of life itself. It is not something which has been invented or planned by individuals. On the contrary, life, in its higher forms at least, could not exist without association. The processes of both nutrition and reproduction in all higher forms of life involve a necessary interdependence among organisms of the same species. From the very beginning of life, almost, the association of the sexes has been necessary for reproduction and for the care and rearing of offspring. Likewise, some degree of association has always been necessary for the procuring of an adequate food supply and for protection against enemies. Thus, society has grown spontaneously out of the necessities of the life-process. It has grown out of both of the fundamental phases of the life-process, the food process and the reproductive process.

[1] In a brief course of study this chapter may be omitted.

No greater error could be made in sociology, therefore, than to assume that society is the result of the coming together of individuals developed in isolation. On the contrary, society, in the sense of a group of organisms carrying on a common life by means of mental interaction, is an expression of the original and continuing unity of the life-process of the associating organisms. While the interaction of individual organisms in its lowest phases was probably purely physical, yet it was out of such interaction that the mental interaction which we call association, or society, arose.

Control over food supply necessitated association among animals because a food supply can be more easily secured by groups of coöperating individuals than by isolated individuals. Natural selection operated, therefore, from the beginning of life, in favor of groups and toward the elimination of individuals living relatively isolated. Moreover, it would especially favor those groups in which the interaction between individuals was quick and sure, in other words, those in which the powers of mental interstimulation and response were developed. It is not an accident, therefore, that the most successful, and, in general, the higher animals, live in groups.

Such collective control over the food process established primarily by natural selection becomes one of the great bases for social organization, and in humanity such association for providing food supply has given rise to society's industrial institutions.

Defense against enemies has been, of course, another phase of the life-process which has favored the development of association. Really, however, this is very largely the negative side of the food process. It needs no argument to

show that such defense can be much better undertaken by groups of individuals than by isolated individuals, and that natural selection, therefore, must have operated all along in this way to favor group life.

However, the activities connected with nutrition have probably not played so large a part in the genesis of association as the activities connected with reproduction. The birth and care of offspring are essential phases of life, and in all but the lowest forms of life they involve the coöperation of at least two individuals. In our study of the family, we have seen how sexual reproduction and parental care gave rise to the family group. We have also seen the great part which the family group has played in producing all other forms of association. All of the great regulative and moral institutions in humanity, for example, seem to have had their origin, more or less, in the life of the family group. It is not too much to say that society, in the intimate and sympathetic sense, had its beginnings in the family, especially in the relation of the child to the mother.

The Origin of Human Society. We have already noticed that there are vast differences between human society and animal association. What has just been said applies to the origin of animal association in general and not specifically to the origin of human society. What, then, is the origin of human society? The only reply that can be given is that it is an evolution from animal association. Despite the great differences between animal association and human society which were illustrated in discussing the contrasts between the family life of man and of brutes, the only scientific conclusion which we can reach is that human society has been developed through long ages of

selection from animal association. What makes human society distinct and peculiar in itself, indeed, as we have already pointed out, is the intellectual element in it. Upon the two great differences between man and the other animals, articulate speech and the power of abstract thought, rest culture and the distinctive features of human society. For, as we have seen, when we examine human social organization carefully, we find in it the same instinctive elements which we find in the higher animals. But, in addition, we find many intellectual elements such as language, self-consciousness, morality, religion, and all the other products of man's higher intellectual faculties. Peculiar human instincts may give human society its distinctive character to some extent, but this distinctive character is more largely attributable to man's much higher intellectual development.

Nevertheless, we must not conclude that human society is in any sense an artificial and rational construction. There is every evidence that human institutions for the most part have not had a premeditated, reflective origin, but have sprung up spontaneously from the needs of life. Many, indeed, have developed down to the present time with but little premeditated guidance. Nevertheless, with the advance of social evolution, the intellectual and spiritual elements have played an increasingly important part, and there is good ground for believing that they can play a controlling part in the future. Human society is modifiable, then, in the same sense and in the same degree in which human nature is modifiable. While it is not a contract, as was once thought, which can be made over to suit the pleasures of the parties thereto, neither is it a machine of the gods which man cannot modify.

The Process of Social Development. — The process of social development is necessarily in part like that of organic evolution, in part like that of individual mental growth, since it is made up of both organically hereditary and individually acquired elements. However, if we neglect that part of social development which is brought about through the working of the factors in organic evolution (variation, heredity, and selection), then the social process presents itself as a continuous adaptation and readaptation in the relations of individuals brought about by mental processes. The adjustments between individuals, as we have seen, necessarily must constantly change, not only on account of changing conditions in the environment but also because of the expansive character of life itself. Now, the adjustments or coadaptations between individuals which exist at any given time are the social order or organization of that particular time and place. Such coadaptations between individuals give rise to persistent forms of social activities, which we may term social habits, also called by some writers "folkways." As long as such persistent social activities, crystallized into institutions of law, government, religion, morality, and industry, work well, they usually receive but little attention. Accompanying these persistent activities, or social habits, are, of course, uniform ways of thinking and feeling in the group; and these habits of thought and feeling, as well as habits of action, are passed along by tradition or customary imitation from generation to generation.

Habits cannot exist in society any more than in the individual without continually being modified. Groups of individuals have to continually adjust themselves to new

conditions in the environment, and so the relations between individuals themselves must also change. Hence, social habits must change. Now these changes in the adaptation of individuals to one another and of the group to its environment are brought about mainly by processes of mental interaction. That is, communication, suggestion, sympathy, imitation, and other forms of mental interaction bring about uniformity of ideas, feelings, and opinions within the group, both with reference to the old conditions and with reference to the new adaptation which must be made. Hence, we see at once the great function in the social life of such processes as public criticism, discussion, the formation of public opinion, the selection of leaders and programs for action. All these processes, and so also communication, suggestion, and imitation in general, have manifestly reference to building up new types of adaptation between the individuals of the group, or between the group and its environment.

Thus the development of our social life, so far as it is not brought about by the factors in organic evolution, is very like the process of mental growth or development in the individual. Just as in individual life there is a constant replacement of habits which are no longer workable, or are outgrown, so in our social life there is a continual replacement of old institutions and customs by new institutions and ways of living. So the process of social development is like the learning process in individuals. Just as in the individual superior adaptations can be made only by processes of attention, discrimination, the association of ideas, and judgments of value, so in the social group processes of communication, discussion, the formation of

public opinion and of social values work to the same end. Moreover, as in the individual we find the highest consciousness in the transition from one habit to another, so in social life we also find the greatest use of mental interaction in the transition from one form of institution or association to another.

The student can readily illustrate all this from what has been said regarding the historical development of the family, and also from the social life of the present in which he lives, because all of our present social problems are due to the difficulties of effecting transition from one type of social adjustment to another. In discussing divorce, for example, we especially pointed out that the present disintegration and confusion in our family life is due to the fact that the old type of family, which answered very well the needs of our forefathers, is no longer adapted to modern conditions, and that there is difficulty, in some classes of our population at least, in coming to an agreement regarding what shall be the new type of family. Social life thus develops largely through the continual interchange of opinions, ideas, and ideals as well as through the copying of activities and feelings by individuals.

It is impossible in this text to go in detail into the numerous factors which make up the process of social development. It may be pointed out, however, that imitation manifestly comes in wherever uniform, concerted action in the group is necessary or desirable. Imitation serves to diffuse uniform activities throughout a group. Hence, the imitative tendency in man is a very great factor indeed in the social life, because all social activity has in it this element of uniform, concerted action among individuals.

Sympathy and understanding are two other closely related factors which have much to do with the social life. Sympathy brings about uniformity of feeling and therefore aids in securing uniformity of activity. Through sympathetic understanding individuals are able to coördinate their activities more harmoniously; thus successful social adjustment depends in very great measure upon sympathy and understanding between associates, and for this reason all social groups seek to cultivate sympathy and understanding among their members. Finally, conflict is also a method of social adjustment. However, conflict of the more serious sort is relatively an abnormal thing within the group, and arises only because the members of the group have failed to adjust themselves harmoniously to one another.

The Theory of Social Order. — Social order differs from social organization. Social organization may refer to any condition or relation of the elements of a social group; but by social order we mean a settled and harmonious relation between the individuals or the parts of a society. The problem of social order is then the problem of harmonious adaptation among the individuals of the group; and the question arises, how do the relationships become settled and harmonious?

It is evident that all the factors which shape social organization must enter more or less into this problem of the determination of the conditions which make for settled and harmonious relationships among individuals. Social order, like social organization, therefore, will rest more or less upon the instincts and the acquired habits of the group. Harmonious relationships between individuals are furthered, of course, by certain native tendencies of individual human

nature, such as the sexual and parental instincts, the gregarious instinct, sympathy, and imitation. The acquired habits of social groups, also, whether we call them custom, tradition, usages, or folkways, make for settled and harmonious relationships between individuals. In animal groups and in the lowest human groups, social order is almost entirely an outcome of the working of instinct and habit. But in practically all human groups, except the very lowest, we find another factor working for social order, namely, regulative institutions. While a natural, spontaneous social order may be furnished by instinct, sympathy, custom, and tradition, the actual social order which we find in human groups is achieved rather by conscious means of social control over the individual.

The chief of these regulative institutions in human society are those which we group under the names of government, law, religion, morality, and education. Government and law are perhaps the oldest of the agencies consciously employed to secure social control over the individual. While government probably began, as we have seen, as a means of control in time of war, more and more government has extended its control over all other phases of social activity. Some modern socialists would apparently make government absorb and direct all social activities. While such an extension of the functions of government must be regarded as unsound in theory and unwarranted in practice, yet there can be no doubt that, inasmuch as the purpose of government is to regulate, its functions are "co-extensive with human interests."

Government and law, instead of being less needed in the future, will probably be more needed. The anarchistic

ideal of no government is without any good scientific foundation. Nevertheless, government and law are, by themselves, relatively inadequate means of social control in very complex societies, because the control which they exert over the individual must necessarily be over gross external acts. Such social control does not go deep enough to secure a type of social order which is adequate for modern social life. Hence society needs, in order to achieve any high type of social order, not simply a well-developed governmental and legal system, but also highly developed systems of religion, morality, and education.

Religion, like government, is one of the oldest means of control in human societies. As we have already seen, the religious sanction when added to institutions gives them a stability and capacity to survive such as hardly anything else does. Personal religion prevents too wide a variation in the character and conduct of individuals. So we may agree with Professor Ward in declaring religion to be " the force of social gravitation which holds the social world in its orbit." When religious beliefs decay, the social order associated with them most frequently decays also. Hence the belief that society in the future may be able to do without religion is as unwarranted as the belief that society may be able to do without government. Instead of religion becoming less necessary as society advances, it becomes more necessary for the simple reason that there is more necessity for social control in complex societies. The church, instead of being an outworn institution in human society, therefore has before it a field of social usefulness in the present larger than in any past stage of social development. One of the greatest practical needs of modern

society, from the standpoint of social order, is a religion adapted to the requirements of modern life.

Now, as has just been implied, religion secures its social effects chiefly by giving sanction to ethical standards and ideals. It ought not to be necessary, therefore, to argue the need of ethical standards and ideals as a means of social control in modern society. The moral, as we have seen, is nothing but the social raised to an ideal plane. Proper moral ideals in individuals and proper moral practices, or virtues, of themselves, would ultimately guarantee the harmonization of relationships between individuals, for the virtues are what mainly bind men together in harmonious relationships. As we have already seen, higher types of morality are needed as societies become more complex. The simple virtues that suffice for a rural population, living under simple conditions, are found to be no longer adequate for complex, urban populations. A stable and harmonious social order cannot exist in complex groups without high character in individuals. Now, this character depends largely upon the conscious moral ideals which the individual accepts. Hence, the great importance of moral ideals in society.

Of all the methods of social control, however, the education of the individual is the most effective. Human character is formed mainly in the plastic periods of childhood and adolescence. Now, education furnishes the ultimate and most subtle form of social control because it controls, as we have seen, the formation of habit and character in individuals. Moreover, education has this advantage over all other forms of social control, that it is best adapted to secure a *progressive* social order. Government, law, religion, and

even moral ideals tend to become static, but education can as easily adapt itself to the higher social order which should be as to any social order which exists. An education which adapts the young to the social life before they participate in it, is therefore the wisest means of social control which human societies can devise.

It is evident that all these different regulative institutions must be developed to the highest possible efficiency in order to secure the type of social order which modern societies demand. One other factor, however, deeper even than these, must be emphasized, and that is the factor of like-mindedness in individuals which Professor Giddings has made so much of in his sociological theories. Without such like-mindedness as is furnished by likeness of instinct, habits, feelings, desires, and interests in the population, social order would be impossible. But beyond this, social order demands a fundamental likeness in the beliefs, opinions, and ideals of individuals. Here comes in the whole problem of social assimilation. Now, present society is radically divided as to its ideals of life. Long ago Comte pointed out that no stability in our institutions could be assured as long as there was disagreement regarding the fundamental maxims of our social life. One of the greatest tasks of the social sciences, therefore, must be to bring men to more unanimity, more genuine unity, in their opinions regarding the meaning and ideals of life.

The Theory of Social Progress. — We have already discussed the nature and causes of progress in the chapter on " Education and Social Progress." It is only necessary here to add a few words as to the relative importance of cer-

tain factors in progress, a topic which we have more or less considered throughout this book. Accepting the general idea that we may regard those changes as progressive in society which secure a more harmonious adjustment of individuals to one another and a better adaptation of social groups to the requirements of their existence, then we have the further question, what factors determine that changes shall be progressive rather than retrogressive in their nature, and how may these factors be controlled? This, as we have seen, is the great practical problem to which sociology leads up, and it has received many different answers from the social thinkers of the past.

On the one hand we have thinkers who find the active factors in social progress exterior to the individual, and even some who find them to be entirely outside of society. According to the geographical determinists, the determining factors in human progress have been certain conditions of climate, food, and soil. This geographical theory received perhaps its fullest expression in the writings of Henry Thomas Buckle, who endeavored to show that the geographical conditions in Europe alone were such as to favor the development and persistence of a high type of civilization. Later theorists of the same general school have held that the pressure of population upon food supply is what gives rise to invention, discovery, control over nature, and all the other phenomena of civilization. But progressive evolution, we need only remark, does not always take place in society when physical conditions are favorable, nor have the most favorable physical conditions prevented in the past social retrogression. We must rather regard geographical conditions, not as determining factors in progress, so

much as opportunities or stimuli to social progress in certain directions.

Another set of thinkers have held that race, or biological conditions, are the determining factor in the progress of society. According to this theory, all the sources of social progress are given in the biological make-up of the individual. If individuals receive the right equipment by heredity, are of the right blood or breed, social progress will take care of itself. The more extreme eugenists sometimes make statements which resemble these; but as we have already seen, the control of physical heredity can solve only a small part of our social problems. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that race, any more than geographical conditions, is a very important active factor in progressive changes in human society. Race is important, not as an active factor in progress, but as a condition of progress. The potentialities of progress must, of course, be in the stock before they can be developed; but in human society so much comes, not by the way of physical heredity, but by the way of acquired habit and intelligent adaptation, that we must beware of laying too much stress upon the importance of the biological element. For example, our ancestors, three thousand years ago, were probably of better stock, physically, than we civilized men of to-day, yet they were also probably barbarians or savages. Social progress evidently comes more through the acquirements of individuals, passed on by social tradition, than from purely biological elements. The biological element at most furnishes merely the potentialities for social progress.

We have already discussed economic determinism, or the economic theory of social progress, in criticizing Marxian

socialism; also throughout the book we have emphasized the importance of economic factors as conditions and stimuli to progress. Of all the factors outside of the individual, economic factors are without doubt the most important, in modern social life, in furthering progressive or retrogressive changes. Nevertheless, from a scientific point of view, economic conditions must be regarded like geographical and biological conditions as simply furnishing a basis for social progress, rather than as the active element in progress. In other words, even the most perfect economic conditions would be but a preliminary step to make room for the higher mental and moral adjustments which constitute true social progress.

Philosophers and religious and moral teachers have for ages emphasized that the active agency in human progress is man's intellect, and that the character of human social life depends largely upon ideas and ideals. Much ridicule has been poured upon this so-called ideological theory of progress by the advocates of materialistic theories, such as geographical and economic determinism. But, if the intellect is the supreme device to control individual and social adjustment, the ideological theory still deserves serious consideration even from the most rigorous scientific standpoint. Many of the advocates of this ideological theory have, however, laid it open to serious criticism by making thought, ideas, and ideals not so much instruments of social progress, as the social reality itself. Such ideological theorists have lost sight of the concrete life of societies, nations, and civilizations, and their theories deserve to be called one-sided. We can cordially recognize the importance of intellectual elements, ideas, and ideals in our

social life without indorsing such a purely intellectualistic view of human society. The social life of animal groups is modified but little, if at all, by intellectual elements, but almost wholly by the influence of the physical environment; for this reason animal societies do not progress at all, or very slowly. This fact alone shows that the capacity for progress in human society rests upon man's higher intellectual development, that is, upon ideas and ideals. However, it is the interaction of man's intellect with the physical and economic environment which produces progress, and not the abstract evolution of ideas.

We have repeatedly insisted that the ultimate reliance in social reconstruction must be the education of the young, and Professor Ward, in his *Dynamic Sociology*, has demonstrated once for all that education is the initial or proximate means of progress in human society. Yet education, if it is not of the right sort, can block all social progress, as we have already seen. Education itself must be controlled by certain ideas and ideals as to the meaning or purpose of our social life. Moreover, education is not so much a factor in progress as a method of progress. What, then, is the sociological theory of progress? The sociological theory of progress must be synthetic. Sociology finds some truth in all the one-sided theories of progress, but it regards them when taken singly as partial and inadequate. This is not saying that all factors in social evolution, and in social progress, are of equal importance. Perhaps we may agree with Professor Dealey that race, economic organization, and education are the three vital things in social progress, given favorable natural resources; but it is certain that two of these, economic organiza-

tion and education, must be guided and controlled by ideas and ideals, and could not become effective without the aid of government, law, and religion; all of which is again equivalent to saying that any scientific theory of social progress must be synthetic. Social policy, in other words, must be broadened so as to give proper attention to all factors in the social life, and social reform movements must be not one-sided, but broad enough to give due recognition to each factor of importance, if any sort of satisfactory social adjustment is to be reached.

The Nature of Society. — Three great historical theories of the nature of society have been more or less held by the social thinkers of the past, and are, to some extent, still held by thinkers of the present. These theories are the contract, the organic, and the psychological theories of society. Let us, finally, briefly consider these three theories of the nature of society.

The contract theory of society is the view that the unity of the social life is wholly a matter of agreement or understanding between individuals. According to this theory social organization is primarily an intellectual construction, depending upon expressed or implied agreement, explicit or implicit contract, between individuals. This theory would make the unity of the family life, for example, to consist essentially in contract. Marriage and the family would be simply relations which rest upon the agreement of individuals; so, also, all the other institutions of society. The manifest weakness of this theory as a theory of social origins has led many of its recent advocates to modify it to this extent: They say that while society and its institutions may not have originated in contract, they should

nevertheless now rest upon the basis of contract or agreement. Marriage and the family, for example, may not have originated in contract, but in the future these institutions should be based wholly upon contract or the mutual agreement of individuals. We have already pointed out the inadequacy of this view by showing the large part which biological elements and psychological elements other than the intellectual play in our social life. As we have seen, the foundations of society and of practically all institutions are far deeper than intellectual agreement. This has been true, not only of the social past, but it will also hold in the social future. Society is not, and in its nature cannot be, merely an intellectual construction, for it is a phase of the life-process, and in the life-process biological factors and forces are fundamental.

The organic theory of society is largely a reaction from the contract theory. It is the theory that society instead of being merely a product of intellectual agreement is wholly a product of the operation of the blind forces of organic nature; that it is a growth which has come about through the operation of biological laws. The unity of society is, therefore, according to the organic theory, in no wise different from the unity which we find in the biological organism. Society, according to this view, is essentially an organic structure, subject to the general laws of organic growth and decay.

This pure biological theory of society, likening it to a biological organism, has rarely been held exactly in the way just stated. Most of the writers that have adhered to the organic theory have modified it in some way. Nevertheless, even such a writer as Herbert Spencer, who argues at length that society is an organism or a superorganism,

represents society as a sort of superhuman organic structure, which we might presume to describe but hardly to control. The organic theory is still further modified by other writers till it becomes little more than a means of emphasizing the unity and interdependence of the social life. When this is all that is meant by the organic theory, there is little to criticize in it, except that it often suggests misleading analogies; for the resemblances between society and a biological organism, which the organic theory assumes, are very far from being established. The organic theory, however, in the history of sociological thought served to emphasize that human social life is a phase of organic life in general; that in it biological processes and forces are fundamental; that the unity of society is an expression of the original and continuing unity of the life-process; and to this extent it performed an indispensable service.

However, the leading sociologists of the present accept the psychological theory of society, as it is called; that is, that the unity of the social life is a matter neither of mere intellectual agreement nor of the operation of blind forces of organic nature, but of the interaction and interdependence in function of individual minds in all their phases. As we have already said, a society is a group of individuals carrying on a collective life by means of mental interaction. Social unity is constituted by this process of reciprocal mental adaptation, not on the intellectual side alone, but equally on the sides of instinct, habit, and feeling. The social life is, then, a psychical process, not, to be sure, in the sense that it is purely subjective, but in the sense that its significant and controlling elements are mental. The psychological theory of society leaves, therefore, ample

room for all other factors which must be considered, and may be held, when fully developed, to represent the synthetic or final stage in the development of psychological theory.

The social life is, then, a process. It is a process of living together. In this process of living together, social groups must necessarily act as units, and so become functional unities. The psychical elements of impulse, feeling, and thought — and their expressions in communication, imitation, suggestion, and other types of mental interaction — are the necessary means by which this process of living together is carried out; so they are the vital, constituent elements of society. If societies may be styled organisms in any sense, they are, therefore, preëminently psychical or moral organisms. They must be understood, if understood at all, not in terms of mechanical causation, but in terms of life needs and life purposes.

We said above that education itself, if it is to be progressive, must be controlled by certain ideas and ideals as to the meaning or purpose of our social life. What, then, is its meaning? Not wholly within the individual life, for that is temporary; not in any minor group, for that is but a fragment of social life, a part of a larger whole. The meaning of our social life must rather be sought in the development of humanity as a whole. All the great and lasting movements of human history and of our own time have just this meaning — that they are strivings for the development of a humanity all of whose elements shall be harmoniously adjusted to one another, and to the requirements of existence. Accordingly, not the development of self or the dominance of any class or group, but the development of humanity, should become the real end of social endeavor.

This end is alone truly synthetic and constructive, because it includes the development of the individual in accordance with the requirements of a progressive social life and the development of all classes, nations, and races who go to make up the whole of humanity. For the individual, the ideal of life becomes, according to this view, a life of service in which he shares in and strives to realize a higher life for all humanity.

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INDEX

Abbott, Grace, 242.
Abnormal classes, 24, 297–301.
Accidents, industrial, 200, 306.
Acquired traits, 37, 40–42, 64–66, 74, 315, 353–354.
Active factors in association, 73, 416.
Adaptation, biological, 33, 36, 58.
Adaptation, social, 55, 61, 72, 74, 389–390, 407.
Adler, Felix, 91, 179.
Agriculture, 139, 279–281, 289–290.
Altruism, 45–47, 67, 84, 126, 178.
Americanization, 235–239, 265.
Ancestor worship, 117, 132–136, 139.
Andaman islanders, 103.
Anderson, H. W., 296, 365.
Andrews, B. R., 91.
Angell, J. R., 59.
Animal family life, 96, 97, 98–100.
Animal societies, 10, 36, 47, 404.
Apes, family life of, 100, 120.
Archer, W., 271.
Aristotle, 97.
Aronovici, C., 92.
Aschaffenburg, P. F., 367.
Association, 11, 12, 13, 36, 37, 47, 73, 96, 403.
  forms of, 11, 12, 76–79, 110, 128.
Atavism, 354.
Australian aborigines, 103.

Bachofen, J. J., 101, 110, 111, 112.
Bagehot, W., 213.
Bagley, W. C., 402.
Baldwin, R. N., 368.
Barnes, H. E., 367.
Beliefs, 73, 79, 82.
Benedict, B., 385.
Bernstein, E., 385.
Betts, G. H., 402.
Biological conditions of social life, 16, 17, 34, 38–56, 58, 73, 93, 186–210, 375, 403–406, 416.
Biological point of view in sociology, 47, 55.
Biology, 16, 29, 58, 244, 416.
Birth rate, decrease of, 183–190, 199.
  causes of decrease in, 191–197.
  in cities, 287–288.
Blackmar, F. W., 28, 180, 423.
Bogardus, E. S., 28, 75, 91, 242, 423.
Boies, H. M., 367.
Bolshevism, 25, 370, 379, 382.
Booth, Charles, 299.
Bossard, J. H. S., 331.
Bratt System, 365–366.
Brawley, B., 271.
Briffault, R., 103, 109, 130.
Brissenden, P. F., 385.
Brooks, J. G., 385.
Buckle, H. T., 244, 415.
Burgess, E. W., 75, 296, 402, 423.
Burt, C. L., 367.
Bushee, F. A., 28, 91, 180, 210, 242, 423.

Calhoun, A. W., 180.
Capital, 370.
Carpenter, M., 296.
Carr-Saunders, A. M., 210.
Case, C. M., 28, 423.
Chapin, F. S., 56.
Character, individual, 13, 43, 65, 72.
Charitable institutions, 322–325.
Charity, 309, 319–325.
Charity Organization Societies, 319–322.
Child, influence of the, 82, 96, 97, 152, 177.
Child labor, 89, 178.
Child welfare, 82–90, 168, 177, 179, 203.
Childlessness, 82, 152, 196.
Chinese immigration, 239–242.
Christianity, influence on family, 142–144.
  evolution of, 80, 379.
Cities, growth of, 139, 160, 273–279, 296.
  causes of growth in, 280–286.
  minor causes of, 284–286.
Citizenship, education for, 25–27, 239, 394–402.

City, the problem of the, 273–296.
City life, social conditions of, 286–291, 298, 344–345.
the reconstruction of, 291–296.
Civilization, 11, 13, 37, 65, 69, 79, 85, 108, 124, 125.
modern, 145–148.
Classes, social, evolution of, 49, 300.
Cleveland, F. A., 180.
Climate and season, influence of, 71, 73, 118, 200, 304, 341.
Clow, F. R., 402.
Coadaptation, social, 37, 74, 407.
Colbert, Gillin, Dittmer, and, 28.
Commerce, 283–284.
Committee of Fifty, 310, 349, 368.
Commons, J. R., 215, 228, 242.
Communication, 72, 75.
Communities, 12, 76.
Competition, 44, 45, 48, 51–54.
Comte, Auguste, 15, 414.
Conflict, 43–45, 48–52, 377.
Congestion of population in cities, 294.
Conklin, E. G., 56.
Conn, H. W., 56.
Consciousness, social rôle of, 10, 57, 59, 61, 71, 407, 422.
Contract theory of society, 30, 138, 145.
Control, social, 376, 383–385, 391.
Cooley, C. H., 75, 79, 91, 367, 397, 423.
Coolidge, Mrs. Mary Roberts, 243.
Coöperation, 37, 45–47, 52, 84, 206, 207.
Counts, G. S., 402.
Crampton, H. E., 56.
Crawley, A. E., 109.
Crime, 332–367.
among foreign born, 224–225, 345.
among negroes, 256–257.
definition of, 332–333.
extent of, in United States, 335–341.
statistics of, 335–341.
increase of, 339–341.
cost of, in United States, 338–339.
causes of, 341–355.
influence of physical degeneracy on, 351–353.
influence of heredity on, 353–354.
Lombroso's theory of, 354–355.
prevention of, 362–367.
remedies for, 355–361.
Criminals, classification of, 333–335.
Criminology, 332.
Cross, Ira B., 385.
Cultural evolution, 37, 65, 69, 80, 85.
Cultural groups, 11, 51, 102.
Culture, defined, 13, 37, 69.
Curriculum in education, 395, 400.
Custom, 65, 79, 94, 101, 213.

Darwin, 29, 31, 33, 56, 97, 207, 372.
Darwin's theory of descent, 29–34.
Davidson, Thomas, 393.
Dawson, C. A., 91, 92.
Dealey, J. Q., 28, 91, 130, 180, 418.
Death rate, decrease of, 185, 186–188.
causes influencing, 198–203.
of negroes in United States, 258–259.
in cities, 288–289.
De Coulanges, Fustel, 133, 144.
Defects, individual, 301, 306, 308, 313, 314–316, 317, 318, 319, 323, 343, 348.
Degeneracy, in cities, 288–289.
and pauperism, 314–317.
and crime, 351–353.
Delinquent children, 336, 361.
Democracy, 26, 80, 158, 165, 231, 379, 396.
education for, 26, 401.
Dependence. *See* Poverty.
Dependent children, 323–324.
Depressed classes, genesis of, 300–303.
Depressions, industrial, 306–308.
Desertion, family, 147, 312.
Devine, E. T., 331, 383, 384.
De Vries, Hugo, 34.
Dewey, J., 75, 402.
Dexter, R. C., 331.
Discussion, public, 179.
Disease, 194, 205.
Dittmer, Gillin and, 28.
Divorce, 135, 138, 140, 143, 147–174.
statistics of, 148–151.
distribution of, in United States, 152, 153.
grounds for granting, 154–157.
causes of increase in, 157–166.
remedies for, 169–175.
Domestic arts, 85–87, 175.
Dow, G. S., 28, 91, 242, 367.
Dowd, Jerome, 272.
Du Bois, W. E. B., 254, 272.
Dugdale, R., 311, 314, 352.

East, E. M., 210.
Economic conditions, 19, 39, 45, 48, 50, 82, 84–90, 104, 117, 119, 120, 122, 129, 139, 141, 146, 160, 168, 177, 185, 188, 191, 193, 199, 203, 205–210, 215, 221, 237, 260–261, 281–284, 304–308, 343, 369–385, 417.

Economic determinism, 129, 141, 142, 209, 371–372, 417.
Economic planning, 328–330.
Economics, 18, 19, 86.
Edman, I., 75.
Education, and social progress, 23, 386–402, 418.
as a means of social reconstruction, 26, 174, 176, 238, 268–271, 356, 383, 386–402, 413, 418–419,
of women, 89, 160, 175, 195.
of the negro, 261, 262, 266–271.
relations of sociology to science of, 23.
social function of, 390–392.
as a factor in social evolution, 392–393, 401.
socialized, 383, 394–401.
vocational, 399–400.
Educational conditions of cities, 289–291.
Educational system, defects in, 158, 308, 345–346, 394.
Efficiency, social, 25, 46, 52, 397.
Eighteenth Amendment. *See* Prohibition law.
Elberfeldt System, 320.
Elimination of unfit, 34, 43, 50, 53, 300–303, 316–318, 347–348, 386.
Eliot, T. D., 92.
Ellwood, C. A., 28, 56, 75, 91, 109, 130, 179, 180, 210, 242, 271, 296, 331, 385, 402, 423.
Elmer, M. C., 92.
Ely, R. T., 385.
Embree, E. R., 272.
Emotions, 67, 71, 74.
Engels, 371.
England, birth rate of, 187, 188.
crime in, 337, 341.
Epileptic, the chronic, 316, 317.
Ethics, 21, 22, 166, 177, 398.
Eugenics, 209, 232.
Evolution, definition of, 14.
current meanings of, 29, 34.
bearing of, upon social problems, 29–56.
Spencer's theory of, 34.
phases of universal, 35–37.
cosmic, 35.
organic, 36–46.
factors in, 37–46.
mental, 36.
cultural, 37, 65, 69.
Evolution, social, 15, 25, 36, 37, 45, 47, 55, 57, 65, 70, 72, 407–410.
factors in, 38, 46, 71, 73, 74.
survey of, 47–55, 407–410.
bearing of, upon poverty and dependence, 300–303.

Fairchild, H. P., 242.
Family, the, 12, 46, 76–179.
functions of, in social organization, 76–85, 91.
the primary social institution, 77, 80, 85.
the normal family, 90, 176–178.
function in conserving the social order, 82, 83.
as a school for socializing the individual, 83.
function of, in social progress, 84, 85.
and industry, 85–90, 129, 160.
origin of, 93–109.
biological foundations of, 93–97.
origin of, in human species, 97–103.
the earliest form of, in human species, 106.
the forms of, 110–130.
historical development of, 131–144.
influence of Christianity upon, 142–144.
instability of modern, 147–179.
reconstruction of, 166–179.
decrease in size of, 189–197.
Family life, 76–179.
differences between that of man and of the brutes, 98–100.
of the lower human races, 100–107.
Roman, 131–140.
decay of modern, 147–151, 155–166.
as affecting crime, 167, 342.
Fay, E. A., 315.
Feeble-minded, the, 316, 317, 322, 333.
Feeling, 66–68.
Feldman, H., 368.
Feminism, 158.
Ferrero, G. L., 367.
Ferri, E., 368.
Findlay, J. J., 91.
Finney, R. L., 56, 92, 402.
Fisher, I., 368.
Fiske, John, 56.
Flexner, B., 368.
Food process, 47, 108, 403.
Force, limits of, 379–380.
Ford, J., 331, 368.
Forms of association, 76–79.
Fosdick, R. B., 368.
France, birth rate, 188, 199.

Frazer, J. G., 109.
Freedom and social evolution, 55.
Freedom of speech, 179, 401.
Free love, 107, 108.
Friedman, E. M., 180.
Functional psychology, 57.

Galpin, C. J., 296.
Garis, R. L., 242.
Geddes, P., 56, 109, 296.
Geographic influences, 71, 74, 118, 246, 283, 304, 341.
George, Henry, 300.
Gettis, Dawson and, 91.
Giddings, F. H., 414.
Gillette, J. M., 28, 92, 130, 296, 402.
Gillin, J. L., 28, 180, 331, 367, 423.
Gilman, Mrs. C. P., 159.
Gilman, N. P., 385.
Glueck, 368.
Goddard, H. H., 331, 352.
Good, A., 402.
Goodsell, Miss W., 109, 130, 144, 180.
Government, 12, 17, 20, 49, 69, 74, 82, 411.
  defects in, 308, 345.
  nature of, 380, 411.
Greek family, 131, 140.
Groups, primary, 76–80.
Groups, social, 10–12, 14, 36, 45, 48, 50, 73, 76–80, 404.
Groves, E. R., 75, 92, 180, 402.
Gulick, S. L., 243.
Gummere, F. B., 144.
Guyot, I., 385.

Habits, acquired, 37, 64–66, 79, 142, 165, 174, 387, 391, 411.
  social, 65, 114, 165, 407.
Hall, Prescott F., 242.
Harper, Warner, Queen, and, 331.
Hart, A. B., 75, 180, 272, 402.
Hayes, E. C., 28, 423.
Haynes, F. E., 367.
Healy, W., 338, 339, 368.
Hearn, W. E., 144.
Heath, White and, 402.
Hebrews, 121, 131, 135, 144.
Hegel, G. W. F., 142.
Heineman, T. W., 109.
Henderson, C. R., 331.
Heredity, 39–42, 81, 314–316, 333, 353–355, 386, 407, 416.
  racial, 230–232, 241, 244–246, 416.
    of the negro, 246–248.
  and pauperism, 314–316.
  and crime, 353–354.
History and sociology, 17.
Hobhouse, L. T., 423.
Hocking, W. E., 75.
Hoffman, F. L., 258, 272.
Homicide in United States, 337–338.
Hoover, C. B., 385.
Hourwich, I. A., 242.
House, F. N., 423.
Howard, G. E., 109, 130, 144, 180.
Human nature, 58, 59, 62, 69, 73, 107, 313.
Hunter, Robert, 331.
Huxley, T. H., 46.

Ideals, sources of, 70, 79, 80, 85, 90.
  importance of, 85, 174, 398.
Illiteracy, of immigrants, 223–224, 233–234.
  of negroes, 261.
  and crime, 345–346.
Imitation, 63, 73, 140, 142, 214, 346, 409.
Immigration, problem of, 211–242.
  history of, into United States, 214–217.
  changed character of, 217, 218.
  distribution of, 218–221.
  social effects of, 222–227, 235–239.
  into other countries, 226–227.
  restrictions on, 228–235.
  measures for Americanization, 235–239.
  Asiatic, 239–242.
Imprisonment, substitutes for, 360–361.
Impulses, native, 61–64, 74.
Indians, North American, 102, 103, 110–113, 116.
Individual, the, 13, 23, 42, 48, 78, 146, 207, 306, 313, 317.
  and society, 13, 73, 213, 386.
Individualism, 48, 145, 148, 158, 338, 401.
Industrial conditions, among the Negroes, 260.
  and poverty, 304–308.
  and crime, 343.
Industrialism, 146, 148, 160, 277.
Industry, 13, 18, 44, 51, 85, 108, 140, 146.
  and the family, 85–90, 129, 146, 160.
  pastoral, 116.
  centralization of, 282–283.
  See also Economic conditions.
Infant mortality, 202.
Insane, the, 317, 322–323, 351–353.
Instincts, human, 61–64, 97, 107, 245.

Institution, definition of, 65, 77.
Institutions, bases of human, 63, 65, 72, 84, 107, 165.
Insurance, social, 325–328, 384.
Intellect, 68–71, 406.
Intelligence, 36, 61, 68, 70, 397.
Intemperance, and poverty, 309–311.
and crime, 349–351.
Interaction, mental, 10, 36, 57, 72, 404, 408, 422.
Intercommunication, 37, 72, 75, 408, 422.
International Workers of the World, 382.
Invention, 20, 69, 73.

James, W., 75.
Japanese immigration, 239–242.
Jenks, J. W., 242.
Jennings, H. S., 56.
Johnson, A., 272.
Johnston, Sir H., 272.
Jukes family, 311, 314, 353.
Juvenile court, 177, 361.

Kallikak family, 352, 353.
Kelley, Mrs. Florence, 92.
Kellogg, V. L., 56.
Kelsey, Carl, 56, 210.
Kelso, R. W., 331.
Key, Miss Ellen, 159.
King, Irving, 402.
Kinneman, 402.
Kirkup, T., 385.
Kroeber, A. L., 56.

Labor, 86–90.
of children, 89, 178, 305.
of women, 88, 160.
Lacassagne, 348.
Language, 51, 69, 79, 82, 406.
Lauck, W. J., 242.
Law, relations to sociology, 21.
nature of, 21, 411
criminal, 335, 345.
Laws, social, 13, 209, 210.
Leadership, social, 166, 179, 397, 408.
Lecky, W. E. H., 144.
Letourneau, C., 109.
Lewis, B. G., 368.
Lichtenberger, J. P., 180, 423.
Lindeman, Anderson and, 296.
Liquor Problem, 362–363.
Literacy test, 233–234.
Locke, A. L., 272.
Lombroso, 352, 354–355, 368.
Love, sexual and parental, 63, 84, 97, 405.
Lowie, R. H., 109.
Lubbock, J., 102, 109.
Lumley, F. E., 28.
Lynd, R. S., 92.

McCurdy, J. F., 144.
McDonald, J. R., 385.
McDougall, W., 56, 75.
McLennan, J. R., 101, 109.
MacIver, R. M., 28, 296, 423.
MacLean, Miss A. M., 92.
Maladjustment, social, 14, 24, 302, 333, 393.
Malthus, T. R., 39, 204, 300.
Malthus, theory of population, 205–208.
Man, fossil remains of, 33.
social instincts of, 37, 46, 63.
Mangold, G. B., 210, 331.
Mann, Queen and, 331.
Marett, R. R., 56.
Margold, C. W., 109.
Marriage, 102, 103, 118–129, 134, 138, 143, 149, 169, 173, 175, 201, 316.
ceremony, 99, 134.
forms of, 118–129.
higher age of, 162.
Marx, Karl, 141, 142, 300, 370, 372, 373, 374.
Marxian socialism, theoretical basis of, 370–381.
criticism of, 373–381.
Mass as a social factor, 181–184.
Materialistic conception of history, 371.
Maternal family, 110–115.
Matriarchy, 101, 110–113.
Maximalist party, 370.
Mayo-Smith, R., 201, 242.
Mecklin, J. M., 272.
Mendelian inheritance, 40, 41, 317.
Merriam, G. S., 272.
Meyer, M. F., 75.
Migration, causes of, 211, 212.
as factor in social evolution, 212–214.
Miller, K., 242, 272.
Millis, H. A., 243.
Mind, function of, 58–61.
social character of, 71–72.
Mohammedan peoples, 121.
Monogamy, 97, 100, 102, 103, 106, 118, 125–128, 147.
Morality, 12, 22, 50, 54, 69, 70, 79, 82, 398, 413.
Morel, 351.
Mores, the, 65, 174, 177, 179, 296.
Morgan, A., 402.
Morgan, L. H., 101, 109, 110, 113.

Mormons of Utah, 121, 124.
Morrison, W. D., 368.
Motion pictures and crime, 346.
Mowrer, E. R., 180.
Multiplication, 38.
Municipal socialism, 292–294.
Murphy, E. G., 272.
Mutation, 34, 43.
Myers, 423.

National origins system, 235.
Native impulses, 61–64.
Nature of society, 10, 30, 406, 419.
Nature peoples, 103, 264.
Negritos, of Philippine Islands, 103.
Negro, racial heredity, 246–248.
  educational progress, 261–262.
  influence of slavery on, 248.
  statistics of, in United States, 249–253, 258–260.
  increase of, 250–253.
  social condition of, 253–260.
  industrial condition of, 260–261.
  political condition of, 262–263.
  proposed solutions of problem, 263–271.
Neo-Malthusianism, 209.
Newman, Dr. G., 203.
Newman, H. H., 56.
Newsholme, A., 210.
Non-Marxian socialism, 381–382.
Normal social life, 14, 24, 91, 177, 383.
North, C. C., 331.

Odum, H. W., 28, 180, 272, 331.
Ogburn, Groves and, 180.
Oldham, J. H., 272.
Order, social, 83, 410–414.
Organic theory of society, 420.
Organization, social, 14, 49, 63, 65, 78, 107, 386, 394, 404, 410.
Origin of the family, 93–108.
  of government, 49.
  of races, 248.
  of society, 47, 403–406.
Osborn, H. F., 56.
Outdoor relief, 319.

Page, T. N., 272.
Palmer, V. M., 92.
Parental care, 95–97, 126.
Parental instinct, 97–107.
Park, R. E., 28, 75, 242, 296, 402, 423.
Parmelee, Maurice, 331, 367.
Parsons, Mrs. E. C., 109.
Parsons, P. A., 28, 368.
Pastoral industry, 116–117.
Paternal family, 115–118.
Patriarchal family, 115–117, 132–135, 137, 143.
Pauperism, definition of, 297.
  and degeneracy, 314.
  remedies for, 316–331.
Penology, 332, 355.
Peters, C. C., 402.
Philanthropy, scientific, 24, 316, 317, 318, 355.
Philosophy of history, 18.
Philosophy of socialism, 371.
Political science, 20.
Polyandry, 118–120.
Polygamy, 120.
Polygyny, 120–125, 135.
Popenoe and Johnson, 272.
Population, growth of, 181–210.
  distribution of, 276–279.
Post, L. F., 102.
Poverty, definition of, 297.
  among foreign born, 225–226.
  and pauperism, 297–298.
  extent of, in United States, 298–300.
  causes of, 303–318.
  remedies for, 316–331.
Press, as an educational agency, 179, 234, 346.
  influence of, on crime, 346.
Preventive agencies, 330–331.
Primary groups, 12, 77–80, 91.
Prison statistics, 335–338.
Prison system, 358–360.
Probation, 360–361.
Progress, social, 44, 84, 376, 387–402, 414–419.
Prohibition law, 350–351, 362–367.
Promiscuity, theory of primitive, 97, 101–106.
  objections to theory, of, 104–106.
Property, private, 77, 82.
Psychology, relation of sociology to, 16.
  bearing upon social problems, 57–74.
  theory of human society, 373.
Public charity, 319–325.
Public discussion, 179, 379, 380, 408.
Public opinion, 174, 179, 234, 379, 380, 408.
Punishment, 358.

Queen, S. A., 331.
Quetelet, 343.

Race as a factor in social evolution, 244–246.
Races, intermixture of, 253–256.

Racketeering, 338, 344, 351.
Rapid transit, 294.
Rationality, 69–71.
Reconstruction, social, 25, 26, 64, 71, 91, 107, 166, 175, 178, 209, 232–235, 263–271, 291–296, 380, 383–385, 394–402.
of the family, 166–179.
of population policy, 209.
of immigration policy, 232–235.
of negro policy, 263–271.
of our city life, 291–296.
of education, 394–402.
Red Cross Society, 321–322.
Reformation of criminals, 359–361, 387.
Registration area, 288.
Religion, 117, 123, 127, 139, 141, 157, 290, 384.
Religious conditions of cities, 290.
Reproduction, 38, 81, 96, 108, 181, 375.
Restriction of immigration, 228–235.
Reuter, E. B., 242, 254, 271.
Revolution as means of social reconstruction, 370, 378–380, 383–385.
Richmond, Miss Mary E., 331.
Robbins, C. L., 402.
Roberts, P., 242.
Roman family, 131–144.
Romans, 103.
Ross, E. A., 28, 75, 242, 423.
Rowe, H. K., 92.
Rowntree, B. S., 299, 368.
Rural problems, 279–280.
Russia, 149, 328, 370, 379.

Saleeby, C. W., 92.
Sanderson, D., 296.
Schaeffer, H., 144.
Schafer, Cleveland and, 180.
Schmidt, 144.
Schmiedeler, 144, 180.
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 125.
Science, purpose of, 27, 384.
Scudder, Miss V., 385.
Segregation of unfit, 316, 317.
Selection, artificial, 33, 53, 232–235, 386–387.
natural, 33, 36, 53, 55, 259, 302, 393.
Sex, 93–95, 201, 348–349.
Sexes, differences between, 94, 95, 348.
numerical equality of, 95, 121, 125, 130, 222, 286–287.
Shaw, 368.
Sherwell, Rowntree and, 368.
Sims, N. L., 296.
Slavery, 49, 115, 120, 122.
Small, A. W., 28, 423.
Smith, W. B., 272.
Smith, W. R., 92, 402.
Snedden, D. S., 92, 402.
Social, meaning of term, 12.
Social causes, 115, 129, 140, 142, 197, 313, 347, 373.
Social change, 14, 110, 140–142, 146, 407–410.
Social development, process of, 407–410.
Social dynamics, 16.
Social evolution. *See* Evolution.
Social instincts, 37, 46, 63.
Social insurance, 325–328.
Social life, 10, 12, 13, 37, 63, 77, 78, 79, 81, 92, 403–409.
Social order, theory of, 410–414.
Social organization, 14, 49, 63, 65, 78, 107, 386, 394, 404, 410.
Social patterns, 80, 85, 91.
Social phenomena, defined, 12.
Social problem, defined, 91, 168, 374, 380.
Social progress, 44, 84, 379, 386–402, 414–419.
Social reconstruction, 25, 26, 64, 71, 91, 107, 166–179, 235–237, 263–271, 291–296, 383–385, 386–402.
Social research, 384.
Social retrogression, 15, 85, 138, 198, 379, 391, 415.
Social science, 17, 22, 27, 397.
Social service, 83, 84, 271, 397–401.
Social statics, 15.
Social surveys, 5, 92.
Social values, 19, 78, 82, 85, 398, 408.
Social work, 24, 383.
Socialism, relation to sociology, 24–26.
in the light of sociology, 369–385.
theoretical basis of, 371.
criticisms of, 373–381.
substitute for, 383–385.
Socialization, 79, 83, 229–230, 394–401.
of education, 394–402.
Society, definition of, 9–13.
the study of, 9–27.
products or phases of, 12–13.
origin of, 403–406.
nature of, 419–423.
Sociology, definition of, 13–14.
faulty conception, 14.
problems of, 15, 16.
statical, 15.
dynamical, 16.
relations to other sciences, 16–24.
to biology, 16.
to psychology, 16.
to history, 17.

to economics, 18, 19.
to politics, 20.
to law, 21.
to ethics, 21, 22.
to education, 23.
to philanthropy, 24.
to social reconstruction, 25–27.
to socialism, 25–26.
and social practice, 23–27.
bibliography of, 27, 28.
applied, 316.
Southard, E. E., 331.
Sorokin, P., 296, 423.
Soviet, 370.
Spargo, J., 385.
Spencer, A., 92, 109, 180.
Spencer, Herbert, 28, 34, 102, 109, 207, 420.
Spencer's theory of universal evolution, 34, 35.
Standards of living, 161, 192.
Starcke, C. N., 109.
State charitable institutions, 322–323.
Steiner, E. A., 92, 242.
Stone, A. H., 272.
Struggle for existence, 43–45, 47–48, 51, 301.
Survival, social, 37, 46, 51, 105, 107, 108, 187, 202, 389, 391.
Sutherland, E. H., 367.
Syndicalism, 382.

Taylor, C. C., 92, 296.
Thomas, W. I., 109.
Thompson, W. S., 210, 271, 296.
Thomson, J. A., 56.
Thorndike, E. L., 75.
Thrasher, F. M., 368.
Tibet, 118, 119.
Todd, A. J., 402, 423.
Towne, E. T., 92.
Trade, 283–284.
Tradition, social, 66, 79, 82, 213.
Travis, T., 368.
Trotter, W., 75.
Turkey, 121.

Unemployment, 306–308, 325–330, 343.
Uniform divorce and marriage law, 169.
Urban population, distribution of, 277–279.

Variation, 33, 42, 110, 301, 333, 347, 354.
Veddahs, 103.
Vice, 138, 140, 141, 155, 194, 254–257, 309, 314, 354.
Vital statistics, 185–186, 189, 190.
of negro, 258.
Vocational education, 399–400.

Wages, 87, 177, 192, 228, 300, 384.
Wallace, A. R., 33.
Wallas, Graham, 75, 423.
Walter, H. E., 56.
War, 48–51, 115, 199.
War, the World, 25, 183, 188, 199, 229, 233, 370, 384.
War Industries Board, 329.
Ward, Lester F., 28, 388, 397, 402, 412, 418.
Warne, F. J., 242, 243.
Warner, A., 331.
Washington, Booker T., 254, 261, 265, 272.
Weatherford, W. D., 272.
Weber, A. F., 296.
Weismann, 40, 315.
Wells, H. G., 385.
Westermarck, E. A., 100, 103, 105, 109, 130.
White and Heath, 402.
Wickersham Commission, 338, 343, 344, 351, 363, 364, 365, 366, 368.
Wife capture, 115, 116, 122.
Wife purchase, 116.
Wilder, H. H., 56.
Willcox, W. F., 148, 151, 180.
Williams, J. M., 75.
Wilson, W. H., 296.
Wines, F. H., 368.
Wissler, C., 56.
Wolfe, A. B., 210.
Woman, position of, 112, 115, 120, 124, 136, 138, 158, 159.
Woman's movement, 158, 159, 195.
Woodworth, R. S., 75.

Zimmerman, Sorokin and, 296.
Zuñi Indians, 112.

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